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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of Queensland teachers’ conceptions of creativity. In Australia, as 
throughout the world, governments, economists, educators and social theorists see 
creativity as critical for our economic and educational futures. However, across the 
scientific, academic and educational communities creativity has been, and continues to 
be, a contentious and poorly defined construct. The aim of this study has been to uncover 
how teachers conceptualise creativity. It was undertaken with a view to understanding 
why creativity is so contentious and improving prospects for the enhancement of 
creativity in Australian schools. 
A phenomenographic approach was used to investigate conceptions of creativity 
within a group of primary and secondary school teachers in the Brisbane region in South 
East Queensland. Data was elicited through semi-structured interviews and analysed 
according to phenomenographic procedure in order to discover the limited number of 
ways in which creativity was understood within the group of participants. 
The study has found that the teachers’ ways of defining and valuing creativity were 
tied structurally to a central dimension described, in the research outcomes, as an 
evaluation of which location for rules/values/rewards is the most reliable – external or 
internal. Greater expansiveness in views of creativity involved greater focus on the 
benefits, for individuals and society, of attending to internal rules/values/rewards rather 
than external rules/values/rewards. From an internal rule perspective unreflective control 
by external rules/values/rewards was seen as not creative and was ideologically rejected 
as less beneficial than reflective regulation by internal rules/values/rewards. Seven 
categories of creativity conceptions were identified which describe the various ways that 
the teachers defined creativity operationally, that is, as an aspect of their lived experience. 
The variation between the identified categories is reflected as different combinations of 
values on several dimensions. The outcome space for the study has been constructed to 
reflect a hierarchy of categories wherein the more expansive ways of conceptualising 
creativity can be seen to include awareness of categories lower in the hierarchy. Teachers 
who expressed more expansive views of creative value conceptualised and endorsed 
“creativity” as ownership of learning/development or autonomous and authentic being. 
Two supporting analyses suggest that greater reliance on external rewards, rules and 
values is consistent with both an external-rule (extrinsic value) focused view of creativity 
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and a teacher/transmission-focused view of teaching, whilst greater reliance on internal 
rewards, rules and values is consistent with both an internal-rule (intrinsic value) focused 
view of creativity and a student/enabling-focused view of teaching. These analyses 
suggest that conceptions of creative teaching and the enhancement of student creativity 
differ significantly when seen from externally ruled vs. internally ruled perspectives. It is 
recommended in lieu of these indications that teachers’ conceptions of creative teaching 
and enhancing student creativity could be investigated in further studies, in order to more 
firmly establish how teachers interpret the phenomena of creative teaching and enhancing 
the creativity of students. 
Also discussed are similarities between the internal rule-external rule dimension of 
variation, as identified in this study, and the autonomy-control dimension as defined in 
Self-determination Theory (SDT). The SDT research literature indicates that people 
exhibit tendencies towards taking either an intrinsic value focus or a more extrinsic value 
focus. SDT describes these tendencies in terms of an autonomy orientation vs. control 
orientation. It appears that, within SDT, autonomy and control are conceptualised in a 
similar way to the internal-external rule orientations as they emerged in the present study. 
The term “autonomy” has been utilised in the present research as a suitable referent to 
delimit a meaning of creativity emphasised in the internal-rule perspective. It is therefore 
suggested that SDT theory and research provides an additional means of apprehending 
and scrutinising the key dimension of variation as identified in the present study. 
Given the intense current emphasis on the importance of creativity for economic and 
educational futures, and the wealth of research now demonstrating benefits of behavioural 
autonomy for learning, “creativity”, health, relationships and socially responsible 
attitudes, the future implications of the study findings reach across many areas, including 
education, business, industry, creativity research and the reading of social theory around 
creativity. 
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FOREWORD: CAN WE SEE BEYOND “THE MATRIX”? 
The study described in this thesis is a phenomenographic investigation. 
Phenomenographers concern themselves with trying to identify and describe critical 
variation in how phenomena appear to people. Phenomenographers are also interested in 
how such observations might be used to help learners to shift, from less contextually 
appropriate or less comprehensive ways of seeing something, to more appropriate, or 
more comprehensive, ways of seeing that thing – for example, from a layman’s 
understanding of a concept, such as speed or heat, to a physicist’s understanding of it.  
If ever a movie represented spectacularly what it might be like to transition from one 
way of seeing something to a totally different way of seeing the same thing, surely that 
movie is The Matrix (Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999). Anyone who has seen the movie 
is likely to recall fairly vividly the moment where the movie’s computer-hacker hero, 
Neo, takes a “red pill” and spirals into a state of perception where the world as he has 
always known it is replaced by an altogether new way of seeing that world. He can now 
never see “The Matrix”, his old home, in the same way. Neo joins a group of fellow 
exiles from “The Matrix” in a space, or place, named “Zion”. From the vantage point of 
“Zion”, he and his compatriots can recall and even revisit “The Matrix”. Meanwhile, the 
residents of “The Matrix” continue on in the belief that the world as they see it is all there 
is. They are simply not aware that “Zion” exists. 
Now, in 2014, that movie is fairly dated. But it still provides a relevant metaphor for 
the potential for variation in people’s ways of perceiving the world around them. Early in 
the formulation of the present research project I was intrigued and also inspired by The 
Matrix as a film. I spent much time thinking about, what I saw as, the deeper messages of 
the movie and also read scholarly explorations of these deeper messages. Some scholars 
discuss religious themes reflected in The Matrix, others discuss the movie’s references to 
philosophical paradigms and some discuss what the movie has to say about humanity and 
its relation to its technologies. I pondered on the significance of The Matrix as a cultural 
artefact that emerged at a time of global transitioning into the present era of electronic 
communication. At the same time I was thinking about the challenges faced by educators 
as we, like Neo, open our eyes to the new “reality” of a world “ruled” by electronic 
technology. I conjectured that education, as we know it, could not fail to be shaken in the 
wake of social change around the increasing use of electronic media and reflected on how 
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the creative capacities of educators might be tested over the coming years. I suspected 
that creativity must also impinge on students’ lives, in diverse ways, in the age of 
electronic media. Thus began, in earnest, the thought processes and questions that led into 
the long process that has produced this thesis.  
I cannot say that these thought processes began with contemplation of The Matrix. In 
actuality my interest in The Matrix – that is, what I took from it as significant – can be 
linked much further back to the days of my studies in Anglo-Saxon and Old Norse at 
James Cook University in North Queensland. In those studies, especially while translating 
medieval texts into modern English, I was brought abruptly into confrontation with 
differences between my own expectations about communication and what one finds in 
early writings. I saw and learned, with the help of my tutors and lecturers that it was 
necessary to put aside many of my assumptions about communication, if I wanted to see 
more clearly into the meanings expressed and the assumptions about communication 
reflected in these fragments of writing from earlier times. It was probably inevitable that 
my interest in media technology and how it relates to the ways people think about 
knowledge, communication and education, would be present, at least in the background, 
of this thesis. My interest in media and how media technology links to culture is also 
closely linked to my interest in, and approaches to thinking about, the main topic of this 
thesis: creativity. However, the overriding concern of the thesis has come to be with the 
question of how teachers experience creativity. 
In this thesis it is argued that just as the notion of learning is undeniably central to the 
work of educators, the notion of creativity is equally important in education. It is not 
likely that one will find “creativity” listed as a subject in any schools. But, then, one is not 
likely to find “learning” listed as a school subject either. Creativity is not highlighted as 
an area of study in the new Australian curriculum. But neither is learning a subject of 
study in that curriculum. In the Australian curriculum creativity is seen as an important 
capability that interacts with learned content to serve the student and community beyond 
school (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014a). 
However, just as research has shown that there is significant variation in the ways 
teachers and students conceptualise and approach learning, the present research study 
underscores an issue that has proven to be problematic when dealing with creativity as a 
topic: Creativity is understood in a variety of ways. It has even been suggested that 
creativity may continue to evade the sort of definition that would facilitate its integration 
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into educational curricula (Kleiman, 2007; Sefton-Green, 2008). Given that there has 
been difficulty in discussing and dealing with creativity and that people see creativity in 
different ways, is it possible that some of that difficulty comes about because some 
meanings of creativity are either not shared or not valued? In the contexts of teaching and 
education in an era where information technology and creativity are seen as drivers of 
cultural change it seems important that educators understand each other when discussing 
creativity. By this I do not mean to suggest that we can all see creativity in exactly the 
same way. But where our interests in the educational value of creativity appear to differ 
markedly it seems important that we are able to describe and clarify what we mean when 
we discuss it and decide if we have similar or divergent meanings in mind. 
The principal research question addressed in the present thesis is: How do teachers 
conceptualise creativity? Due to the researcher’s location in Queensland, recent emphases 
on creativity, in this Australian state, and the fact that there appear to have been few 
investigations of creativity conceptions in Queensland, or Australia, the study has focused 
on Queensland teachers’ conceptions. The purpose has been to uncover variation in 
teachers’ ways of seeing creativity. If teachers were to see creativity differently from each 
other, whilst remaining unaware of how their conceptions of creativity differ, this would 
have import for policy making, teaching and teacher training at this time. We would have 
a situation like the one portrayed in The Matrix film where people are living in different 
perceptual worlds and unaware of other ways of seeing the phenomenon in question.  
Here, at the outset of the present study it seems apt to frame the research in terms of 
“The Matrix” metaphor, for at this time when creativity is seen as important in education, 
a major concern is surely with whether teachers are – or if it is even possible for 
educators to be – “on the same page” when it comes to meanings of “creativity”. If 
teachers cannot apprehend alternative conceptions of creativity how will decisions, about 
the educational importance of creativity, be made? Do we really know how other people 
conceptualise creativity and is there hope of seeing it from other perspectives? Are there 
equivalents of “The Matrix” when it comes to teachers’ conceptions of creativity and can 
you see “Zion” from “The Matrix”? 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The engine of cultural change is the human capacity for creative thought and 
action. 
(National Advisory Committee on Creativity and Cultural Education 
[NACCCE], 1999, p.6) 
1.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter begins with a brief outline of the research focus and the observation of a gap 
in the current literature. The rationale for this study is then stated in greater detail, with 
attention given to why creativity is an important topic for educators and why there is a 
need to investigate teachers’ conceptions of creativity in Australia. This leads to a precise 
statement of the research aims, the central research question and an overview of the study 
as a whole. 
1.2 THE RESEARCH FOCUS 
This thesis reports on a phenomenographic investigation of Queensland teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity. The investigation is situated within the context of present day 
global interest in creativity and culminates as Australian educators begin implementing a 
national curriculum which aims to equip students with skills for building “the social, 
intellectual and creative capital of our nation” (Australian Curriculum Assessment and 
Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014a, Cross-curriculum priorities, para.1). The rationale 
that has informed and driven the present study is that whilst creativity has become an 
important matter for educational consideration in Australia and elsewhere, it remains far 
from clear how educators conceptualise creativity. 
In the Western world creativity has entered into, and receded from, education discourse 
at various times and for varying reasons over the past century and more (Albert & Runco, 
1999; Craft, 2001, 2008a; Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). Across its educational incarnations 
creativity has proven to be a generally popular, notoriously difficult, often controversial, 
sometimes divisive topic (Craft, 2003; Gibson, 2005). Creativity seems to elude 
satisfactory definition (Ellis & Barrs, 2008; Runco, 2004a). Although creativity has 
appeared in the context of the latest version of the Australian curriculum as a seemingly 
uncontentious notion – specifically, as a general capability required for building the 
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nation’s creative capital – to date, educators have not stopped debating the meaning and 
value of creativity as a construct (Banaji, 2008; Bleakley, 2004), or as an aspect of 
education (Cochrane, Craft, & Jefferey, 2008; Sefton-Green, 2008; Shaheen, 2010). Not at 
a societal, nor academic, nor teaching community level has creativity ever been 
uncontentious and the reasons why it is so contentious have never been resolved to an 
extent that is truly helpful for the purposes of education. 
In the interests of not repeating the oversights of the past, the present study has been 
aimed towards resolving the difficulties educators have around creativity, by attempting to 
uncover how teachers experience or understand it. As teachers form a group that mediates 
between the policy world, the social world and the student world, insight into teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity can potentially make clearer why it is that education has not 
managed to come to terms with creativity and what can be done to improve the way the 
teaching community approaches creativity issues. 
1.3 SETTING THE SCENE: A GAP IN THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 
To what extent those currently engaged in teaching and learning are able, 
willing and resourced to address wise, creative educational futures, will 
need careful consideration. 
(Anna Craft, 2008a, p.11) 
Recently creativity has become a global educational priority (Craft, Cremin, Burnard, 
Dragovic, & Chappell, 2012; Shaheen, 2010). It has been argued that the current 
educational interest in creativity is based on more complex social and cultural imperatives 
than in its previous education incarnations (Craft, 2008a; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008). 
Anna Craft’s (2008a) quote, highlighted beneath the title of this section, helps set the scene 
for the present study for in it she expresses her concerns about “how able, willing and 
resourced” teachers are to deal with the complexities of creativity imperatives impinging 
on education. In one sense her comment relates directly to the research problem, because it 
highlights the key role of teachers, their knowledge and attitudes, in dealing with creativity 
in schools. But the quote helps set the scene of the educational context within which the 
present study has been undertaken for it points to an important aspect, of the current 
educational focus on creativity: complexity. Craft specifically mentions that teachers need 
to be “resourced” in order to address creative educational futures. It is argued here that 
amongst the resources teachers will need, will be the outcomes of specific kinds of 
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research which can help them when it comes to interpreting contemporary creativity 
discourse. 
Prior to and since undertaking the task of reviewing the creativity literature for the UK’s 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) (Craft, 2001) Anna Craft has reflected on 
the evolving relation of creativity to education in the UK and elsewhere. Whereas in her 
early books and articles she focused on creativity as receiving too little attention in 
education (Craft, 1997, 2000), after an interval of only a few years she sees educators 
dealing with a “creative tsunami” (Craft, 2008a), the result of fundamental shifts in the 
“values-plates which underpin educational provision” (p.1). Her views are illustrative and 
summative of a growing discourse, around creativity in education, which acknowledges the 
role of “creativity” in shaping and coping with ambiguous and uncertain cultural, 
economic and educational futures (Burnard & White, 2008; Craft, 2008a; McWilliam, 
2007; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008). In this kind of discussion, scholars point to complex 
relationships between creativity and societies. 
More recently Craft and colleagues (Craft, et al., 2012, p.3) observe that whilst, in the 
UK, the policy focus on creativity appears to have again shifted to a narrow marketised 
view of the creativity imperatives, a “professional commitment” to nurturing student 
creativity continues: 
Whilst a change of government in 2010 signalled a change in perspective, a 
professional commitment to nurturing the creativity of students has 
continued to inform the development of pedagogy in the early years, primary 
and secondary education (e.g. Craft et al, 2011, Clack, 2011, Chappell et al, 
2011). 
They suggest that after a period of time at the forefront of researching and developing 
pedagogic practice around creativity, the UK education system is under threat of a reversal 
in this trend due to the return of a policy focus on a narrow, core skills-based curriculum. 
The authors stress that the need for nurturing creativity in education is linked to societal 
context and continues to be high in the priorities of education systems around the world. 
They are thus critical of their government’s current directions which appear to them to be 
incompatible with the social and global situation. 
With respect to Australia it could be argued similarly that the establishment of a 
standardised national curriculum seems at odds with its expressed aim of nurturing 
creativity. Nonetheless the aim of supporting students’ creative capacities is clearly stated 
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in a number of areas and ways throughout Australian curriculum policy. This policy 
remains current and is viewable online at the ACARA website (Australian Curriculum 
Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014a, 2014b). Addressing creativity is 
therefore an aspect of curriculum to be interpreted and acted upon by educators in this 
country. Furthermore, whether or not governments choose to acknowledge creativity-
related issues in their educational policies, logically the cultural and social issues do not 
magically disappear when they are not being attended to. 
But addressing creativity is not a straightforward issue. Although there has been a 
substantial creativity research effort during the past century (Amabile & Hennessey, 2010), 
with some of this research focused within education, (Craft, 2008b), defining creativity for 
the purposes of education has nonetheless proven to be a persistent problem (Ellis & Barrs, 
2008; Fryer, 2012; Lucas, Claxton, & Spencer, 2012; McWilliam, 2007). Over the past 
decade much scholarly commentary on the importance of creativity as an aspect of 
contemporary education takes the position that whilst creativity can be plausibly linked to 
cultural change and student futures in a variety of ways, educators are placed in a very 
difficult bind where they are required to address creativity issues without really being able 
to define, in any simple way, what is meant by creativity (Gibson, 2005; Kleiman, 2005; 
McWilliam, 2007; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008). This approach, to thinking about 
creativity in education, focuses on the contemporary context and attempts to identify those 
aspects of the cultural milieu which reflect or implicate “creativity” as a driver of change 
or as a response to change. The next step taken in these arguments is often to ask how 
educators can address the imperative to enhance creativity and to offer ways of resolving 
the rift between the discerned imperatives and educators’ understanding of creativity. For 
example, Gibson (2005) argues that education needs to refer to a more complex “systems” 
framework (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999) for defining and envisioning creativity; McWilliam 
(2009) suggests taking a view of teaching as “meddling” in such a way as to facilitate 
deeper thinking and problem-solving in students; Kleiman (2005) argues that insight into 
educators’ meanings of creativity is needed. 
However, another kind of response to claims that educators need to address “creativity” 
focuses more on the problem of diverse meanings in creativity rhetoric (Banaji, 2008; 
Banaji, Burn, & Buckingham, 2006; Bleakley, 2004; Sefton-Green, 2008). Sefton-Green 
(2008) has argued, for example, that views of creativity derive from different schools of 
thought, such as the arts tradition and the constructivist tradition and suggests that these 
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traditions sometimes present conflicting ideas about creativity. He argues further that 
ultimately such divergent views may be irreconcilable and that calls to address creativity in 
education may fail to filter through to make any noticeable impact on what happens in 
classrooms. 
Such discussion, within the literature, points to a rift between the rhetorical level of 
creativity discourse – at which arguments are made about the importance or lack of 
importance of creativity – and the interpretive level. It is argued here that there is a 
requirement for a range of studies to help in bridging this rift, for although calls to address 
creativity have impacted educational policy around the world (Shaheen, 2010), the 
capacity of education systems to assess and address the imperatives is hampered by lack 
of, what could be described as, interpretive knowledge concerning how creativity appears 
to people. Arguably the creativity imperatives for education lie somewhat ambiguously 
between the phenomenon of creativity as it is understood, observed and then 
communicated at the rhetorical level and the phenomenon of creativity as it is understood 
by those who interpret the rhetoric. To support educators’ interpretive knowledge, around 
meanings of creativity, investigations of both levels of discourse would be useful. The 
investigation of meanings of creativity would implicate the use of methodologies suited to 
uncovering and describing variation in views of creativity. 
1.4 THE RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
The rationale for the present study is based on seven pillars: 
1. There is a requirement for teachers to address creativity within the Australian 
educational context. 
2. Teachers’ conceptions of teaching and/or learning-related phenomena matter in 
the educational context. 
3. There are indications that teachers may have qualitatively different conceptions 
of creativity. 
4. It appears that there is no serviceable, single, authorised definition of creativity 
which meets current educational needs. 
5. Lack of a serviceable definition places the onus upon teachers to address 
creativity according to their own conceptions of creativity and could mean that 
there are significant differences in teachers’ understanding of, or approaches to, 
creative teaching and enhancing the creativity of students. 
6. Furthermore, because teachers are required to interpret what is meant when the 
term “creativity” arises in educational and/or scholarly discourse they will 
benefit from more information about different meanings of creativity than could 
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be gained from current definitions of creativity. It seems unlikely that a 
definition of creativity, even if devised and authorised for educational purposes, 
would or could convey the variety of ways in which the terms “creativity” or 
“creative” are actually used in education discourse nor provide insight into how 
they are used in the wider world, including in the scholarly arguments being 
made for educational interest in creativity. It would be beneficial, from a 
training and policy-making perspective, to have some insight into teachers’ 
ways of understanding these terms. 
This latter issue of the need – whether one is a teacher, teacher trainer, scholar, 
or policy maker – to interpret, rather than assume, what is meant when the term 
“creativity” arises in educational and/or scholarly discourse is highlighted here 
in the rationale for the study. However, due to the complexity of this issue, it is 
taken up more explicitly in the literature review chapter. 
7. Finally, whilst existing studies suggest that teachers conceptualise or experience 
creativity in different ways, further research is required to gain insights relevant 
to the Australian context and to more fully understand what it is that Australian 
teachers are seeing as creativity. 
 
      In summary, creativity as an aspect of Australian education is seen as an important 
capacity to be encouraged via the current national curriculum. The emphasis on creativity 
in the Australian curriculum is linked, as it is abroad, to cultural trends involving 
increasing use of information technology and the rise of the creative economy. In the wake 
of these global trends the emphasis on teacher and/or student creativity has intensified 
within education systems around the world (Shaheen, 2010). Knowing about creativity is 
therefore an aspect of the knowledge teachers require in order to teach effectively and 
interpret policy in the current context. However, as evidenced by a limited number of 
overseas studies (e.g. Fryer & Collings, 1991) and a very few Australian studies which 
have attempted to gain insight into teachers’ views of creativity, teachers appear to place 
varying degrees of emphasis on creativity as an aspect of teaching and learning. However, 
little is known about how teachers conceptualise creativity. Research into Australian 
teachers’ conceptions of creativity is required in order to better deal with creativity 
concerns in the Australian education context. Such insights would be useful for 
anticipating whether there are likely to be important differences in Australian teachers’ 
teaching practice around creativity and differences in teachers’ reading of the term 
“creativity” as it arises in discussion, policy documents or other literature. 
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This rationale is now elucidated under the following headings: 
1. The need to address creativity in Australian education 
a) addressing creativity by teaching creatively and enhancing student creativity 
b) addressing creativity by becoming interpreters of creativity discourse 
2. Creativity is a poorly defined construct within education 
3. Teachers’ conceptions matter 
4. Teachers experience creativity in a variety of ways 
5. Australian studies of teachers’ creativity conceptions are needed. 
1.4.1 The need to address creativity in Australian education 
An important aspect of the rationale for the present study of teachers’ conceptions of 
creativity is that there is a requirement, within Australian education, for teachers to address 
creativity. Given the degree to which creativity is presently seen as a critical factor in the 
functioning of global economies and for living well in the age of electronic media (Burnard 
& White, 2008; Craft, 2008a; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008), it seems inevitable that the 
perceived importance of creativity for students and for this nation would be reflected in the 
aims of the Australian curriculum. In recent decades interest in creativity in Western 
education has been buoyed, or perhaps re-energised, by developments in computer 
technology and global economics. Educators across the Western world have been urged to 
consider and interpret how creativity and culture are presently intertwined and what this 
means for education (NACCCE, 1999). In Australia, the perceived importance of these 
imperatives has been reflected in events such as the 2020 Summit, convened in Canberra in 
2008 to discuss, and make recommendations about, Australia’s creative future (Australian 
Government, 2010). Clearly these are not directives to build creative capacities in students 
in some simplistic way. There is a requirement to consider broad, complex issues 
concerning what is happening with creativity in the wider world. 
The interest of Western educators in creativity has been mirrored by similar educational 
interest and discussion in the East, albeit with ongoing debate among educators from both 
cultural worlds concerning possible differences between Western and Eastern views of 
creativity (Craft, 2003; Ng & Smith, 2004; Tan, 2004). Shaheen (2010) finds that creativity 
is outlined as an essential learning or capacity in the educational policy documents of a 
broad cross section of developed countries, including Australia, Canada and the USA, 
major European countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, and East Asian 
countries such as Korea, China and Japan. Presently creativity is seen as not only 
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fundamental to the competitiveness of countries within the global economy (Shaheen, 
2010), it is seen as becoming normal and endemic to people’s daily and working lives 
(Florida, 2002). Educational interest in creativity is further implicated because of social 
change occurring as a consequence of the penetration of electronic media into the way 
people currently live (Bruns, 2011; Jenkins, Purushotma, Weigel, Clinton, & Robison, 
2009). 
It might be useful to consider the set of “big picture” imperatives around creativity in 
education as relating to teaching for a world in which cultural change and knowledge work 
are becoming increasingly common, as a somewhat distinct agenda from teaching for 
creativity. It is useful to separate them because teaching to support student participation in 
a social milieu that is impacted by various types and consequences of “creativity” is not 
equivalent to attempting to support, build, inspire or otherwise encourage “creative” 
capacities. These two aspects of creativity issues at some point overlap. However, the big 
picture directs our attention to the broader context of contemporary living, which is now 
seen as much influenced by two factors: technological change and a shift in economic 
activity, which sees a large proportion of the working population involved in creative work 
(Florida, Mellander, & Adler, 2011; Howkins, 2001; Pink, 2005). The big picture is 
important for educators on many levels. A particularly important consideration is that there 
are many facets of contemporary life and work which raise new personal and social 
problems and require attention from educators (Florida, 2005). 
Richard Florida has pointed out that in the emergence of creative economic systems, 
some aspects can be observed, which are “liberating” and some which are “divisive and 
stressful” (Florida, 2002, p. xvii). Florida (2005) emphasises the importance of 
understanding the social problems, which have arisen in the wake of the creative economy. 
Similarly, observers of the interconnections between culture and technology have noted 
that technology currently affords positive social potentials for creativity and brings new 
problems, which educators are advised to monitor in order to maximise benefits and 
minimise problems (Bruns, 2008; Jenkins, et al., 2009). 
Creativity researchers have argued that creativity is associated with the kind of adaptive 
attitude and flexible thinking that is suited, not only to coping with life generally (Zhang & 
Sternberg, 2005), but to living with contemporary conditions (Runco, 2004a). This 
message is echoed in educational discourse. Craft (2008a) notes that creativity has been 
proposed as a means of “navigation” in a changing world. She notes also a discourse in 
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education, which defines creativity as engagement in “personal trajectories” with links to 
“effective learning”. On the other hand, she argues that these agendas present teachers with 
dilemmas, for example, around the conflict between performativity and enhancing 
creativity in a crowded curriculum. Thus creativity discourse of relevance for education 
seems, on the one hand, to attribute positive social value to creativity in terms of 
contributing to the economy and to individual adaptation in the current social climate. At 
the same time it is linked to social problems and to difficulties currently being experienced 
in education. 
Education based scholarship on the relationship between creativity and education now 
often points to the issue of what extensive changes need to be made to educational 
provision in order to meet the conditions of teaching, learning and working in the 21st 
century (Bruns, 2011; Craft, 2008a, 2008b; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008; Shaheen, 2010). 
Craft (2008a) argues that educators are faced with the possibility that educational provision 
must change fundamentally. Some media theorists have suggested that educational and 
other institutions will undergo collapse if there is a failure to restructure them in response 
to the creative social and cultural movements of the electronic age (Bruns, 2011; Pesce, 
2007). 
It appears, then, that teachers have at least two interconnected tasks or roles when 
addressing creativity in education. The first is the role of enhancing the creativity of 
students – that is, supporting students’ capacities to be creative in the settings and ways 
that might prove adaptive for them in the contemporary social environment. It has been 
argued that this would implicate a high level of teacher creativity also (Jeffrey & Craft, 
2004). Secondly, teachers need to bring their interpretive capacities to bear on the rhetoric 
that posits connections between creativity and culture. These two aspects of the rationale 
for the present study will now be discussed in more detail. 
1.4.1.1 Addressing creativity by teaching creatively and enhancing student creativity 
Consistently it has been suggested that key to dealing with the various complexities of 
contemporary culture and education will be the development of teacher and student 
creativity (Craft, 2008a; Jeffrey & Woods, 2003; NACCCE, 1999). The requirement for a 
teaching workforce with the capacity to teach for the contingencies of the present cultural 
environment implicates renewed attention to what it takes to be a creative practitioner 
(Craft, 2008a). These arguments focus attention, not only on what established “creative” 
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practitioners, such as teacher-artists, do when they are teaching creatively and enhancing 
creativity (Denmead, 2011), but also on what school teachers think is meant by teaching 
creatively and enhancing creativity. 
On the basis of research undertaken in the UK it has been suggested that what needs to 
be seen as central to both student and teacher creativity is “ownership” of activities and 
learning (Jeffrey & Woods, 2003, 2009). Support for this view can also be found in the 
creativity research literature where much research work indicates that creative outcomes 
are more likely under conditions where people are fully engaged and experience a sense of 
freedom and personal control in what they are doing (Collins & Amabile, 1999; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000c). It has been argued that this kind of focus on teaching and learning presents 
great challenges for education, especially as teachers are often concerned or constrained by 
a perceived conflict between student-focused approaches and performativity in teaching 
(Burnard & White, 2008; Craft, 2008a). Nonetheless, as a critical aspect of the educational 
approach to dealing with creativity, a focus on ownership seems inescapable. 
However, even before the 2010 change of government in the UK, when educational 
creativity initiatives were still strongly supported there (Craft, et al., 2012), it appears that 
there were signs that teachers differed in the extent to which they were committed to 
supporting ownership in learning. Craft (2008a, p.5) reports the persistence of both a 
marketised view of the creativity imperatives and teaching practices which, rather than 
being supportive of ownership, were more oriented toward the acquisition of propositional 
knowledge, the maintenance of discipline and driven by assessment-orientated outcomes. 
Nonetheless, Jeffrey and Woods, (2003, 2009) revealed that despite curriculum pressures 
some teachers and whole schools remained dedicated to ownership in teaching and 
learning, managing to resolve the supposed clash between creativity and performativity 
through creative teaching (Jeffrey & Woods, 2003, 2009). 
The foregoing observations suggest that where there is persistent emphasis on 
marketised justifications for creativity and non-creative approaches to teaching, this may 
owe more to teachers’ and administrators’ conceptions of creativity and teaching than to 
restrictive conditions in the curriculum. Research of the kind undertaken in the present 
project would be beneficial for Australian education in terms of helping to identify and 
avoid such obstacles to the development of student and teacher creativity as have been part 
of the UK experience. 
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1.4.1.2 Addressing creativity by becoming interpreters of creativity discourse 
As argued above the requirement to address creativity in education is not a narrow 
directive to enhance creativity but implicates engagement with complex discourse around 
creativity and culture. Addressing creativity in education means considering and dealing 
with these complex issues and doing so is as relevant for Australian educators as for 
educators in other countries. Inevitably this will involve Australian teachers in 
reading/hearing about creativity, interpreting policy related to creativity and ongoing 
collaboration with others in their workplaces as they consider the nature of the creativity-
culture relationship and work towards supporting student participation in present day 
culture. 
An inescapable difficulty in dealing with discourse around creativity is that people are 
not always using the term in the same way. Furthermore there are other terms such as 
“entrepreneurship” or “problem solving” which are sometimes substituted for creativity or 
with which some meanings of creativity share common ground (Craft, 2001). Despite this 
difficulty, arguments about creativity deserve to be considered on their merits. For 
teachers, a critical aspect of working effectively with creativity discourse will be 
interpreting what is meant by the term “creativity” when it arises and attempting to clarify 
what they themselves mean by creativity. Currently, it appears that this approach is rarely 
taken in creativity discourse. Meanings of creativity are often not clarified, even within the 
creativity research literature (Feldman, 1999; Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). 
One of the conditions contributing to this confusing situation is that there has been little 
intensive research to define the range of ways in which creativity is understood. How can 
teachers decide if their own ways of understanding creativity are comparable with the 
views expressed across their groups and communities and in scholarly arguments about 
social conditions that have a bearing on educational provision? Research to consolidate 
understanding of the range of ways in which creativity is understood would be helpful in 
this regard. 
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1.4.2 Creativity is poorly defined in education 
Where the reification of creativity involves striving for concrete definitions, 
in over half a century of formal research into creativity this has not resulted 
in consensus of opinion …  
(Bleakley, 2004) 
Arguably, the problems teachers may have around enhancing creativity and interpreting 
messages about creativity are not helped by the lack of a useful definition of creativity 
within education. Lucas, Claxton and Spencer (2012) contend that “across the educational 
world there is no widely used definition of what creativity is, no agreed framework for 
assessing its development in schools” (p.2). Ellis and Barrs (2008) observe that attempts to 
generate definitions for creativity are usually unsatisfactory. Existing definitions generated 
for educational purposes reflect quite different views of creativity (Kleiman, 2008). 
Problems arising from the lack of consensus around useful definitions for creativity are 
reflected nowhere more pointedly than where attempts have been made to address the issue 
of assessing creativity in educational settings. As a first step in generating guidelines for 
evaluating creativity, in the UK education context, Lucas et al. (2012) attempted to 
generate a suitable definition of creativity by first reviewing existing creativity literature. 
They nonetheless observed, first hand, how contentious is this issue of defining and 
assessing creativity. They observe that teachers have strong opinions concerning creativity 
and recount how at an “appreciative inquiry session” to show some of their preliminary 
assessment formats, teachers were sometimes in agreement and at other times “expressed 
anger, hostility and bewilderment” (p.2). They note further: “We got the strong sense that 
there is little appetite for the creation of a complex summative matrix against which the 
creativity of pupils can be compared and cross-checked” and suggest that “teachers who 
are interested in creativity may remain wary about assessing it” (p.22). They see the 
development of assessment tools for creativity as requiring considerable work in trials and 
collaborations into the future. 
1.4.2.1 Definitions of creativity other than from education literature 
The lack of a useful or comprehensive definition of creativity is not an issue peculiar to 
education. The creativity research literature can also be confusing in this regard 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Feldman, 1999; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). Some recent 
reviews of the creativity research literature indicate that different investigators seem to be 
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defining creativity differently and this situation has resulted in a fragmented literature 
(Amabile & Hennessey, 2010; Sawyer, 2011). Beyond the research literature, the wider 
creativity literature is replete with observations about differences, or possible differences, 
in the way creativity is defined historically, within popular discourse, between popular and 
scientific discourse and cross-culturally. 
On the issue of whether creativity is an old concept or a new concept, some 
commentators have suggested that, in the West, interest in creativity was expressed by 
early Greeks at around Plato’s time (Albert, 1983; Albert & Runco, 1999), that it has links 
to early Judaic, Christian and Moslem traditions (Albert & Runco, 1999; Craft, 2001) and 
was promoted by Renaissance educators interested in the ideal of cultivating persons of 
genius (Albert, 1983). Lubart (1999) expresses the view that all cultural views of creativity 
may derive from creation myths and reasons that cross-cultural differences in definitions of 
creativity could reflect differences in the original mythologies. However, some discussion 
indicates that, because the meaning of creativity has evolved over time and has only 
recently come to be associated with originality (Albert & Runco, 1999), earlier 
conceptualisations might not be very close to modern day views of creativity. Hennessey 
(2004) states that just as there is no word for creativity in modern Arabic, neither did the 
word “creativity” exist in the Western world prior to 1870 and has only been in popular use 
since around 1950 (Weiner, 2000, cited in Hennessey, 2004, p.218). Hennessey contends 
that the speakers of Arabic “have not found the need to coin such a term” (Hennessey, 
2004, p.218). By implication, she seems to suggest that in the West, such a need must have 
arisen. 
However long the Western construct or concept of creativity has been in use, the current 
“scientific” (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999) view of creativity might be said to date from the 
time of Galton’s (1869) studies of hereditary genius. Galton’s work seems to have lifted a 
veil of mystery from the conceptualisation of genius and acted as a precursor or impetus to 
research into creativity, which moved gradually from initial interest in exceptional 
individuals to more recent interest in common or “everyday” creativity (Albert & Runco, 
1999; Amabile & Hennessey, 2010; Sawyer, 2006). Sawyer (2006) observes that it is really 
only since the 1990s that creativity researchers have focused on common and ubiquitous 
indications of creativity, that is, creative thinking and problem-solving seen as common 
human capacities. Amabile and Hennessy (2010) have noted that, until recently the field of 
creativity research was focused on a few “big” questions. They now see the field of 
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creativity research as marked by fragmentation, with attention given to many small 
questions rather than big questions and lack of collaboration between investigators in 
various subfields. Rather than bringing us closer to a common understanding of creativity, 
research seems to be reflecting a variety of research interests and ways of understanding 
the construct. 
The history and evolution of conceptualisations of creativity seems to continue to 
contribute to the confusion around creativity, with a mixture of older views and 
contemporary views of creativity in popular use. Conceptions associating creativity with 
genius, madness and spirituality persist in educational and popular discourse (Isaksen, 
1997; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999) alongside conceptualisations focused on innovation and 
creative thinking. Sternberg and Lubart (1999) argue that spiritual and commercially 
promoted understandings of creativity have hindered the “scientific” investigation of 
creativity as they contribute to the popular perception that creativity “runs counter to the 
scientific spirit” (p.12). 
Bleakley (2004) questions the extent to which the scientific view of creativity has itself 
“constructed” the object of its investigation. He suggests that the scientific interest has 
tended to promote a definition of creativity as the production of novelty and value whilst 
other possible meanings, such as transgression and serendipity, are not legitimised. Banaji 
and colleagues (Banaji, 2008; Banaji, et al., 2006) ask whether the current “rhetorics” of 
creativity actually correspond to anything in the “real” world. They too see creativity as 
“constructed through discourse”. They perceive several current rhetorics or discourses of 
creativity vying for educational attention. 
Some recent research based on cross cultural psychological theories of creativity 
suggests that creativity discourse may be further complicated by “external” and “internal” 
implicit theories of creativity (Paletz, Peng, & Li, 2011). In this work researchers are 
investigating “the tendency to consider creativity to be prototypically expressed internally, 
via inner and personal processes, or externally, through products and interactions with 
others” (Paletz, et al., 2011). This observation raises the possibility of a fundamental divide 
in conceptions of creativity, which would be of considerable interest from an educational 
perspective should it prove to be the case. One of the implications of external and internal 
biases in creativity conceptions would be that the “rhetorics” of creativity would likely 
reflect both biases. Some “rhetoric” would focus, perhaps, on more internal definitions of 
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creativity, while others would focus on more external definitions of creativity. Teachers 
themselves might be prone to such “biases”. 
Why should there be external and internal biases in people’s conceptions of creativity? 
Research has shown that the internal aspects of certain kinds of focused creative processes 
register at the level of personality and behaviour (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 
1994; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). Frequent 
experience of “flow” and deep interest appears to promote an intrinsic orientation 
(Amabile, et al., 1994; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002), which is manifested in such 
areas as people’s choices of vocation, because intrinsically oriented people tend to seek the 
kind of work that allows them to experience interest and to further develop their areas of 
interest (Amabile, et al., 1994). Flow has been linked to patterns of culture (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). It is therefore not improbable that intrinsic and extrinsic 
orientations could be linked to different ways of experiencing or conceptualising creativity. 
Investigative work on implicit theories of creativity does suggest that internal and external 
foci are somehow implicated in the variation that seems to exist in people’s creativity 
conceptions and that internality-externality may be a dimension implicated in cross-
cultural differences in ways of conceptualising creativity (Lubart, 1999). However, it 
seems from the studies carried out so far that it is not yet clear how internal and external 
biases play out in Westerners’ conceptions of creativity, nor yet how they manifest across 
cultures (Paletz, et al., 2011). 
It appears that although research has managed to demystify some aspects of creativity, 
definitions remain elusive and creativity remains contentious and poorly defined. As 
teachers collaborate and work on how to address creativity in education there is a need for 
further understanding of how teachers conceptualise and value creativity. As discussed in 
the following section, teachers’ ways of experiencing phenomena matter in education. 
1.4.3 Teachers’ conceptions matter 
A significant literature now shows that rather than being compliant and malleable 
implementers of policy, teachers filter and shape policy (Borko & Putnam, 1996; Coburn, 
2001; Kelchtermans, 2005; van den Berg, 2002). Teachers do not cope invariantly with 
change. They do not teach with the same ideas about teaching. Teachers exhibit variation 
in how they understand learning and other phenomena. Therefore with respect to any 
valued educational initiative it is important to consider the role of teachers’ conceptions in 
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relation to it. Teachers’ conceptions are critical in determining not only what aspects of 
policy will receive attention, but also what and how students will learn. 
As noted earlier there is considerable variation in the degree to which teachers 
demonstrate support for creative teaching and the enhancement of student creativity. In 
order to understand such variation in teachers’ attitudes towards creativity, there should be 
value in looking into how teachers understand creativity. It is further suggested that unless 
teachers and policy makers have some basis for understanding why there are differences 
between views of creativity, instead of receiving due and united consideration, creativity 
initiatives in education will continue to languish in the background of Australian 
education. 
Research has shown that, teachers’ beliefs, about learning and other phenomena, can 
affect how they implement policy and what they prioritise in the classroom. Richardson 
(1996) defines beliefs as “psychologically held understandings, premises, or propositions 
about the world that are felt to be true” (p.103). Pajares (1992) suggests that beliefs travel 
by many interchangeable names such as attitudes, values, judgements, axioms, opinions, 
ideology, perceptions, implicit theories and perspectives. He argues that while it is often 
presumed that knowledge and beliefs are different entities, there is actually little to 
distinguish between them. He states: “The conception of knowledge as somehow purer 
than belief and closer to the truth or falsity of a thing requires a mechanistic outlook not 
easily digested” (Pajares, 1992, p.310). Nespor (1987) contends that “belief” and “affect” 
are stronger evaluative components of thinking than the cognitive components of 
knowledge. 
Where Pajares (1992) sees “conceptions” as another term for “beliefs”, Thompson 
(1992) argues that “conceptions” denotes a general mental structure, which encompasses 
beliefs and other related concepts. This is reasonably consistent with the way the term has 
been used by phenomenographic researchers. The aim of phenomenography has been 
stated as “describing conceptions of the world around us” (Marton, 1981). Marton and 
Pong (2005, p.336) explain that phenomenographers use a variety of terms to point to what 
people “have in mind” when focusing on something: 
A “conception”, the basic unit of description in phenomenographic research, 
has been called various names, such as “ways of conceptualizing” {sic], 
“ways of experiencing”, “ways of seeing”, “ways of apprehending”, “ways 
of understanding”, and so on. Now, it is perfectly clear that 
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“conceptualizing” is not identical with “experiencing”; learning to 
distinguish the taste of the same wine from two different years is not the 
same thing as to see the difference between a Newtonian and an Einsteinian 
concept of time. The reason for using so many different synonyms is that 
although none of them corresponds completely to what we have in mind, 
they all do to a certain extent. 
As the present thesis supports a phenomenographic study of conceptions, it may avoid 
confusion to be guided by Thompson in regarding the word “conceptions” as the more 
encompassing term. 
There is a great deal of support for the view, that uncovering teachers’ conceptions of 
various phenomena, is a critical goal for education research (G. Brown, 2003; Pajares, 
1992; Richardson, 1996; Thompson, 1992). Borko and Putnam (1996) state: “The 
knowledge and beliefs that prospective and experienced teachers hold serve as filters 
through which their learning takes place. It is through these existing conceptions that 
teachers come to understand recommended new practices” (p.675). 
From a phenomenographic perspective, conceptions are not “held”, as such. A person’s 
way of seeing something is a function of what they notice about it or what they are aware 
of with respect to that thing. An expert in something is likely to be aware of certain things 
about the phenomenon that are outside the awareness of non-experts. Marton and Pong 
(2005) suggest that when something is “felt” or seen with “ease” a person is more likely to 
express that meaning. 
Teachers’ conceptions, are understood to be organised into systems, in which some 
aspects are central while others are more peripheral (Marton, 2000; Pajares, 1992; Pratt, 
1992). Brown (2003) observes that the structure of teachers’ conceptions is not uniform 
and simple. Rather they are multi-faceted and interconnected. Conceptions may be 
individual, yet also socially and culturally shared. Conceptions may be complex. For 
example, Vermunt and Vermetten (2005, p.362) describe a conception of learning as a 
“coherent system”: 
A conception of learning is a coherent system of knowledge and beliefs 
about learning and related phenomena (e.g. knowledge and beliefs about 
oneself as a learner, learning objectives, learning activities and strategies, 
learning tasks, learning and studying in general, and about the task division 
between students, teachers, and fellow students in learning processes). 
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Some researchers observe that a large proportion of a person’s conceptual repertoire is 
drawn from experience and cultural sources of knowledge (Nespor, 1987; Pajares, 1992). 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue that socialisation “constructs” people’s sense of 
reality. Connerton (1989) also argues that rituals, routines, objects and artefacts in the 
environment make up or construct people’s view of reality, that is, they contribute to the 
sense that things are performed a certain way because that is the way they are performed. 
Plotkin (2002) refers to this aspect of perception as a “trick” of socialisation. 
However, people demonstrate different degrees of awareness of socialisation effects and 
these may be reflected in their epistemological views (Unger, 2000). In turn, it has been 
shown that there are links between epistemological beliefs and beliefs about learning, 
which translate into vocational or teaching practice (Brownlee, Berthelsen, Dunbar, 
Boulton-Lewis, & McGahey, 2008). 
Images and associations from one’s past are also identified as screens through which 
new information is filtered (Goodman, 1988). Particularly influential moments are 
observed to produce detailed episodic memories, which later serve as inspiration for one’s 
behaviour or teaching practices (Nespor, 1987). Memories of this kind have been revealed 
in interviews with pre-service teachers (Goodman, 1988). 
Importantly, beliefs can determine how much time and energy a teacher is willing to 
expend on an activity (van den Berg, 2002). Pajares (1992) suggests that because teachers 
must often function on impulse and intuition rather than reflection, belief structures are 
particularly important in guiding teacher decision-making and action. He argues that even 
when teachers have declarative knowledge structures drawn from bodies of formal 
understanding, using this knowledge involves belief and affective components. Making use 
of declarative knowledge, he suggests, requires belief in the authority of its source and in 
one’s own capabilities. Choosing which strategies to use in the classroom involves a series 
of judgements and evaluations of people, contexts and situations that are inevitably 
informed by beliefs. 
Brown (2003) contends that understanding teachers’ conceptions of a phenomenon 
independently of their conceptions of learning, curriculum and teaching provides only a 
partial understanding of teachers’ significant education related views. Many influences on 
teacher education-related conceptions have been identified, including teachers’ memories 
of their own schooling (Pajares, 1993); implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck & 
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Bempechat, 1983) and of the nature of abilities (Swann & Snyder, 1980). Van den Berg 
(2002) found that innovation in education can impact negatively on teachers’ sense of 
professional identity and confidence and that teachers differ in the degree to which they 
cope effectively with change in education. 
Studies have shown that teachers’ conceptions of teaching, learning, subject content and 
various phenomena strongly influence how they teach (G. Brown, 2003; Pajares, 1992; 
Thompson, 1992). Richardson and colleagues found that teachers’ beliefs about teaching 
and learning was related to the ways teachers taught reading (Richardson, Anders, Tidwell, 
& Lloyd, 1991). Brown (2002) identified teacher emphasis on deep versus surface learning 
to be related to teachers’ views of assessment. Wilson and Wineberg (1988) found that 
history teachers’ beliefs about the nature of history influenced how teachers taught their 
subject. It has also been found that how teachers teach is influential in how students 
approach learning (Prosser & Trigwell, 1999; Trigwell, Prosser, & Waterhouse, 1997). 
It is therefore suggested that teachers’ conceptions of creativity will likewise be related 
to their teaching practice and will in turn influence how teachers approach information 
about creativity and the ways that they attempt to encourage creativity in the classroom. 
Creativity is a complex notion or construct. But it is also seen as an important concept 
within education at this time, and one that teachers appear to see through different lenses. 
1.4.4 Teachers experience creativity in a variety of ways 
Although creative capabilities have been named as capacities to be encouraged through the 
Australian curriculum, such indications as there are to hand suggest that Australian 
teachers are likely to interpret policy directives on creativity in very different ways. Studies 
of teachers’ creativity conceptions for the Australian context appear to be almost non-
existent, but a limited number of overseas studies suggest that significant variation is to be 
expected in the degree of sophistication of teachers’ views of creativity. Newton and 
Newton (2009) found, for example, that within a group of British trainee teachers, 
conceptions of creativity in science were, “narrow, focused mainly on practical 
investigations of matters of fact, and included misconceptions” (p. 45). They describe the 
trainee teachers’ views as “grossly inadequate” and suggest that creativity may be a 
confusing idea for science teachers. 
Newton and Newton’s (2009) study also highlights, as have some other existing studies 
of teachers’ conceptions of creativity, that across groups of teachers, not one, but a range 
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of views of creativity are reflected or expressed (Diakidoy & Kanari, 1999; Fryer & 
Collings, 1991). While studies confirm that teachers possess a range of different 
conceptions, there remains a lack of specificity of the precise parameters of those 
conceptions. 
1.4.5 Australian studies of teachers’ creativity conceptions are needed 
Finally it is suggested that Australian studies of teachers’ conceptions of creativity are 
needed on the bases that such studies have been scarce and there could be conditions 
within education here which require specific research attention. Cross-cultural research has 
indicated that there may be differences between conceptions of creativity across cultures or 
across social sectors (Lubart, 1999; Paletz & Peng, 2008) and perhaps on that basis alone it 
would be advisable to conduct research into conceptions of creativity within the Australian 
context. 
Some commentary suggests that Australian education policy has tended to promote a 
“marketised” view of creativity (Burnard & White, 2008) as opposed to a more 
“democratic”, student-focused view promoted recently in UK policy (Craft, et al., 2012). 
Burnard and White (2008) observe that “Creativity in Australian education is synonymous 
with innovation and invention. Policy documents consistently state the purpose of 
creativity as a necessity for enhancing science and technology and improving economic 
outcomes” (Burnard and White, 2008, p.670). Whilst these are important considerations 
there is considerable research support for the value to students of creativity where 
creativity is understood in the sense of ownership in learning (Cochrane, Craft, & Jeffery, 
2008; Jeffrey & Woods, 2003, 2009). So it is confronting that Australian educational 
policy has reflected such a narrow marketised approach to creativity questions and taken so 
little note of more student-centred arguments and benefits. Relevant to the present rationale 
is the question of whether Australian teachers themselves share these views of creativity or 
whether there is conflict between teachers’ ways of thinking about creativity and the views 
espoused at the policy level. Certainly, as mentioned earlier, Craft et al. (2012) refer to a 
distinct rift between the present UK government marketised focus on creativity and an 
ongoing professional interest in creativity. Do we have such a rift in Australia? Research 
aimed at finding out about Australian teachers’ conceptions of creativity could be useful in 
illuminating how teachers’ views might differ from or approximate views promoted at the 
policy level. 
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Whatever the impediments have been, in the Australian educational context, to 
engaging more seriously and openly with creativity questions it is conceivable that there 
could be trying times ahead for the support of creativity during implementation of the 
Australian curriculum. UK analysts have argued that the introduction of the national 
curriculum in England at the end of the 1980s contributed directly to a slump in creative 
approaches in education over the course of the 1980s and 1990s (Craft, 2008b). It may take 
considerable effort to ensure that Australian educators do not remain entrenched in a 
narrow, marketised view of creativity imperatives. The culture within education in some 
Australian regions could be more receptive to marketised approaches than others. There 
have been indications that conditions in Queensland education, for example, have tended to 
maintain fairly traditional styles of teaching over time. Meadmore (1978) chronicled a 
history of rigid, formalised schooling in Queensland and subsequent research has 
continued to point to a predominance of skills-focused rather than engagement-focused 
teaching in this state (Lingard et al., 2001). It could be useful to know more about how 
teachers’ views of creativity sit within such an environment. 
In order to respond to social imperatives in respect of Australia’s creative future, 
educational attention to creativity needs to move beyond rhetoric. Research to support 
teachers in the development of teacher and student creativity and in their role as 
interpreters of creativity discourse is particularly relevant for Australian education at this 
time. Yet it appears that currently only a handful of studies can be seen as contributing to 
this effort. 
1.5 THE AIMS OF THE STUDY 
On the basis of existing studies it seems only possible to say that individual teachers may 
apprehend more than one meaning for “creativity” and some teachers appear to value 
“creativity” more than others. What is not clear from these studies is whether teachers are 
seeing creativity in ways that are really comparable. For one thing, it is not clear if 
teachers’ different ways of valuing creativity are based on different ways of constituting, 
using or interpreting the terms “creativity” or “creative”. 
    The aim and central research question for this study is: How do Queensland teachers 
conceptualise creativity? The study also hopes to gain insight into the reasons why the 
support of creativity has, historically, been a difficult and sometimes contentious issue in 
Western education. 
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1.6 THE CHOICE OF RESEARCH APPROACH 
For the purposes of addressing the aims of the present research, phenomenography, a 
qualitative research approach has been implemented. The usefulness of the 
phenomenographic approach, for illuminating qualitative variation in people’s conceptions 
of phenomena, has been illustrated across a large number of studies (Åkerlind, 2003; Van 
Rossum & Hamer, 2010). The variation identified by researchers has been reflected 
differently in different studies. Bruce (2003, p.6) states: “outcome spaces have, in different 
studies been found to represent historical views of a phenomenon, to represent a widening 
awareness or to represent a hierarchy of increasing complexity and sophistication.” By 
illuminating variation across views of a given phenomenon, such as a concept or a process, 
phenomenographic studies have provided useful insights with respect to understanding 
what is in focus and how people are seeing that phenomenon. The phenomenographic 
approach is well suited to the researcher’s aim of understanding how teachers 
conceptualise creativity and what makes creativity such a contentious issue. By 
discovering what it is that people are focusing on, with respect to a given phenomenon, it 
becomes possible to understand differences in people’s various meanings of that 
phenomenon. 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is one researcher’s attempt to reconcile the need for educators to address 
creativity with the situation in which it is apparent that people – teachers and creativity 
researchers included – perceive creativity in different ways. The research reported is a 
phenomenographic investigation of Queensland teachers’ conceptions of creativity. In 
keeping with phenomenographic procedures data was elicited in interviews with a group of 
participating teachers and the interview transcripts were analysed in order to uncover the 
limited number of ways in which creativity was conceptualised across the group. The 
participating teachers were sourced from schools in and around the Brisbane area and 
reflected a range of experience levels and disciplinary backgrounds. The group included 
teachers from primary school and secondary school backgrounds. Some of the teachers had 
experience of both primary and secondary school contexts. 
The empirical analysis leads to the development of an outcome space delimiting 
variation in teachers’ conceptions of creativity. A key dimension of variation across the 
conceptions has been identified as an evaluation of where rewards/rules/values are reliably 
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located – external or internal to the person. Conceptions of creativity constituted through a 
more internal rule focus are distinguished from a more external rule focus on the basis of 
greater breadth of awareness of personal and social benefit deriving from internal rewards 
and values. The study provides useful insights into how teachers conceptualise creativity, 
which are supported by explication of the structures of awareness involved in the different 
ways of seeing creativity. 
In Chapter Two attention is given to two main areas of literature – the literature which 
currently expresses reasons for creativity moving from the fringes to the fore of 
educational provision and the, largely, psychology-based research literature, which has 
investigated the nature and value of creativity. In this review emphasis is placed on the 
need to interpret creativity discourse in an attempt to distil messages of import for student 
futures and the form of educational provision. Chapter Three describes the methodological 
underpinnings of the study undertaken by the researcher – or more appropriately, it details 
the qualitative research approach (Marton, 1986) used to investigate Queensland teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity – and the steps taken to arrive at the research outcome. Chapter 
Four presents the research findings or outcomes. This comprises written and diagrammatic 
descriptions of the categories of description, which form the outcome of the study. Chapter 
Five provides a discussion of the study’s outcomes and their relevance for education. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 REVIEW STRATEGY 
For the purposes of providing a context for the present study, the review strategy is aimed 
at reporting on how creativity is claimed to be socially significant and valuable in the 
contemporary context. Many educators argue that creativity must be made central to 
education, but on what grounds are such arguments made and what would such curriculum 
involve? The question of how creativity may be understood to have value is also pertinent 
to thinking about how education relates to it, but here the concern shifts or expands to 
encompass the question of the value of being creative. 
The review is, therefore, concerned with two main bodies of literature: the literature that 
articulates the “big picture” reasons for educational interest in creativity; and the literature 
that documents theory and research on the nature and value of creativity. Given the 
diversity of definitions of creativity, both areas present considerable scope in terms of what 
might be considered relevant to the present thesis. Selection of material for the review has, 
however, been guided by the presence, in both literatures, of an insistent theme or pattern: 
the relation of creativity to behavioural “autonomy” (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 
2006). While some discussions of creativity do not necessarily involve or acknowledge 
autonomy, there is a line of common interest in behavioural autonomy, which can be seen 
as reflected in some of the big picture arguments for educational interest in creativity and 
also in some areas of the research literature, which locate an important value for creativity 
in its relation to autonomy. 
The first major focus of the literature review is the big picture. This includes brief 
commentary on some of the arguments that psychologists and educators have put forward, 
over the course of the past century, in favour of educational interest in creativity. But the 
reviewer’s main focus is on the issue of creativity in the contemporary context. It is 
arguments of the type presented in this part of the review which have intensified present 
day educational interest in creativity. Ideally, “creative teaching” would extend to teachers 
collaboratively problem-solving how to address big picture creativity issues in schools. 
The second major focus is creativity per se. If teachers are to teach for creativity in 
connection with the big picture imperatives, can the literature inform about the nature and 
value of creativity? What would teachers do to enhance creativity? Given that the 
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curriculum is often described as crowded, how is creativity of benefit to students? 
Therefore the review focuses on some of the various directions that creativity research has 
taken and considers, not only what researchers and theorists have to say about the nature of 
the object of their investigation but, what can be discerned with respect to the value of 
creativity. 
Some explanation about the structure of the review is also warranted. Behind every 
literature review is a background story of the reviewer’s journey to understand the 
literature and to eventually decide what kind of message needs to be communicated 
through the selected literature. This story is worth acknowledging here because part of the 
message I have chosen to communicate reflects a feature of my situation in dealing with 
the literature which is in common with the situation of teachers and the reader of this 
thesis: we are all faced with the difficulties of interpreting discourse and rhetoric around 
creativity, which, as has already been stated, is a poorly defined and ambiguous construct. 
The tale I have chosen to tell through the structure of the review is one that imitates the 
complexity of the challenges that educators face unless and until steps are taken to 
investigate and delimit the range of meanings of creativity that can be encountered in 
creativity discourse. Before us, are discussions and arguments about creativity and its 
relation to globalisation, to culture, to our economies, to our ways of communicating and 
being in community. Many of these concerns seem to require urgent attention from 
educators. But what are the meanings of creativity expressed in these arguments? This 
review can only highlight that there is a need to interpret what is meant by creativity at the 
rhetorical level and, at the same time, attempt to take an interpretive approach when 
discussing the presented arguments. 
A dilemma was faced in trying to decide what should come first in this review: 
explication of the nature of creativity as reflected in the creativity research literature or 
consideration of the big picture arguments currently facing educators. Given that both 
literatures reflect ambiguity in defining creativity, it was decided to consider the 
imperatives first, separately from the creativity research, on two grounds: this is arguably 
the position most educators would face in trying to make sense of the creativity 
imperatives through the lenses of their current understandings about creativity. So this 
approach to structuring the review highlights the difficulty of teachers’ positions in trying 
to make sense of these arguments. Secondly, the imperatives themselves are those aspects 
of the contemporary milieu that, as identified and communicated through creativity 
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discourse, have recently intensified educational concern with creativity. Therefore when it 
comes to interpreting the creativity rhetoric it is not some generic idea of creativity that we 
need to understand, but whatever view of creativity is reflected in the arguments. 
Considered in this light, whilst the findings from creativity research are useful and 
important, the articulated imperatives need to take precedence in our deliberations so that it 
can be decided what, of creativity research, is then valuable in helping to formulate our 
response in education 
The review has been structured so that it moves from initial consideration of some of 
the diverse meanings for creativity that can be found in the creativity literature, to 
discussion of some of the main arguments that have been put forward for educational 
interest in creativity. Some prevalent psychological-educational arguments for educational 
interest in creativity are presented. Media perspectives are then addressed more fully, 
followed by an overview and discussion of Richard Florida’s (2002, 2005) perspective on 
the creative economy. The issue of whether there are differences between conceptions of 
creativity in the East and the West is also discussed. From this overview and discussion a 
synthesis is made which affirms the importance of investigating conceptions of creativity 
and also the importance of recognising that “autonomous motivation” (Ryan & Deci, 2006) 
is a key concept when attempting to understand the arguments themselves and what is 
happening with creativity in the world. Consideration is then given to how the big picture 
issues may be addressed via education. 
At Section 2.5 the focus of the review shifts to the creativity research literature with an 
emphasis on seeing how researchers understand the nature and value of creativity. 
Considerable attention is given to the notion of autonomous motivation and how it relates 
to the processes and products of creativity. Research around this area suggests that 
autonomous motivation (intrinsic or integrated motivation) (Ryan & Deci, 2006) is 
personally and socially valuable and is a foundational concept for the development of 
creative pedagogy. Other areas discussed are creative cognition, the creative personality, 
the relation of creativity to diversity and marginality, the relation of creativity to 
religion/spirituality and the relation of creativity to psychopathology. The link between 
psychopathology and creativity could be of concern to some teachers from the perspective 
that they would not want to encourage something that might be psychologically harmful 
and therefore not valuable to students. From the platform of the creativity research 
attention is given to what is involved in teaching for creativity. That is, how is student 
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creativity to be enhanced? This aspect of teaching would combine, ideally, with what is 
implicated in teaching for a changing and “creative” cultural environment. 
Finally a review is presented of studies, which have examined conceptions of, or 
attitudes towards, creativity to date. Studies relevant to both non-teaching and teaching 
populations are considered. It is concluded that there is a need for further qualitative 
illumination of how creativity is apprehended in varying populations or contexts. 
Researchers have barely begun to uncover educators’ understandings of creativity and, in 
Australia, such studies are notably scarce. 
2.2 MANY MEANINGS OF CREATIVITY 
“Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas – only I don’t know exactly 
what they are”. 
Alice, Through the Looking Glass, (Carroll, 1872) 
The words (quoted above), which Lewis Carroll has the fictional Alice say as she first 
encounters the nonsensical poem “Jabberwocky”, may seem like a strange headline for a 
review of the literature on creativity. But this is the quotation, which Mumford and 
Gustafson invoked to express their impressions of the creativity research literature as they 
undertook their 1988 review (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). They found it difficult, they 
said, to understand what creativity researchers were actually investigating. To date, any 
number of reviews and discussions of the creativity literature can be found, which contain 
a reference to the difficulty of defining creativity or the perplexing nature of the creativity 
literature itself (e.g. Bleakley, 2004; Craft, 2001; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Dietrich, 2007; 
Ellis & Barrs, 2008; Feldman, 1999; Gibson, 2005). 
But Mumford and Gustafson (1988) discerned, at least, that investigations of creativity 
seemed to share some common concern with the production of novel, socially valuable 
products. They concluded that creativity researchers seemed to be interested in outstanding 
occupational achievement. In a later review, Mayer (1999) found that definitions of 
creativity usually refer to producing something that is novel or original as well as useful, 
valuable or appropriate. 
Despite this degree of consensus, definitions of creativity exhibit considerable variation. 
For example, Lubart (1999) observes that in the West, creativity is usually defined as “the 
ability to produce work that is novel and appropriate” (p.339). But taking an educational 
perspective, the NACCCE (1999) report places more emphasis on the role of imagination 
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in the act of creating, defining creativity as: “Imaginative activity fashioned so as to 
produce outcomes that are both original and of value” (p.30). 
Definitional differences may often be related to the purposes for which the definition is 
intended. Runco (2004b) argues, for example, that many scientific definitions of creativity 
emphasise products, “probably because it is easy to count things and therefore easy to be 
objective about them” (p.10). As Mumford and Gustafson (1988) observed also, defining 
creativity in terms of its products has allowed scientific research on creativity to progress. 
Without a serviceable definition creativity is a difficult phenomenon to study 
experimentally. In the case of the NACCCE definition above, the purpose of the definition 
is not to study creativity but to guide educators with respect to how to think about and 
facilitate creative processes in the classroom. What is nonetheless a common feature of 
both of these definitions is that they emphasise the product as the valued outcome of a 
creative process. 
Reflecting on the variation in definitions Runco (1994, 2004b) argues that the personal 
side of creativity tends to be obscured amidst the proliferation of social “consensual” 
views, which emphasise the product and its social or cultural value. In preference to 
emphasising the product, Runco emphasises “personal” creativity, seeing the interpretive 
capacities, discretion and intentions of individuals as the fundaments of creativity (Runco, 
2004b). He regards interpretive capacities as universal and the origin of all creativity, 
whilst discretion is tied to culture, because it involves choices and judgments. 
Product value is not the only type of creative value discussed in the literature. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) observes that a common theme in the reports given by the ninety-
one eminent creators, interviewed for his study, is that they all “love what they do” (p107). 
The regularity with which creativity is linked with love, pleasure, satisfaction or 
investment in the process is reflected in current models of creativity, which propose that 
intrinsic motivation or interest is a key component of complex creative processes 
(Amabile, 1983; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). More recently, it has been shown that 
reflectively endorsed motivations, based on integrated values (Ryan & Deci, 2006) are also 
important in both product creativity and process satisfaction (Burton, Lydon, 
D'Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006). 
The literature reflects that there is considerable difference in people’s implicit, or day-
to-day, conceptions of creativity. In the NACCCE (1999) report, it is noted that, in their 
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implicit theories of creativity, people often associate creativity with the “arts” or “creative 
arts” – that is, creativity is mostly linked with such areas as music, dance, drama, visual art 
and literature. It is suggested in the report that this association can set up a separation in 
people’s minds between artistic domains of activity where creativity is thought to occur 
and other supposedly non-creative domains such as science, mathematics or accountancy. 
A second problem area pointed out in the report is an “elite” view of creativity, where 
creativity is associated with famous or influential creators only. However, in the scientific 
literature the term “creativity” can be used quite differently to signify, for example, 
creative thinking in everyday life or creative problem solving across domains (Sawyer, 
2006). 
Another type of problem with use of the term “creativity” is identified by Dietrich 
(2007) as the “monolithic entity fallacy” of creativity, by which he refers to the tendency to 
conceptualise creativity as a specific psychological or neurological property or mechanism. 
He observes, for example, how creativity is often equated with divergent thinking – the 
ability to generate many possible solutions to a problem. But Dietrich argues that the 
association of divergent thinking with creativity can be misleading as creativity also 
requires “convergent” or analytic thinking. Even if a person is generating ideas, 
assessments have to be made about the appropriateness or applicability of the ideas to the 
problem. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) suggested that there may be different, virtually unrelated types 
of activity, which all qualify as creative. He contends that: “the term “creativity” as 
commonly used covers too much ground. It refers to very different entities, thus causing a 
great deal of confusion” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p.25). He distinguishes, for example, 
between the behaviour of extremely agile and interesting thinkers, people who are engaged 
in being “personally creative” and people who perform culture-changing work. Similarly, 
Feldman (1994) points out that the development and functioning of precociously talented 
people can be quite different from the development and functioning of creative people with 
more usual capabilities. Precocious talent, he observes, involves close fit with the 
provisions of an existing domain of activity, whereas people who change culture in some 
way are often dealing with a lack of fit between some aspect of self and culture. 
Other distinctions have been made concerning the nature of the work that counts as 
creative in different domains (Feldman, 1999) and between different kinds of creative 
work within domains, such as achieving mastery within a domain as compared with work 
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performed with the intention to influence or affect others (Policastro & Gardner, 1999). It 
has also been noted that there are differing degrees or levels of creative activity (Ghiselin, 
1963) and the question arises as to just how similar creativity is at non-eminent and 
eminent levels (Craft, 2003; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
Significant differences between the processes and the affective experience of “reactive” 
versus “proactive” problem solving have also been noted (Heinzen, 1994). Heinzen (1994) 
observes that as well as feeling different from the point of view of the creator, different 
cognitive networks are used in these two types of problem solving. 
The relationship between creativity and problem-solving is somewhat unclear. The 
literature appears to support two different ways of explaining the relationship: creativity is 
seen as a type of problem-solving or problem-solving is seen as a type of creativity 
(Nickerson, 1999; Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). How a given author resolves the issue, or 
whether they consider it as important to resolve the issue may not be made explicit. 
There seems to be some confusion in the literature as to whether reward increases or 
decreases creativity and this relates to the question of whether or not creativity is 
intrinsically motivated. A great deal of research, suggests that intrinsic motivation 
increases the creativity of what is produced (Collins & Amabile, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 
2000c) and complementary research has shown that various kinds of reward and reward 
strategies reduce creativity (Collins & Amabile, 1999). However, research conducted 
within the behaviourist tradition has shown that creativity can be increased using rewards 
(Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; 
Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001). Deci, Koestner and Ryan (2001) argue that what is at issue 
here is that where intrinsic motivation is involved, reward will tend to decrease creativity, 
because reward tends to interfere with intrinsic motivation. From their perspective, the 
behaviourist experiments show increases in creativity using reward, because the processes 
these studies examine are step-wise and controlled by the experimenters. Under such 
circumstances, they argue, reward would predictably increase creativity, as there is no 
intrinsic motivation involved (Deci, et al., 2001). This issue suggests that, when 
approaching the creativity literature, there is a need to be clear about what the scientific 
researchers are attempting to investigate and how they are defining creativity. Clearly both 
groups of researchers are defining creativity from the point of view of its outcome or 
external aspect, as is common in scientific research (Lidstone & Stoltman, 2007; Runco, 
2004b). From the external or observer perspective creativity is a property of the product. 
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The perceived creativity of the product is not necessarily a clear indicator of the process 
involved and this does serve to confuse the issues of how to define creativity and how to 
decide the value of creativity as a process. How, for example, do we reconcile the ideas 
that creativity can eventuate from a step-wise process, which can be enhanced using 
incentives, but also from a non-step-wise process which may suffer if incentives are used? 
It would appear that “novelty and value” can be brought into the world in very different 
ways. 
Another kind of conceptual confusion seems to surround the way creativity is 
understood as a characteristic or ability of people. Creativity is sometimes identified as a 
kind of wisdom or higher order thinking ability (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003). Physicist 
David Bohm argued this way, suggesting that, on one hand, there are mechanical types of 
thinking and, on the other hand, there are types of thinking that are creative and less prone 
to outside control (Bohm, 1998; Bohm & Peat, 1989). Similarly Simonton (2000b) sees 
creativity as “optimal functioning”. Creativity has also been consistently linked to 
spirituality (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Banaji and Burn (2007) acknowledge that amongst 
the many observable “rhetorical constructions” of creativity is “a rich literature on religion 
and creation”. Some authors have suggested that some kinds of religious or spiritual 
experience share common ground with creative processes (Crook, 1980; Dietrich, 2004a; 
Jung, 1938; Maslow, 1964; Underhill, 1911). Some perspectives link creativity to 
happiness or well-being (Cacioppo, Hawkley, Rickett, & Masi, 2005; Lyubomirsky, 
Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005). It is difficult, at least on the surface, to reconcile these positive 
views of creativity as desirable or socially adaptive, with the view that creativity is also 
linked to psychopathology (Verhaegen, Joormann, & Kahn, 2005). Nonetheless there is a 
wealth of research to suggest that there are links between creativity and psychopathology 
(Kaufman & Baer, 2002; Ochse, 1990; Ott, Reuter, Hennig, & Vaitl, 2005; Rothenberg, 
1990a, 1990b; Simonton, 2005; Verhaegen, et al., 2005). 
But there are various ways of making the link between psychopathology and creativity 
and these are given attention later in the review. It is simply worth noting here that higher 
order thinking, wisdom, spirituality and psychopathology are all associated with creativity 
and that these connections sometimes come into the discussions and meanings of creativity 
touched on by the authors whose views are represented in the present review. 
The various perspectives on the relation between creativity and cultural change outlined 
in the present literature review, all call the attention of educators to creativity in some way. 
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But the expressed meanings of creativity seem to vary. Sometimes the term is used in a 
general way that seems to encompass a number of possible meanings and sometimes there 
seems to be a specific definition or meaning in mind. Sometimes creativity is defined in 
terms of what is produced, but at other times the author is concerned with a process or 
attitude. Therefore a job of interpretation is necessary before the educational import of 
arguments concerning “creativity” can be ascertained. 
2.2.1 More than one meaning of “autonomy” in the literature 
Decades of creativity research have established that intrinsic motivation is a key aspect of 
complex creative activity (Collins & Amabile, 1999; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Runco & 
Sakamoto, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000c). However, recently it has been asserted that the 
persistence for complex endeavour is enhanced by the presence of both intrinsic motivation 
and identified or integrated values (Burton, et al., 2006). Within Self-determination theory 
(SDT) processes involving intrinsic motivation and processes involving 
integrated/identified values are described as “autonomous”, on the basis that people feel 
self-determined in carrying out actions of this type. Within SDT processes resulting from 
autonomous motives are contrasted with other kinds of processes which people experience 
as either internally pressured or externally controlled (Ryan & Deci, 2000c, 2006). It is 
also asserted, within SDT, that people exhibit tendencies towards either autonomous or 
controlled regulation. Autonomy orientation refers to the tendency to regulate with a focus 
on intrinsic motives and endorsed values, whereas a control orientation involves focusing 
on how one ought to behave and how one is seen by others (Ryan & Connell, 1989; Ryan 
& Deci, 2006). 
This meaning of autonomy is clarified here because it is critical to the SDT paradigm, 
which is discussed in this literature review. Intrinsic motivation and other kinds of 
autonomous processes are seen as important components in creativity (Amabile, 1983, 
1996; Collins & Amabile, 1999; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Runco & Sakamoto, 1999; Ryan 
& Deci, 2000c; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). This meaning of autonomy is also relevant to 
interpreting the findings of the present study. However, the term “autonomy” is used with 
slightly different emphases or meanings by other authors whose views are presented in this 
review. 
A different, though possibly related, use of the term “autonomous”, occurs in the 
writing of Walter Ong (Ong, 1982). Ong discusses the idea of the “autonomous argument”, 
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which is the capacity to make arguments that challenge or differ from the communal 
knowledge of one’s tribe or group. Ong seems to be concerned with intellectual autonomy 
or objectivity more so than self-regulation. In the SDT paradigm “autonomy” is used as a 
descriptor of complex psychological, phenomenological and developmental processes, 
which are not specifically addressed in Ong’s way of using the term. Burnard and White 
(2008), use the term with a different emphasis again, where they discuss the requirement 
for teachers to experience “autonomy” in their teaching roles. This meaning of autonomy 
seems to refer to the desirability of teachers being granted enough flexibility in their roles 
to be able to apply professional discretion. Whilst these three ways of using the term 
“autonomy” share some common ground they do not seem to reflect equivalent meanings. 
2.3 THE CREATIVITY IMPERATIVES 
This section of the review is concerned with the reasons that have been, or are being, put 
forward as to why creativity is important for education. This part of the review relates to 
the rationale for investigation of teachers’ conceptions of creativity for it demonstrates 
that: 
a) more than one meaning of creativity is discussed in these arguments; 
b) the failure to apprehend the meaning of creativity in these arguments would 
limit the interpretation of the arguments; 
c) the issues discussed in some of these arguments indicate that there would be 
negative consequences for students, teachers and, in some cases, for education 
institutions if the arguments are not apprehended and acted upon by educators. 
Therefore the literature reviewed here points to the importance of identifying what is 
meant by creativity when expressed at the rhetorical level of creativity discourse. It also 
underscores the importance of supporting teachers’ interpretive capacities by investigating 
and describing variation in the ways creativity is understood. 
2.3.1 Psychological‐educational perspectives 
As noted in Chapter One, the literature is ambiguous on the topic of how long creativity 
has been of interest to educators. Some perspectives suggest that interest in creativity is 
quite a new educational trend (Noller & Isaksen, 1997). However, it is possible also to find 
perspectives suggesting that, to the contrary, educators have been interested in creativity in 
various times and places over the centuries. Albert (1983) observes, for example, that 
during the Renaissance educators became interested in cultivating persons of genius 
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through the education system. He suggests that this agenda mirrors modern day 
educational interest in encouraging giftedness and talent. In this sense there would appear 
to have been a long history of educational interest in creativity reaching back to the 
Renaissance, but possibly beyond (Albert, 1983; Craft, 2001). However, this section of the 
present review is mainly concerned with those psychology and education based rationales, 
which, over the past century or so, have argued for educational interest in creativity on the 
basis of perceived benefits for students and society. 
Five main themes found in psychological-educational arguments for educational interest 
in creativity are noted here. Some or all of these may overlap – and there are undoubtedly 
more that are not mentioned. For example, one theme which will not be discussed is the 
specific consideration of creativity within giftedness education. Creativity has been seen as 
important, more generally, in education on the basis that addressing students’ creativity 
would benefit them in one or more of the following five areas: 
Development: Creativity is seen as important in the development of the child or person. In 
some views creativity is seen as an optimal form of development 
Learning: Creativity is seen as important for quality and interest in learning; 
Thinking capacities: Creativity is seen as part of the spectrum of human thinking 
capacities (sometimes leading to socially/personally valuable performance and products) 
Life quality: Creativity is associated with quality of life and well-being; 
Flexibility in thinking: Creativity is linked to the kind of flexible thinking seen as 
necessary for living well in the current global climate of rapid cultural change. 
Each of these rationales will be briefly addressed in turn. 
Development: Amongst those who have theorised and investigated how creativity 
functions as an aspect of development are psychologists Lev Vygotsky (e.g.1971) and Jean 
Piaget (1953), both of whom have been extremely influential in the field of education. 
Both Piaget and Vygotsky were interested in how the child actively constructs knowledge 
of the world. A key area of difference between their views is summed up by Moran and 
John-Steiner (2003): “Whereas Piaget said that maturational development precedes 
learning and a child independently constructs his or her knowledge of the world, Vygotsky 
theorized that learning jumpstarted mental development and knowledge construction was a 
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social, cooperative venture” (p.1). Vygotsky was thus looking beyond the child to the 
broader social context, hypothesising that somehow development involves interaction 
between the socio-cultural and individual contexts. According to Moran and John-Steiner 
(2003), Vygotsky was interested in the use of the “creative imagination” in this 
developmental process. He saw development as something that does not happen in a 
vacuum but is both individual and social/cultural, both subjective and objective, both “the 
goal and the means of personal and cultural development” (Moran & John-Steiner, 2003, 
p.5). He also saw development as an open-ended process. Moran and John-Steiner (2003) 
regard Vygotsky’s thinking on development through personal and cultural creative 
transformation as pertinent to the work of education in the 21st century. 
Creativity has also been seen as important in education because it represents optimal 
development. This view was expressed in the humanistic tradition, which was articulated 
notably by Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1954, 1964) and Carl Rogers (Rogers, 1954). This 
perspective emphasised self-development and realisation of the self. The view that people 
can experience optimal development through creativity, or that creativity represents 
optimal development and should be encouraged in schools, are claims (or implications) 
commonly found in the creativity literature (Simonton, 2000b). Feldman (1999) sees the 
education system as one of seven environmental aspects contributing to the creative 
development of the person. 
Learning: A related argument, which is often raised in support of educational interest in 
creativity, is that creativity is important for interest and quality in learning – or to rephrase 
this relationship, interested and active learning is seen as quality learning, which is in itself 
understood as creative (Sefton-Green, 2008). The accomplishment of learning through 
active interest and creativity was central to the thinking of John Dewey (Savage, 2002). 
Dewey wrote on, amongst other creativity-related themes, the topic of Interest and effort in 
education (Dewey, 1913). Later in the 20th century the importance of interest for quality in 
learning was a central theme of recommendations for major educational reform in England 
as detailed in the Plowden Report (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1967). Craft 
(2008a) observes that although not aimed explicitly at creativity the impact of the report 
was that it “brought together an influential and deep-rooted collection of child-centred 
approaches to learning” and “influenced educational provision profoundly in terms of 
curriculum, learning, pedagogy including architecture, classroom organisation and 
management, nature and use of resources” (p.3). Subsequent “waves” of educational 
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interest in creativity (Craft, 2008a) have re-emphasised the value of interest as an aspect of 
learning (Jeffrey & Woods, 2003, 2009). 
Research has shown that interest or some form of active (as opposed to passive) 
learning does improve the quality of conceptual understanding (Benware & Deci, 1984; 
Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2000c). The implication that this type of learning 
is creative may have to do with the perception that active learning involves active 
transformation of knowledge rather than passive memorisation or absorption. In the UK, 
the term “creative learning” was recently employed as a banner for educational initiatives 
aimed at arousing renewed attention to interest and quality in learning. Craft (2008a) 
reports that UK educators have come to view the idea of “creative learning” as problematic 
because it cannot be distinguished from learning, as defined by constructivists. But she 
notes that the term “creative learning” has remained in use to highlight: 
… strategies and approaches to engage children and young people in 
stimulating, meaningful learning, developing generative and transformative 
dispositions and behaviours (Sefton-Green, 2008). Such strategies and 
approaches are harnessed so as to address a concern with student 
disengagement as one of the challenges for education identified as Europe-
wide (Kendall and Kinder, 2005). (Craft, 2008a, p.2) 
Thinking capacities: Guilford (1950) argued that creativity is a natural resource, which 
could be encouraged in education, but that this capacity does not simply emerge from IQ. 
In this view IQ represents only a part of the spectrum of human thinking capacities. 
Guilford proposed a complex model of the intellect, which acknowledged divergent, 
convergent and evaluative mental operations (Guilford, 1967, 1977). In line with the 
psychometric tradition of intelligence testing, Guilford and others, notably Torrance 
(Torrance, 1974, 1976), developed tests through which it was hoped to measure creative 
potential as divergent thinking ability. On one hand this kind of interest in creativity, as an 
aspect of intellect, may reflect the social interest in high level performance and 
technological innovation, which seems to have gained momentum in the mid 1900s 
(Shaheen, 2010). On the other hand, Guilford’s research interest in creativity also 
demonstrates concern with more accurately understanding human intelligence. 
It appears that enthusiasm for the “paper and pencil” assessment of creativity in 
education has declined (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Ryhammar and Brolin (1991) contend 
that after the 1960s there arose a pronounced loss of faith in divergent thinking tests as 
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instruments for identifying creative talent and also in the usefulness of personality-based 
research focused on eminence. However, the value of Guilford’s contribution to 
undermining the view that IQ equals intelligence can still be discerned. For example, 
recently, a group of researchers have made a case for the assessment of abstract/higher 
order thinking in school students on the basis of evidence from neuroscience, which 
suggests that “higher order” thinking capacities may not be evenly distributed in the 
population. The eight authors argue that currently favoured methods of assessment in 
schools target only rote-verbal skills and therefore perpetuate certain kinds of student 
disadvantage: “In school settings, students are typically evaluated using group achievement 
tests, IQ scales, and college entrance exams that focus more on rote-verbal skills (e.g. 
vocabulary, mathematical facts) than on higher level executive functions (e.g. abstract 
thinking, problem solving)” (Delis et al., 2007, p.29). They contend that students are not 
usually tested for both types of ability as it is assumed that both are aspects of general 
intelligence, which will show up in normal kinds of school assessment. However, they 
found, in their study of 470 school age students, groups of students showing strengths in 
one but not the other type of cognition. Part of their discussion is worth quoting in full for 
it illuminates the kinds of problems that current forms of assessment in schools may 
present for students with either form of “deficit”: 
The results suggest that a significant subgroup of school-age children exists 
who have relative strengths in more rote-verbal skills but who have relative 
weaknesses in their capacity for abstract, higher-level thinking. For these 
children, the current emphasis on IQ and achievement testing in our school 
systems likely results in academic promotions and honors for them without 
identifying and helping them in their areas of weaknesses. The current 
findings also suggest that there is another subgroup of children who could 
represent perhaps the most alarming fallout of our current school assessment 
practices. Specifically, a substantial number of youths likely have relative 
weaknesses in more rote-verbal skills but have strengths in higher-level 
executive functions such as abstract thinking, cognitive flexibility, and 
problem-solving skills. These children and adolescents are at risk for being 
hindered or precluded in their pursuit of higher levels of educational 
attainment in large part by the relatively low scores they obtain on IQ scales, 
group achievement tests, and college entrance exams. That is, these tests 
may represent roadblocks to areas of study that could benefit from the 
creativity that these students offer. It is not uncommon for these students to 
develop lower self esteem based on the scores they receive on these tests. 
(Delis et al., 2007, p. 37-38) 
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The authors reason further that, in contemporary society, many professions are in need 
of individuals with capabilities in higher level problem-solving skills. This situation 
demonstrates the value of thinking broadly about the nature of intelligence and recognising 
that some students may have strengths or weaknesses in the more “creative” thought 
processes, which Delis et al. define as higher executive functions believed to be governed 
within the frontal lobes of the human brain. The arguments presented by Delis and 
colleagues provide a strong rationale for paying attention to assessment and its role in 
encouraging or discouraging such creative operations, which appear to form part of the 
human thinking spectrum. 
Another instance of this kind of approach to elaborating on the understanding of human 
intelligence is evident in Howard Gardner’s perspective on multiple intelligences (Gardner, 
1983). In this perspective Gardner proposes that people have different kinds of 
intelligence. Some of these, such as kinesthetic intelligence, may be unrelated to the types 
of abilities usually assessed in tests of general intelligence. Both Guilford’s and Gardner’s 
efforts may be seen as attempts to understand human abilities/intelligence in a broader 
way, which allows for the identification of specific strengths and the development of 
enabling practices in relation to encouraging students’ abilities. Gardner has related these 
distinct “intelligences” to people’s different areas of creative work and achievement. 
Gardner (1993) examined the creative trajectories of seven influential creators who reflect 
differing intelligence profiles. Policastro and Gardner (1999) noted that creative 
contribution is often related to some kind of “fruitful asynchrony”, which a person 
evidences relative to the wider populace. They suggest that asynchronous thought and 
capacities can underpin a person’s ability to see things differently from others or do some 
things better than others. They contend that as every person is unique, everyone can 
potentially contribute to society in some unique way. The rationale for educational interest 
in creativity expressed in these perspectives, then, is firstly, that creative thinking and 
problem-solving is part of the spectrum of human thinking capacities and, secondly, that 
creative contribution may often be linked to individual thinking capacities, profiles and 
potentials. Creativity, seen this way, can therefore be supported in educational contexts. 
Life quality: Recent investigations have linked creativity to quality of life. One of the main 
arguments here is that regular experience of “flow”, which can occur when people are 
focused on meaningful, optimally challenging activities or work conduces towards a sense 
of fulfilment or satisfaction (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990, 1996; Nakamura & 
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Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). A number of (Western and Eastern) studies indicate that people 
who regularly experience flow report higher levels of meaning in life or higher well-being 
relative to people who report little or no experience of flow (Asakawa, 2004; Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Doing something enjoyable and interesting on a regular basis 
seems to be related to higher levels of experienced well-being and has been identified as a 
reliable strategy in the pursuit of happiness (Lyubomirsky, et al., 2005). In some 
educational contexts, such as Montessori schools, interventions are being sought and 
developed to harness the value of flow for students (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). 
The Self-determination theory (SDT) perspective on well-being distinguishes between 
“hedonic” well-being (happiness) and “eudaimonic” well-being (fulfilment, self-
regulation) (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008). These authors contend that 
thinking in terms of flow experiences is not quite enough. They suggest that it is important 
to consider the support of basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness and 
autonomy. They argue that flow theory does not give adequate consideration to the “what” 
and “why” of goal pursuits and observe that how people approach goals is an important 
aspect of attaining eudaimonic well-being – that is, a sense of wholeness and meaning, 
rather than just fun or happiness (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Flexibility: Among the most vociferous psychology-based arguments for educational 
interest in creativity in recent times revolves around the need for flexible thinking and an 
internal centre of balance as a means of coping with the speed of cultural change and the 
ambiguity of cultural futures (Craft, 1997, 2008a; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008; Moran & 
John-Steiner, 2003; Runco, 2004a). Runco (2004a) states that “creative ideation allows the 
individual to remain flexible” and that “the flexibility of creative persons is what gives 
them the capacity to cope with the advances, opportunities, technologies, and changes that 
are a part of our current day-to-day lives” (p.658). Moran and John-Steiner (2003) see 
creativity as a necessity for psychological health in the present cultural milieu, which is 
characterised by “fast-paced change”, diversity, and having to deal with ambiguous 
futures. 
These reasons for educational attention to creativity may be summarised as arguing that: 
creativity is part of human development, creativity is related to interest and quality in 
learning, creativity is part of the spectrum of thinking capacities, creativity is part of 
quality in life, and creativity contributes to living well by maintaining flexibility in the 
modern world. These arguments or themes may overlap depending on the paradigms on 
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which they are based. Vygotsky’s view of creative development, for example, touches on 
most of these themes. Although each of these benefits is attributed to “creativity” it is not 
clear exactly what meanings of creativity are relevant in each case or whether any given 
meaning of creativity is applicable across all of the rationales. 
2.3.2 The Media Massage 
Attention will now be given to claims that have been made about the relation of creativity 
to old and new media. This section of the review looks at how creativity is conceptualised 
and discussed in media-theoretical accounts, such as the work of Marshall McLuhan. The 
section title, The Media Massage, is a direct reference to McLuhan’s ideas about “the 
message” of the medium (e.g. McLuhan, 1964b), which he alternatively conceptualised as 
the “massage” of media (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967). The aim in this section is to draw 
attention to the diverse meanings of creativity that are applied, within the literature of 
media theory, when observations are made about connections between creativity and 
media. In so doing this section of the review will also highlight the need for taking an 
interpretive approach when engaging with discourse around creativity and its relation to 
media and culture. 
Educators are faced with a plethora of arguments about the place of creativity in the 
global environment. Sometimes these arguments appear to be in conflict. It has been 
argued that creativity is important to countries for their economic competitiveness in the 
global economy (Florida, 2002, 2005; Shaheen, 2010). But it is also argued that creativity 
may be a construct linked to Western “individualistic” ideologies and therefore of lesser 
importance from a “collectivist” perspective (Craft, 2003). It has been suggested that the 
encouragement of creativity in some Asian cultures is impeded by Confucian teachings, 
collectivist outlook and focus on basic skills in education (Cheng, 2004). But it is also 
asserted that the notion that Asians are collectivist and impeded in their creativity by 
cultural ideologies is formed on the basis of an unfounded Western view of the Asian 
stereotype (Lau, Hui, & Ng, 2004). Some argue that collectivism-individualism is not a 
distinction that applies only across cultures, but is observable within Western and Eastern 
cultures (Lau et al., 2004; Triandis, 2006). However, it is claimed that as exposure to the 
mass media increases worldwide, those areas of the world that are currently described as 
collectivist are likely to become increasingly less collectivist and more individualistic in 
outlook (Triandis, 2006). Bruns (2008) observes that in the wake of the new electronic 
media and its penetration into the affairs of nations around the world, a global 
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“Renaissance” is occurring within which many cultural institutions and areas are being 
redefined through the “bottom-up” or “grass-roots” forms of creative activity which these 
new media support. He claims further that the creativity occurring within the new, global, 
electronic media environment is bringing industrial models of politics, production and 
education unstuck. Of particular concern, for educators, is the claim that the creative new 
media environment requires that teachers develop new approaches to educational provision 
and teaching (Bruns, 2008). 
Perhaps because some of these arguments seem to conflict, the educational response to 
the issue of new media and its relation to creativity, has been uncertain. For example, in 
response to the considerable debate about whether the Western interest in creativity should 
be regarded as an individualistic, capitalist perspective that is in some way ethnocentric 
and colonialist in its assumptions (Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, & Kaplan, 2003), 
Craft (2003) argued that this may represent a limiting factor for the focus on creativity in 
Western education. Also, whilst scholars acknowledge that technological change has 
become a central aspect of the complex creativity-related issues that now confront 
education (Banaji & Burn, 2007; Bruns, 2008; Bryant, 1998; Craft, 2008b; Jenkins, et al., 
2009; McWilliam & Haukka, 2008), as Banaji and Burn (2007) observe, educators express 
varying kinds of response to the idea that education has a part to play in mediating the 
relation between creativity and communication technology: 
Additionally, it becomes apparent through a closer look at discourses of 
creativity which appeal to the potentials of technology that wider social 
concerns are never far from the minds of those who work with children and 
technology and that these concerns can lead in several directions. This leads 
for some to uniform approval and enthusiasm about information and 
communication technology’s innate creativity; for others to a wholesale 
rejection of the notion that any technology can be creative; and for yet others 
to the need for an understanding of technological potential in given social, 
cultural and psychological circumstances (p.69). 
These authors suggest that teachers’ various concerns about technology and its effects 
on students and society may lead them to unreflectively embrace or reject the idea that 
technology has potentials for enhancing creativity. 
However, such responses may often reflect a narrow reading of what is being asserted 
about the links between computing and creativity. In reading the arguments narrowly many 
educators may be overlooking issues of critical importance for education. For example, it 
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is sometimes argued that traditional forms of educational provision cannot cope with the 
needs of the information society (Bryant, 1998; Burnard & White, 2008; Craft, 2008a, 
2008b; Jenkins, et al., 2009). Indeed it is argued that educational institutions are under 
threat of degeneration or collapse due to the role of new media in facilitating the 
widespread generation and dissemination of information outside the borders of formal 
education (Bruns, 2011). With such dire possibilities facing education, there is a degree of 
urgency to the argument that there is a need for educators with the capabilities and 
resources to read deeply into, and respond to, these issues (Bruns, 2011; Craft, 2008a). 
Bruns (2011) observes that in the current media environment, where information is widely 
generated and shared by “non-experts”, educators also need to be aware of important 
changes to their teaching roles. Firstly, he points out that teachers stand to lose their 
privileged positions as experts. He argues that this is because “knowledge”, or information, 
is no longer perceived to be a scarce commodity. But, he argues further that, nonetheless, 
teachers have an important role to play in computer-mediated society, because they are in a 
position to influence the quality of the content that people produce. Bruns argues that 
teachers need to help students to become more critical and capable builders and 
disseminators of information. 
Given that the use of electronic media technology is increasing worldwide it seems 
important to consider how this trend may be influencing cultural patterns even in 
collectivist or developing countries (Triandis, 2006, 2011). As a precursor to considering 
the educational and global implications of the many “creativities” which are seen to be at 
work in the new, information rich, electronic media environment, the following section of 
the review explores the reasons behind some theorists’ claims that communication 
technologies have been involved in a general trend towards more “creative” human 
consciousness (McLuhan, 1964a, 1964b; Ong, 1982). In these arguments it is suggested 
that there are connections between the media people use and the consciousness of users. 
These views are addressed because they suggest that in a changing media environment 
there are reasons for expecting changes in people’s “consciousness” regardless of 
economic or colonialist agendas. Through such arguments media can be linked, not only to 
the creativity observed to be happening in the world, but also to Triandis’ (2006, 2011) 
suggestion that media can be involved in shifts from “collectivism” to “individualism”. 
However, as argued in the rationale for the present study, it is necessary to take an 
interpretive approach in order to apprehend what these authors mean by “creativity”. 
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2.3.2.1 From oral conservatism to electronic creativity 
Our new electronic environment compels commitment and participation, and 
fulfills man’s psychic and social needs at profound levels. 
Marshall McLuhan, The Playboy Interview (1969). 
In the 1960s, before the emergence of the Internet, media theorist Marshall McLuhan made 
a number of seemingly prophetic statements about the social effects of the continuing use 
and development of electronic media – predictions which included his vision of a shift 
toward greater cultural diversity and creativity (McLuhan, 1964a, 1964b; Norden, 1969). 
In an interview with journalist Eric Norden for Playboy Magazine (Norden, 1969) – a 
resource which is referenced here because in it McLuhan gives a cogent and approachable 
synthesis of his ideas – McLuhan claimed that significant new technologies tend to 
“penetrate” societies and “saturate” their institutions. On this basis he envisioned cultural 
shifts of such magnitude in the wake of global saturation by the electronic media, that he 
predicted trauma and identity crises for both younger and older generations. He was not 
talking only about what might happen as electronic media penetrates remote areas of the 
world. McLuhan was of the opinion that, as a logical consequence of the shift to 
electronically mediated communication, students habituated to the electronic age would 
find it difficult to engage deeply with the printed form and would tend to resist the 
traditions of print culture. But in addition to, and partly because of, this cultural trauma he 
envisaged that the electronic media would foster a cultural climate conducive to creativity. 
Why did McLuhan think that media could have these effects? What is his understanding 
of the relation between media and consciousness? McLuhan believed that through our 
technologies, we humans “extend” aspects of our capacities and that in return our 
extensions shape us (McLuhan, 1964b). One of the central notions in McLuhan’s 
perspective on media is the idea that societies are shaped more by the media they use, than 
by the content communicated. This is apparently the idea encapsulated in his now famous 
phrase “the medium is the message” (McLuhan, 1964b), which later appeared in modified 
form as a book title: The Medium is the Massage (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967). Reflecting on 
the two versions Ong (1982) indicates that the latter pronouncement more closely conveys 
McLuhan’s awareness of the complex subjective and inter-subjective operations inherent 
in communication. McLuhan’s message was that communications media work on us like a 
subtle massage. He was concerned about the degree to which people tend, in general, to be 
 45
unaware of change in the media environment and oblivious to the extent of its effects on 
themselves and others. 
So why did McLuhan think that the electronic age would also be a time of great 
creativity (Norden, 1969)? McLuhan had studied communication in early oral cultures 
(cultures without writing) and traced some of the key changes that had occurred, as he saw 
them, through the history of early literacy up to medieval times (McLuhan, 2009). In the 
interview with Norden (Norden, 1969), McLuhan first recounts his historical perspective 
on the differences between “oral” cultures and “literate” cultures. He then argues that the 
development of writing and the use of print technologies had played a large part in 
promoting the kind of consciousness wherein individuals see it as possible to establish 
their own views and inner worlds separately from their wider community or “tribe”. It is 
largely in this sense that McLuhan saw literate consciousness as more “creative” than the 
consciousness of orality. McLuhan is really talking about a kind of intellectual autonomy 
or tendency towards objectivity and experimentation. Whilst he saw Western print culture 
as one that has promoted individualism and specialisation he also regarded the print culture 
of the West as fragmented and lacking a sense of communality. He believed that, by 
contrast, the electronic media would have a “retribalizing” effect, blending human 
consciousness into a global, tribal sense of oneness. At the same time the electronic media 
would have a freeing effect conducive to creativity. 
McLuhan, as revealed in the interview (Norden, 1969), believed that “creativity” would 
become ubiquitous, as the artists and writers who have historically been the ones to “sniff 
out” environmental change and relate it back to the masses, would be joined by many 
others in performing this work. Here McLuhan envisioned the spread of the kind of 
consciousness, which can be critically aware and creative because it has access to a broad 
range of perspectives, is aware of cultural content as changeable and sees itself as a 
separate knowing entity. It should be added here that creativity researchers have articulated 
that major creative work usually requires the belief that culture is changeable (Feldman, 
1999) and is favoured in climates characterised by diversity (Simonton, 1999). But it is 
important to note that creativity researchers have usually been interested in a view of 
creativity as the development of new and valuable products (Mayer, 1999) whilst 
McLuhan is also thinking of creativity in terms of “consciousness” – in particular, what 
people know or understand about the nature of knowledge and communication. McLuhan 
makes an interesting observation in the Playboy interview when he discusses the shifts in 
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consciousness which must have taken place when images of the Earth were first beamed 
back from space. Such images, he argued, could not have failed to change our 
understanding of our place in the universe. This is the kind of distinction that McLuhan 
tries to convey when he discusses differences between the way information and culture are 
understood in an oral environment vs. how they came to be seen in a print environment vs. 
an electronic media environment. He envisaged that, as a result of such media-related 
shifts in consciousness, the inhabitants of the electronic age would scrutinise and overturn 
ideals from the print age – ideals such as the ideal of “progress.” 
Throughout his discussion it is clear McLuhan was not thinking of creativity as 
something that only a few can do. He was emphasising a view of creativity as intellectual 
autonomy and widespread cultural participation. What he saw as remarkable about 
individual, creative participation in critiquing and contributing to the cultural matrix itself 
is that such a thing was unthinkable to all but a few in the age of print and virtually 
impossible before writing – that is, in the media environment of orality. From his 
perspective, the physical and mental media environments, which grew up around writing, 
then print and most recently the electronic media have all tended in some way to be more 
conducive, than the environment of orality, to promoting objectivity and the freedom to 
experiment with “knowledge”. 
It could be objected that having a sense of freedom to experiment with knowledge could 
arise simply from having access to a variety of perspectives and not really from any 
properties of media per se. Perhaps the way to think about this is that McLuhan’s media 
theory grew from trying to understand differences between how people thought in oral 
times and how people thought once writing had developed. It does not really propose that 
media has properties that determine how people will think. McLuhan argued that the 
difference between oral thought and literate thought, as we can observe it historically, can 
largely be explained via the involvement of writing technology in how people habitually 
construct thoughts, view knowledge, view themselves and view the world – much of which 
is taken for granted whilst people inhabit their respective media environments. He was 
really talking about what is and is not in people’s awareness with respect to knowledge and 
communication and what has changed as people have embraced additional media 
technologies. 
The contribution of Walter Ong (1982) to the interest in understanding differences 
between the consciousness of orality (never having any contact with, or awareness of, 
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writing) and the consciousness of literacy, was the development of a set of characteristics 
delimiting critical areas or dimensions of difference between “thought and expression” in 
these two cases. Ong’s (1982) book Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word 
illuminates the differences between “pristine” oral thought and later literate consciousness 
and teases out why it is that orality promotes a communal and conservative or traditionalist 
mindset and why, by contrast, modern literate thought can be seen as more creative in 
some ways. Such questions were also explored in detail by anthropologist Jack Goody in 
his 1977 book The Domestication of the Savage Mind. It should again be stressed that in 
discussing orality-literacy contrasts these authors were not simply discussing differences in 
the act of speaking and the act of writing. They were concerned with what it is like to live 
and think in a world where no-one has seen a “word”, where no-one has a mental 
representation of words in their heads and there is no means of recording knowledge in 
written form. 
These authors’ views are worth noting from the perspective that they suggest that 
through the media people accommodate to themselves their “consciousness” changes. Ong 
(1982) believed that complex “psychodynamics” are implicated in the interrelations 
between humans and their media and that one of the identifiable differences between 
“oral” thought and “literate” thought, as it has developed over time, has been a drift 
towards greater “creativity”. Contrary to views implicating a colonialist Western agenda 
behind such change in the world, this media perspective suggests that such change in 
consciousness simply happens, whether people are aware or not that it is happening to 
them. 
Ong (1982) and Goody (1977) argued that the conditions of orality inhibit intellectual 
experimentation with the accumulated knowledge of the tribe or community whilst, 
relatively speaking, the conditions of print and electronic culture conduce towards it. 
According to Ong, people who live without a means of recording their thoughts must 
invest a great deal of time and energy in saying things over and over in order to remember 
them and keep them for future generations, for “conceptualized knowledge that is not 
repeated aloud soon vanishes” (Ong, 1982, p.41). It is this need, he argued, that has 
promoted a highly traditionalist mindset in oral cultures. 
Ong (1982) observed that the speech and thought forms, which arise spontaneously in 
oral cultures (and/or cultures high in oral residue) because they aid memorization, are not 
particularly conducive to innovation. He noted that whereas written arguments can be 
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sparse in form, because the reader can use the writing itself as a source for reference if a 
point is missed or forgotten, in oral discourse, the content of communication must be made 
memorable through what is uttered (or performed) and thus tends to be repetitive. Oral 
communication tends to be “additive” rather than “subordinative”, Ong observed, by which 
he meant that rather than using words such as when, while or thus to form nuanced 
narrative flow, oral narrative tends to use a lot of “ands”. He pointed out that the additive 
character of oral communication is preserved and observable in the Biblical book of 
Genesis. This, and other characteristics, made/make oral expression, “cumbersome and 
tiresomely redundant because of its aggregative weight” (Ong, 1982, p38). Ong argued 
further that oral thought favours the use of formulary elements, such as “epithets” and 
“type” characters in stories, which are important tools of the oral thinker. These formulas, 
he said, are “incessant” in oral thought, forming “the substance of thought itself” (Ong, 
1982, p.35). He claimed, moreover, that when such formulas are established in an oral 
culture they are not meant to be disassembled. Once they have become part of shared 
communal understanding any thoughts that might possibly be built without the use of 
mnemonic formulas can only be “passing thoughts” (Ong, 1982, p.35). Goody (1977) 
doubted seriously whether, within the constraints of oral discourse, it would be possible to 
build a critical tradition that could be contemplated by others. 
Ong suggested, in Orality and Literacy, that reading and writing are conducive to 
reflection and attention to the inner self (interiority) and that writing and print gave rise to 
the “autonomous” argument. In Ong’s perspective, autonomous argumentation is the point 
of view developed at a distance from the world of communal discourse. In the early days 
of the development of writing, observers commented on the difference between the 
“warmth” of the spoken word and the “coldness” and detachment of the written word 
(McNicholl, 2003; Ong, 1982). Writing was observed to “freeze” the processes of oral 
communication. It is mentioned, for example, in the Biblical New Testament, in 2 
Corinthians 3:6 that “The letter kills but the spirit gives life” (Ong, 1982, p.80). Speech 
was seen as “alive”, written texts as inanimate (McNicholl, 2003). However, writing also 
lends itself to the making of nuanced and sequential argumentation and reflection. Thus, 
while early writers, such as Plato, bemoaned aspects of writing, at the same time their 
consciousness had been transformed by the use of writing (McNicholl, 2003; Ong, 1982). 
Plato and other early literates were able to argue the way they did because they were 
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readers and writers. McNicholl (2003) notes, however, that writing was regarded as useful 
but inferior to speech. 
McNicholl (2003) argues that understanding the world through collectively maintained 
mythologies went hand-in-hand with understanding consciousness as co-extensive with the 
“body” and the “person”. He argues that in Plato’s words and thought, we can observe a 
shift away from this outlook. Plato begins to locate different aspects of consciousness in 
different parts of the body: 
Plato distinguishes between the immortal and mortal parts of the soul. These 
parts of the soul are separated by being located in different parts of the body 
… The immortal part of the soul, the rational or intellectual, is located in the 
head. The mortal part of the soul is in turn divided into two parts 
corresponding to the divisions in the Republic. The spirited part is located in 
the chest, and is separated from the rational immortal part by the neck. The 
appetitive part is located in the belly, and is separated from the spirited part 
by the midriff (McNicholl, 2003, p.140). 
McNicholl notes how Plato divides the intellect, locating the superior reasoning aspect of 
intellect – which is also immortal and Divine – in the head, and the more emotional and 
bodily drives are located elsewhere in the body. Elucidated also in McNicholl’s thesis is a 
shift in the meaning of truth from truthfulness as something that inheres in the utterances 
of “persons of authority” to truth as something that is evaluated via sense-making. Some of 
Plato’s arguments therefore seem to parallel those of much more contemporary scholars 
and educators, who argue for the superiority of sense-making and deep learning over the 
accumulation of facts and surface approaches to learning (Biggs, 1987; Marton & Saljo, 
1976; Prosser & Trigwell, 1999), and for the greater value of mindfulness over blind 
acceptance (Langer, 1989, 2000). 
Whereas the oral communicator was “immersed unconsciously in communal structures” 
(Ong, 1982, p.175), Ong sees literate consciousness as one that is simultaneously separate 
and communally involved. Today the autonomous authorial argument, developed in 
relative detachment from the community, is accepted as normal. Thus, in the way Ong 
(1982) sees it, contemporary creativity has a certain character – it is reliant on a particular 
autonomous state of mind and has a community value that could not have emerged within 
the constraints of an oral “noetic” (thinking) economy. 
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But is the state of orality itself of much interest to us today given that most of the world 
is, to varying degrees, literate? The orality consciousness continues to be important to us 
today because the content and practices of many contemporary and historically important 
institutions, the world over, such as religion and education, originated in the oral past 
(Hawkes, 1977; Ong, 1982). We may not be able to fully and accurately understand early 
oral utterances, whilst we peer at them through the lenses of our literate bias (Ong, 1982). 
Nonetheless Ong (1982) argued that oral and literate communication does differ and that 
cultures and groups of people vary in the degree to which life and communication are tied 
to oral tradition and oral dynamics of communication. He claimed that most cultures reflect 
“residual orality” to different degrees – and that oral residue is reflected particularly in the 
degree of reliance on memorisation in a culture’s educational practices. 
The foregoing perspectives suggest that the media one uses does matter in ways that 
have little to do with the “content”. Media seems to matter in terms of such things as how 
one habitually structures thoughts, one’s expectations about where to find knowledge, how 
to retain knowledge, whether one feels immersed in group norms or more like an objective 
observer, one’s understandings about what is more important in one’s culture: speaking or 
writing? If the broad thrust of such arguments is applied to the contemporary situation it 
could be suggested that with the advent of new media will have come conditions with the 
potential to engender change in “consciousness”. This could be an important matter for 
educators if practices deemed relevant to education in the past are retained unreflectively 
in such a way as to be counterproductive in the present. As McLuhan understood it, we can 
continue seeing and doing things in certain ways, unaware that our way of seeing has 
become “obsolete” (McLuhan & McLuhan, 1992). Back in the 1960s McLuhan regarded 
print-focused education and print-focused educators as already obsolete (Norden, 1969). 
Whilst in 1955 McLuhan declared that the complexity of communication effects made it 
impossible to predict how communication shifts would manifest socially (McLuhan, 1955) 
he often appeared oracle-like in his ability to mentally model the interrelations between 
technology, mind, body, knowledge, and culture and then predict a given “future” on the 
basis of a change in one or more of the parts of the model (Logan, 2011). Eventually, he 
formalised some of his evaluative technique in the posthumously published Laws of Media 
(McLuhan & McLuhan, 1992). McLuhan suggested that understanding the ecological 
significance of a technology could be approached by considering four aspects: What the 
technology enhances, what it makes obsolete, what it retrieves or recovers from 
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obsolescence, and what it “flips” into when “pushed to extremes” (McLuhan & McLuhan, 
1992). The “laws” imply a kind of closure or balance in the ecology of humanity and its 
technologies. As something is pushed out other things surface or re-emerge. How one 
might work with McLuhan’s tetrad of laws cannot be discussed here, but a number of 
scholars have continued to work in this tradition (e.g. Levinson, 1999; Logan, 2011). 
McLuhan predicted, for his future, that the media “environment” which was 
characterised and delimited by the primacy of television and the printed book, would be 
superseded by an environment infused and delimited by the primacy of electronically 
encoded information and instantaneous information retrieval (McLuhan, 1964b). He 
predicted that television and the book would become part of the obsolete “content” of the 
new environment. He also anticipated increased “creativity”. He considered that creativity 
would be catalysed and expressed within the electronic media environment via dissension 
and disagreement, cultural diversity, cultural trauma, cultural participation and cultural 
transformation. Castells (2004) has since suggested that creativity, as an “emergent” skill 
or necessity, must be expected in an era where information is stored in data-base 
repositories outside the person. 
Ong (1982) envisioned that the consciousness shifts he had observed would be 
maintained in a “creative” direction, towards interiority, towards what might be described 
as cultural objectivity or intellectual autonomy. But he did predict also that humanity was 
entering an era of “secondary orality” where communication would combine reliance on 
the more visual literacy aspects (reading, writing) with the re-emergence of reliance on 
oral-aural communication. 
When considered from these perspectives it seems reasonable for these theorists to have 
anticipated that the electronic age would be a creative time. Whilst educators have 
interpreted this message in different ways (Banaji, 2008), the message assumes greater 
educational relevance and weight when read as referring to relations between creativity and 
ecologies of the media context, than when seen as a blanket prescription that computers 
have some kind of inherent ability to enhance creativity. 
The nature of contemporary creative activity might be seen as distinguishable from 
creativity before the advent of electronic media technologies in terms of the degree of 
freedom people have to alter, contribute to or challenge knowledge itself. Some of our 
thinking might be changing on the basis of what our technological extensions allow us to 
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do. There might be change in our thinking on the basis of the “tools” that undergird 
thinking and how those tools are implicated in how we gain access to information, our 
exposure to cultural diversity, the value that accrues to “creativity” in such an environment 
and the speed and/or magnitude of cultural change acting as an impetus to creative thinking 
and problem-solving. 
Although McLuhan saw value in creativity and in the creative possibilities inherent in a 
diverse global environment, he declared that he was not particularly enamoured of 
electronic culture nor of the “maelstrom”, as he termed it, into which he saw humanity 
descending in the creative, electronic age (Norden, 1969). He acknowledged that his was 
an intellect shaped by, and comfortable in many ways, with print culture. However, he saw 
it as inevitable that massive environmental, social and psychic change would accompany 
the saturation of cultures by electronic media and he espoused taking a position of 
“detached involvement” when studying media. Detached involvement, he observed, is 
unlike the polarised, immersed thinking of orality and therefore precisely the kind of non-
reactive state of mind that literate culture has made possible. He regarded it as a valuable 
mindset for “survival” and for making diagnoses in the times ahead. He suggested also that 
complaining about the changing media environment achieves nothing. However, he opined 
that it is necessary to study the changing media environment and to adapt media potentials 
where possible to serve humanity or – as he put it in the closing paragraphs of the Norden 
interview – to charge in and kick the media in “the electrodes”. This is perhaps a fitting 
attitude for educators to assume also as they attempt to make sense of the relation between 
creativity and the “new media” and the parts these are playing in cultural change. 
2.3.2.2 New media creativities 
New technologies are providing unprecedented access to ideas, information, 
people and organisations throughout the world, as well as to new modes of 
creativity, personal expression, cultural exchange and understanding. 
(NACCCE, 1999, p.7) 
This sub-section of the literature review explores the ways in which the “new media” may 
be understood as connected to “creativity”. On what bases might it be claimed that the new 
media support, engender or demand creativity? Whilst there may be many “sites” of 
creative activity not mentioned in the ensuing overview, the purpose here is not to point to 
all possible sites of creation in the contemporary media environment, but to indicate some 
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of the effects of new media to which the term “creative” has been, or might be, applied. 
Hence, as the title suggests, the section aims to show where new media supports not 
“creativity” but “creativities”. The concern is to identify capacities, attitudes or ways of 
thinking which could be described as creative and are either peculiar to the environment of 
“new” media or are aspects of human creative thinking which may be intensified by new 
media. In doing so it is hoped to underscore that there is a need for teachers to become 
interpreters of creativity discourse. 
The secret to distinguishing between “new” and “old” electronic media, says Flew 
(2005), is to think beyond the delivery technologies themselves to what the technologies 
allow people to do and what people are doing with them. The “new” technologies allow 
people to access information, to do things with information and to interact with other 
people. The Internet is one of the central aspects of new media in this respect (Flew, 2005), 
but mobile phones are another major, versatile technology with interactive potentials 
(Flew, 2005; Pesce & Fraser, 2005). The particular perspectives highlighted here indicate 
that creativity and information technology are implicated in cultural change in a variety of 
ways – some in a passive or unintentional way and some where people are motivated to 
problem-solve or contribute content which then becomes communal property. 
The term “creativity” may seem vague and overworked in this context (Banaji & Burn, 
2007), but where linkages have been posited between creativity and technology it is often 
in the sense that information technology and creativity have come together to contribute to 
rapid cultural change (NACCCE, 1999) and may be predicted to do so into the future. In 
this sense creative thinking may be regarded as both an agent of change and a product of 
the current technology-infused, information-rich, changing cultural environment. Others 
have argued that creative thinking is desirable, if not essential, for survival in the current 
climate of cultural change (Moran & John-Steiner, 2003; Runco, 2004a), which suggests 
that creativity is also being seen as something to be cultivated or nurtured, as an adaptive 
response to environmental change. This section of the review looks at some of the more 
specific linkages that have been made between new media, creativity and culture. A 
meaning of “creativity” as autonomous thinking or contribution enabled by new media 
comes through in some of these linkages. 
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2.3.2.2.1 Creativity as passive transformation 
Some commentary suggests that aspects of new media support elements of creativity, such 
as transformations in thinking or exchange of ideas, which are taking place outside 
people’s awareness. New media has been linked to the presence of an increasingly fertile 
global environment for creativity, through its potential to support “weak ties” – which may 
be thought of as brief or infrequent connections between people with low levels of 
emotional entanglement (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). New electronic media provisions 
make it possible for people who may never have met, to establish narrow connections 
around such areas as mutual interests or work related knowledge. This kind of contact 
increases people’s exposure to diverse information (Dewett, 2003; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 
2003). 
In addition, electronic communications allow people to stay in contact with friends and 
family, even while living far apart and are therefore believed to be contributing to the 
emergence of new, less physically and culturally bound forms of community (Wang & 
Wellman, 2010). Under such conditions a certain amount of unconscious change in 
people’s ideas and thinking could occur, which could be regarded as involving 
transformations, of a creative nature. Weisberg (1999), for example, has argued that 
creativity relies on the knowledge people have in their heads, which at any time may 
combine in an unexpected way with aspects of a given situation to produce a new 
combination of elements. Finke (1996) demonstrated the human capacity to create 
“emergent” structures at an imaginative level, thus generating previously unimagined 
combinations of objects or ideas. Transformations of this kind may not be observed by 
anyone at the time they occur but arguably have the potential to contribute to cultural 
change in a passive way. 
Simonton (2000b) has observed that diverse cultural environments tend to loosen 
people’s sense of social constraints and are therefore conducive to creativity. Within such 
environments the potential arises for more active forms of creativity as well. Simonton’s 
research has shown that creativity, in the form of innovation, increases in times of cultural 
diversity. 
2.3.2.2.2 Convergence and produsage: Creativity as acting in the cultural sphere 
Two perspectives which emphasise how the new media relates to more active forms of 
creativity, are Jenkins’ (2006) observations of “convergence culture” and Bruns’ (2008) 
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proposal of a “produsage” model of user-led cultural content creation. Both of these 
perspectives take account of how the creative activity of individuals and groups is 
increasingly implicated in cultural processes. Cultural change is further assisted by the 
capacity of new media to support rapid “peer-to-peer” distribution of cultural content – that 
is, Bruns explains, intensification of “the perhaps fundamental, innate human tendency to 
share what interests, excites, and entertains us” (Bruns, 2008, p.244). 
Jenkins (2006) explains patterns of contemporary cultural change in terms of 
“convergence” processes. In his view, what happens culturally is seen as increasingly 
constellated around the selective, creative and social activity of individuals. He coins the 
term “affective economics” thus making explicit the role that affect – what people like, 
don’t like and what they like to do – now has in shaping cultural activity. It has been noted 
that consumers have always exerted some sort of control commercially and culturally, but 
that their creative role has been more on the receiving end of things (Bruns, 2008; Jenkins, 
2006). Consumers have usually been thought of as exerting little force over how things are 
done culturally and commercially and the business world has been able to depend on 
relatively stable consumer patterns to predict target audience consumption behaviour. 
Jenkins describes how this situation is changing in relation to media consumption: 
Convergence requires media companies to rethink old assumptions about 
what it means to consume media, assumptions that shape both programming 
and marketing decisions. If old consumers were assumed to be passive, the 
new consumers are active. If old consumers were predictable and stayed 
where you told them to stay, then new consumers are migratory, showing a 
declining loyalty to networks or media. If old consumers were isolated 
individuals, the new consumers are more socially connected. If the work of 
media consumers was once silent and invisible, the new consumers are now 
noisy and public (Jenkins, 2006, pp.18-19). 
In Jenkins’ opinion, what differs significantly now is the opportunity for media 
consumers to act in the cultural sphere, to do things in a visible way with the media they 
enjoy and to interact with others, sometimes building knowledge or content with others in 
like-minded groups and sometimes sharing information across social networks. Fan 
communities have emerged as particularly active groups in contemporary social and 
economic culture. Jenkins (2006) observes that new technology has made it possible for 
individuals to engage with large fan communities over new media platforms and for fan 
cultures to shape the behaviour of media producers. Some fan communities and 
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communities of practice have proven resistant to commercial manipulation. Media 
producers, Jenkins observes, have demonstrated uncertainty in how to deal with this new, 
assertive consumer and have pursued a variety of strategies in response to the new 
consumer behaviour. 
As Bruns (2008) points out, consumers were probably never really just consumers at all. 
Our tendency to frame knowledge and cultural activity in terms of production and 
consumption can perhaps be related to the suggestion from Ong (1982) that text “freezes” 
the word contributing to the illusion that “knowledge” is encapsulated and frozen in 
artefacts/documents. In this way of thinking about knowledge, knowledge is contained 
where it is recorded, whilst creativity – in the sense of activity that builds new knowledge 
– becomes visible where new knowledge is reified and recognised. Stacey (1996, 2001) 
argues against the usefulness of this view of knowledge and creativity, insisting that 
knowledge is not contained in artefacts, but grows in interactions between people. Bruns 
(2008) expresses similar views, seeing knowledge development as an ongoing and fluid, 
interactive process. 
Bruns (2008) also points to the role of industrial age production practices in embedding 
a “production” model rather than an interactive model of content development: “power 
structures in the production value chain were very strongly slanted in favor of producers 
and (to some extent) distributors rather than consumers” (p.10). Bruns has suggested that 
the production-consumption model is deceptive and furthermore is not properly indicative 
of the character of either cultural content or commodity production. He argues that via new 
media, cultural content is being “prodused.” By this he means that users of content are also 
making it and distributing it or taking part in how content is distributed. The new types of 
content are also not “products” in the sense that the industrial era trained us to think of 
products. Content is often now in an ongoing state of refinement and often collaboratively 
co-produced. 
2.3.2.2.3 Creativity as collective intelligence, collaboration and “ad‐hocracy” 
An important cultural emergence attending the popular use of new media for cultural 
content creation and dissemination is the rise of on-line communities, within which distinct 
patterns of produsage and interaction can be observed. Bruns (2008) has examined a 
number of different sites of produsage such as the virtual world of Second Life, online 
gaming and fan communities. But his observations concerning the ongoing collaborative 
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work on the Wikipedia are informative and illustrative of produsage community principles 
and patterns. 
The Wikipedia is an online encyclopaedia, which is built and maintained through the 
collective (group or combined) intelligence and maintenance activities of voluntary 
contributors. Interestingly, the Wikipedia combines communal input – which was a feature 
of oral knowledge transmission, as seen, for example, in the performer-audience 
interactions accompanying public oral epic performance (Ong, 1982) – with the objectivity 
associated with print encyclopaedias and can, perhaps, be seen as a working example of 
Ong’s “secondary orality” concept. 
Two aspects of the Wikipedia project are particularly relevant to the present focus on 
creativity. Firstly, Wikipedia is being developed by a community of enthusiasts, volunteers 
and occasional contributors. Wikipedia, as Bruns (2008) notes, exists because people want 
it to exist. They are motivated in some personal way to contribute to the Wikipedia project 
and not because they are coerced or offered incentives. Secondly, as part of the ongoing 
operations of Wikipedia, Wikipedians “produse” not only content but also the organisation 
and procedures for the project as they go. Bruns observes that an administrative structure 
has emerged with several levels of roles and types of contribution carried out at each level 
– anonymous contributors at the bottom and an arbitration committee and founder, Jimmy 
Wales, at the top: “At the very top of this pyramid, of course, remains Jimmy Wales 
himself, described by some Wikipedians as the site’s ‘god-king’” (Bruns, 2008, p.141). 
On-the-hop and relatively fluid produsage of rules and procedures is, according to 
Bruns (2008), a feature of all produsage communities, whether those communities deliver 
open-source software or write Harry Potter sequels and share them on-line with other 
Harry Potter enthusiasts. The term “ad-hocracy” (Doctorow, 2005) has been coined to 
describe this kind of loose adaptive operating structure especially applicable to online 
environments. Produsage community members are often adapting, always potentially 
involved in ongoing adjustment to processes and procedures as well as creating new 
content. There are conditions in the functioning of online communities, which can be seen 
as conducive to the creativity that occurs within them: environmental appeal in terms of 
low entry requirements, loose rather than rigid operating structures, opportunities for 
activity consistent with the motivation or abilities of participants and potentials for solving 
problems when many minds are at work on a given problem. On this last condition, Bruns 
points out that the community of open source software developers adhere to the motto that 
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“given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” (Bruns, 2008, p.24). Another condition 
conducive to creativity in some online communities is their capacity to drive up and/or 
expose competence levels. This condition for creativity is in evidence, for example, when 
particular individuals who consistently make contributions of high quality are then placed 
in positions of prominence by their peers where their contributions may then challenge 
others to produce similar quality. 
The operation and existence of such communities may also be seen as changing the 
wider cultural environment, making it more conducive to creativity generally. On-line 
communities contribute to the flow of new content into the cultural arena adding generally 
to a diverse cultural environment. There may be cultural flow-on effects also, in terms of 
preference for the kind of loosely organised operating structures to which produsage 
community members may be becoming accustomed. 
2.3.2.2.4 Creativity as a fluid approach to knowing 
Another aspect of produsage that relates to creativity is that the “products” of produsage 
communities often require a different way of “reading” from the reading we have become 
used to in the age of print. Just as literate thinkers are no longer able to access or create 
epic poetry in the way oral poets were able to do (Ong, 1982), those of us accustomed to 
the conventions of print may struggle to fully appreciate the artefacts of digital produsage. 
In other words, reading digital prodused artefacts often requires new “literacies” and less 
rigid ways of thinking about knowledge. 
Bruns (2008) points out that the ability to read the information embedded in some 
prodused artefacts requires understanding of the layered, often collaborative and ongoing 
nature of the process that has built or is building the artefact. He illustrates with the 
example of “wiki” formation. Because a wiki is an online application or platform, which 
allows one or more people to continually upgrade or change information displayed in the 
document – like an electronic “magic” blackboard but with the important difference that 
the history of the ongoing work is preserved and can be accessed by the viewer – this 
history of development and discussion is part of the information contained in the wiki. 
Being aware of this is, as Bruns points out, part of wiki literacy. Knowledge, he argues, 
can now be seen as “palimpsestic”. A palimpsest is essentially a document that can be, or 
has been, overwritten. Understanding knowledge and knowledge artefacts this way 
ultimately means recognising that human knowledge development is an ongoing, uncertain 
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and not necessarily unidirectional process. Knowledge at any time encompasses multiple 
perspectives and is not “fixed” but in a continual state of incompleteness, dissolution, 
reformation and renewal. 
2.3.2.2.5 Creativity as intrinsically motivated innovation by hobbyists 
The dynamics of produsage communities, including fan communities, have a significant 
presence culturally and commercially. They are changing commercial practice in a number 
of areas and ways. Understanding this aspect of cultural change is fundamental to thinking 
about how to live and work with these changes. Although a number of egoistic reasons 
have been suggested for people’s involvement in produsage activities – such as attention 
from peers, exposure of capabilities or establishing status (Bowman & Willis, 2003), it 
appears that intrinsic interest and the motivation to share those interests with others often 
underpins both online sociality and the work of people making significant contributions to 
cultural content creation and changing commercial practices (Bowman & Willis, 2003; 
Bruns, 2008; Franke & Shah, 2003; Jeppesen & Frederiksen, 2006; Morrison, Roberts, & 
von Hippel, 2000). 
Findings from a study of user-led music software development provide illustration: 
Jeppeson and Frederiksen (2006) investigated what motivates people to put considerable 
time and energy into collaborating on projects, for which they receive no remuneration. 
They studied the motivation of users of “Propellorhead” music software who, as well as 
consuming, were also engaged in voluntary software development and voluntary 
collaboration with the software company to improve the product. The company encouraged 
these interactions and thus derived commercial gain from the interest and input of 
volunteers. Jeppeson and Frederikson observe that often hobbyists possess considerable 
expertise and are quite capable of coming up with valuable innovations. Consistent with 
the findings of an earlier study (Morrison, et al., 2000) they conclude that these hobbyists 
play a critical role in driving innovation because they are most often “early adopters and 
willing diffusers of new products, knowledge and practices” (p.58). They thus pilot faster 
adoption of new products and practices and are enabled in this by the provisions of new 
media. 
Franke and Shah (2003) found in a study of innovative sports enthusiasts that user-
innovators were not motivated by monetary profit but by “fun” and the “norm” of “giving 
assistance” to other community members. They argue that this is a common feature of 
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innovation by end users in both off-line and on-line voluntary communities. In this way it 
is possible to see how personal interest is related to the development of expertise, personal 
creation and also to cultural innovation and change via sharing across the electronic media. 
Recent research has further illuminated how marginal interest profiles and perspectives 
of individuals are positively related to innovative problem-solving in electronically 
mediated environments: “Technical and social marginality, being a source of different 
perspectives and heuristics, plays an important role in explaining individual success in 
problem solving” (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). This finding relates to understanding 
creativity in connection with the electronic media, but is in many respects a re-affirmation 
of an observation, which has been made many times with respect to creativity: that 
marginal perspectives can catalyse or facilitate creative thinking and the motivation to 
bring about innovation/social change (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Gardner, 1993; Mumford & 
Gustafson, 1988; Policastro & Gardner, 1999; Simonton, 2005; Unger, 2000). 
An important concomitant effect of intrinsically motivated “produser” behaviour is that 
it has, as Jenkins and Bruns note above, made it necessary for companies to think about 
and change their marketing strategies and relations with consumers. Bruns (2008) suggests 
that companies are better served by understanding and working with the dynamics of user-
led production and distribution than by trying to control and resist such behaviour. 
The on-line environment has proven to be advantageous as a shop-front and distribution 
point for some companies such as the on-line book retailer Amazon.com (Bruns, 2008). 
The potentials of the online environment for supporting “niche markets” and the associated 
rise in niche marketing (Anderson, 2004) have also been observed. Consumers have much 
greater access to the objects that interest them and choice is less constrained than when 
marketing is to majority tastes. Although it is difficult to say exactly how such market 
conditions might relate to creativity, it seems likely that the effect is more towards 
encouraging individuality, diversity and tolerance of difference, than towards supporting 
conformity. 
Online environments are used for many kinds of communication and activity. Some of 
these are productive. Some activities – such as “flaming”, “trolling”, virtual forms of 
vandalism, virtual theft and “cyberbullying”, where communicators appear to use the 
relative safety of online communication to vent and disrupt (Bruns, 2008) – are arguably 
less productive. The existence of new avenues for exhibiting bad form does not, however, 
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overturn the thesis that intrinsic and other forms of motivation also drive viable content 
production. Projects such as the Wikipedia have endured and overcome many instances of 
vandalism (Bruns, 2008). 
What surfaces as being of primary importance in these observations is the shift from 
primarily top-down forms of management and control of both knowledge and other forms 
of culturally significant production, to consumer-led forms of selection and cultural input. 
In other words, a transition is occurring where the taxonomy gives way to the 
“folksonomy”, where the impetus for innovation is moving from the expert to the hobbyist 
and from production to produsage (Bruns, 2008) – or at least we are seeing the emergence 
of cultural patterns reflecting relations between these two modes of content creation. 
2.3.2.2.6 An endless creative frontier? 
The transition to electronic forms of mediation has brought into view many links between 
creativity, technology and cultural change. People around the world, young and old, are 
creating and networking using the potentials of online mediation (Jenkins, et al., 2009). 
The foregoing discussion has not dealt with all of the many important “sites” of creative 
activity and cultural change which have been specifically linked to the new media 
environment – sites such as citizen journalism, the Creative Commons, social media, 
virtual worlds and many others (e.g. Bruns, 2008). To do justice to these areas in terms of 
examining how they are contributing to change in the world would require a much larger 
and more detailed discussion than is possible here. What has been highlighted in the 
review is that to read into how media is related to creativity, it is important to recognise 
that creativity may take different forms and that the term creativity may be used in 
different ways. 
As described above, creativity can be used to describe passive forms of recombination 
and contribution performed outside awareness. But it can also be applied to specific kinds 
of processes and contributions such as the innovative production of cultural content by 
enthusiasts. It is worth noting that Bruns’ (2008) definition of cultural content creation by 
users, as “produsage”, does not, on its own, distinguish between types of production. Thus, 
as Bruns (2008) himself observes, produsage is a descriptor for different kinds of 
“creative” production, some individual, some collaborative, some performed without the 
intent or awareness of being a contributor, some carried out with the intention to be noticed 
and so on. 
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Creation, however it is performed, can lead to cultural changes which can then open up 
new potentials and sometimes new problem issues, requiring, in turn, creative problem-
solving. An example of this is the problem-solving that is currently being applied to 
resolve or manage the issues of information accumulation and overload which have arisen 
since electronic technologies have become central to everyday and organisational 
functioning (Dewett, 2003). Some have observed that the use of computer technology may 
be changing how people think (Jenkins, et al., 2009; Sefton-Green, 2005). Sefton-Green 
(2005) has noted, for example, that through their use of computer software young people 
may be using new imaging elements or developing new ways to imagine. We might relate 
this idea back to Ong’s (1982) observation that in the media environment of orality 
formulas and epithets formed the “substance” of thought and that this pattern was a 
condition related to having to record knowledge in memory. At this juncture it seems 
relevant to reflect on how the scarcity of knowledge in the oral past and the requirement to 
conserve knowledge versus the current abundance and availability of information may be 
important factors in setting up, at least some, aspects of cross cultural and intra-cultural 
differences in ways of conceptualising, enacting and valuing creativity. 
Views differ concerning whether the impact of Internet use on health, relationships, 
civic engagement and people’s ways of being in community are positive or negative. The 
mixed results of research into these aspects of electronic culture suggest that the situation 
is neither decisively positive nor decisively negative (Boulianne, 2009; Wang & Wellman, 
2010). Whether the age of electronic media will, as McLuhan forecast, help to “satisfy” the 
psychic needs of humanity (Norden, 1969) remains to be seen. But, so far, the electronic 
age has resulted in many outcomes and effects, which theorists and commentators have 
described as “creative”. Much discussion has pointed to aspects of the electronic media 
environment which support, facilitate or encourage intrinsically motivated production, 
problem-solving and innovation. This is only one kind of creative production. But the 
research literature indicates that intrinsic motivation is an important process aspect to be 
aware of and to consider with respect to creativity because it tends to be a part of complex 
creative work and is often critical in the persistence required to make major contributions 
(Collins & Amabile, 1999; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). 
In summary, many observers with interests in both media effects and education have 
noted that the electronic environment affords opportunities to contribute to, what is 
summed up by Bruns (2008, p. 405) as, “the human commons of culture, information, and 
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knowledge.” Bruns sees value in this type of contribution. He acknowledges, however, that 
there are differences in the processes of produsage/innovation. The creativity research 
literature supports the view that innovation often, but not always, comes about as the result 
of an intrinsically motivated process. Later in this review, research that points to the 
personal and social value of intrinsically motivated creativity and other autonomous 
processes is presented. If creative processes can be of different types with different values 
for individuals and society, it follows that, teachers’ conceptions of creativity and creative 
processes could be critical in how they connect up the affordances of media with the notion 
of “creativity”. For example, if a teacher does not regard intrinsically motivated creativity 
as particularly valuable he/she may be less inclined, than Bruns (2008), to value new media 
potentials that support non-experts in contributing to the human commons of culture and 
information. 
McLuhan suggested decades ago that educators need to detach from nostalgic 
commitment to the familiar world of print culture in order to meet the needs of students 
and societies in the age of electronic media (Norden, 1969). Contemporary media theorists 
have pointed out that electronic literacy builds on print literacy (Jenkins, et al., 2009) and 
McLuhan by no means promoted abandoning print literacies in schools. However, he 
believed that unless educators became aware of how electronic media was transforming the 
world around them, the “television child” would have “no future” in our schools (Norden, 
1969). Since then, as McLuhan’s own laws of media describe (McLuhan & McLuhan, 
1992), television has become the “content” of digital media. In other words it has been 
“obsolesced” (read: superseded rather than obliterated) by the new “environment” of 
computerisation. If, for “television child”, we substitute “Internet child” or “digital native”, 
McLuhan’s warning becomes this: Unless educators are aware of the electronic media 
environment our children will have no future in our schools. Whilst, as Banaji and Burn 
(2007) note, some teachers are unimpressed by the challenges of dealing with creativity 
and technology, the situation clearly demands consideration rather than disinterest. 
Educational consideration of the links between creativity and technology involves, among 
other things, interpreting what commentators really mean by the terms “creativity” or 
“creative”.. 
 64
2.3.3 The Creative Economy 
The task before us is to build new forms of social cohesion appropriate to the 
new Creative Age – the old forms don’t work, because they no longer fit the 
people we’ve become … 
(Richard Florida, 2002, p.xviii) 
Increased creative activity at the global level has been identified, not only by media 
watchers, but by economists as well. Among the most influential perspectives (Andersson 
& Mellander, 2011) in this respect is the work of North American economist, Richard 
Florida. In Florida’s (2002, 2005, 2010) understanding of the creative economy, 
contemporary economic patterns are increasingly tied to the activities of a growing 
“creative class”. The creative class refers to a category of workers whose work involves 
problem-solving, analysis and creating new content. The qualities of creative work and 
what it produces are often dependent in some way on the presence or absence of intrinsic 
motivation. Florida’s thesis is overviewed here, not to suggest that his views are the only 
economic views of merit or importance, but because there is evidence that for many 
industry professionals and teachers, the dynamics of intrinsic motivation are 
counterintuitive (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Pink, 2009; Reeve, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). 
Florida has noted that much of the resistance to his thesis has arisen out of people’s 
incomplete understanding of the nature of creative work and its relation to intrinsic 
motivation. To understand how student creativity might relate to Australia’s “creative 
capital” (ACARA, 2012), it would seem critical that educators understand how intrinsic 
motivation may be linked to economic activity and creative work. 
Florida (2002, 2005) identifies the emergence of the “creative economy” as a global 
trend and identifies the “rise” in high-tech societies of an influential, creative social sector 
with a particular ethos. He has continued to conduct economic analyses on the performance 
of three categories of workers in high-tech societies: creative, service and working classes. 
He sees the creative class as instrumental in changing cultural patterns (Florida, et al., 
2011). 
In his 2002 book, The Rise of the Creative Class, Florida charted the growth of creative 
cities and centres, which have attracted creative talent and creative industry. He observed 
growth rates there to be eclipsing the growth of industrial style centres. In the foreword to 
the Australian edition of the book, Cutler asserts that, as Florida observed for the US, the 
situation in Australia shows a correlation between concentrations of creative populations 
 65
and the location of “high tech” industries. Florida (2002, 2005) maintains that the central 
commodity in the present economic environment, human creativity, is shaping the creative 
centres themselves. The key to understanding this trend, he argues, is to recognise the 
nature of creativity and, in particular, the role of intrinsic motivation in creativity. 
Florida (2002) defines the core of the creative class as including “people in science and 
engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose 
economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new creative content” 
(p.8). He describes the creative class as a group who share some common characteristics 
and a common ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference and merit. This ethos, 
he suggests, is significantly different from the mindset valued or promoted in the industrial 
age and is intricately tied to changes occurring in workplaces, city environments and 
population distributions. 
In Florida’s (2002) view, creative people doing creative work appear to function best in 
time flexible, no-collar environments, where they can have some control over their own 
processes. He observes that work environments are changing. Office layouts are becoming 
more open, schedules are more flexible and management methods are less rigid. Some new 
management styles accept that organisations should operate according to the non-linear 
nature of the natural world, with all of the natural world’s unpredictability and instability 
(Mansfield, 2003). Others are geared towards supporting worker autonomy (Stone, Deci, & 
Ryan, 2009). 
Florida (2002) contends that the more flexible, no-collar workplace is an adaptation to 
the rise of creative work. Creative work requires enormous concentration, is often project 
work, which tends to run in cycles and is hard to turn on and off. It therefore does not 
respond well to schedules. Creative work is often collaborative, requiring spaces where 
people can meet to generate ideas. In the creative workplace, flexibility, casual dress and a 
relaxed atmosphere does not translate into low productivity or low levels of effort. Florida 
observes that creative workers work the longest hours of all. 
The no-collar workplace is also an adaptation to creative people. Florida (2002) 
suggests that much of the banter or resistance over casual dress codes misses the point that 
this evolution in work conditions is part of the shift towards environments that both 
support, and are shaped by, creative work and creative people. He suggests that workplaces 
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are developing a new code: “The new code is evolving toward none at all, or more 
accurately, toward a code of diversity and tolerance” (p. 120). 
The attitude of diversity and tolerance among the creative class is a feature that registers 
at the level of economics and geography. Florida (2002, 2005) finds that creative people 
gravitate to places, which can offer them the lifestyle and diversity of experiences that will 
nurture their creativity. He suggests that creative people also seek “authenticity” in the 
venues they attend and in their life and leisure experiences. He has found that the places 
where creative people live tend to be characterised by diversity, often with high 
concentrations of Gay and Bohemian residents. Among Florida’s early controversial 
readings of the contemporary economic landscape, was the contention that concentrated 
Gay and Bohemian populations provide excellent predictors of economic growth: 
A region’s Bohemian concentration in 1990 predicts both its high-tech 
industry concentration and its employment and population growth between 
1990 and 2000. This provides strong support for the view that places with a 
flourishing artistic and cultural environment are the ones that generate 
creative economic outcomes and overall economic growth. (Florida, 2002, 
p.261) 
In this view, the creative ethic that values diversity and tolerance transcends social 
boundaries, so that the places where creative people live and work are places where 
individuality is accepted. 
Another of Florida’s interesting claims is that the emergence of the creative ethos is 
generating deep divides in high tech societies. He fears that “we may well be splitting into 
two distinct societies with different institutions, different economies, different incomes, 
ethnic and racial make-ups, social organizations, religious orientations and politics” 
(Florida, 2002, p.281). On the one hand is a group that is creative and diverse and on the 
other a more close-knit, older, church-based society of working people and rural dwellers. 
Florida argues that a strong creative economy cannot be sustained in such a divided 
society. His proposed solution to preventing the divides from generating strife and 
disadvantage is to ensure “that the creativity of the many is tapped and that the benefits of 
the Creative Age are extended to everyone” (Florida, 2002, p.318). 
Thus, in The Rise of the Creative Class, Florida is optimistic about the possibilities 
offered to individuals in an economy reliant on creative work and creativity. He is 
concerned for those who could be left behind by what he sees as an inevitable change in 
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the nature of work and signals what could happen if nations fail to recognise the role of 
creativity in gaining economic advantage. But he is also concerned about possible negative 
aspects of an economy hungry for innovation and fuelled by creativity. 
In his later 2005 book, The Flight of the Creative Class, Florida is even more focused 
on the challenges posed to countries by the global creative economy and the challenges to 
societies of understanding and managing the social consequences of the concomitant 
increase in creative work. He argues that the creative shift in the US has been mismanaged 
and that the creative class members who seek opportunities to “exercise” their creativity 
are now looking abroad (Florida, 2005). He argues that Australia is well positioned to 
benefit from the rise of the creative economy as it has a diverse and open culture, which is 
attractive to creative people. The problem he highlights is that in the present global climate 
a challenge for any country in a position to benefit from the creative economy is to 
encourage but also retain creative talent. Another challenge he sees is that creative work 
brings its own kind of work-related problems. Among them is the lack of understanding 
that many people have of the nature of creativity/creative work. 
In this regard, economists and creativity researchers have noted the potential mismatch 
between the way creativity works and work management practices based on prevailing 
economic models (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Mumford, 2000). This may account, at least in 
part, for the very high levels of stress-related injury occurring in the world’s centres of 
innovation (Florida, 2005). 
The conditions of work in industries geared toward harvesting the creative capacities of 
workers are often quite different from the familiar nine-to-five model and may be 
particularly hard on women and families (Thrift, 2001). The tension between creative work 
and family life has been noted in the creativity literature (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; 
Policastro & Gardner, 1999) and is an important consideration for governments, education 
and industry. 
A related issue is that while industry is demanding creative employees and education is 
attempting to answer the call (Dewett, Shin, Toh, & Semadeni, 2005; Reid & Petocz, 
2004), there is a great deal yet to be discovered about how well employee creativity is 
being utilised, encouraged or managed at work. Florida (2005) points to the enormous 
personal, social and organizational costs that lie ahead if society as a whole does not come 
to terms with the issue of managing creativity in the workplace. He notes that 
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organizations are “scrambling” for solutions to the problem of anxiety and stress in the 
workplace and states emphatically that, “if we don’t appreciate the underlying motivations 
of creative people, we can’t think intelligently about work, period” (p.77). Florida observes 
that although creativity researchers have long recognised that intrinsic motivation underlies 
complex creative activity, many people do not recognise the underlying motivations of 
creativity. This, he contends, has been responsible for much of the misunderstanding 
around his creative economy thesis. 
The response of universities to Florida’s creative economy thesis illustrates the 
importance of accurately understanding the basis of his reasoning. At the university level, 
the economic imperative seems to be often interpreted as a call to make creative students 
and commercialise outputs (Evans & Kamler, 2005). Attention has been focused on the 
doctorate as a site for generating needed innovation to boost the economy (Hockey, 1996; 
Usher, 2002). This perceived need has fuelled a push towards shorter and/or “professional” 
doctorates (Park, 2005). But Florida has met the development of a more industry-oriented, 
professional doctorate with, what Laing and Brabazon (2007) describe as, “disquiet”. His 
reasons for concern are partially revealed in a collaborative paper, which cautions against 
the movement that seeks “to make universities “engines of innovation,” and to enhance 
their ability to commercialize their research” (Florida, Gates, Knudsen, & Stolarick, 2006, 
p.1). Florida and colleagues point out that this view of the function of universities misses 
two things: There is not, first of all, a direct and discrete line of flow from university 
innovation to commercial innovation and secondly, universities make their contributions to 
social capital and the economy in deeper, more subtle ways: “By creating social 
environments of openness, self-expression and meritocratic norms, universities help to 
establish the regional milieu required to attract and retain talent and spur growth in the 
Creative Economy” (Florida, et al., 2006, p.17). In other words, they are concerned that the 
very aspect of university environments that makes them well-springs of creativity is in 
danger of being squeezed out by excessive concern with commercial interests and 
misinterpretation of their role in the creative economy. 
Florida et al. (2006) present analyses of economic and demographic data showing that 
the economic and social function of the university is maximised when it performs as a 
“creative hub”, facilitating the flow of technology, talent and diversity within regional 
creative “ecosystems.” Florida (2002) earlier argued that creativity is a driving force or 
energy, which is driving economic growth and can be harnessed to fuel both social and 
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economic development. Florida et al. (2006) recommend that for optimal regional growth 
universities, local authorities and regional industry should work toward increasing their 
local region’s capacity to absorb its innovations and talent. In other words, attract and build 
the talent, but also retain as much of it as possible. The catch is, as Florida (2005) has 
stressed, that in order to attract, keep and mobilise creative talent while avoiding the 
potential economic and human damage, which can be caused by overemphasis on the 
commercial interest in creativity, it is necessary to understand creativity and what 
motivates creative people. Florida (2005) throws down this challenge: “The society that 
can build the most productive and efficient mechanisms for harnessing human creative 
energy will move ahead of those continuing to make a fetish of the greed motive” (p.78). 
In his advice to universities, Florida is again highlighting what he perceives as a lack of 
understanding that surrounds both creativity and his thesis. The principal shortfall in 
understanding, which he discerns, concerns the relationship between intrinsic motivation 
and creativity. As he sees it intrinsic motivation is a key driver of economic growth. Thus 
although Florida perceives that his work has focused attention on the creative economy, he 
sees also that attention is more often focused on product outcomes than on his broader 
message, which is about the involvement of intrinsic motivation in both innovation and the 
evolution of a socially influential “class”. These aspects of creative economies are seen, by 
him, as potentially beneficial and potentially problematic given that intrinsically motivated 
processes and people benefit from specific kinds of handling. Creative work differs from 
the kind of work commonly performed in the time period from the industrial age to the 
present one and, according to Florida, understanding it is a major challenge for 
organisations and education in a world where it is recognised that creativity is increasingly 
implicated in both the nature of work and each nation’s or region’s capacity to be 
economically competitive. 
2.3.4 Creativity East and West 
It is sometimes too easy to resort to simple concepts and presumptions in 
explaining Asians’ behaviours and the comparison of differences between 
East and West. 
(Lau, et al., 2004) 
Some scholars and educators have pondered what it means for the Western interest in 
creativity if, as some commentators have indicated, Eastern and Western views of 
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creativity appear to differ. Contrasts between collectivism and individualism are often 
raised in these discussions. Collectivists are said to see themselves as part of a whole and 
motivated by collective norms and duties, whereas individualists are motivated more by 
preferences and needs (Triandis, 1995). Eastern countries are often described as collectivist 
and collectivism is sometimes seen as antithetical to “creativity” as conceptualised in the 
West. Craft (2003) sees this situation as presenting Western educators with a dilemma. 
Some authors and researchers have entered into debates over whether the Western position 
on creativity and related constructs, such as individualism and autonomy, represents an 
ethnocentric or even colonialist attitude (Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov, et al., 2003; Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Oishi, 2000). 
However, there are variations in the extent to which, and on what grounds, Eastern and 
Western views of creativity are seen to differ and as Shaheen (2010) points out, if 
creativity is now important for economic competiveness, most countries would probably 
want to compete. This might mean that each country will be faced with its own specific 
kinds of challenges in respect of participating in the global creative economy – but it 
would not mean that creativity would have no relevance for them. Another consideration 
around the issue of Eastern and Western views of creativity is the global effect of mass 
media. Current theory and research suggests that rapid change in global use of mass media 
is likely to result in a shift towards more “individualistic” or Western styles of thought and 
self-representation (Triandis, 2006). One of the educational challenges in this respect for 
countries high in collectivist outlook might be coping with loss of cultural identity and the 
grounding aspect of tradition – but again it would not mean that creativity has no relevance 
for those countries. 
Lubart (1999) and Lubart and Georgsdottir (2004) contend that the Western view of 
creativity tends to focus on products or work that is novel and appropriate whereas in 
Eastern countries an alternative view is more commonly expressed. Lubart and 
Georgsdottir (2004) describe this Eastern view as relating to “a state of personal fulfilment, 
a connection to a primordial realm, or the expression of an inner essence or ultimate 
reality” (p.36) – and they describe this as a much more internal focus than the view more 
commonly expressed in the West. Lubart (1999) reviewed research which focused on 
groups of non-Western artists and religious spiritualists. He observes that culture plays a 
role in dictating the kinds of activities in which creativity is allowed. Where there are 
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taboos or norms that constrain how people are expected to deal with particular content, 
such as religious artefacts and traditions, creativity may not be allowed. 
However, Paletz, Peng and Li (2011) argue that the research indications from cross-
cultural work around collectivism-individualism run counter to Lubart’s (1999) assessment 
that the common Eastern conception of creativity is more internal than the common 
Western conception. They suggest that in the West, where individuals are more likely to be 
individualistic, internal and analytic in their thinking styles, creativity conceptions would 
most likely focus on inner experience and self-awareness. In the East, where individuals 
are more likely to have a collectivist, holistic and somewhat external focus, creativity is 
more likely to be seen in the external world, in actions, leadership and socially valued 
products. These more external expressions of creativity, the authors argue, would be 
associated with such personal characteristics as productivity and social influence. They 
argue for a more complex set of distinctions than that proposed by Lubart: “Thus, the 
internal–external distinction overlaps both with an individual–collective dimension and 
other, related issues, such as the process–product dimension, the impractical–practical 
dimension, and the degree to which an activity is valued by society” (Paletz et al., 2011, 
p.85). 
The view expressed by Lubart (1999) and the view expressed by Paletz et al. (2011) 
appear contradictory. Paletz and Peng (2008) argue that a problem can be seen with 
Lubart’s view in that it compares “anthropological data and ancient philosophical works 
from Eastern countries with ideas held by modern Western (generally American) 
psychologists” (p.287). As Paletz et al. (2011) state, the review “compared Western 
explicit theories of creativity with Eastern implicit theories of creativity” (p. 85). In other 
words, they argue that it is inaccurate to take the Western scientific definition of creativity 
as being representative of the implicit theories of creativity held by Westerners in general. 
In a study of college students’ conceptions of creativity, which used quantitative 
methods, Paletz et al. (2011) found mild tendencies in support of their hypothesis that 
Eastern implicit theories of creativity would be more externally focused and Western 
implicit theories more internally focused. They also found indications of some similarities 
between some groups in both cultures. Unfortunately, this quantitative work by Paletz and 
colleagues seems to be limited by the problems of studying conceptions using 
questionnaires and checklists. Although it may be possible to say, as they do, that Anglo-
Americans tend to select artists as creative, whilst, for example, Asian Americans tend to 
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select political leaders as creative, this observation still leaves many questions as to why 
such attributions are made. It may be that the conclusions of Lubart (1999) and the 
conclusions of Paletz et al. (2011) are both in some measure descriptive of the situation. 
Paletz et al., conclude that there needs to be further elaboration of the external-internal 
dimension in order to plan additional, more illuminating studies. 
There are a number of aspects of the literature around cross-cultural implicit theories 
and approaches to creativity, which warn against taking a simplistic view of cultural 
differences in this respect. Firstly, as Paletz and Peng (2008) remind their readers, although 
China and Japan are often “lumped” together as Eastern, not all East Asian cultures are the 
same. Secondly, according to Triandis (2011), the mindsets which may be described as 
collectivist and individualist are not confined to specific countries but may be observed to 
differing extents in both Eastern and Western countries. This situation, he argues, is not 
fixed, but is subject to changes in education systems and levels of education in the 
populace, exposure to other cultures and, significantly, exposure to the mass media: 
Mao’s China was collectivist in most domains but in the 21st century China 
is individualist in economics and aesthetics. Second, one must consider 
demographic factors. Specifically, age, gender, social class, education, 
amount of contact with other cultures, and exposure to the modern mass 
media can change the position of a sample on any of these dimensions of 
cultural variation. For example, lower class samples in many cultures are 
more collectivist than upper class samples in all cultures (Kohn, Naoi, 
Schoenbach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990), so that an upper class sample 
from a collectivist culture might be more individualist than a lower class 
sample from an individualist culture. (Triandis, 2011, p.7) 
To Triandis' observations might be added the media theory perspectives of Walter Ong 
and Marshall McLuhan which were elaborated earlier. It could be that the cultural effect 
identified as collectivism is, in large part, residual oral conservatism (Ong, 1982). On this 
basis, a shift towards the dispositions described, by Ong, as greater internality and 
reflectiveness, might be expected in collectivist cultures as education systems evolve in the 
new media environment and the mass media continues to permeate life-styles worldwide. 
Such a shift, if Ong was accurate in his observations, would stem largely from changes in 
perspectives on knowledge. The availability of information brought about via the 
affordances of new media would likely bring about an alleviation of the necessity to 
conserve knowledge. Bruns (2011) has also discussed this and describes this trend as a 
shift from seeing information as a scarce resource to seeing information as abundant. He 
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argues that this shift is engendering a changed relationship between learners and traditional 
sources of information. 
Some studies of Asian teachers’ attitudes towards creative students are certainly 
suggestive of intra-cultural variation in Asian teachers’ conceptions of creativity --although 
this is not the explicit finding of the studies. Ng and Smith (2004) found that conservative-
autocratic Asian teachers accustomed to the Confucian tradition dislike “creative” students: 
“nice” students are docile and passive and accept the authority of the teacher, thus 
disruptive students are creative/creative students are disruptive. They found that liberal-
democratic teachers were more tolerant of challenging creative behaviours of students. Ng 
and Hor (2005) examined the view that liberal-democratic teachers cope better with 
creative students because they tend to exhibit more creative attitudes themselves and 
possess greater emotional intelligence than conservative teachers. They suggest that on the 
strength of these qualities the liberal-democratic teachers are more flexible and able to 
cope with creative students. Although these researchers observe that liberal-democratic 
teachers are more likely than conservative teachers to persevere in trying to liberate the 
“creative spirit” in students they do not explain whether the two groups of teachers have 
the same or different understandings of creativity in mind. The researchers link the style of 
the teachers to their effectiveness in dealing with creative students but they do not explore 
the question of differences in the conceptualisation of creativity. 
Of additional interest for this debate about possible differences in East-West 
understandings of creativity is a growing body of research which shows that, intrinsically 
motivated or autonomous processes engender a sense of well-being irrespective of a 
person’s culture (Asakawa, 2004; Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov, et al., 2003; Deci & Ryan, 
2000). Studies across many cultures have shown that autonomous functioning reliably 
enhances people’s sense of wellness and conduces towards positive outcomes for learning 
and performance (Chirkov, 2009). Chirkov (2009, p.257) concludes that far from being an 
ethnocentric Western construct, autonomy is “an essential condition for all people to 
flourish and grow.” He argues that autonomy research provides an empirical basis for the 
cross-cultural promotion of autonomy on ethical grounds: 
This proposition concerning the universality of autonomy is a fundamental 
humanistic thesis that has been endorsed by leading humanitarians and social 
scientists across various nations and times. Empirical research based on SDT 
strongly supports this proposition. (Chirkov, 2009, p.257) 
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He argues further that the claim that some people or cultures “prefer authoritarian ruling 
and control” represents a shallow reading of cultural dynamics. 
Some research work focused on the facilitation of creativity/innovation in an Asian 
context, indicates that autonomy is both conducive to innovation and compatible with 
Eastern values. Liu, et al. (2011) have shown that autonomy-support functions to increase 
innovation in the Chinese context, just as it has been shown to do in Western contexts. The 
finding from their studies is that when autonomy, characterised by the authors as 
“harmonious passion,” is operationalised through autonomy support in the organisational 
environment it translates into job creativity. They found that autonomy support had a 
positive influence in converting weak individual autonomy orientations to stronger 
autonomy orientations and suggest that the support of harmonious passion would be, not 
only economically advantageous but also, socially advantageous, for China. 
From this perspective, to the extent that creative acts or activities involve autonomous 
processes, creativity would be no less beneficial to individuals in one culture than in 
another. Furthermore, to the extent that the global creative economy engenders a cultural 
climate, which values creativity, we might expect an increase in opportunities to act and 
work in ways that are consistent with authentic goals (autonomy). Indeed, it is an aspect of 
Richard Florida’s thesis that he regards the potential benefits for people, in the increasing 
incidence of economically beneficial creative work, as being related to the integral role of 
intrinsic motivation (autonomy) in creative work: 
Perhaps the most incredible thing about the creative age is that it holds the 
possibility not only for economic growth and prosperity, but also for a much 
fuller development of human potential in general … In short people love to 
do creative work; it’s what we’re about. (Florida, 2005, p.27) 
He conceptually grasps relationships between intrinsic motivation and the regulatory 
norms and values of creative people and beyond this envisions social benefits deriving 
from the expression of humanitarian/egalitarian values at a socially influential level: 
The Creative Class is the norm-setting class of our time. But its norms are 
very different: Individuality, self-expression and openness to difference are 
favoured over the homogeneity, conformity and “fitting” in that defined the 
organizational [sic] age. (Florida, 2002, p.9) 
Thus whilst Florida does not directly discuss his view of creativity in terms of 
authenticity and autonomy, his descriptions of the “creative ethos” and emphasis on a view 
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of creativity as involving intrinsic motivation suggest that a view of creativity as autonomy 
is very much what he has in mind. When this view is in turn related to the earlier 
mentioned body of research concerning the benefits of autonomy for humanity, Florida’s 
particular argument for potential global benefits from the global creative economy is 
strengthened. The force of objections that the East stands to gain less from the creative 
economy than the West would need to be assessed with reference to the particular views of 
creativity contained in those arguments. 
With these aspects in mind it seems reasonable, when interpreting discourse around 
“creativity” in the cross cultural context, to first of all be cautious about the kinds of broad 
claims that are made about differences between Eastern and Western conceptions of 
creativity. If one takes Triandis' view on board it seems as reasonable to expect that intra-
cultural differences in creativity conceptions might be linked to collectivist-individualist or 
externally-internally focused dimensions within both Eastern and Western countries. 
Furthermore cross-cultural similarities between particular groups could be expected, such 
as between highly educated Eastern and Western people. But, it seems that, irrespective of 
culture, developmental benefits can be expected from the experience of autonomy. 
2.4 SUPPORT FOR STUDIES OF CONCEPTIONS OF CREATIVITY 
The previous part of the review has taken a broad overview of some of the arguments 
currently informing educational discourse around how creativity is relevant to education. 
The review has so far highlighted psychological and educational arguments for the 
importance of creativity as an aspect of student’s development, cognition, quality in 
learning, quality in life and capacity to deal flexibly with contemporary social conditions. 
A number of influential perspectives on how creativity is linked to technology and cultural 
change have been discussed. Richard Florida’s perspective on the creative economy, the 
changing nature and challenges of work and the role of creativity in driving contemporary 
economies was outlined. Some current thinking on differences between Eastern and 
Western conceptions of creativity has been observed. 
The reviewed arguments and issues cannot be seen as explicating the full range of 
reasons for giving attention to creativity in education. However they can be seen as 
supportive of the view that shaping educational provision in a way that is fully responsive 
to these aspects of contemporary cultural discourse around creativity will be dependent on 
the capacities of teachers to interpret the meanings of creativity expressed. Teachers will 
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need to evaluate the degree to which such arguments represent issues important enough to 
be dealt with within schools. For example teachers would need to see that there are 
potential links between the creative use of new media and the required changes in 
educational provision. The consequences of not seeing these links at all could be 
potentially damaging for education. However, seeing the arguments implicates accurately 
apprehending the meanings of creativity being discussed. 
Arguments in which the notion of creativity is discussed are not necessarily consistent 
in their use of the term nor do descriptions of creativity by different authors necessarily 
reflect similar meanings. However, within the reviewed literature a number of areas 
suggest the importance of apprehending the nature of autonomous motivation in order to 
appreciate how such motivation may be linked to innovation and contemporary trends 
relating to the use of new media technologies. For example, in order to assess whether the 
produsage of quality cultural content could conceivably emerge from hobbyists it would be 
helpful to recognise the role of intrinsic interest in gaining knowledge. It is therefore 
suggested that teachers would need to have some grasp on the relationship between 
autonomous motivation, creative processes and products in order to effectively engage 
with creativity discourse and consider what is required in teaching for a world in which 
creativity is a driver of rapid cultural change (NACCCE, 1999). However, the value and 
dynamics of autonomous motivation, especially intrinsic motivation, are often 
misunderstood. On this basis alone, the question of how teachers experience, conceptualise 
or understand creativity, which is central to the present thesis, is an important one. From a 
policy and training point of view it is not only important to understand how teachers 
conceptualise creativity, it is also practical, in the interests of building the resources that 
could help teachers in their role as interpreters of creativity discourse, to begin to build 
understanding of the various ways in which creativity is understood. 
2.5 ADDRESSING THE IMPERATIVES VIA EDUCATION 
Much commentary indicates that addressing these “big picture” issues implicates changes 
to educational provision that are extensive and challenging (Bruns, 2011; Burnard & 
White, 2008; Craft, 2008b; Jenkins, et al., 2009). The full extent of these recommended 
changes cannot be discussed here. However it seems important to acknowledge some 
perspectives in order to convey the general nature of the implicated changes. As the 
enhancement of student creativity is specifically treated later in the review some strategies 
outlined here do overlap with strategies discussed in the later section. However, as much as 
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possible, comment in this section is confined to consideration of what may be required in 
respect of the information society and creative work. 
With respect to the teaching for the information society there are many aspects to 
consider. Of particular relevance for teachers is the observation that a “user-led” 
environment, in which content is prodused and shared via the electronic media, implicates 
change in teachers’ knowledge, their understanding of their teaching role and their 
perceived status as “experts” (Bruns, 2011; McWilliam, 2009). The main thrust of Bruns’ 
(2011) argument is that in order to assist students to become reflective, informed, and 
critical, thus competent, “produsers” of user-led content, teachers themselves need to 
develop “thorough” and “systematic” understanding of workings of user-led environments. 
He argues further that teachers would need to understand that the common perception of 
teachers’ privileged roles as experts is increasingly challenged by the growing quantity of 
quality information and expertise generated outside formal educational contexts. Bruns 
argues that rigid teacher/learner dichotomies are not appropriate to teaching for complex 
user-led information environments, as teachers would not thereby be modelling the more 
fluid processes of user-led produsage. Furthermore, such practices stand to be rejected by 
students as irrelevant and antiquated. McWilliam (2009) makes a similar argument that 
teachers need to move from the position of “sage” to “meddler” in order to facilitate deeper 
learning and problem-solving capacities. 
Jenkins, et al. (2009) discuss change to educational provision in terms of educating for 
“participatory culture”. They identify new technical and thinking skills, skills for cultural 
participation and social awareness around the effects of widespread cultural participation 
as important areas for development in schools. They recommend that teaching for 
contemporary participatory culture implicates engagement with contemporary issues 
related to new media and cultural change. They argue that the challenges of teaching for an 
information society are not limited to the Information Technology subject areas. From the 
perspective of these authors, education for the challenges of participatory culture requires 
whole school approaches and community supports. The goals of education for participatory 
culture, in their view, involve the development of more than skills and knowledge. They 
argue that attention should be given to the ethical frameworks and self-confidence 
necessary for full participation in contemporary culture. They discuss the need for flexible, 
creative thinking skills and attitudes. The following list is their summary of important 
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needed skills and illustrates the extent of curricular change as envisioned by experts in the 
field of new media studies: 
Play — the capacity to experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of problem-solving 
Performance — the ability to adopt alternative identities for the purpose of improvisation 
and discovery 
Simulation — the ability to interpret and construct dynamic models of real-world 
processes 
Appropriation — the ability to meaningfully sample and remix media content 
Multitasking — the ability to scan one’s environment and shift focus as needed to salient 
details. 
Distributed Cognition — the ability to interact meaningfully with tools that expand 
mental capacities 
Collective Intelligence — the ability to pool knowledge and compare notes with 
others toward a common goal 
Judgment — the ability to evaluate the reliability and credibility of different information 
sources 
Transmedia Navigation — the ability to follow the flow of stories and information 
across multiple modalities 
Networking — the ability to search for, synthesize, and disseminate information 
Negotiation — the ability to travel across diverse communities, discerning and respecting 
multiple perspectives, and grasping and following alternative norms. 
(Jenkins, Clinton, Purushotma, Robison, & Weigel, 2006, p.4) 
 
Some of these skills involve autonomous motivation: play, for example, is a 
prototypically intrinsically motivated activity (Ryan, 1995). Other skills in the list, such as 
distributed cognition, collective intelligence and appropriation would clearly benefit from 
intrinsic interest and independent thinking rather than merely rote learning skills. 
Moreover, understanding the educational value of these processes and skills and why they 
are integral to life and work in the contemporary world requires an understanding of 
autonomous motivation, its relation to the skill, its role in bringing about the kind of 
cultural milieu in which such skills are required/developed – and its value to the student. 
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Jenkins et al., (2006) describe a classroom that encourages distributed cognition as one 
that “encourages students to participate with a range of people, artefacts, and devices” 
(p.39) and “to acquire patterns of thought that regularly cycle through available sources of 
information as they make sense of developments in the world around them” (p.38). To 
encourage skills of this type, teachers themselves would need to value such fluid, flexible, 
meaning-seeking modes of thought. 
Some of the skills listed above, such as collective intelligence, may conflict with present 
educational practices, such as evaluation practices in schools and universities. Mobilising 
collective intelligence involves working as part of a collaborative team. Jenkins et al. 
(2006/2009) point out that, in organisations, teams are often formed to deal with a specific 
problem. When working in teams within organisations, team members are often required to 
organise themselves and develop operating structures in an ad-hoc way. They may then 
disband and move to a different team with different members. Jenkins et al. (2006, p.41) 
observe that “schools do an excellent job, consciously or unconsciously, teaching youth 
how to function within bureaucracies. They do almost nothing to help youth learn how to 
operate within an ad-hocracy.” 
In teaching for the imperatives of the creative economy there is much overlap with 
teaching for the imperatives of the electronic/information society as the skills required for 
creative or knowledge work are now often networking and IT skills (Dewett, 2003). But 
Florida’s (2002, 2005) argument is strongly focused on intrinsically motivated creativity. It 
is here that he sees, both, the greatest opportunities for people to experience the benefits of 
living at a time when creative work is common – and also some of the greatest challenges. 
It may be beneficial to students and teachers to discuss creativity and its processes 
openly in the school context. Open discussion of creativity may be one of the strategies 
schools can implement in respect of Florida’s assertions that something needs to be done to 
combat the rise of stress related injury in the workplace. Long term creative processes 
often involve common stages and emotions and students may benefit from knowing about 
these elements in advance of any creative work they may undertake (Shaw, 1994). Shaw 
(1994) states: “it might aid students substantially in knowing that the process they are 
involved in is similar for all practitioners, no matter what stage of development they are in” 
(p.41). Fensham and Marton (1992) argue that meta-cognition and intuition, which are 
important to scientists and other people involved in high level problem-solving work, are 
largely neglected in schools. Reid and Petocz (2004) have also suggested that teachers in 
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various disciplines might discuss with students the meanings of creativity as they are 
envisioned within each discipline. They recommend that educators need to think about the 
role creativity plays in their discipline, examine their own understanding of creativity, set 
up situations where teachers and students can discuss ideas about creativity in the 
discipline and ensure that activities and assessments provide opportunity for creativity. 
Building greater openness, in the school context, about internal processes and about 
creativity may be a useful step towards giving the creative process shape and substance in 
the minds of teachers and students. 
Much scholarly opinion supports the view that environment is important in fostering 
creativity. Florida (2002), for example, has argued that universities contribute to the 
creative economy in their role as creative hubs of ideas and talent, but that the university 
environment needs to provide support for the growth of intrinsic motivation. In a study of 
the effects of university environment on university teacher creativity, Ryhammar (1996) 
found that university teacher creativity is tied to the university climate. Ryhammar and 
Brolin (1999) report that creative activity within the university was supported in a climate 
with a high degree of freedom and debate and hindered by the presence of a high degree of 
emotional tension and a lack of openness in teachers’ contacts with one another. 
Conditions of openness, diversity, flexible leadership and low strife have generally been 
found to be favourable to creativity in organisations (Klijn & Tomic, 2009). It seems 
reasonable to suggest, then, that a challenge for schools would be to maintain 
environments conducive to the autonomy of both teachers and students. An open, diverse 
and flexible school climate would seem to be an important aspect of structuring 
educational provision for contemporary conditions. 
However, there appear to be significant obstacles to maintaining school environments 
conducive to autonomy (Craft, 2008a; Craft, et al., 2012; Reeve, 1998; Stone, et al., 2009). 
Stone, Ryan and Deci (2009) have commented that although it has become almost 
commonplace in schools and business organisations to find acknowledgement of the value 
of autonomous motivation, for some reason it is rare to find that this rhetorical 
demonstration is actualised within the organisation itself. They argue: “Unfortunately, we 
observe many managers and academics who doggedly cling to the now discredited tools of 
command-and-control methods” (Stone, Deci and Ryan, 2009, p.2). These authors suggest 
that the problem may lie in the difficulty of implementing autonomy supportive strategies. 
But it seems pertinent to wonder, in light of their observations, whether people would 
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“doggedly cling” to discredited command-and-control methods if they truly valued 
autonomous motivation? 
An important concern with respect to tailoring school climate in a way that nurtures 
autonomy is the issue of evaluation. If an objective of supporting creativity is to support 
autonomous motivation, research indicates that care is needed to ensure that evaluation 
regimes in schools do not encourage shallow teaching and learning strategies (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000c). The explicit arguments of Delis et al., (2007), noted earlier, suggest that 
adjustments to current assessment practices are called for if students’ more “creative” 
cognitive capacities are to be identified and given the best chances of development. This 
may be one type of assessment which teachers with an interest in creativity would regard 
as necessary, whereas, as Lucas et al. (2012) have observed, some teachers may be wary 
about assessing other aspects or kinds of creativity. Different aspects of creativity may 
require different types of evaluation. Deciding evaluation strategies and which types or 
aspects of creativity to evaluate would be one of the important areas to be addressed within 
school and disciplinary contexts. 
Craft (2008a) argues that it is important to commit to the challenge. She contends that 
educators need to be looking “beyond current horizons”, that doing so will require 
commitment, co-participation with other teachers and will “pose significant demands to 
visionaries as well as to practitioners” (Craft, 2008a, p.10). Past creativity initiatives in 
education appear to have suffered from lack of commitment, as indicated by the waxing 
and waning of educational interest in creativity over the course of its various incarnations 
(Craft, 2008a). 
Burnard and White (2008) argue that supporting and sustaining teachers is an important 
practical consideration in implementing the current extensive changes to educational 
provision: 
Professional pedagogical practices that foster and promote student creativity 
cannot be expected from teaching assistants and bureaucrats. Such practices 
are those arising from the professional artistry involved in valuing the 
process and outcomes of risk-taking, problematising knowledge, journeying 
from the known to the unknown, and sharing the process of education with 
students (Craft, 2005). If this longer-term thinking about our educational 
future is not pursued, and teachers are not professionally sustained, then the 
distressingly high numbers of teachers leaving the profession (in the UK and 
Australia) can be predicted to continue (Everton et al., 2007; Australian 
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Council of Deans of Education, 2005, pp. 33–36) … While the policies of 
both countries reflect the particular dynamics of an information society as 
well as the global economy, both remain oblivious to the importance of 
teacher autonomy and transformative professionalism (Burnard and White, 
2008, p.677). 
As teaching for the skills outlined in the foregoing discussion may mean that teachers 
have to invent practices in various subject areas, teachers will need room for flexibility 
within their roles in order to take risks and experiment. As quoted above, Burnard and 
White point out that teachers will be moving from concern with what is easily measured to 
dealing with greater ambiguity – a major challenge in itself. They argue for giving teachers 
greater “autonomy”, by which they mean allowing teachers to make decisions about the 
what and how of teaching in their classrooms on the basis of their professional 
understandings. But as has been pointed out in this thesis, with respect to the support of 
creativity, this is also a problematic idea given the current lack of definitions and resources 
to help teachers in this work. 
2.6 THE VALUE OF CREATIVITY: MANY DIRECTIONS OF CREATIVITY RESEARCH 
It seems incontrovertible that educational futures need both to be inherently 
creative and also to enhance the creativity of children and young people – 
and of the adults who work with them. Educational futures however both 
reflect and construct the wider societal context and to this degree, the 
multiple futures that may be constructed or emerge, may reflect a variety of 
wider scenarios from environmental, health, conflict-based or economic 
collapse to more positive possibilities 
(Anna Craft, 2008a) 
The previous sections of the review have explored how creativity is seen, by various 
observers, to be implicated in contemporary cultural change. It was shown that the 
literature reflects a variety of different meanings of creativity. Furthermore, it is possible to 
see reflected in these arguments about creativity and meanings of creativity different 
criteria of creative value: the value of creativity may be seen to lie in what it produces 
and/or it may be seen to lie in process benefits to the person who creates. Some authors 
show concern with the social value dimension – that is, concern with what creativity means 
for social cohesiveness and harmony. But how one sees creativity, production, society and 
individuality, undoubtedly makes a difference as to how one might understand the 
relationships between creativity and society. 
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Anna Craft’s (2008a) statement, quoted above, sets the scene for the present part of the 
literature review for it exemplifies the level of certainty, which many scholars presently 
express concerning the need for teacher and student creativity in education, whilst it 
juxtaposes that certainty against a vision of the future as inherently uncertain. If teachers 
cannot be certain about the future, then, in order to support creativity they would need to 
believe in the value of creativity itself, which leads to the issue of what is currently known 
about the value of creativity for individuals and for society. The focus of the review now 
turns to the issue of value in creativity and explores what is known about the value of 
creativity with reference to the research literature. However, the diversity of views of 
creativity which can be found in this literature, serves to further underscore the issue that 
creativity is a poorly defined construct. 
The review now addresses: 
 Types of creativity research 
 Intrinsic motivation and autonomy 
 Creative cognition 
 Creative personality 
 Psychopathology 
 Diversity and marginality 
 Spirituality, religion and creativity. 
2.6.1 Types of creativity research 
Creativity has been investigated using a variety of frameworks and methods. According to 
Plucker and Renzulli (1999) the majority of creativity studies can be categorised under five 
headings: psychometric, experimental, biographical, historiometric, and biometric. In 
recent times, computational approaches have also contributed to creativity research 
(Mayer, 1999). A problem for teachers and other professionals accessing this literature is 
that the different research interests contribute to a confused and fragmented view of 
creativity (Amabile & Hennessey, 2010). 
Psychometric approaches view creativity as “a mental trait that can be quantified by 
appropriate measurement instruments” (Mayer, 1999, p.452). Psychometric research uses 
quantitative measurement and controlled environments. Creative ability is assessed using 
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test instruments, such as tests of divergent thinking ability – that is, the ability to make 
“remote associations” between disparate ideas. These measures are then used to compare 
people who score high and low in creativity and to determine relations to other measures – 
such as, of the environment. 
Psychometric approaches were employed as early as Galton’s investigations into 
hereditary genius in the late 1800s (Albert & Runco, 1999; Plucker & Renzulli, 1999). 
There is consensus in the literature that psychometric approaches were the most prominent 
type of investigation into creativity from around 1950, when Guilford (1950) convinced 
the scientific community that creativity was an important area for study, until somewhere 
around the 1980’s when new interests in creativity arose (e.g. Amabile, 1983) and interest 
in psychometric studies declined. Gruber and Wallace (1999) suggest that there is little 
evidence concerning divergent thinking in highly creative people. Nor is it clear, they 
argue, “how the ability to produce many ideas is related to the ability to produce a few 
superb ones” (p.95). 
Nevertheless, Plucker and Renzulli (1999) consider that psychometric research still 
offers valuable information to the field. They argue that it is important to understand the 
merits and limitations of all available methods. The predominance of psychometric 
approaches to the study of creativity until recently is, however, a potentially confusing 
aspect of the creativity literature for students of creativity for the literature reflects 
approaches which treat creativity as “innate”, while there are others, for example, the 
social psychology approach to creativity research, which treat creativity as a common 
potential (Collins & Amabile, 1999). 
Experimental approaches to the study of creativity manipulate and control variables in 
order to reduce the complexity of creativity to a manageable level and to observe induced 
changes in performance (Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). Runco and Sakamoto explain that, in 
this respect experimental studies differ from psychometric studies, which focus on 
individual differences that exist without experimental manipulation. 
Biological or cognitive neuroscience approaches “seek to determine the physiological 
correlates of creative problem solving” (Mayer, 1999, p.456). They look at what is 
happening in brain and body while creative problem solving is occurring. 
Biographical studies provide a qualitative narrative of a case history of a creative 
person, or people, and then apply analyses to the data. Gruber and Wallace (1999) describe 
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this kind of approach as a “commitment to the study of the creative process, to the study of 
the creative person at work” (p.95). In contrast to the controlled environments and 
experimental manipulations of psychometric and experimental approaches, biographical 
methodologies investigate creativity in authentic environments (Mayer, 1999). 
Historiometric studies apply “powerful” quantitative analyses to historical data (Runco, 
2004a). Simonton (1999) describes historiometry as the “scientific discipline in which 
nomothetic hypotheses about human behaviour are tested by applying quantitative analyses 
to data concerning historical individuals” (p.117). 
Computational approaches to creativity are based on the idea that creative thinking can 
be modelled using computer programs. Underlying this approach is a view of creativity 
and creative thought as mental computation (Mayer, 1999). A strength of the 
computational approach is its precision. However, there is debate concerning just how 
much computer models can inform about cognition by reducing it to mathematics, as this 
type of investigation fails to address non-cognitive aspects of creativity. 
A fuller understanding of “creativity”, as a phenomenon, therefore requires that a range 
of approaches to creativity study be taken into account. Taking any one approach as the 
way to define creativity could, as Feldman (1994) suggests, have the effect of distorting 
one’s picture of creativity. It could be argued that few people have the available time to 
canvass and synthesise the amount of literature necessary to try to form a coherent view of 
the subject. If creativity has been seen, by educational scholars, as a “slippery”, indefinable 
or unstable construct (Bleakley, 2004; Ellis & Barrs, 2008; Gibson, 2005; Spendlove, 
2008), it is hardly surprising. Nonetheless, as summarised in the following section, 
creativity research has accomplished some important “myth-busting” work, managing at 
least to show that creative acts and work are not confined to special people. In carrying out 
their interpretive role this is an important understanding for teachers for it has been 
observed, that, within education, creativity is often seen as dependent on innate talent and 
is therefore thought of as being relevant to the few rather than the many (Collins & 
Amabile, 1999; NACCCE, 1999). 
2.6.2 Some common creativity myths “busted” 
By the early 2000s reviews of the creativity research literature by leading creativity 
researchers (Runco, 2004a; Simonton, 2000a) indicated that a number of persistent myths 
about creativity could be laid to rest. These mysteries had guided researchers to investigate 
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such propositions as whether or not creativity is a mainly “right brain” activity involving 
divergent thinking, whether there is a relationship between intelligence and creativity and 
whether creativity requires special abilities. These reviewers suggest that the research 
supports a view of creativity as a “common potential” with value for both individuals and 
the wider society. Among the empirically supported understandings about creativity 
reported by Runco (2004a) and Simonton (2000b) are the following: 
 Creativity is a not a right-brain activity. It involves whole brain activity 
requiring divergent and convergent, generative and analytic forms of thinking, 
in order to produce novel concepts and evaluate them for appropriateness, 
usefulness or value. 
 Creative thought is a capacity of almost everyone because it involves ordinary 
cognitive processes. 
 Exceptional talents and creative activity are most often developed through 
practice and the attainment of well-developed skills and a rich body of domain-
relevant knowledge. 
 Consideration of the relationship of intelligence to creativity should also take 
account of such specific intelligences as emotional, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, 
interpersonal and intrapersonal. 
 The development of creative potential requires the simultaneous contribution of 
both nature and nurture. 
 Creative outcomes are favoured when individuals perform a task for inherent 
enjoyment rather than for external inducements. 
 Original contributions to a field generally do not occur in isolation, but within a 
context of domain-specific rules and skills, other operators in the field, and 
wider socio-cultural circumstances. 
 Simonton (2000) stresses that there is a relationship between creativity and 
cultural diversity. 
These findings suggest that, whatever the value of creativity is, it lies within the reach 
of everyone and, therefore, the potential for creative production is spread across a 
populace, rather than isolated within a smaller group of exceptional people. However, it is 
notable that even taken as a whole, these understandings do not clearly convey what 
creativity is. Runco (2004a) indicates that the exact nature of creativity remains elusive. 
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The issues, which Amabile and Hennessey (2010) raise concerning the fragmentation of 
present day creativity research suggest that that situation has not yet changed. 
There is, however, at least one finding from the creativity research literature which 
appears to speak to a common creative value amidst findings from a number of varying 
research directions and interests. This is the assertion that creativity often involves an 
intrinsically motivated or autonomous process. It appears that where a creative process is 
intrinsically or authentically motivated it is often experienced as valuable and tends to have 
valuable consequences in terms of learning and development. In the next section the 
theoretical aspect of intrinsic motivation and its role in creative processes is described. 
2.6.3 Intrinsic motivation and autonomy 
“The reason I can work so hard at my writing is that it’s not work for me … 
Work is pleasure to me” 
John Irving (as quoted in Amabile, 2001). 
There is a great deal of support for the opinion that intrinsic motivation is an important 
ingredient, if not the key ingredient, in complex creative endeavour (Albert & Runco, 
1999; Amabile, 1983; Hennessey, 2000; Nickerson, 1999; Raven, 2002). Intrinsic 
motivation refers to the sense of doing something for the pleasure and satisfaction of 
performing the task itself: it “exists when people freely choose to perform an activity out 
of a sense of interest” (Burton, et al., 2006, p.750). In the context of the present thesis, it is 
important to include research and theory around intrinsic motivation in the literature 
review as this body of work supports the reader’s interpretation of the findings from the 
study. Furthermore this body of research relates to the rationale for the study, because 
many people regard it as counter-intuitive that intrinsic motivation is important in the 
performance of creative work (Florida, 2005; Pink, 2009) Therefore it is important to 
illuminate the relationship between intrinsic motivation and creativity in order to 
demonstrate that knowledge of this relationship is critical for accurately interpreting some 
key areas of creativity discourse. 
The role of intrinsic motivation in creativity was noted at least as long ago as Galton’s 
(1869) studies of hereditary genius (Albert & Runco, 1999) and its importance for 
creativity has been consistently confirmed in experimental studies (Collins & Amabile, 
1999). More recently, it has been shown that autonomous motivation, whether intrinsic or 
integrated is important in creativity. Integrated values/goals are those values and goals 
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which are fully endorsed by the “self” and therefore a person experiences a sense of 
freedom and autonomy in carrying them out (Ryan & Deci, 2006). While it is clear that 
intrinsic motivation is not an ingredient in the production of all products that may be 
judged as novel and appropriate in a given context, it has been observed that in long term 
or complex or culture-changing creative work it is a “crucial” ingredient (Collins & 
Amabile, 1999). Creators often report being motivated by some form of personally 
significant involvement, interest or pleasure in their work (Amabile, 2001; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Thus, the support for the crucial role of intrinsic motivation in 
complex creative work comes, not only from considerable experimental research but also, 
from the reports of recognised creative people. 
The following nine sections of the review examine the literature around the areas of 
interest and intrinsic motivation in order to show, in detail, how intrinsic motivation can be 
linked, not only to people’s capacities to problem-solve and produce high quality work, but 
also to characteristics observed of “creative” people, such as the creative personality 
(Runco & Sakamoto, 1999), and the high value that creative people place on creativity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Teachers’ knowledge of these relationships between intrinsic 
motivation and creativity would therefore be important in terms of their capacity to 
interpret what is being expressed, at the rhetorical level, about the value and character of 
intrinsically motivated creativity. In turn these understandings would be important for 
interpreting how the processes of creativity might relate to the contemporary cultural 
environment. 
2.6.3.1 Self – determination Theory 
Although conceptualisations of intrinsic motivation vary (Runco, 1994; Runco & 
Sakamoto, 1999), the Self determination theory (SDT) framework has proven robust in 
predicting outcomes of human behaviour and in creativity research (Amabile, et al., 1994; 
Hennessey, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Within SDT, intrinsic motivation is 
conceptualised as a developmental trajectory, which encompasses personal growth, social 
integration and a transition from external control to autonomy – or internal control (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000d; Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). According to SDT, internal control, also 
referred to as self-determination, is regarded as desirable for it leads to growth and greater 
well-being, whereas external control is associated with less desirable developmental 
outcomes. 
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Intrinsic motivation, as conceptualised within SDT, might be described simplistically as 
a propulsion mechanism by which humans become fully functional, autonomous beings 
within their social contexts. However, it is not necessarily the case that intrinsic motivation 
precedes the process. There has been some debate about the relation of evaluations to the 
processes that are sensed as intrinsically satisfying (Lazarus, 1991; Runco, 1994). Runco 
(1994) suggests that intrinsic motivation may be a feeling and/or an assessment based on 
more complex interrelations between internal appraisals, tensions, anticipation and affect 
and may involve retrospective evaluations of progress towards goals that have already been 
defined as important. 
In whatever way evaluations are involved in an intrinsically motivated process SDT 
researchers regard it as important to study intrinsic motivation and understand the 
conditions which facilitate or catalyse it, on the basis that research has shown that intrinsic 
motivation has developmental and other benefits. Ryan and Deci (2000b) state: “Because 
intrinsic motivation results in high-quality learning and creativity, it is especially important 
to detail the factors and forces that engender versus undermine it” (p.55). It may be helpful 
at this juncture to use additional insights from SDT research in order to appreciate why the 
qualities of intrinsic motivation yield such benefits in comparison with the qualities of 
other processes. 
Within SDT it is recognised that people do not always do things because they are 
intrinsically motivated to do them. SDT recognises a continuum of motivations for 
behaviour. The self-determination continuum describes different reasons for acting as 
being on a continuum from more externally controlled reasons for acting to more internally 
controlled reasons for acting. In some cases people feel pressured to act. In other cases 
they may feel that they are doing things because they value or enjoy the activity. Within 
SDT six types of regulation in activities are recognised: impersonal, external, introjected, 
identified, integrated and intrinsic (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Drawing on findings from their 
study of school-children’s reasons for doing homework Ryan and Connell (1989) illustrate 
four of these: 
Because the teacher will yell 
Because I’d be ashamed 
Because I want to learn 
Because it’s fun 
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The first two reasons provide examples of doing homework for more externally controlled 
reasons. Doing homework because the teacher would otherwise yell suggests that the child 
is acting in response to external pressure. Doing homework to avoid a sense of shame is 
seen by Ryan and Connell (1989) as focusing on how one appears to others – which they 
describe as an introjected motive. Whereas wanting to learn reflects doing homework for a 
reason identified and valued by the person. Acts of this type are experienced as more 
volitional than doing homework in response to external pressure. Doing homework 
because it is fun or enjoyable reflects an intrinsic interest in doing the work. The latter two 
examples represent more autonomous reasons for doing homework and are likely to 
support better learning outcomes and better experiences of learning overall. Whilst these 
are simple examples they nonetheless serve to illustrate how the more autonomous forms 
of regulation can lead to the benefits, to which SDT research attests, such as better quality 
learning and greater well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000c). 
From an SDT perspective, the presence and functioning of intrinsic motivation as a 
developmental agent relies on fulfilment of three basic psychological needs – needs for 
competence, autonomy and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000d). Adequate fulfilment of 
these needs promotes vitality, interest, learning and creativity (Ryan & Deci, 2000d). A 
great deal of research now supports these findings. It has been found that thwarted 
satisfaction of psychological needs has negative consequences for mental health and often 
undermines persistence and performance (Ryan & Deci, 2000d). Researchers in this field 
are interested in how people are best able to develop as healthy, self-regulating individuals 
and how they may be supported to do so. 
A crucial aspect of the SDT theoretical position is its emphasis on the existence of a 
human need for autonomy. Healthy infants and children exhibit a propensity for curiosity, 
interest and learning (Ryan & Deci, 2000b) and research indicates that, irrespective of 
cultural background, people experience well-being and vitality and perform at a higher 
level when they feel autonomous in their actions (Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov, et al., 2003). 
Thwarted autonomy has been observed to result in anti-social behaviour, such as racism 
and controlling manipulations of others (Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 
2007). 
Ryan and Deci (2000a) point out that the sense of autonomy is “functionally real” and 
can be sensed internally. According to them, people know when they feel controlled 
(externally or internally pressured) in their actions and know when they feel self-
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determined for a task or action. Different mental processing occurs under each of these 
conditions. The cognitive processing associated with controlled states and autonomous 
states can be induced unconsciously and has been observed in experimental situations, 
where it has been induced using priming techniques (Levesque, Copeland, & Sutcliffe, 
2008; Levesque & Pelletier, 2003). 
2.6.3.2 Interest and competence 
SDT has been applied to explain the qualities of focus and meaning experienced in the 
interest state. Krapp (2003) contends that a person will only be interested in something 
over a long period of time if the activity is rationally assessed as valuable and is 
continually experienced as emotionally satisfying. He reasons that for this to occur a 
person must experience sufficient fulfilment of the basic needs for competence, self-
determination and relatedness, as postulated by SDT. As a complement to the motivating 
effects of interest, it appears that deeply integrated goals help maintain persistence through 
the tedious aspects of complex tasks (Burton, et al., 2006). 
Interest is relevant for creativity in that it improves thinking ability (Hidi & 
Harackiewicz, 2000; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993) and increases feelings of vitality 
(Nix, Ryan, Manly, & Deci, 1999). When people are interested they demonstrate increased 
ability to generate ideas, make connections between ideas, solve problems and cope 
flexibly with change or new situations (See Friedman & Forster, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 
2000d). Furthermore, a person with a strong interest will tend to be unsatisfied with current 
levels of knowledge in his/her interest area and will be highly motivated to increase 
competence (Krapp, 2002). Over time the interest content is internalised (Renninger, 2000) 
and can, through being integrated into neural networks, become a stable part of the 
personality (Krapp, 2002, 2003). At the same time the person’s sense of personal 
competence with respect to the interest area tends to increase (Renninger, 2000). 
Perspectives on the effect of cognitive load in learning tasks may also be relevant here, as 
it has been noted that as competence levels increase, need for structured instruction 
decreases and need for autonomy in learning increases (van Merrienboer & Sweller, 2005). 
Krapp (2003) describes the deeply interested state as one in which there is no “gap” 
between what people wish to do and what they have to do and observes that when deeply 
interested in what they are doing, people sometimes experience a state of heightened 
mental performance and pleasure, which Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1990) has termed, flow. 
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Dietrich (2004b) has hypothesised, from a neuroscience perspective, that flow is an altered 
mental state, induced by deep focus. The heightened clarity and efficiency of processing in 
the flow state may, Dietrich suggests, come about as the brain ceases to buffer awareness 
of the environment, the self-representation and the sense of temporal flow – that is, 
whichever mental processes keep track of our location in space and time are removed from 
processing and a larger quota of brain energies can then divert to the task at hand. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) has suggested that activities in which flow is experienced become 
“autotelic” or self-reinforcing. Czikzentmihalyi and colleagues have extrapolated possible 
broader cultural effects of flow, on the basis that people tend to invest time and effort in 
those activities that are experienced as interesting and rewarding (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Massimini, 1985). Ryan et al. (1997) have suggested that the enjoyable and energising 
phenomenology experienced as interest may have evolved to ensure investment in 
developing genetic talents. 
Much of the research on links between intrinsic motivation and creativity of products 
and mental processing has been carried out in laboratories and/or under experimental 
conditions and often explores the relation of intrinsic motivation to “creativity” in the short 
term (Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). However, the indication that intrinsic motivation is 
linked to the increase of competence and interest over time, provides an explanation of 
how intrinsic motivation can also be linked to “creativity” in the long term – that is, how 
intrinsic motivation comes to be implicated in high level creative work (Amabile, 1983, 
1996, 2001; Cox, 1929; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Galton, 1869) and creative personality 
(Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). 
2.6.3.3 Interest and intra‐personal intelligence 
Whatever its biological determinants and social consequences may be, the phenomenology 
of interest is a critical aspect of certain types of creative activity. Without it, creators would 
probably not invest time in building competence and there would be no energising pleasure 
associated with exploration and learning. Even the experience of insight , the “Aha!” 
moment, which signals the resolution of a problem, has its own satisfying phenomenology 
(Schooler, Fallshore, & Fiore, 1995). Some researchers have observed that through 
creative work and associated activities, creators become adept at attending to, activating 
and working with the internal processes, which are part of creative processes 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Policastro & Gardner, 1999). 
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It appears that at high levels of complexity, creativity involves giving attention to this 
inner world of sensations and making “subtle distinctions among cognitive and emotional 
processes, as one means of understanding and guiding one’s own creative behavior [sic]” 
(Policastro & Gardner, 1999, p.218). Some sensations arise, perhaps, from the “traffic” 
between unconscious and conscious processes (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Gardner, 
1994), with which creators often learn to work. Without the mental focus that accompanies 
consuming interest an entire dimension of experience needed for high level creativity may 
not be present. Creativity researchers have suggested that people need to experience doing 
something they “love” in order to develop a sense of what it is to be intrinsically motivated 
(Collins & Amabile, 1999) and to want to more deeply investigate an area of interest. It 
has, however, also been found that many people are not aware of having any interests 
(Renninger, 2000). 
2.6.3.4 Intrinsic and extrinsic goals 
When it comes to selecting goals there is evidence that what we value and why we value it 
can impact either positively or negatively on overall well-being and interest during creative 
work (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Goals that have intrinsic content – that is, goals that are 
directed at enhancing relationships, growth, community or health – appear to have positive 
effects on well-being and persistence. It has been suggested that this occurs because goals 
of this order “promote satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness; that is, they promote people’s natural growth tendencies” 
(Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Sheldon, & Deci, 2004, p.246). In contrast, vigorous pursuit 
of “extrinsic” goals, such as wealth, image and fame, is theorised to be less satisfying of 
the basic psychological needs. Such extrinsic goals tend to be associated with excessive 
comparison with others, leading to less stable self-image. Studies have shown that 
individuals who vigorously seek extrinsic goals tend to experience less vitality, self-
actualisation and self-esteem and more psychological ill-being, such as depression, anxiety 
and narcissism (Vansteenkiste et al, p.246). Because extrinsic goals cannot satisfy 
psychological needs, an extrinsic orientation is also linked to social costs as people attempt 
to satisfy their needs in anti-social ways, such as the adoption of socially dominant 
attitudes towards others, materialistic competition with others and non-empathic 
manipulation of others (Duriez, et al., 2007). 
It seems that extrinsic values tend to interfere with intrinsic motivation and focus. 
Although it is often observed that material rewards can be powerful motivators (Ryan & 
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Deci, 2000e), there is considerable accumulated evidence showing that, “when 
materialistic values direct one’s behaviour individuals are at increased risk for diminished 
well-being and psychopathology and become less concerned with the welfare of others” 
(Kashdan & Breen, 2007, p.522). Moreover, materialism is associated with lower ability 
“to take action in congruence with core interests and values” (Kashdan & Breen, 2007, 
p.533). This appears to hold even for business students whose extrinsic values match the 
values promoted by their university departments (Vansteenkiste, Duriez, Simons, & 
Soenens, 2006). The indication is that in a culture that gives high priority to materialistic 
values, such as we have in the Western world, people may easily pursue goals that are not 
ultimately able to fulfil their psychological needs. 
Research indicates that excessive focus on self-image can be detrimental to well-being 
(Ryan & Brown, 2003). In SDT terms, autonomy is not a philosophical construct – it is 
experienced as a sensation of doing things of one’s own accord. Ryan and Brown (2003) 
suggest that a person who is overly concerned with how he/she appears to others is not 
easily able to experience a sense of freedom in working toward goals, whereas a person 
who feels competent, autonomous and related has self-esteem and so does not need to seek 
it. SDT researchers reject the idea that people need either self-esteem or power, identifying 
these as need substitutes, which people pursue when their actual needs are thwarted or left 
unsatisfied (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
SDT researchers therefore support the encouragement of intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, 
goals in schools. They further recommend that teachers adopt autonomy supportive 
teaching approaches. In a study of the effects of intrinsic goals and autonomy-supportive 
environments, Vansteenkiste et al. (2004) found that these two things together had a strong 
positive effect on learning and persistence. They report that although intrinsic goals had a 
positive effect even in a controlling context, they had a “synergistically” positive effect 
when administered in an autonomy-supportive context because, they reason, the context 
allowed people to experience the congruence of pursuing an intrinsic goal that is closely 
aligned with their basic psychological needs. 
2.6.3.5 Phases of interest development 
Interest has been found to exert a powerful influence on formal and informal learning. 
However, recent work has produced a four phase model of interest development (Hidi & 
Renninger, 2006), which shows that interest is not a unitary concept or process and that the 
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experience of interest may change or develop over time. People may experience mild 
levels of interest in a situation. But a person may come to see him/herself as a person who 
pursues particular content, such as, science, chess, or soccer, demonstrating that there can 
be links between interest content and identity (Renninger, 2009). This is consistent with 
the view noted earlier that knowledge and stored value for interest content may become 
ingrained in neural networks (Krapp, 2002, 2003, 2007). 
The four phases of interest development, as identified by Hidi and Renninger (2006), 
progress from triggered interest in a situation, which may or may not evolve into the next 
phase, a maintained situational interest. The third phase is where maintained interest has 
developed into an emerging individual interest and the fourth phase is the establishment of 
a well-developed individual interest. The authors report that each phase is characterised by 
“varying amounts of affect, knowledge, and value” (Hidi & Renninger, 2006, p.112). 
In this model, triggered situational interest is defined by focused attention and positive 
feelings. The authors note that in a substantial number of studies situational interest has 
been found to increase cognitive engagement and cognitive performance and is therefore 
seen as generally beneficial for learning. But as interest deepens it is characterised by 
“stored knowledge and repeated engagement, in addition to positive feelings” (Hidi & 
Renninger, 2006, p.114). The authors, while not allied with the SDT paradigm, indicate 
that deepening of interest is supported by feelings of competence, autonomy and social-
relatedness. 
In the two early phases of interest, as described in the four phase model, activities are 
typically (but not exclusively) externally supported, for example, by a teacher, whereas in 
the latter phases interest is more (but not exclusively) internally supported as individuals 
generate their own curiosity questions, develop more knowledge, become increasingly 
resourceful in finding answers to self-generated questions, choose to re-engage with 
particular content and produce work more effortlessly. The final phase is characterised by 
an “enduring predisposition to engage with particular classes of content over time” (Hidi 
and Renninger, 2006, p.115). The authors report that well-developed individual interest is 
positively related to sustaining long-term creative endeavours, strategic thinking, self-
regulation and broadening of attentional awareness in both problem-solving and attending 
to information. Furthermore, the individual may, in the later stages of interest 
development, see him/herself as someone who pursues a particular kind of content 
(Renninger, 2009). Renninger argues that there are links between interest and self-
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representation that could be exploited by teachers in the interests of students, to aid 
students’ learning and age-related identity development. Renninger is interested in 
furthering research in this area, particularly in respect of how to help students to overcome 
a sense of themselves as people who cannot engage in certain subject areas or activities. 
She sees an important case in point as the situation where girls often see themselves as 
incapable of liking or doing science. 
2.6.3.6 Flow and autotelic personality 
Flow has been described as an “optimal experience” (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) which 
arises in processes where there is an ideal level of challenge, loss of awareness of self and 
surroundings and, often, an associated enhancement of performance (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975, 1990). It has been observed that some people experience flow more easily and 
regularly than other people and the term “autotelic personality” has been used to describe 
this disposition. Autotelic personality has been associated with general curiosity, interest in 
life, persistence, low levels of self-centredness and doing things for intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic rewards (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). In a study it was found that 
autotelic participants were uncomfortable in “apathy” situations (situations with low 
challenge and low skill requirement) whereas non-autotelic participants “did not find the 
apathy situation aversive” (Hektner, 1996, as reported in Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2002, p. 98). Autotelic personality is seen by Nakamura and Czikszentmihalyi (2002, p.92) 
as something that possibly emerges from the experience of flow itself: 
The phenomenon of emergent motivation means we can come to experience 
a new or previously unengaging activity as intrinsically motivating if we 
once find flow in it. The motivation to persist in or return to the activity 
arises out of the experience itself. The flow experience is thus a force for 
expansion in relation to the individual’s goal and interest structure, as well as 
for growth of skills in relation to an existing interest. 
2.6.3.7 Creativity, integration and values 
Earlier it was discussed that certain goals are more conducive to feelings of satisfaction 
and well-being than others. This section points to a different aspect of values, that is, the 
values that tend to be expressed in connection with an extrinsic or intrinsic orientation. 
Any task can be experienced as more extrinsically or intrinsically motivated, but it is also 
the case that people demonstrate tendencies to be either extrinsically or intrinsically 
oriented. Within SDT these orientations are usually referred to as causality orientations, 
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which are respectively designated as control and autonomy orientations (Deci & Ryan, 
1985a). In connection with these orientations, people tend to express certain kinds of 
values. 
Patterns of lifestyle and career choice emerge when comparing the value inclinations of 
more internally and more externally oriented people. Amabile and colleagues found that 
intrinsically oriented people are more likely to, “choose professions that will allow them 
active, self-reliant involvement in their work; continue their educations (formally and 
informally) beyond college … and express higher levels of positive affect when engaged in 
complex challenging activities” (Amabile, et al., 1994, p.965). Thus there are empirically 
supported links between intrinsic motivation and the formulation of specific kinds of 
values and lifestyle and career choice. It is on this basis that we might understand the 
observation that creative people value creativity (Czikszentmihalyi, 1996; Florida, 2002). 
Some psychologists argue that there are connections between intrinsic motivation and 
awareness of the internal world, which in turn influences how people relate to the external 
world and the values that they express. Internal orientations have been connected more 
strongly than extrinsic orientations to personality integration and the development of 
mindfulness. Brown and Kasser (2005) find that because mindful individuals perceive 
internal and external realities clearly they “exhibit higher personal well-being on a wide 
variety of indices” (p.351). They report that mindful individuals tend to express values, 
which are more intrinsic than extrinsic in nature. Mindful individuals tend to focus on 
growth, relationships and community rather than financial success, image and popularity. 
They also incline toward such behaviours as “choicefulness”, ecological responsibility and 
lower levels of material consumption. 
2.6.3.8 Integration 
Psychologists argue that intrinsic motivation is not only associated with the development 
of socially responsible values, it may assist in the growth of capacities for integration and 
reflection. Integration involves reflecting on and coming to endorse particular values and 
acting in accordance with those values. It is a dialectic process which may result in letting 
go of values that have been unreflectively taken in, that is, “introjected” (Ryan, 1995), 
while others are reflected upon and implemented as part of the self (Ryan & Deci, 2000c). 
In his review of the literature on integration Ryan (1995) notes that across a number of 
psychological frameworks, including those of Freud, Jung, Rogers, Maslow and Piaget, 
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there is a shared assumption that “innate tendencies toward assimilation and integration 
play a critical role in social development” (p.398). Ryan contends that the impulse towards 
integration manifests via three main aspects of behaviour: intrinsic motivation, 
internalization and emotional integration. 
Jung (e.g.1962) discussed this kind of trajectory as a process of individuation and 
Maslow (1954) conceptualised it in terms of self-actualisation. In more recent 
psychological work, integration and the development of reflective capacities are similarly 
viewed as desirable, higher order capacities linked to intrinsic motivation and creativity (K. 
Brown & Kasser, 2005; Langer, 1989, 2000; Ryan, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2000e; Ryan, et 
al., 2008; Zhang & Sternberg, 2005). Interest development seems to be one of the 
pathways along which interests, competencies and values become integrated and develop 
into a strong sense of self (Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Krapp, 2002, 2003, 2007; Renninger, 
2009). 
2.6.3.9 Conclusions about the educational value of autonomy 
There is therefore considerable accumulated research which suggests that, whether or not 
an autonomous process results in a product of value to the outside world, such processes 
have internal value. That is, autonomy is valuable to the person in terms of well-being, 
learning enhancements, self-regulation and developing a sense of self. Research also 
indicates that anti-social values tend to accompany the excessive pursuit of extrinsic 
goals/rewards, whereas greater mindfulness and tolerance of others is associated with the 
pursuit of intrinsic rewards. These are important considerations with respect to the 
enhancement of “creativity” in education. There are strong experimental research 
indications that intrinsically motivated processes tend to result in more “creative” (as 
externally judged) product outcomes and case studies indicate that complex “creative” 
work usually involves a combination of enjoyment and other autonomously regulated 
processes. On the basis of such research, teachers should feel confident in the knowledge 
that by supporting “autonomy” they are simultaneously supporting their students’ learning 
and development as well as their capacities to produce better quality and/or innovative 
outcomes. 
However, in order to fully address big picture creativity imperatives, educators may 
need to take a broader perspective on creativity than the facilitation of autonomy. As 
indicated, at the beginning of the review, there appear to be different kinds of creative 
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and/or problem-solving and/or innovative processes. Whilst it does appear that 
autonomous processes conduce towards complexity in thinking, autonomous processes do 
not necessarily result in innovative products at the cultural level. Furthermore, innovations 
are not necessarily produced through the kinds of processes that facilitate well-being. 
Some innovative processes may be enacted for ego-enhancing or other instrumental 
reasons. Some innovation may be produced in a relatively step-wise manner. 
Therefore, in order to engage with creativity discourse, to interpret the messages about 
creativity and decide on what can be done to address the issues, teachers would need to be 
aware that a range of meanings of creativity are reflected at the rhetorical level of 
creativity discourse. Available taxonomies, although helpful, offer limited insight into the 
meanings of creativity reflected at the rhetorical level. 
Banaji and colleagues (Banaji, 2008; Banaji & Burn, 2007; Banaji, et al., 2006) identify 
and group various creativity “rhetorics”, according to the domains from which they 
originate. This kind of grouping is informative and more work of this type could be useful. 
But at the same time this kind of focus on creativity leaves unaddressed the similarities and 
differences in the meanings of creativity expressed across and within the groupings. For 
example, in the following quote Banaji and Burn (2007, pp. 55-56) discuss the conflicting 
views of creativity contained within the discourse of “the Creative Classroom rhetoric”: 
In its most positive incarnation, the Creative Classroom rhetoric may be seen 
to promote forms of learning that are generally held to improve the 
experience of children in education – holistic learning, active learning, 
expanded notions of intelligence, attention to social and cultural contexts, 
social learning and ethical human development (Beetlestone, 1998; Starko, 
2005). By the same token, though, it runs the risk of losing what is 
distinctive about “creativity” itself – if it cannot be distinguished from all 
these other things, where is its explanatory power? Additionally, in some 
formulations, process and product are set up as being in opposition to each 
other, rather than as in dialogue and this in turn leads to a seriously 
problematic relationship between creativity and evaluation, and creativity 
and critical literacy practice. 
Bleakley (2004) takes the perspective that although some meanings of creativity are 
legitimised, any view of creativity is as legitimate as another, as they are all constructed 
through discourse. Whilst his typology may, as he claims, provide a snap-shot of current 
constructions of creativity, it does not account well for people’s various ways of enacting 
and valuing what they see as creativity. In other words, there seems to be an experiential 
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dimension to creativity conceptions that is not addressed in Bleakley’s typology. It would 
be harder to counter Bleakley’s view if there was no evidence that people’s accounts of 
creative processes often agree concerning the internal qualities of the processes they 
identify as creative. Rather than creativity being “one idea” constructed discursively in so 
many different ways that it can be seen, as Bleakley argues, as an “unstable construct”, it 
seems at least equally possible that different people discern particular phenomena to which 
they attach the terms “creativity” or “creative”. On the basis of this reasoning the use of the 
term “creativity” to describe some phenomena could indeed be a matter of social 
convention, but the discerned phenomenon itself is experienced. In order to find out what 
people mean when they use the term “creative” it would be useful to investigate what 
people are experiencing when they identify something as creative. 
2.6.4 Creative cognition 
This section samples some of the work that has been carried out to investigate creative 
cognition. Research into creative cognition tends to use either biological (neuro-scientific) 
or experimental research methods. This literature contains much that is informative for 
educators depending on what one requires of it. But if one is interested in understanding 
what creativity “is” or how people, including the researchers working in this area, 
understand creativity, it seems that it would be difficult to find out about it from this 
literature. With specific reference to neuroimaging investigations, Sawyer (2011, p.151) 
contends that neuroscience studies show that “what people think of as creativity involves a 
wide variety of cognitive processes, each of which results in distinct patterns of brain 
activation.” He reasons further that the short term investigative strategies used by 
neuroscientists may be able to tell us little about creativity overall because “it might be the 
case that there are many different neural pathways that result in behavior [sic] that is 
characterized [sic] as creative … ” He thus highlights some difficulties in engaging with 
the literature, in that much of this research sub-serves a range of different creativity 
research agendas, involves various meanings of creativity and that there is a disjunct 
between what researchers in these areas are able to investigate and how creativity is 
conceptualised more broadly. Experimental research in laboratories can investigate short 
term problem-solving and generation of creative outcomes but is not suited to investigating 
what is going on in long term creative efforts (Runco & Sakamoto, 1999; Sawyer, 2011) 
and therefore may only help us to understand more about certain meanings or aspects of 
creativity. The stated objective for this part of the literature review, which is locating the 
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value of creativity, is hard to apply to the research that has been carried out to investigate 
creative thinking. 
However, it seems important to acknowledge this body of creativity research and what 
it has contributed to our understanding of creative thinking. Sawyer (2011) observes that 
there have been no comprehensive reviews of the creativity neuroscience literature prior to 
his 2011 review. He argues that much of the recent neuroscience research on creativity is 
interesting but often serves to show, in a different way, what has already been shown 
earlier in “classic” experimental studies of creative problem solving. He suggests that one 
of the clearest contributions of the neuroscience literature to understanding creativity is to 
show that the whole brain is active in creative processing. One major value of the 
investigative work has been the demystification of processes internal to creativity. 
However, the value of creative thinking itself is not illuminated in these investigations, 
except perhaps, in the sense that by knowing that creativity is “ordinary”, rather than 
outside human control, it can be seen as applicable in those areas and ways that individuals 
or societies see as valuable. 
As presented below, some investigations of creative cognition have been experimental 
investigations of problem-solving. Some investigations have been to find out if people, 
who appear high in some measure of creativeness, use processes which differ from those of 
less creative people. Some work has helped to pinpoint the conditions under which more 
analytical and more global types of mental processes occur. Some work has shown that 
there are common phases that occur in problem-solving. Some work has opened up such 
internal experiences as intuition and incubation to research scrutiny. 
The section is divided into three categories. The first groups together research 
suggesting that creative cognition may take different forms across the population; the 
second groups together some research, which illuminates the nature of creative cognitive 
processes; the third section groups together research which suggests that “interventions” 
are possible and that people can think more creatively under specific circumstances or with 
some form of training. 
This section reviews creative cognition under the headings of: 
 Creative cognition differences in the brain 
 Creative cognition characteristics 
 Creative cognition as malleable. 
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2.6.4.1 Creative cognition differences in the brain 
The question arises as to whether people differ in their ability to access or mobilise 
particular processes. Certainly it seems that people may differ in the extent to which they 
are conscious of certain mental processes. Baars (1996) notes, for example that some 
people seem to be completely unaware of their mental images. Le Doux (1995) states that, 
“people have different degrees of insight into their emotions” (p.229) for which anatomical 
findings suggest possible explanations. Differences in people’s conscious awareness of 
mental processes could indicate something meaningful about people’s preferred cognitive 
modes. 
Some comparative biological research indicates that there are differences between the 
mental processing of creative and less creative people. Martindale (1999) contends that 
creativity is actually a rare characteristic or mental trait. EEG monitoring in studies of 
more and less creative individuals indicates to him that when creative individuals engage 
in associative problem solving, such as continuous word association tests, they exhibit 
“defocused” attention, low cortical arousal and greater right-hemisphere activation than 
less creative people. In his view creative people have greater access to autistic, free 
associative, analogical and reverie-like cognitive states than less creative people. However 
he observes that, in general, creative people only exhibit these traits when engaged in 
creative activity. 
There is some research suggesting that relatives of schizophrenics figure prominently in 
creative populations, perhaps pointing to a genetic predisposition for some people to use 
aspects of primary-process thinking (Martindale, 1999). Simonton (2005) similarly 
observes that in some cases mild pathologies may contribute to creative thinking, as 
elevated scores on psychoticism are associated with the capacity for defocused attention. 
Dietrich (2004a) suggests that understanding the generative capacity of the human brain 
requires a broader neuro-scientific approach than can be attained from studies of 
hemispheric asymmetry, such as have been undertaken by Martindale (1999). Others have 
also expressed concerns about the extent to which hemispheric specialisation can inform 
about creativity (Runco, 1999; Sawyer, 2011). Therefore it may simply be a common 
misconception that creativity is located in a particular side of the brain, or that creative 
people have greater use of one side of the brain than the other. 
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Dietrich (2007) has hypothesised that as the brain stores both cognitive and emotional 
information, people’s creative thinking may differ depending on where their strengths lie 
in terms of retrieving and using these two types of information. Dietrich suggests that main 
types of thinking processes, deliberate and spontaneous, combine with these strengths in 
using cognitive and/or emotional information and reasons that there may be four types of 
creative cognition involving different combinations of these four aspects. He suggests that 
people may therefore demonstrate strengths in one or more of these types of thinking. 
Finke (1996) observes similarly that people exhibit different types of creative thinking. 
He contends that some people rely on chaotic thinking and “tend to view the world as an 
essentially unpredictable place that is filled with complex relationships and meaningful 
associations” (Finke, 1996, p.390). He observes that they are usually good at dealing with 
unexpected events and characterises their creativity as strikingly original. At the other end 
of the creative spectrum, he places “ordered” thinkers who are “organised, proactive, 
controlled, serious and literal” (Finke, 1996, p.390). He suggests that when ordered 
thinkers do creative things, their creativity is often highly structured and directly connected 
to previous ideas and concepts. 
This limited selection of research outcomes and perspectives is representative of 
literature, which supports a view of creative cognition as different for different people. One 
educational consideration with respect to such observations could be that it may not be 
reasonable to expect that people can perform equally well on “creative” tasks requiring 
specific kinds of mental processes or sensitivities to particular kinds of internal states and 
information. 
2.6.4.2 Creative cognition characteristics 
Research has established a number of common characteristics of cognition during creative 
processes. Creative processes often involve periods of intuition, incubation and insights 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Finke, 1996). Incubation occurs when attention is 
turned away from a problem for a period of time in order to allow unconscious problem-
solving to occur (Finke, 1996). It is alternatively described by Csikszentmihalyi and 
Sawyer (1995) as a period during which “information is processed in parallel at a 
subconscious level, and is followed by a period of conscious evaluation and elaboration” 
(p.358). The following quotations are by participants in a study of creative insight 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995, p.353) and illustrate that people sometimes sense 
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directions (Fensham & Marton, 1992) and are able to manipulate the brain’s capacity to 
perform incubation and produce insights: 
You have these ideas, and then you work on them. As you work on them, 
you get new ideas … One makes the other one come out; it’s as though 
creatures come out. If you don’t work on it, they hide in there … Something 
has begun to work, and you continue it, you feel the singing inside you. 
(Respondent H) 
I would say that scientific intuition is more sort of half-conscious 
knowledge, where you can see connections between things where a 
connection is not obvious, almost unconsciously, almost like a dream. 
(Respondent I) 
Studies on intuitive judgement have shown that it is possible to sense meaningful 
directions for exploration without being aware of the actual reasons underlying the choices 
(Finke, 1996). Studies also show that verbalisation and over-regulation of exploratory 
processes can discourage the emergence of relevant structures and problem solutions. Thus 
it is not helpful to talk through problems requiring insight. 
Finke (1996) states that it now seems that the effectiveness of incubation results 
primarily from the decay of misleading, inappropriate or less viable forms of activation – a 
kind of “helpful forgetting” of less relevant approaches and associations. It appears also 
that as incubation occurs outside of consciousness one cannot know how long incubation 
will take (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995). 
Finke (1996) reports on how people are able to mentally combine mental images to 
make discoveries and generate insights. An interesting finding from this research is the 
discovery of emergent structures in mental images. A person can discover details or 
properties of an object that were not intentionally committed to memory, by inspecting 
his/her image of the object. Finke (1996) notes, for example, that it is possible to scan 
one’s image of the American flag to see if the top stripe is red or white. Emergent features 
can be discovered by mentally combining forms. According to him experimental subjects 
are not generally aware of emergent patterns contained in their images until the images 
have been consciously inspected. 
Some neuro-scientific research suggests that the prefrontal cortex of the human brain is 
involved in various aspects of creative cognition, which are referred to as higher order 
functions (Dietrich, 2007). Dietrich (2004b) proposes, also, that flow is a focus-induced 
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state of “transient hypofrontality”, in which various functions of the prefrontal cortex that 
are nonessential for processing of a given task are “subtracted” from consciousness 
allowing maximum processing by the more efficient “implicit” system. He suggests that 
the feelings reported by people who have experienced flow – complete focus, 
disappearance of self-consciousness, no worry of failure and distortion of time – can be 
explained as inhibition of the prefrontal functions which support the self-construct, 
awareness of time and so forth. He asserts that understanding how the areas of the 
prefrontal cortex are involved in various types of creative thinking is essential for refining 
future creativity research. 
Investigation of differences between problem-solving under duress and problem-solving 
for proactive purposes has been informative as it shows that creative processes can differ 
markedly at a neural and phenomenological level. Heinzen (1994) reports that reactive 
creativity uses different kinds of neural processes from those used in proactive creativity. 
Reactive creativity is experienced as having negative affect or feelings of desperation, 
while proactive creativity is marked by positive affect or pleasure. According to Heinzen 
reactive creativity triggers simple and rigid, coping type associations and processing, while 
proactive creativity triggers “rich and divergent” cognition. This indicates that creative 
products are not always produced through emotionally satisfying processes. “Creative” 
processes can be mobilised for different reasons and under different conditions of pressure 
and absence from pressure. However, there is considerable evidence demonstrating that the 
outcome of thinking occurring under conditions of “proactive” (Heinzen, 1994), 
“intrinsically motivated” (Collins & Amabile, 1999), “approach” (Friedman & Forster, 
2002) or “autonomous” (Levesque, et al., 2008) mental states is likely to produce better 
quality, more effective or more interesting products or solutions. 
Research of this type has been valuable in terms of showing that creative thinking 
involves ordinary processes. It also shows that there are commonalities in the processes 
that underlie some types of creative processes. However, there also appear to be 
differences in creative thinking involved in different kinds of creativity. 
2.6.4.3 Creative cognition as malleable 
The research findings reported in this section point to creative thinking as something which 
improves under certain conditions or can be improved through certain techniques, thereby 
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suggesting that creative thinking may be malleable. Seen this way, creative thinking is a 
capacity that could benefit from interventions in the education context. 
Collins and Amabile (1999) use a “maze” metaphor to explain why intrinsically 
motivation or interest produces outcomes that are more “novel and appropriate” than when 
interest is not involved. They suggest that when engaged in a task requiring creative 
thinking, willingness to explore the task maze rather than rushing to the most obvious exit 
increases the likelihood of finding more unusual or creative solutions (Collins & Amabile, 
1999, p.303). This suggests that to maximise problem-solving and generative capacities 
tasks could be geared to ensure interest, relevance and deep focus. Some researchers 
suggest that although more creative people demonstrate a capacity to consciously 
manipulate creative processes such as incubation and insight this capacity is learned 
through ordinary means – through education, mentoring, interest and engaging with 
problems (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995). 
This view is further supported by experimental studies, which have demonstrated 
consistently that when the brain operates free from threat, pressure or stress, the focus of 
attention broadens and there is increased activation of relatively inaccessible mental 
representations (Friedman & Forster, 2001, 2005). Being in an approach frame of mind 
increases performance in tasks requiring abstract thinking, apparently irrespective of 
enjoying the task (Higgins, 1997). Research indicates that simple verbal or pictorial 
manipulations can induce an approach focus (Forster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & 
Forster, 2005). Similar manipulations have been shown to induce an autonomous 
orientation with similar improvements in creative mental processing (Levesque, et al., 
2008). Friedman and Forster (2005) contend that improvements in global processing are 
not due to positive affect, but to cognitive anticipation. Therefore although positive affect 
or good mood has been shown to correlate with higher creativity it may not be good mood 
that contributes to improved global processing but other anticipatory cognitive elements of 
approach-type processes, which shift processing to the right hemisphere (Friedman & 
Forster, 2005). Studies of this type suggest that simple strategies such as the way that 
instructions and feedback are given can be critical in stimulating more creative types of 
processing. In Self-determination theory research it has been demonstrated that instructions 
and feedback can be given in such a way that people feel more engaged and autonomous in 
the way they carry out tasks (Stone, et al., 2009) 
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Finke’s (1996) “geneplore” model of cognition distinguishes between two types of 
cognitive processes – generative and exploratory processes. Generative processes such as 
visualised patterns, mental blends, mental models and verbal or conceptual combinations 
are used to develop “pre-inventive” structures, which can then be “examined and 
interpreted using various exploratory processes, and the forms can then be modified or 
replaced by further generative processes” (p.386). The model further distinguishes between 
intentional and spontaneous generation of forms. Some pre-inventive forms arrive in 
consciousness already completed and can be considered spontaneous, while others are 
intentionally generated. This model suggests that people could learn to use such strategies 
to generate solutions to problems. 
Meditation has also been shown to improve creative thinking. Transcendental 
meditation (TM) practice appears to increase access to “a deeper level of mental 
functioning” (Dixon et al., 2005). Studies have shown a range of cognitive enhancements 
with TM practice, including improved working memory, reflectivity and flexibility in 
children aged 5–11 relative to a control group (Warner, 2005), significant increases in 
analytic ability, self-concept, and general intellectual performance over 45 weeks in 
another group of school children (Dixon, et al., 2005) and a shift from conformity to self-
awareness in maximum security prison inmates (Alexander, Walton, & Goodman, 2003) 
Merrienboer and Sweller (2005) are not primarily concerned with creativity as such. 
They are interested in what promotes efficient cognition, effective learning and 
transferability of information. Their studies assess how cognitive load is involved in the 
processing of tasks. Two of their findings are of interest for creative cognition: Firstly they 
observe that the transferability of information is dependent on the quality of mental 
schemas. The building of high quality schemas requires perseverance. Therefore 
motivation is important for building high quality, transferable schemas that can be used in 
associative tasks. Similarly Bargh and Chartrand (1999) note that the achievement of 
automaticity in the execution of tasks makes them “light” and effortless. Automaticity of 
execution is not to be confused with autonomy. However automatic execution of tasks is 
essential for carrying out complex tasks, independently and at high levels of competence. 
As Bargh and Chartrand state, “automatic mental processes free one’s limited conscious 
attentional capacity” (p.464). Secondly, Merrienboer and Sweller (2005) report that as 
competence levels increase, the requirement for autonomous handling of tasks in order to 
reduce cognitive load, increases. If instruction continues in a structured way after learners 
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have achieved mastery, the effect is to increase cognitive load due to redundancy of 
information. In other words the support of creative cognition may require that appropriate 
attention be given to when to use structured instruction and when to allow freedom to 
choose how to engage in a task. 
It appears that one cannot peer into the human brain and locate “creativity”. But 
research of the type highlighted in this section should be useful where it is perceived, in 
some context, such as in education, that a certain type of “creative” process or “creative 
outcome” is desirable. These observations suggest that “creative thinking” of various types 
can be improved or manipulated. There appear to be a number of avenues and strategies 
through which educators might seek to effect improvement in the short or long term. 
2.6.5 Creative personality 
The question of whether there is a creative personality has relevance for educators from the 
point of view that it is of interest to know if creativity is a general ability irrespective of 
personality or if it is more applicable in some way for people with certain personality 
characteristics. In this section an attempt is made to synthesize a range of views, some of 
which seem to support the key creativity research finding that creativity is a common 
potential, while others seem to be at odds with it. If creativity is a common potential, how 
is it that some researchers conclude that there is a creative personality? 
Feist (1999) asserts that there is a creative personality and that this personality remains 
consistent over time. He observes that characteristics such as nurturance, autonomy and 
self-control appear to remain consistent for creative individuals from adolescence through 
to adulthood. Similarly after examining accumulated research Barron and Harrington 
(1981) concluded that certain core characteristics are consistently attributable to creative 
achievers, even across diverse fields. These characteristics include: 
high valuation of esthetic [sic] qualities in experience, broad interests, 
attraction to complexity, high energy, independence of judgement, 
autonomy, intuition, self-confidence, ability to resolve antinomies or to 
accommodate apparently opposite or conflicting traits in one’s self-concept, 
and finally, a firm sense of self as “creative.” (p.453) 
Mumford and Gustafson (1988) attempted to account for the consistent emergence of 
these core characteristics in creative people. Referring firstly to “broad interests, 
intellectual and artistic values”, they suggest that: 
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Attributes of this sort tend to increase the probability that the individual will 
(a) have multiple understandings available, (b) be willing to use multiple 
understandings in problem-solving efforts, (c) be sensitive to information 
that is inconsistent with a given understanding, and (d) be willing to resolve 
conflicting facts or understandings. Thus differential characteristics of this 
sort might be conceived of as attributes contributing to development and use 
of complex schemata. (Italics added) (p.35) 
Secondly, they consider that autonomy, independence, self-confidence, energy and 
willingness to work would be essential for creative work because creative work often lacks 
social approval. They conceive of this set of core characteristics as “general personality 
attributes required for implementing both major and minor contributions within the broader 
context of the creator’s personal and social world” (p.35). From this perspective, the 
attainment of certain attributes makes it more possible or likely for a person to think 
unusual things or do difficult work that lacks social support. 
The literature on intrinsic motivation, reviewed in the previous section, has provided 
substantial support for the view that there is a close association between high levels of 
creativity and the attainment of autonomous functioning. On this basis, we would expect to 
find that many highly creative people exhibit behaviours consistent with autonomy – 
behaviours such as curiosity, independence, self-confidence, non-conformity, interest in 
deep rather than surface learning, diverse interests and high energy for intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic goals. But is it, as Mumford and Gustafson (1988) seem to say, that people have 
these attributes as aspects of personality and this then allows them to be creative? 
SDT theory makes another kind of framing of the relationship between personality 
attributes and creativity possible. Ryan et al. (1997) state that “the greater one’s autonomy, 
the more one acts in accord with self-endorsed values, needs and intentions” (p.702). 
Therefore, rather than viewing creativity-promoting personality attributes as a precondition 
of creative behaviour, an alternative explanation is that as a person becomes more 
autonomous he/she simultaneously develops independence of judgement, confidence, self-
motivation, deep focus and engagement in learning, leading to expansion of personal 
interests and competencies. 
Do autonomous attributes underlie creativity or might autonomy and creativity grow 
together? From Simonton’s (2005) perspective this need not be an either/or proposition. He 
observes that while creators need to have a certain cluster of traits such as “defocused 
attention, divergent thinking, openness to experience, independence and nonconformity” 
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(Simonton, 2005, p.2) this cluster can be attained in different ways. He suggests that 
because some psychopathologies are associated with high levels of these characteristics, 
possessing moderate levels of some psychopathological symptoms will be positively 
correlated with creativity, and to the extent that these symptoms have a genetic foundation, 
“creativity can be said to be partly biologically determined” (Simonton, 2005, p.3). 
However, he also reports that many environmental experiences and conditions can support 
the same cluster, for example, creativity is associated with traumatic childhood experience, 
but also with growing up in a culturally rich environment. Ryan and Deci (2000) report, in 
addition, that creativity and autonomy have been observed to increase when growing up in 
an autonomy supportive environment. Whichever way an autonomy orientation arises – 
whether due to genetic or environmental factors – there are strong indications that 
motivational orientation is a stable feature of personality. Amabile et al. (1994) found that 
an autonomy orientation is strongly correlated with people in creative professions. 
The association of creativity with a relatively stable autonomy orientation is also 
reflected in a recent synthesis of research around cognitive and learning style theories 
(Zhang & Sternberg, 2005). Zhang and Sternberg (2005) use the term intellectual style to 
refer to all major “style” constructs that have been propagated over the past few decades. 
An intellectual style, they explain, refers to one’s preferred way of processing information 
and dealing with tasks. They suggest that intellectual styles are more like “states” than 
traits, because although they are quite stable they are, at least to some extent, modifiable. 
Their integrative model of intellectual styles sorts style characteristics into three 
categories: Type 1 intellectual style characteristics include preferences for autonomy and 
non-conformity while Type 2 intellectual style characteristics include preferences for 
structure and conformity. Type 3 styles are flexible/neutral depending on the task or 
situation and include the intraversion/extraversion dimension. 
Zhang and Sternberg (2005) suggest that teachers can cater to all possible styles by 
giving attention to five dimensions of preferences. These are preferences for: 
 high degrees of structure vs. low degrees of structure 
 cognitive simplicity vs. cognitive complexity 
 conformity vs. nonconformity 
 authority vs. autonomy 
 group vs. individual. 
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They suggest, however, that student approaches may differ depending on activity-type. 
Merrienboer & Sweller (2005) also have explained that, depending on levels of expertise 
people may have different needs for structure versus freedom in tasks. Therefore, aside 
from any other likes or dislikes, students may prefer and need the opportunity to be 
autonomous in their areas of greatest competence and to be structured in areas for which 
they hold few high functioning schemas. Zhang and Sternberg suggest that styles can also 
be modified, at least, to some extent. They predict that most interventions would be toward 
promoting more Type 1 creativity-supportive behaviours – for example, promoting 
reflectiveness rather than impulsiveness, autonomy rather than conformity – as these have 
been shown to have greater benefits for learning and socialisation than Type 2 
characteristics. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999) prefers not to view the personalities of creative people in a 
fixed way. On the basis of his studies, he suggests that creative people have the ability to 
operate through a range of personality dimensions. He assesses that their behaviour is not 
dictated by a rigid inner structure as much as by situational demands. Raven (2002) asserts 
that creativity must be understood in the kinds of activity a person is strongly predisposed 
to carry out and in his or her idiosyncratic motives. 
On the basis of the views represented above, a description of the creative person in 
terms of a fixed personality that determines a person’s ability to be creative seems 
unsupportable. But we need also to keep in mind how creativity is being defined. If we 
think of it in terms of outstanding occupational achievement or products, then perhaps we 
might consider that some entrenched personality characteristics will suit some occupations 
while other characteristics are better suited to other areas. Inherited structures that favour 
non-conformity or special ability may contribute to the creativeness of some people. Some 
high level performance may be due to special ability rather than autonomous functioning. 
2.6.6 Psychopathology 
A number of researchers have found evidence of higher than normal incidence of 
psychopathology, depression, alcoholism and suicide among creative populations 
(Eysenck, 1999; Rothenberg, 1990a, 1990b). Schizophrenia and autism appear also to have 
some relation to creative capacity (Ott, et al., 2005). There appears also to be an 
association between high levels of creativity and bipolar mood disorder (Bowden, 1994; 
Richards, 1994). Because creativity is now seen as a central aspect of work (Florida, 2002, 
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2005), the question of how psychopathology relates to creativity is more relevant for 
educators than it might seem at first. Here the reviewer explores three questions that can be 
asked about the relation of psychopathology to creativity: Is creativity a form of 
psychopathology? Are people with psychopathological disorders more creative? Can 
psychopathologies develop through creativity? 
2.6.6.1 Is creativity a form of psychopathology? 
On this question the consensus appears to be in the negative. There seems to be a much 
more resounding agreement that creativity represents optimal functioning (Bohm, 1998; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Ryan & Deci, 2000c; Simonton, 2000b; Zhang & Sternberg, 
2005). Again we should be careful about trying to understand how the researchers claiming 
this are thinking about creativity. Bohm (1998) regards creativity as a type of adaptive 
attitude or consciousness. Csikszentmihalyi (e.g. 1990, 1996) is often concerned with 
creativity as high level, but also meaningful, creative achievement with deep roots into a 
person’s sense of self via the experience of flow. SDT related research sees creativity 
resulting from processes of optimal development. Within the SDT framework it is 
amotivation and some types of extrinsically motivated orientations that are indicative of 
lack of functionality and associated more readily with psychopathological states. Thus in 
these views creativity is seen as indicative of behavioural functionality and capacity for 
positive social contribution. 
Terror management theorists (TMT), on the other hand, have proposed that creativity 
can result from our need to manage anxiety around mortality and can result in anti-social 
behaviour, which then may raise our anxiety levels because we find ourselves outside our 
community (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszcynski, Solomon, & Schimel, 1999). This is the 
situation in which, as Sternberg and Lubart (1995) put it, creators find that they are 
“defying the crowd”. Abra (1995) also considers whether the “muses” dwell in Elysium, 
that is, whether creative motivation and/or inspiration is connected to death concerns and 
suggests a number of ways in which the prospect of death may motivate creative effort. 
SDT researchers respond to this line of thought by reasserting their concern with 
positive development and with making the kind of choices which promote well-being as 
opposed to ill-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). They contend that “people typically engage 
life – that is, they seek challenges, connections, authentic meaning and significance – not 
because they are trying to avoid the scent of death, but because they are healthy and alive” 
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(Ryan & Deci, 2004, p.473). In their view the well-being experienced in full engagement 
of life cannot be explained as avoiding the prospect of death. Furthermore they note that 
growth propensities such as curiosity, discovery and self reliance are in evidence in 
children well before they are aware of death and are also evident in the animal kingdom. 
Moreover, they observe that people who feel that they are living full lives tend to have 
lower levels of concern with death and this they suggest has to do with the attainment of 
satisfaction and meaning in life, rather than a deliberate attempt to obliterate awareness of 
death. 
Nevertheless, Deci and Ryan (2002) have stated that there is a need for further research 
to understand those situations in which humans act in ways, which appear diametrically 
opposed to their own true value systems: 
An interesting case in point concerns Nazi values that were apparently 
endorsed by many Germans during the 1930s and early 1940s. The espoused 
value of annihilating an ethnic minority within their culture was certainly 
inconsistent with values contained within the integrated selves of many of 
the individuals—values of kindness and promoting humanity, for example. 
(p.437) 
Carl Jung (1963) revealed that he too experienced a struggle within his own value system 
around nationalistic hopes for Germany. Jung’s example suggests that in the process of 
integration people sometimes have to confront difficult dilemmas, which outsiders might 
see very differently. Thus even highly reflective people can make bad choices in difficult 
situations. It is perhaps for reasons, such as this, that there have been calls for “values” 
education as part of any educational program aimed at facilitating creativity (Craft, 2003, 
2008b; Gibson, 2005). SDT theorists (Ryan & Deci, 2000b) are adamant, however, on the 
basis of considerable research, that people with high levels of autonomy tend to be far less 
malleable, less easily led away from their internally assessed values than people with low 
levels of autonomous self-regulation. 
A related question is whether the deep focused and satisfying affect of creative activity 
– flow for example – is qualitatively different from the absorption and pleasure that 
reinforces people’s indulgence in, for example, gambling. Here again, SDT related 
research shows that while absorption appears quite similar in both situations, addictive 
gambling is ultimately unsatisfying, while meaningful creative endeavours tend to promote 
lasting well-being. The totality of the intentions and the affect somehow differ. It is 
 114
important to be engaged in activities which support a sense of eudaimonic well-being 
(Ryan, et al., 2008). 
2.6.6.2 Are people with psychopathological disorders more creative? 
Ochse (1990) reviewed the literature and stated that while psychopathology cannot be 
regarded as a prerequisite for creative achievement on the basis that some highly creative 
people are not disordered, neither can it be claimed that mental health is necessary for 
creative achievement as some creative achievers are indeed disordered. Simonton (2000b) 
supports this view, noting that while some creators demonstrate symptoms of 
psychopathologies many creators are not psychopathological. He adds that incidence rates 
of psychopathological symptoms in creators vary across domains, that creators who exhibit 
symptoms usually possess compensatory characteristics, and many characteristics that have 
the appearance of abnormality are often adaptive in the context of the person’s life. He 
concludes that, “the creative personality often provides a fine illustration of how supposed 
psychological weaknesses can sometimes be converted into a form of optimal functioning” 
(Simonton, 2000b, p.153). 
Simonton (2000b, 2005) explains the correlation between psychopathology and 
creativity with reference to his evolutionary model of creativity. He sees psychopathology 
as a form of marginality, which is sometimes fruitful. In terms of their ability to think 
differently from population norms and their tendency toward non-conformity, mildly 
psychotic individuals, for example, contribute conceptual variations for cultural selection. 
2.6.6.3 Can one develop a psychopathology through creativity? 
There are important links to be made between creativity and acquired psychopathologies – 
especially stress related conditions. The indications are strong that failure to maintain 
intrinsic motivation and authenticity when performing creative work can have seriously 
debilitating effects on both creativity and mental health. When people are not being 
propelled by authentic motivation in creative work – that is by intrinsic motivation or a 
combination of intrinsic motivation and deeply held values – their pleasure in the work and 
emotional health can be impaired (Kaufman & Baer, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000d). 
Research indicates that intrinsic motivation can be eroded in many ways. Studies have 
also shown that a variety of extrinsic constraints and motivators can have decremental 
effects on creativity. It has been observed that creativity can be decreased by surveillance 
(Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990), evaluation (Amabile, 1979), competition 
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(Amabile, 1982), reduced autonomy (Amabile & Gitomer, 1984; Greenberg, 1992), and 
contracting for a reward contingent on task engagement (Hennessey, 1989). Many studies 
have been conducted confirming the decremental effects of reward on creativity (Deci, et 
al., 2001). 
Some aspects of creative jobs can be extremely stressful (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; 
Kaufman, 2002; Policastro & Gardner, 1999). There are many pressures, for example, of 
being a leader in a field or in weathering the periods of boom and bust that can mark 
creative careers (Kaufman, 2002). Time pressures can reduce a person’s ability to think 
creatively (Friedman & Forster, 2005; Policastro & Gardner, 1999). Some domains offer 
limited opportunity to make a reasonable living by being creative (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1996). Furthermore, a person who creates, often has a great personal investment in his/her 
creative work, to the extent that the loss of creative motivation or criticism of that work 
can be experienced as painful – as seems to have been the situation leading up to the 
suicide of poet Sylvia Plath (Runco, 1998). 
Plath’s suicide has raised a great deal of speculation as to why she took that course. But 
suicide among female poets is apparently common enough that some psychologists have 
referred to the phenomenon as the “Sylvia Plath effect” (Kaufman & Baer, 2002). 
Although Kaufman and Baer (2002) identify this as a complex problem with many 
contributing factors, they indicate that the construction of women’s social roles can 
intensify pressures surrounding creative women and make it difficult for them to ignore 
coercive or distracting extrinsic factors. They suggest that the problem of stress, which also 
affects male poets to a lesser degree, is at least partly due to the difficulty of maintaining 
authentic motivation during creative work. 
Extrinsic pressures can undermine confidence and emotional health, which can in turn 
be debilitating for eminent creative people (Kaufman, 2002). Kaufman distinguishes 
between creative genius and more usual forms of creativity and cites investigations (eg., 
Kaufman, 2001; Ludwig, 1995), which have found that mental illness, especially 
depression-rates, are significantly higher “in the greater eminence condition than in the 
accomplished (but not genius) condition” (p.375). Kaufman suggests that depression and 
loss of confidence may be a price paid by many eminent people. Kaufman and Baer (2000) 
propose that to preserve mental health in creative work, creators, especially poets and 
writers and more especially female poets and writers, might need to learn to manage the 
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intrusion of extrinsic motivational constraints in order to allow the intrinsic motivational 
factors to predominate. 
It is possible that dispositional factors come into the issue of psychopathology, stress 
and suicide in people who work in the “expressive” arts. Verhaegen, Joormann & Kahn 
(2005) found a link between artists’ depression and a tendency towards “rumination”. 
Ruminators become trapped in non-productive thoughts. They conclude that creativity 
itself is not the cause of depression in artists and writers. Rather they find that, “people 
who are more likely to have the blues are the ones who are more likely to sing (paint or 
write). Both – the blues and the singing –appear to be rooted in a maybe all-too-closely 
examined life” (Verhaegen, et al., 2005, p.231). 
Simonton (2000a) has also pointed out that compared to the careers of domain experts, 
the careers of eminent creators are marked by unpredictability. He states that, “the career 
of the typical creator consists of a chaotic sequence of hits and misses, of successes and 
failures … In fact, the ratio of hits to total attempts does not increase over the course of the 
career, but rather tends to fluctuate randomly” (p.286). Csikszentmihalyi (1999) suggests 
that domains such as music, drama and poetry receive little cultural support, can often only 
offer depressing careers, and attract persons who are exceptionally sensitive. He reasons 
that studies showing higher than expected rates of nervous disease in these professions 
“may have little or nothing to say about creativity itself” (p.331). 
Stress in creative work is not limited to the arts areas. Shaw (1994) studied the affective 
elements of scientific creativity as reported in a group of mathematicians and found that 
although scientific creators report significant pleasure in their work and a sense of 
connection to others, they also report having to deal with external pressures and feelings of 
alienation, failure, rejection, shame and frustration. 
Florida’s (2005) comments on the stress-related problems associated with creative work 
and the problems this poses within a creative economy were earlier cited. On this topic of 
creativity in organisational settings Frey and Jegen (2001) state that while there is 
extensive and compelling empirical evidence for the “crowding out” of intrinsic motivation 
by monetary rewards, this evidence has not been well integrated into economic thinking. 
They and others (Pink, 2009; Reeve, 2002) have suggested that intrinsic motivation seems 
counterintuitive to many people. It is more often believed that offering incentives is the 
way to increase supply (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Mumford (2000) indicates that managing 
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creative people in a way that allows the creative work-style to proceed, requires careful 
revision of common organizational practices involving evaluation, incentives, goals and 
schedules, for traditional management practices have the potential to reduce intrinsic 
motivation and induce stress in people carrying out creative work. 
From an educational point of view there is clearly cause to be concerned about the 
preparation of students set to enter work environments where a tradition of applying 
coercive, extrinsic motivators to enhance work performance may persist alongside growing 
demands for creative work. Students also need to know what creative work is like, what 
challenges are posed by creative work within different domains. Shaw (1994) suggests that 
creative work requires the development of affect tolerance and sees this as a “critical 
parameter in allowing for the development of personal creativity” (p.41). He suggests that 
students, especially graduate students, should learn about the spectrum of emotional 
experiences that can be part of creating. 
2.6.7 Diversity 
The relation of diversity to creativity is relevant to the consideration of creativity in 
education because diversity is now seen as a condition of the contemporary cultural 
environment and is also regarded as an environmental factor that supports creativity. It 
seems that diversity relates to creativity in different ways. Diversity, as an aspect of the 
environment, has been shown to increase the incidence of creative outcomes and 
production (Simonton, 1984, 1994, 1999). Not only does exposure to diversity in the 
environment make the generation of new ideas more likely, it appears to facilitate 
autonomous, objective kinds of thought. Simonton (2000b, p.153) asserts that diverse 
experiences help weaken the constraints imposed by conventional socialization. Being able 
to choose among alternatives may promote the awareness that there are different ways of 
doing things. Feldman (1994a) notes that for any major form of creativity a person needs to 
see that the social and built world is not fixed and may be changeable. 
Simonton (2000b) has examined the historical record using historiometric analysis 
and finds that cultural diversity facilitates creativity. He has observed that, “growing up 
when a civilization is fragmented into a large number of peacefully coexisting independent 
states tends to be conducive to creative potential” (Simonton, 2000b, p.155). Also, creative 
activity within a civilization tends to increase through interaction with outside influences. 
He reasons that the enrichment of the cultural environment encourages “new creative 
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syntheses” (p.155). Florida (2002) also argues that cultural and lifestyle diversity is 
important for creativity and notes that the places where creative people live tend to be 
characterised by diversity. 
Also possessing diverse knowledge and experience seems to increase the likelihood 
of coming up with new ideas (Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 2004). Kashdan & 
Fincham (2002) observe: 
If the wellsprings of creativity are the fusion of previously disparate ideas 
and concepts (Martindale, 2001), then the more ideas, categories, and/or 
domains accumulated and integrated by an individual, the greater the 
likelihood of finding novel or creative links among them. (p.373) 
The importance of a diverse knowledge base to creators is supported by the research of 
Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein (2004) who found that “successful artists and scientists 
tend to be polymaths with unusually broad interests and training that transcend disciplinary 
boundaries” (p.128). However, fusion of ideas can occur under varying conditions and via 
varying mental processes. Heinzen (1994) raises the example of the ingenuity of people 
living through conditions of starvation or wartime, whose creativity may be driven by 
harsh necessity. 
Mumford and Gustafson (1988) wanted to know why studies had revealed that major 
creative contributions, were most likely to occur in young adulthood, with a tendency for 
minor contributions to occur in middle age. Dissatisfied with the available range of 
hypotheses attempting to account for the high level of creativity in young adulthood, they 
conjectured that valuable insight could be gained by considering “what one age group has 
that the other might lack” (p.29). They cite Koestler’s (1964) argument that major 
achievements seem to occur when the “fusion of two or more schemata” brings about a 
reorganisation of existing understandings. It can be envisaged that upon entry to existing 
domains, the young bring with them a set of experiences that will often be substantially 
different from those of the previous generations. This increases the likelihood that young 
individuals entering the domain will explore or synthesise ideas in new ways. 
2.6.7.1 Marginality 
In his study of seven highly creative people responsible for significant contributions to 
separate cultural domains, Gardner (1994) observed two features common to all seven: 
they each possessed asynchronous intelligence profiles and each felt marginal in some way 
 119
in their culture. Gardner suggests that their lives were characterised by “lack of fit” 
(Gardner, 1994, p.79) and conjectures that marginality might have motivated these creative 
people to “prove” themselves. Csikszentmihalyi (1999) argues that dissatisfaction with the 
status quo is an ideal impetus for wanting to introduce novelty into a domain. Thus, a 
person’s marginality may not only predispose them to think in novel ways, but may also 
contribute motivational aspects to creative endeavour. 
More complex connections between marginality and creativity are discussed by Unger 
(2000). Unger notes that marginality can have positive and negative aspects. On the 
negative side, marginality may be accompanied by stigmatisation and lack of social power. 
On the positive side, she argues that marginality can also engender a desire to bring about 
positive social change. She finds that people who have encountered problems with society 
are more likely, than people whose relationship with society is relatively problem-free, to 
question dominant social beliefs and hold a “constructionist epistemology”. She defines 
constructionism as: “belief in the relative nature of truths, concern for subjectivity, focus 
on the individual as a source of authenticity and authority, and acknowledgement of the 
role played by chance in the determination of events” (Unger, 2000, p.174). She frames the 
relationship between positive marginality, consciousness and social action as follows: 
Positive marginality appears to promote constructionist epistemology; in 
particular, awareness that injustice is rooted in structural processes rather 
than personal inadequacy. Thus it supports a vision of collective as well as 
individual responsibility for change. (Unger, 2000, p.177) 
Policastro and Gardner (1999) have observed that this relationship does not apply only 
for the seriously oppressed. Each of us, they point out, is a deviant from a hypothetical 
norm. They have suggested that our creative potentials often lie in our uniqueness, but that 
creative people are distinguished by their motivation to “convert differences into 
advantages” (Policastro & Gardner, 1999, p.223). 
Simonton (2001) is emphatic about the importance of individual difference for the 
development of creativity: “Any developmental factor that enhances the capacity of an 
individual to generate numerous and diverse variations should have a positive impact on 
the development of creative potential” (p.7). He acknowledges that expertise is also 
extremely important, but stresses that, for creativity, expertise must be organised in such a 
way that the production of multiple perspectives are favoured. In Simonton’s view, the 
individual must be willing to develop his/her divergent variations and believes that 
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educational experience for the development of creative talent should include events and 
circumstances that encourage nonconformity, independence, appreciation of diverse 
perspectives and a variety of interests. 
2.6.8 Creativity, religion and spirituality 
A number of authors attest to the long history over which creativity and spirituality have 
been coupled in popular and scholarly thought (Albert & Runco, 1999; Csikszentmihalyi, 
1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). This issue impinges upon educators, from a number of 
angles. On one hand circumstances may have resulted in changes in the way that many 
humans experience their relationship with spiritual or supernatural deities 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). However, people do continue to have spiritual and religious 
beliefs and experience these with varying degrees of faith, curiosity and interest. Some 
spiritual/religious beliefs can inform or be intertwined with beliefs about creativity. 
Sternberg and Lubart (1999) argue that the popular association between creativity and 
divinity and/or spirituality has been an impediment to scientific creativity research. But 
this is an ambiguous lament, which cannot be taken as equivalent to saying that there are 
no conceivable or logical or even empirically verifiable connections to be made between 
creativity and some ways of thinking about spirituality. Lubart (1999) has himself reported 
that, cross culturally, ideas about spirituality and creativity interconnect in different ways 
and has suggested that in the East it is possible to identify a creative process, which differs 
from the typical Western creative process. Spirituality and creativity may interrelate in 
ways that bring about variation in the conceptualisation of creativity. 
Albert and Runco (1999) note that defining creativity in a materialistic way is relatively 
recent even in the West. According to them there is some consensus among scholars that 
the earliest Western conception of creativity is the one contained in the Biblical story of 
Genesis and that this was the origin of “the idea of the artisan doing God’s work on Earth” 
(p.18). They observe that this way of thinking about creativity, where the impetus or 
source for human creativity is located with a divine entity external to the person, took a 
variety of different forms over time. They note, for example, that in the Middle Ages the 
idea arose that special talent is a manifestation of an external “spirit” using the person as a 
conduit. But they argue that such ideas had been contested and largely discredited by the 
end of the Renaissance. 
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However, such beliefs do still make their appearance, even in the scholarly literature, 
and the suggestion that this kind of thinking has died away does not seem to fully represent 
the situation. Sternberg and Lubart (1999) observe, for example, that Rudyard Kipling, 
author of The Jungle Book and other popular stories, wrote of the daemon, which was with 
him as he wrote his novels. Whether Kipling was speaking figuratively or not, the 
utterance reflects the continuing presence, into relatively recent times, of divine origin 
theories of creativity in the popular imagination. 
It is not uncommon to find, even closer to the present day, that scholars/authors have 
framed their view of creativity with reference to some larger spiritual, religious or quasi-
religious framework. Fiction writer and Oxford scholar, John R. R. Tolkien, author of The 
Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings, believed that humans, having been made in the image of 
a creator, can perform no more worthy work than that of, what he termed “sub-creation” 
(Tolkien, 2001, 1964). He shared this view with his colleague, C.S. Lewis, writer of the 
Narnia books (Carpenter, 1977). To Tolkien and Lewis the “sub-creation” of the fantasy 
worlds of “Middle Earth” and “Narnia” were acts of religious significance. 
The work of Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan, 1962, 1964a, 1964b, 2009; McLuhan & 
Fiore, 1967; McLuhan & McLuhan, 1992) and Walter Ong (e.g. 1982), some of which has 
been discussed within the present review, has also been critiqued from the perspective that 
their views may be biased in favour of their religious beliefs (Sterne, 2011). In The 
Playboy interview (Nordon, 1969) discussed earlier, McLuhan openly reveals his Catholic 
views and offers his thoughts on how they relate to the evolution of humanity (Norden, 
1969). The theological interests of the Jesuit Father Walter Ong are proclaimed openly 
even in the title of his most influential work on media theory – Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word (Ong, 1982). Even if it can be said that in fairly recent history 
creativity came to be thought of, by some, as a process originating, not with a divine entity, 
but in the person, it is also the case that for many there is still a link between creativity and 
spiritual or religious ideas and that these ideas can influence the conceptualisation of 
creativity itself. The present reviewer has encountered the “real life” situation where 
people, curious about the topic of the present thesis, have expressed surprise that someone 
who is not of the Christian faith could consider herself equipped to undertake study on the 
subject of creativity. 
Carl Jung, one of the pioneers of modern psychology, noted similarly to Sternberg and 
Lubart (1999) that many people regard spirituality as something which cannot or should 
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not be studied. He saw this as a complex problem and discussed the nature of this 
complexity at length in his essay The Undiscovered Self (Jung, 1957). In the essay, Jung 
expressed his intolerance of the attitude that shrugs spirituality off as non-scientific. It was 
his understanding that spirituality is a basic, even instinctual aspect of the psyche. He took 
the view that spirituality involves that realm of human experience which is underpinned by 
feelings of a “numinous” nature. Numinosity, as Jung used the term, is a quality of awe or 
inspired compulsion in the way one feels and it is around this quality of numinosity that 
creativity, spirituality and the perceived guiding or compelling effect of the numinous 
experience are linked together in the Jungian framework. For Jung, it is the “unconscious” 
that is the seat – the only source – of spiritual or religious experience (Jung, 1957). Despite 
his reports that he himself had experienced compulsions so powerful that he felt as though 
he was “assaulted” and compelled to obey “a higher will” (Jung, 1963), Jung explained the 
human tendency to attribute spiritual guidance and spiritual ecstasy to external rather than 
internal sources and objects, in terms of “projection”, that is, attributing one’s own feelings 
to objects in the outer world. Jung writes that in remote times, “the main body of psychic 
life was apparently in human and non-human objects: it was projected, as we should say 
now” (Jung, 1938, p.242). To Jung, God is a projected aspect of self and therefore any 
spiritual feelings one might attribute to God (or a god) as an external entity, actually arise 
internally. 
Maslow (1964) observed that the “peak experience” – an instance where a profound 
sense of meaning is experienced – is often a common factor in propelling people into 
creative activity. Maslow argued that religious figures have often been “peak experiencers” 
trying to explain to others what life is like after the peak experience. Similarly to Jung, he 
also regards spirituality as related to experience and therefore a normal part of the world. 
The observation that there is an intersection between creativity and spirituality has also 
been made outside psychology. For example, in her investigation of mysticism (Underhill, 
1911), Underhill, a self-proclaimed mystic, concluded that the religious or spiritual mystic 
experience is much the same as other kinds of inspired creative experience. 
Contemporary investigations of religiosity suggest that there is a great deal yet to 
understand about how creativity might appear to people when viewed through particular 
religious or spiritual lenses. Recent work on types of religious engagement suggest that 
there are more and less authentic ways of approaching engagement in religious or spiritual 
activities. Investigations suggest that people can engage with religion in controlled ways, 
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where doctrine is interpreted literally and religious control may be adhered to out of fear. 
But others experience authentic/autonomous religious engagement (Neyrinck, Lens, 
Vansteenkiste, & Soenens, 2010; Neyrinck, Vansteenkiste, Lens, Duriez, & Hutsebaut, 
2006). However, there are aspects of individual approaches to religiosity, such as whether 
a position on transcendence is included in people’s religious beliefs, which seem to 
complicate understanding of differences in religious experience. 
2.7 SYNTHESIS: AUTONOMY HAS PERSONAL AND SOCIAL VALUE 
The synthesis that is made here after considering all of the various aspects presented in this 
selection of perspectives is simply, that autonomy – which underlies creative processes 
which feel meaningful to the creator – has personal and social value. Autonomous 
processes, which may be either intrinsically motivated or involve purposes about which a 
person cares deeply, have been shown to promote deep learning, greater complexity and 
creativity in thinking, development and integration of pro-social values and to enhance 
well-being. Through this review of creativity research it was also noted that understanding 
the relation between autonomy and creativity is valuable for understanding the relationship 
between creativity and culture. Therefore in any complex view of creativity an 
understanding of autonomy is essential. 
2.8 ENHANCING STUDENTS’ CREATIVITY 
Runco (2004a) suggests that the relationship between education and creativity may be one 
of the most important areas for research as “there are serious concerns about the impact of 
education on creativity”(p.670). Csikszentmihalyi (1995) argues that rather than increasing 
curiosity and interest schooling often dampens student interest and creativity. He argues 
that once this has happened, it may be hard to reverse the situation. These views suggest 
that it does matter how educators approach the support of creativity. As Kleiman (2005) 
reasons, it matters how educators approach “the design and delivery of educational 
provision if the stated desire to see more creativity in that provision is to be realised” 
(p.12). 
The reviewed literature has pointed to the importance, for educators, of considering two 
main sets of issues related to creativity: 
1. Teaching with awareness of a social/global environment within which 
“creativity” is becoming more common as an aspect of life and work. This 
aspect of creative curriculum was addressed earlier and involves a number of 
 124
aspects relating to work in a creative economy and life in an electronically 
mediated society. 
2. Teaching for creativity. Teaching for creativity can, obviously, mean a number 
of things if creativity has a range of meanings, and a glance at the creativity 
literature quickly indicates that there are mixed views on both the means and the 
efficacy of approaches to teaching for creativity. It appears on the basis of the 
reviewed literature that schools might cover most bases by considering three 
main approaches: 
 a problem-solving/creative thinking training approach 
 an autonomy-supportive approach 
 a domain-specific approach. 
2.8.1 Training for problem‐solving/creative thinking 
Although “training” may seem like the most straightforward approach to teaching for 
creativity, a survey of the literature and consideration of the reasons for implementing such 
an approach soon suggests that the idea of training for problem-solving and/or creative 
thinking is not very straightforward at all. There are difficulties at the outset in defining the 
objectives of problem-solving and creativity training in education. The literature provides 
varying assessments of how effective such strategies really are (Nickerson, 1999). What 
kind of problem-solving/creative thinking is to be encouraged? Would the intention be to 
stimulate practical, everyday, kinds of problem-solving or some kind of generic problem-
solving ability suitable for use across activities in a range of domains? How might students 
be supposed to benefit? Would this kind of training be for them or is training in creative 
thinking an attempt to build a kind of infrastructure for future innovation? 
The relationship between creative thinking and problem-solving is not clear cut. 
Nickerson (1999) provides a succinct discussion of positions on this matter and suggests 
that the two constructs may be too closely related to be treated in isolation. In deciding 
whether to train for problem-solving and/or creative thinking the problem faced seems, to 
the present reviewer, to be of the same order as the issue of whether there are forms of 
training suitable as preparation for doctoral study (Hockey, 1991). Hockey (1991) notes 
that one of the arguments raised against the usefulness of training for the doctorate is that 
there is little training that could be common to all Ph.D. projects. Similarly, it could be 
difficult to settle on types of creativity training that would provide a general kind of 
underpinning for the various kinds of creative work and life situations for which students 
are bound. 
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Perhaps it is counterproductive to consider the development of creative thinking in 
isolation from the purposes to which it is put. Is it really possible to think of creativity as a 
“skill”, which can be applied in a number of situations? A sophisticated approach to 
learning is usually developed over many years, often through engagement in formal 
education and, as reflected in complex conceptions of learning (Van Rossum & Hamer, 
2010), becomes an attitude based on conscious evaluation of its effectiveness and value. 
The reasons and methods for developing creative thinking, should, one would think, be 
given considerable thought if schools are entertaining the idea of using short term 
programs. It is perhaps because of discomfort with this kind of “training” approach that a 
number of educators and researchers have expressed reservations about teaching for 
“creativity” without also teaching for “values” (Craft, 2003; Gibson, 2005). 
Having articulated these reservations, the possibility of teaching creative thinking 
through programs and direct strategies does receive support in the literature (Nickerson, 
1999; Puccio & Gonzalez, 2004; Torrance, 1972). Torrance (1972) is highly supportive: 
I know that it is possible to teach children to think creatively and that it can 
be done in a variety of ways. I have done it. I have seen my wife do it; I have 
seen other excellent teachers do it. I have seen children who had seemed 
previously to be “non-thinkers” learn to think creatively, and I have seen 
them continuing for years thereafter to think creatively. (p.114) 
In this article Torrance reported on the success of a variety of strategies such as packages 
of materials, problem-solving programs, reading programs, manipulations of classroom 
variables, using the creative arts as vehicles, reward and competition. Similarly, there have 
been reports of favourable results from the Creative Problem-Solving (CPS) program, 
which over the years has been refined and represented through a number of versions 
(Isaksen & Treffinger, 2004; Puccio & Gonzalez, 2004). Nickerson (1999) is objective and 
reserved in his review of several such programs. He reports, nonetheless, that a number of 
programs and techniques are available to enhance a range of thinking elements and that 
some of these appear to have produced evidence of moderate to appreciable gains in 
aspects of creative thinking. Teacher enthusiasm and familiarity with the programs seems 
to be a moderating factor in achieving results on some of these programs (Isaksen & 
Treffinger, 2004; Nickerson, 1999; Puccio & Gonzalez, 2004). 
The extent to which training programs promote the use of surface strategies versus 
depth may be an issue to consider. Nickerson (1999) draws attention to a cautionary note, 
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expressed by Cropley (1992), to the effect that attempts to train in creative thinking could 
have the opposite effect if students learn instead to give the appearance of originality. 
Shalley (1995) has found that in organizational contexts creative outcomes increase if 
people are simply given the instruction that a creative product is required. When choosing 
strategies to increase “creativity” it seems important to consider what people are learning 
about creativity. Puccio and Gonzalez (2004) observe, interestingly, that although creative 
thinking does appear to increase through their structured training for creative problem-
solving, there seems also to be a horizon at which many learners become “stuck”. They 
report that for these learners, “CPS remains a model to be applied to others (i.e. facilitating 
CPS sessions), but does not necessarily become a way of life” (p.406). Puccio and 
Gonzalez argue that to take people beyond this stage they need to develop: “an openness to 
ongoing learning” (p.407). This suggests that if schools were to employ training programs 
of this type, it would also be important to implement more global strategies to help 
facilitate such attitudes to learning. Treffinger and Isaksen (2005) point out that, in any 
case, “the most powerful applications of CPS for students involve them in dealing with real 
opportunities and challenges …” (p.349). Perhaps, after all, an environment geared 
towards the facilitation of quality in learning is the most important aspect of enhancing 
creativity. But it should also benefit educators to be aware of what has been learned 
through decades of refinement and research (e.g. Isaksen & Treffinger, 2004) in the 
understanding and training of problem-solving and creative thinking. Perhaps a specific 
benefit of some training programs is in raising awareness of stages, phases and thinking 
processes specific to creative processes as distinct from other processes. Presumably 
schools wishing to utilise structured strategies for building problem-solving/creative 
thinking would need to decide what kind of outcome is relevant for students and 
investigate the various merits of available programs and strategies. 
2.8.2 Autonomy‐supportive approach 
The term autonomy-supportive approach to enhancing creativity is used here to outline a 
more generalised approach to the support of creativity through the support of autonomy. 
The aim of this strategy is to provide the kinds of environmental supports and instruction, 
which, by facilitating autonomous functioning simultaneously enhance conceptual 
understanding, ownership and complex creative capacities. Almost any strategy could be 
included here if it helps to promote engagement and challenge, depth and ownership in 
learning, if it facilitates interest, curiosity, self-direction, and growth of the self. 
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McWilliam’s (2009) advocacy of the teacher as a “meddler” who promotes challenge and 
problem-solving, would qualify as an element in an autonomy supportive approach. To this 
kind of focus on teaching and learning would ideally be added a wider field of concern 
with the school environment, evaluation and the quality of teacher-student relations. 
Nickerson (1999) discussed a range of strategies for enhancing creativity, most of which 
aim not only at increasing student’s ability to generate quality ideas and outcomes, but 
more fundamentally at the development of deeper approaches to learning. The strategies he 
suggests range from building basic skills and domain specific knowledge to those aimed at 
facilitating deep learning and interest. He argues, for example, for the importance of 
establishing purpose and intention in activities and for stimulating curiosity, interest and 
exploration. 
Since Nickerson wrote his chapter for the Handbook of Creativity in 1999, the research 
around autonomy-support has burgeoned and a nuanced literature is now available to 
inform autonomy-support in schools and teaching. Much of this literature provides explicit 
insight into the differences between autonomous and controlled approaches to tasks and 
learning and illuminates how autonomy may be facilitated in preference to control. For 
example, researchers have explicated differences between maladaptive and adaptive forms 
of “perfectionism” (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010) and between obsessive and harmonious 
forms of “passion” (Vallerand et al., 2003). Maladaptive forms of engagement in tasks and 
learning appear invariably to relate to more controlled motivations for engagement. The 
increasingly clear message from this literature is that there are effective and healthy ways 
of approaching tasks, learning and creativity, which may be facilitated within the teaching 
context. 
Stone, Deci and Ryan (2009) outline five key strategies for autonomy-support in 
organisations, which relate as well to the school environment as to corporations and 
business. These are: establishing open exploratory dialogue by asking open questions and 
inviting participation in solving important problems; establishing empathy through active 
and reflective listening; offering choices within structure; providing sincere positive 
feedback that acknowledges initiative, and includes factual, non-judgmental feedback 
about problems; and minimizing coercive controls such as rewards and comparisons with 
others. These strategies allow the effective functioning of people’s natural inclinations 
towards active, authentic engagement. In the same article, the authors note how 
accountability pressures, within educational and other organisations, have been observed to 
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increase teacher/managers’ tendencies to pressure and control others and undermine 
inclinations to support self-determination. 
SDT researchers have also noted that activities are often unavoidably dull or difficult, 
but that in such circumstances autonomy-supportive facilitation can significantly improve 
people’s ability to feel autonomous in carrying out the tasks (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & 
Leone, 1994). The three main contextual supports in this respect are providing a rationale, 
acknowledging people’s feelings and conveying choice. Contextual supports for autonomy 
therefore appear to be as effective in enabling more autonomous performance on dull tasks 
as for enabling authentic interest and engagement. 
Over the years many suggestions have been made with respect to how to enrich the 
school environment and student’s experiences of schooling so that “creative” outcomes 
and thinking are favoured. Much of this discussion is applicable to the aim of creating 
autonomy-supportive school environments. It has been argued that students should be 
assisted to develop a long-term interest in some form of creative expression (Nickerson, 
1999) , that they should be allowed opportunity to do something they “love” (Collins & 
Amabile, 1999) and that they should be encouraged in finding pleasure in playing with 
ideas (Gardner, 1993). It has been suggested that students may benefit from seeing 
linkages across content areas (Lubart & Guignard, 2004), from exposure to diverse 
information and experiences (Simonton, 2001) and from focusing on self-mastery rather 
than competition with others (Nickerson, 1999). SDT researchers strongly advocate the use 
of intrinsic rather than extrinsic goals when designing activities as they promote 
engagement and are experienced as congruent with the self (Vansteenkiste, et al., 2004). 
The principles of autonomy-support, which are now well researched, therefore indicate 
that the school environment and teacher-student relations are critical aspects in the general 
support of, “creativity”, quality in learning and development of greater autonomy in 
functioning. Autonomy-supportive teaching involves giving attention to many aspects of 
the school environment including how instructions are given, the careful use of extrinsic 
rewards and the quality of teacher-student relations. 
2.8.3 Domain specific approach 
Although little can be said here about how creativity is constituted within various domains 
it seems inevitable that within different domains there will be specific ideas about what 
constitutes a “creative” outcome or product, the reasons for desiring “creative” outcomes 
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and specific procedures governing how best to achieve such outcomes. For example, in his 
study of three exceptional designers with experience in diverse fields of engineering, Cross 
(2002), demonstrates that although there are identifiable similarities across the design 
process for all three individuals, there are specific considerations when designing to 
achieve “creative” outcomes in a given field. As Cross notes experts are not necessarily 
able to successfully “switch” between domains. Therefore an additional aspect in creativity 
support would involve developing familiarity with the specific ways creativity is 
understood in different areas of study and work (Reid & Petocz, 2004). 
2.9 STUDIES OF CREATIVITY CONCEPTIONS 
Pajares (1992) reported that studies aimed at understanding teachers’ beliefs had been 
scarce. Commenting only a decade ago, Plucker and Renzulli (1999) suggested that overall 
“creative attitude research within education and psychology are limited, perhaps because of 
the perceived lack of application” (p.43). Since then there has been growing interest in 
examining teachers’ conceptions of creativity and related phenomena. Recently, in the 
context of his own phenomenographic research project, Kleiman (2008) claimed, 
nonetheless, that research into teachers’ conceptions of creativity has been limited to a 
handful of studies. 
2.9.1 Non‐teachers 
In examining the research around creativity conceptions, the researcher has not restricted 
interest to studies of the teaching community, but has looked more broadly to studies of the 
creativity conceptions of professionals, academics, students and the general public. Three 
types of findings from this research are seen as relevant to understanding implicit theories 
of creativity among teachers: those that help to define the conceptual territory of creativity, 
those that highlight differences in understandings between groups of people and those that 
highlight common ground in conceptions of creativity. 
In an oft-cited study, conducted in the United States, Sternberg (1985) attempted to find 
out about the conceptual territory of creativity by examining how people understand the 
concepts of intelligence, creativity and wisdom. He sent questionnaires to professors in 
various disciplines and to lay people. Sternberg found that, “people have systematic 
theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, and that they use these implicit theories 
accurately both in evaluating themselves and in evaluating hypothetical others” (p.607). 
The findings demonstrated that, although the constructs are overlapping, people do see 
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creativity as different from either intelligence or wisdom. Sternberg found differences in 
the extent to which professors from various disciplines saw creativity as related to either 
intelligence or wisdom. Business professors linked creativity and intelligence less strongly 
than did physics, philosophy and art professors. Business professors also saw an inverse 
relationship between creativity and wisdom: that is, wiser people are seen as less creative. 
These findings are of interest for they suggest that creativity may be conceptualised 
differently by practitioners in different domains. Secondly, they arouse interest about what 
it is that professors in the different disciplines are seeing as creativity. The study does not 
provide insight into this aspect. 
Two qualitative studies are seen as relevant and interesting from the perspective that 
they highlight commonalities in some people’s experience of the process of “high stakes” 
problem-solving. These are Shaw’s (1994) study of scientific problem-solving and a study 
by Marton, Fensham and Chaitlin (1993) of Nobel laureate’s understandings of scientific 
intuition. This work suggests that although creativity is seen by some as a “slippery” 
concept, at an experiential level, there can be commonalities in people’s experiences of the 
processes they regard as creative. Shaw (1994) immersed himself in the transcripts of 
interviews with eleven scientists, to perform a “formal heuristic investigation” of the 
“cognitive and emotional features of the scientifically creative process” (p.3). He discerned 
ten major and five minor themes in the scientists’ descriptions of their creative processes. 
The ten major themes he describes as: “the requirements for becoming immersed, the 
trusting of intuition, the role of unconscious incubation, getting stuck, letting go and the 
use of recreation, illumination, emotional reaction to illumination and body sensations, 
explication and creative synthesis, rejection, and validation and acceptance”. The five 
minor themes are described as: “recognizing the problem, pushing for a solution, external 
pressure, failure, and the general subject of creativity” (Shaw, 1994, p.10). Among the 
most informative of Shaw’s determinations is his suggestion that “there might very well be 
a unified process associated with all types of creative behavior [sic]” (Shaw, 1994, p.41). 
Shaw’s analysis appears to show that similar features can be discerned across individual 
experiences of the scientific creative process. 
An ethnographic study of 83 Nobel laureates” experiences of scientific intuition 
(Marton, et al., 1993) demonstrates that across a group of scientists, the understandings 
expressed concerning the experience of intuition in the creative process, showed many 
similarities. The scientists commonly talked about their feelings of rightness and certitude 
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at times in the process, about having a sense of direction and paying attention to “quasi 
sensory” qualities. Fensham and Marton (1992) relate these findings to the context of 
teaching and learning in science, suggesting that because intuition is important to scientists 
it ought to be important in the teaching and learning of science. They observe that rather 
than setting up the kind of challenges, which could possibly stimulate such thinking, 
science teachers often take a “step by step” approach to teaching science and that 
“probably only a few science teachers model intuition to their students or could recognise 
intuition in their students if and when they think in that way”(p.120). The relevance, for the 
present research interest, of studies which show such commonalities in some people’s 
experiences of creative processes, is that it might be expected that such commonalities 
exist in teachers’ experiences of creativity also and, if they do, that teachers might draw on 
these understandings to inform their teaching in the way that Fensham and Marton 
envisage. 
Another kind of identified commonality relates creative outcomes to deep learning. 
Australian researchers, Reid and Petocz (2004) found that university students evidencing a 
deep approach to learning produced work that was more creative, as judged externally, 
than that of students with a surface approach to learning. This suggests that where 
university student’s work is judged as creative, the student’s approach to learning will be a 
deep approach. However, this work does not show what teachers and supervisors are 
seeing as creativity. 
Petocz, Reid and Taylor (2009) use a phenomenographic approach to examine business 
student’s conceptions of creativity. The researchers identify three increasingly complex 
levels of understanding of creativity, which they describe as definitions, attributes and 
comprehensive. Thus the categories they identify indicate that the least sophisticated 
student conceptions of creativity involve a focus on definitions and a more sophisticated 
approach focuses on attributes. In the most inclusive category, described as 
comprehensive, students were able to discuss creativity in a way which suggests that they 
are aware of the less comprehensive views. What does not emerge from the study is a clear 
way of understanding what has changed in the more comprehensive view. The authors 
suggest that “at this broadest conception of creativity, it may be possible to learn about the 
nature of creativity itself, as well as learning about how students see creativity in the 
contexts of their life, studies and work” (Petocz, et al., 2009). However, it appears that 
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ongoing work would be necessary to understand what students are focusing on when 
seeing creativity from a comprehensive framework. 
2.9.2 Teachers 
Some researchers have attempted to illuminate aspects of teachers’ understandings of 
creativity. As research of this type is fairly limited, the survey includes creative attitude 
and implicit theory research with pre-service, school and university teachers. As with the 
studies for non-teaching groups presented above, some studies use quantitative methods 
and others use qualitative methods. 
Runco and Johnson’s (1993) study, conducted in the United States, required parents and 
teachers to choose from a list of 300 adjectives, that describe characteristics of creative 
children. Both parents and teachers saw creative children as being active, adventurous, 
curious, enthusiastic, and imaginative. However, teachers tended to focus on social 
characteristics such as cheerfulness, while parents focused on intrapersonal characteristics 
such as being self-confident. Runco and Johnson state that teachers have idiosyncratic, 
implicit theories about children’s creativity that “probably act as standards against which 
children’s behaviours and performances are judged. These in turn are important because 
they can significantly influence children’s performance” (p.91). However, the study 
supplies little information about how teachers formulate their ideas or how they apply 
them. 
Fryer and Collings (1991) report on a study in which over a thousand teachers and 
further education teachers in Wales and England completed a survey questionnaire. 
Teachers were asked questions about their views of creativity and also about their styles of 
teaching. Fryer and Collings report that although most of the teachers indicated that 
creativity could be developed, around three-quarters apparently saw creativity as a “rare 
gift”. They report also that teachers “highly oriented” to creativity displayed a preference 
for pupil-centred learning. 
Diakidoy and Kanari (1999) employed similar quantitative methods to investigate 
implicit theories about creativity in a group of 49 trainee teachers enrolled at the University 
of Cyprus. They found that the student teachers believed a number of things about 
creativity, which the authors see as being at variance with scientific understandings, such 
as that “creative outcomes are not necessarily appropriate outcomes” and “creativity is 
more likely to be manifested through artistic and literary endeavours or in the context of 
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artistic and literary domains” (p. 239). They reason that, therefore, teachers might not see 
creativity as related to learning. However, over half of the student teachers also indicated 
that creativity could occur in domains such as mathematics. Diakidoy and Kanari note that 
the data did not allow inferences to be made about how the students are conceptualising 
creativity. They suggest that further research would be necessary to examine the relation of 
beliefs about creativity to beliefs about learning and instructional practice. The authors do 
not appear to have followed up on this research direction. 
A number of studies have found that teachers hold negative attitudes concerning 
creative students (Kwang & Smith, 2005; Scott, 1999; Westby & Dawson, 1995). In an 
Eastern study, Ng and Smith (2005) investigated, what they regard as an anomalous or 
paradoxical situation observed in some studies: “Teachers in the East are encouraged to 
nurture creativity in students. Yet many studies reveal that, in general, teachers do not like 
creative students’ (p.324). They contend that this is due to the Confucian tradition in which 
teacher and student are expected to enact the designated roles of moral exemplar and 
docile, teachable student. Students who ask difficult questions, who act in an 
individualistic way – that is, are opinionated or disruptive – are considered both “creative” 
and not “nice”. The researchers also found differences in the ways novice and longer-
serving teachers view creative behaviours, with novice teachers being more tolerant of 
“creative but undesirable” characteristics. 
Kleiman (2008) interviewed 12 university academics in the UK and used a 
phenomenographic approach to distil five main categories of description from a large 
number of possible conceptions, which emerged initially from the data. He identifies: 
 A constraint-focused experience 
 A process-focused experience 
 A product-focused experience 
 A transformation-focused experience 
 A fulfilment focused experience 
He concludes, however, that the research is still emergent, requiring further analysis. To 
date an update to this work appears not to be available. At the time of publication it had not 
yet been determined how to depict the relational and hierarchical aspects of the variation 
between categories. Kleiman suggests that looking at the categories in terms of inclusivity 
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– that is, which categories would subsume others lower in the hierarchy – “would almost 
certainly situate creativity as a constraint-focused experience at the “lower” end, and 
creativity as a fulfilment-focused experience at the “higher” end” (Kleiman, 2008, p.212). 
He reasons that there might be a parallel with Maslow’s identification of self-actualisation 
as topping the human hierarchy of needs. However, he sees difficulties with determining 
how product-focused and process-focused categories would sit within that hierarchy and 
has not identified a key dimension of variation across the conceptions of creativity 
emerging from the study. 
Using a phenomenographic approach to investigate trainee science teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity, Newton and Newton (2009) found that within the group 
conceptions were, “narrow, focused mainly on practical investigations of matters of fact, 
and included misconceptions” (p. 45). They describe the trainee teachers’ views as 
“grossly inadequate”. 
A persistent issue for quantitative research into creativity conceptions seems to be that it 
is difficult, with quantitative methods, to find out what it is that the participant or 
respondent sees as creativity. As Portillo (2002) points out, a problem with using 
inventories such as the Adjective Check List (ACL) is that “respondents may want to use 
adjectives that do not appear on the checklist to describe the creative person” (p.24). 
Furthermore, people can understand adjectives in different ways. At the completion of her 
study of professionals” views of professional designers and designing, she recommends the 
use of qualitative investigations to find out just what respondents mean by the adjectives 
they choose. Therefore, although the quantitative work is of value it leaves many questions 
open. 
Qualitative researchers, at least in the UK (Craft, 2008b), have begun to explore aspects 
of pedagogy and conceptions relating to creativity. Craft (2008b) relates this growing 
research interest to the size and complexity of the current wave of educational interest in 
creativity: 
The third wave [of educational interest in creativity], in its volume, speed, 
density and potential for massive impact, might be likened to a tsunami, i.e. 
a huge and overwhelming wall of change caused by seismic shifts in the 
underpinning foundations in relation to what we aim for in education (Craft 
2008b, 2008c, 2008d) rather than a mere wave, and is characterised by its 
attention to complexity and to particularistic detail through increasingly 
qualitative empirical investigation (Martin, 2008) … (p.4) 
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In such a changing educational climate there are many questions which need to be raised 
and answered about such issues as what teachers are making of these changes, what is 
effective in terms of teaching strategies and what is not. But as has been argued in this 
thesis, basic questions are how do teachers understand creativity and how do they relate 
their understandings of creativity to the teaching context? Answers to these questions are 
needed in order to facilitate training, collaboration and progress with respect to creativity-
related agendas in education. It seems important, also, that Australia contributes to the 
global effort to understand teachers’ and others conceptions creativity. A third 
consideration, not directly addressed in the present study, is how, or if conceptions of 
creativity differ from domain to domain and cross culturally. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter addresses the researcher’s choice of a qualitative research method, provides a 
brief history and general description of the phenomenographic approach used and details 
how this research approach was employed in the present study. Phenomenography is an 
interpretative approach in which it is acknowledged that the researcher’s own 
interpretations play a major role in formulating the study findings (Collier-Reed, Ingerman 
& Berglund, 2009) and as such various questions and discussions have arisen in the 
phenomenography literature with respect to how to ensure the trustworthiness and usability 
of the research outcomes in phenomenographic studies. Phenomenographers have 
attempted to address these concerns, suggesting different ways of meeting the needs for 
rigour in a phenomenographic, as in any, research project. To this end the directive to 
provide a full and open disclosure of the specific approach taken in any given study 
(Bruce, 2003; Cope, 2004), has been taken as a general guide to the writing of this chapter. 
3.2 CHOOSING A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH 
Burns (2000) observes that research in the professional social sciences has generally been 
conducted using quantitative research methods, in order to establish general laws or 
principles, but that, more recently, qualitative research emphasising the subjective 
experience of individuals has arisen as a viable research approach, and has been 
particularly influential in conducting educational research. A qualitative research protocol 
was employed in the present study as it suits the researcher’s aim of investigating teachers’ 
subjective experience relating to creativity. 
Glesne (1999) characterises the difference between the paradigms underlying 
quantitative and qualitative research as differences in “ways of knowing”. Paradigms are 
described by Usher (1996) as historically and culturally located frameworks that guide 
investigation within scientific communities. The paradigm underlying quantitative research 
has often been referred to as positivist (Burns, 2000). The positivist paradigm supposes that 
the world is objectively observable and measurable. In contrast, qualitative research 
emphasises the importance of subjective, human experience and seeks to discover these 
experiential levels of meaning (Burns, 2000). Qualitative methods are generally supported 
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by the interpretivist, or alternatively termed constructivist, paradigm, which views the 
world as socially constructed and changing (Glesne, 1999). 
Burns (2000) suggests that the practice of polarising social science research into 
quantitative and qualitative categories is misleading to the extent that it characterises 
quantitative designs as more rigorous and legitimate than qualitative designs. Burns 
emphasises that all scientific research, whether quantitative or qualitative, is empirical. The 
term “empirical” refers to “whether phenomenon are capable of being found in the real 
world and assessed by means of the senses” (Burns, 2000, p.14). Researchers are 
commonly advised to be guided in their choice of methodology, by the research problem – 
the specific aims and focus of the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Glesne (1999) 
recognises nonetheless that researchers may be attracted to research problems that match 
their personal view of the world. 
When conducting qualitative research it is the “lifeworld of the participants that 
constitutes the investigative field” (Burns, 2000, p.11). Qualitative approaches recognise 
that humans construct multiple subjective realities and that human activity occurs within 
social contexts. The variability of human experience and perception is not easily accessed 
or understood using conventional scientific methods (Burns, 2000). 
Acknowledged strengths of the qualitative approach for studying the complexity of the 
human lifeworld and educational experience are: its broad focus, hypothesis-free 
orientation and the closeness of the researcher to the field. The qualitative researcher is 
therefore able to observe qualities of interaction that may be missed by more positivistic 
inquiries (Burns, 2000). 
In order to understand and interpret how participants in a particular social setting 
construct and perceive the world around them, researchers need to gain access to the 
participant’s perspectives. There are a variety of modes of qualitative inquiry each with 
their own forms of data gathering, which include participant-observation, interviews, non-
participant observation and archival strategies (Glesne, 1999). Data gathering may involve 
long-term interactions with research participants, in-depth interviews and observations 
requiring that the researcher becomes the interpreter of events. Therefore, “the concern 
with researcher objectivity is replaced by a focus on the role of subjectivity in the research 
process” (Glesne, 1999, p.5). This feature of qualitative research, combined with the 
subjective nature of qualitative data, impacts on requirements for establishing reliability 
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and validity, which need to be differentially addressed according to the methods used in 
various forms of qualitative research (Burns, 2000). This aspect of qualitative research is 
often viewed by quantitative researchers as a limitation (Burns, 2000). Burns, however 
takes the view that investigation of subjective experience is simply not amenable to the 
usual scientific criteria. 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) advise that the choice of methodology should be guided by 
the aims of the research. Previous investigations of teachers’ conceptions of creativity have 
often used quantitative methods to test specific hypotheses about observed differences in 
teachers’ attitudes to creativity, or have elicited teachers’ implicit theories about creativity 
using pre-existing lists of descriptors. In the present study the researcher has sought to 
discover and describe the various ways that teachers in public schools in Queensland 
conceptualise creativity. The researcher has not been interested in finding out about 
creativity itself or in testing a pre-determined hypothesis regarding the different ways 
creativity is understood. The interest has been in gaining a greater understanding of ways 
teachers’ experience, think about or conceptualise creativity. 
The aim of achieving insight into teachers’ experiences of creativity therefore guided 
the researcher to the choice of a qualitative research approach. For various reasons, 
phenomenography was the qualitative approach selected. Phenomenography is regarded as 
an effective means of uncovering and representing qualitative variations in the ways that a 
phenomenon, such as creativity, is understood within a group of people (Walsh et al., 
1993). It is also useful for understanding variations between educators” or learners” 
experiences and the preferred disciplinary meaning of a phenomenon (Walsh, et al., 1993). 
Although disciplinary meanings of creativity may vary and require clarification in 
localised settings (Reid & Petocz, 2004) it has been suggested in this thesis that there are 
educationally critical aspects to teachers’ understanding of creativity, which may be 
regarded as representing a more complete or higher order approach to conceptualising 
creativity within education. 
Phenomenographic inquiry involves gathering data through interviews in a manner that 
permits interviewees to “choose the dimensions of the subject they want to answer” 
(Marton, 1986, p.42).Therefore it allows a kind of information to surface that is not 
attainable through questionnaires. Researchers who have been interested in accessing the 
full range of dimensions of experience in relation to a phenomenon and have used a 
phenomenographic approach, have reported that phenomenography offers greater scope for 
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identifying aspects of discourse and experience within a group of people than other 
methods (Dunkin, 2000; Patrick, 2000; Trigwell, 2000). Furthermore, a phenomenographic 
study results in the presentation of a set of categories or classifications describing people’s 
ways of experiencing something. Because the educational creativity agenda has been 
marked by debate and considerable confusion over the meanings of creativity and diverse 
justifications for its place in school curricula, the prospect of developing a parsimonious 
set of categories showing a limited number of ways that creativity is conceptualised within 
a representative sample of teachers, was seen by the researcher as a highly useful research 
direction. Such a parsimonious set would be particularly informative if it could provide 
insight into why creativity is so contentious. 
3.3 PHENOMENOGRAPHY 
Phenomenography is a research approach, which evolved as a research specialisation from 
a set of empirical studies of learning conducted in the 1970s in Sweden (Marton, 1994; 
Svensson, 1997). Marton (1994) describes phenomenography as the empirical study of the 
limited number of qualitatively different ways in which various phenomena in the world 
around us are experienced, conceptualised, understood, perceived or apprehended (p.4424). 
3.3.1 Theoretical aspects 
The ontological perspective taken by phenomenography is described as non-dualistic 
(Marton, 2000). In this view there is only one world, which exists, but is experienced 
differently by different observers. Subject and object are not separate in this view and 
therefore, in studying phenomena, the experience to be identified and described is a 
relation between the two. Phenomenographers are interested in the phe-noumenon (Bruce, 
2003), that is, how the object appears to the perceiving subject (Bruce, 2003; Marton & 
Booth, 1997; Pang, 2003). In studying this relation of subject and object, the researcher is 
looking for its structure and relations, figures and grounds (Marton, 2000). Different 
people can perceive a given phenomenon in different ways. Alternatively an individual 
may view a single phenomenon in different ways (Marton & Pong, 2005). In a 
phenomenographic study “it is the researcher who senses this variation” (Pang, 2003, 
p.146). 
Phenomenography is unconcerned with the psychological aspects of individual views or 
with describing the “richness” of individual experience (Marton & Booth, 1997). It is 
instead concerned with discerning structures of awareness. Marton (1994) describes the 
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structure of awareness as an internal relation between subject and object, which has an 
internal horizon or focus and an external horizon, in which the focal object is “delimited 
from and related to a context” (Marton, 2000, p.113): 
What surrounds a specific experience, what is its external horizon, is the 
individual’s total experience of the world. In this sense we are aware of 
everything all the time. But we are definitely not aware of everything in the 
same way (Marton, 2000, p.114). 
Bowden and Marton (1998) elaborate: 
Awareness has a certain structure. You are focally aware of certain things; 
they are in the foreground, they make a figure; these things are few. Other 
things you are more or less peripherally aware of on, in principle, an 
infinitely diminishing gradient (p.36). 
Patrick (2000) suggests that differences in how people understand a phenomenon are 
visible in what they notice about it and how they see its parts as being related. This 
observation takes on additional significance, when considered in connection with the view 
that people are more likely to see something a certain way if that way of seeing is “felt” 
with ease (Marton & Pong, 2005). These observations are critical, for they suggest that 
rather than all of human experience being “there” for people to see, if a possible way of 
seeing something is not “felt” with ease, a given individual is not likely to see or notice 
that possibility. This feature of human awareness opens up the further possibility, that not 
only will people see a particular phenomenon in different ways, but also that some ways of 
seeing could be more comprehensive than others. 
Over time some of the theoretical underpinnings of phenomenography have been 
questioned and discussion has been generated leading to a number of attempts to refine the 
theoretical and procedural aspects of the approach. Some of this discussion has concerned 
the nature of “conceptions”, which are seen as the basic units of phenomenographic 
description (Marton & Pong, 2005). As Marton and Pong (2005) note, questions have been 
asked about how conceptions should be denoted and how conceptions relate to the 
categories of description, which make up the outcome of the study – the outcome space. 
Categories of description are generally distinguished from conceptions in that categories 
may contain multiple conceptions and the set of categories is internally related, 
representing the variation in the ways the phenomenon is conceptualised, understood or 
experienced across a group of people (Trigwell, 2000; Walsh, 2000). Nonetheless, this 
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leaves open the ways in which conceptions might be organised into categories and 
differentiated from each other. 
Different studies have depicted variation between categories in different ways. Bruce 
(2006) notes that different studies have delimited categories by: 
a) identifying categories as simple or complex, b) positioning categories as 
reflecting historical development c) positioning categories as identifying 
increasing complexity or levels of understanding d) reflecting the broadening 
of the space of variation or indeed a combination of some of these. (p.15) 
As the onus of interpretation and description of categories rests with the investigator, it has 
been suggested that in writing up their completed projects, phenomenographic researchers 
“need to take care to articulate the character of the framework guiding [their] analyses as 
much as possible for specific projects” (Bruce, 2003, p.11). Cope (2002) advises that 
rigour and usability of research can be best assured by paying attention to and clearly 
defining the observed structures of awareness, showing carefully the dimensions that are 
observed to vary from category to category. Therefore, presently phenomenographers 
appear to be dealing with the question of how conceptions relate to categories more 
through procedural and accountability measures, than through specific theoretical 
stipulations. 
The question of “what is a conception?” has received considerable theoretical 
consideration. Pang (2003) and Marton and Pong (2005) have articulated, for example, 
how the subjective discernment of variation, as a basic element of perception, relates to the 
researcher’s identification of conceptions. It has been suggested that phenomenographers 
might be interested in two “faces” of variation: the variation not only between identified 
categories, but also “the variation that corresponds to the critical aspects of the 
phenomenon, i.e. the dimensions of variation as experienced by the “experiencer” (Pang, 
2003, p.146). Marton and Pong (2005) discuss this second face of variation in some depth 
in conjunction with a study of student’s conceptions of price and trade (Pong, 2000). They 
show how variation in the things focused upon can be used to delimit conceptions. 
However, they leave the issue of how to describe, what might be referred to as, “meta-
conceptualisation”, largely unresolved. They note that students in the study “did not see a 
need for a general concept of price (or trade)” (p.347), and that the model of description 
used in the study does not capture the difference between context specific views of price or 
trade and more abstract analytical views of these concepts/phenomena. Presumably the 
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researcher possessed such an analytical understanding of price and trade. This highlighted 
difference between novice and sophisticated views of a concept underscores the 
complexity of the phenomenographic enterprise. Marton and Pong point to the necessity of 
resolving the problem, in phenomenographic study outcomes, of how to reflect both the 
pared down basis of conceptions revealed through variations focussed upon and the other 
kinds of variation that the researcher sees as existing between people’s ways of 
experiencing the phenomenon. Thus, at the end of their discussion, the interpretive 
awareness of the researcher is once again brought into view. 
3.3.2 Procedural aspects 
The aim of phenomenographic analysis is to arrive at a description of the limited number 
of qualitatively different ways in which a phenomenon is understood within a group of 
people. Bowden (2000) emphasises that the purpose of generating these descriptions is so 
that they can be used for some educational purpose. There are methodological variants and 
varying accounts of this process to be found in the literature. However, most accounts of 
phenomenographic analysis describe similar phases from the gathering of data through to 
the presentation of findings. 
In phenomenographic research, data is usually gathered through interviews (Booth, 
1997). But other methods are considered appropriate. For example, Bruce (1996) utilised 
open-ended writing produced by students in response to specific questions. Where 
interviews are the main form of data gathering, the aim is usually for openness and depth 
in the interview (Booth, 1997). An “open” interview may be semi-structured but allows the 
interviewee to follow his/her own lines of thought. “Depth” refers to the interviewer and 
interviewee reaching common understanding of what is discussed and, ideally, following 
lines of inquiry until the interviewee has nothing left to say about a topic (Orgill, 2002). 
The gathered data, if in audio-taped form, is transcribed and subsequently analysed to 
discover conceptions and construct categories (Bruce, 2003) describing a/the limited 
number of ways in which the phenomenon is understood. In the initial phase of analysis the 
researcher will read the transcripts, often many times in order to become very familiar with 
the content (Alsop & Tompsett, 2006; Sandberg, 2005). Marton (1986) refers to the early 
phase as a “selection procedure” based on criteria of relevance. In his description of 
phenomenographic procedure, utterances found to be “of interest for the question being 
investigated … are selected and marked” (p. 42). He emphasises that interpretation of 
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quotes must nonetheless be made in relation to the context from which the utterance was 
made. 
The selected quotes from the initial phase constitute the data pool for the second stage. 
Marton (1986) specifies that the researcher now abandons the boundaries separating 
individuals to focus instead on the “pool of meanings” and gives attention to the meaning 
embedded in the quotes themselves until finally utterances are brought together into 
categories on the basis of their similarities. However, other researchers take issue with the 
“pool of meanings” approach and argue that it is difficult to separate utterances from their 
transcripts in this way and still retaining their meaning (Bowden, 2000). 
Whichever approach is used, in the latter stages of analysis, categories are formed on 
the basis of perceived similarities in what is meant. Categories are also “differentiated from 
one another in terms of their differences” (Marton, 1986, p.43). Marton (1994) expands on 
this last point, stressing that it is important to determine what are the distinguishing 
features between groups, in order to develop the set of categories of description and 
characterise the variation in how a phenomenon is experienced. Watkins, Dahlin and 
Ekholm (2005) contend that while interviewees may not espouse the same conceptions at 
all times or in all contexts, the variation of conceptions obtained from the 
phenomenographic analysis is regarded as generalisable across contexts. 
Elements of an appropriate phenomenographic attitude have been articulated. During 
analysis phenomenographers have been advised to bracket or hold aside prior experience 
and knowledge of the literature, so that the data may speak for itself (Ashworth & Lucas, 
2000). In other words, they should be reflectively aware of their own expectations or 
knowledge in order to avoid imposing their own views on the data. Another advocated 
principle and mental attitude is to initially view all statements as carrying equal weight. 
This is referred to as horizontalization (Sandberg, 1994). 
Marton (1986) describes the process of analysis as time-consuming, labour-intensive 
and involving continual sorting of data and repeated testing of categories against the data 
(p.42). Many accounts can be found in the literature where researchers refer to the 
prolonged, iterative nature of the process of phenomenographic analysis (Akerlind, 2005; 
Barrie, 2007). 
The resulting range of perspectives is presented, often diagrammatically, in a set of 
categories of description known as an outcome space. The aim with the outcome space is 
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to capture the essences of the different ways of experiencing the phenomenon (Dunkin, 
2000). The outcome space is the product of the research. 
3.3.3 Assuring validity and reliability in phenomenographic studies 
There has been considerable discussion in the phenomenography literature on the question 
of how to ensure validity and reliability in phenomenographic studies (Cope, 2004; 
Sandberg, 1997, 2005). A comprehensive approach in this regard is detailed by Cope 
(2004). He suggests that ensuring validity and reliability in phenomenographic studies 
becomes more “straightforward” if all aspects of the research sub-serve the aim of seeking 
to uncover the dimensions of variation implicated in a particular structure of awareness. If 
key dimensions of variation appear to the researcher to make sense of various ways of 
experiencing a given phenomenon within a group of people, those structures should then 
be verifiable by other observers. Being able to identify and describe the dimensions of 
variation is the task before the researcher: 
One way of describing a way of experiencing a phenomenon, then, is in terms of a 
structure of awareness. The description should incorporate a structural aspect (the internal 
and external horizons), and a referential aspect (the meaning inherent in the structure). The 
detail of the structural aspect should include the dimensions of variation simultaneously 
present in the internal horizon, the “values” of each dimension of variation, and the nature 
of the boundary between the internal and external horizons (Cope, 2004, p.12). If, in a 
given study, dimensions of variation underpinning structures of awareness can be 
demonstrated, the issue of demonstrating the credibility and trustworthiness of the findings 
then becomes one of showing how standards of rigour have been maintained throughout 
the study process. 
Cope (2004) outlines how researchers may provide a “full and open account” of the 
study process and method in order to show that standards of rigour are at a level which 
would support the validity and reliability of the findings. According to him a full and open 
account involves providing details of eight areas, which are here reduced to seven and 
listed below, albeit not in the exact order or using the identical terms found in Cope’s 
article: 
 Characteristics of participants. 
 Design of interview/interview questions. 
 Strategies to collect unbiased data. 
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 Data analysis method. 
 Management of interpretive awareness: Researcher’s background/prior knowledge; 
how data analysis was undertaken with an open mind; processes used to control and 
check interpretations. 
 Presenting the results in a manner that permits informed scrutiny. This includes 
ensuring that categories of description are adequately illustrated with quotes. 
 Establishing interjudge communicability: As a verification strategy for the 
usefulness of the outcome space, Cope (2004) also suggests establishing interjudge 
communicability, which is where the opinion of researchers external to the study 
are used to verify identified structures of awareness. 
For the purposes of assuring validity and reliability for the present study, all of Cope’s 
suggestions have been observed or addressed – except one. Interjudge communicability has 
not been employed. Instead, because it is a finding of the present study that the identified 
creativity conceptions can be seen as reflecting an inclusive hierarchy it is proposed, in line 
with the reasoning of Åkerlind (2003), that empirical support for the researcher’s 
interpretations and analysis is best achieved where transcripts provide evidence that 
participants are aware of the potential for variation in one or more key dimensions of 
variation. The reasoning here is that if participants demonstrate that they are aware of some 
aspect of the variance between the ways of experiencing a phenomenon, as identified by 
the researcher, they are providing the requisite support for the researcher’s interpretations. 
The value of this approach is that the empirical evidence is contained in the transcripts 
themselves and can be scrutinized by others. Therefore, instead of interjudge 
communicability, the final detail in establishing a structure of awareness framework as 
support for validity and reliability in this study will be: 7.Evidence for a hierarchy of 
conceptions in the present study. 
3.4 THE STUDY 
This section provides the detail of the design and process of the study and follows Cope’s 
(2004) recommendations, as outlined above, for “ensuring validity and reliability in 
phenomenographic research using the analytical framework of a structure of awareness” 
(p.5). The aim is to provide a full account, showing how rigour has been maintained 
throughout the study process. Details of participants and data collection are provided in 
support of future research work, including possible replication studies. 
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3.4.1 Characteristics of participants 
In keeping with the aims of the study and as recommended for phenomenographic 
investigations, the participating group was structured to “capture diversity” (Alsop & 
Tompsett, 2006). Varying estimates can be found in the literature concerning what can be 
considered a reasonable number of participants for phenomenographic studies. The 
participants for this study number fifteen in total. The teachers taught, or had recently 
taught, in schools in inner city and suburban Brisbane or in more regional school districts 
around Brisbane. Sourcing and interviewing of participants continued on a “convenience 
sample” basis until little additional information seemed to be arising in interviews and the 
group reflected adequate variation in terms of subjects taught, years of teaching 
experience, age and gender: 
 Teaching areas: Primary school, English, Languages other than English (LOTE), 
Performing and visual arts, Music, Manual arts/industrial technology and 
manufacturing, Home Economics, Hospitality, Social sciences, Maths/Science, 
Guidance counselling and administration. 
 Gender: Female (8); Male (7) 
 Age range: Early 20s to late 50s 
 Years of experience: 3 years to more than 30 years 
Two of the teachers taught in primary school. Two had experience of both primary and 
secondary school teaching. The remainder taught mainly in high school. All of the high 
school teachers taught in more than one subject area, some having taught several subjects 
over the course of their careers. Approximately equal numbers of teachers were involved in 
the teaching of science/maths as in the teaching of arts/music. Three teachers had 
experience of teacher training at university level. Four teachers had been involved in 
school administration roles. Some teachers had taught continuously, others had taken 
breaks from teaching over the course of their teaching career. One teacher had moved from 
teaching high school English into school guidance counselling. A complete overview of 
characteristics of the participating group is shown in Table 3-1 below. 
  
 148
 
Table 3–1: Characteristics of Participants 
P Gender 
Teaching areas (Main 
teaching area listed first) 
[HOD = Head of 
department] 
Relevant outside-
school teaching, 
interests or expertise
Years of 
teaching 
experience
Year 
levels 
taught 
Age 
(approx) 
in years 
1 F Science (HOD)  25–30 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
2 M General primary 
Music and performing 
arts; University 
teaching (teacher 
training) 
< 5 Yrs P-3 50-60 
3 F Japanese; English  20–30 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
4 F Mathematics; English University teaching (teacher training) 10 –15 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
5 M 
Music; Social science; 
Citizenship education; 
English; History; Several years 
in school administration 
Outside-school 
instrumental music 
teaching, live 
performance and 
composing 
25–30 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
6 F Guidance counselling; English  5–10 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
7 M Industrial technology; HOD 
Extra-curricular 
supervision of student-
level industrial design 
competitions 
5–10 Yrs 8-12 30-40 
8 M Music (Years P-12); Mathematics; Science; English  5 Yrs P-12 20-30 
9 M Manual arts 
Telephone counselling; 
custom furniture 
making 
15–20 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
10 M Science/Mathematics (HOD)  20–30 Yrs 8-12 50-60 
11 F General primary Instrumental music and arts interest 15–20 Yrs P-3 40-50 
12 F Visual arts Arts interest >5 Yrs 8-12 20-30 
13 M Performing arts; Social science; English 
Arts and construction 
interests 5–10 Yrs 8-12 20-30 
14 F 
Hospitality; Home economics; 
Health; Extension science; 
Numeracy 
Teaching outside 
school in computing 
and sport 
15–20 Yrs 8-12 30-40 
15 F 
Science/agricultural science 
(6-7 years); Primary school (2 
years) 
Hobby art interest 9 Yrs P-12 20-30 
 
 149
3.4.2 Design of interview questions 
Cope (2004) observes that “in phenomenographic studies, interview guide questions need 
to be designed to provide data which will help establish critical variation in a group of 
participants’ ways of experiencing a phenomenon” (p.12). It seems appropriate to 
acknowledge at the outset, that as this study was exploratory there was little to draw on in 
terms of previous studies of creativity conceptions to help clarify what would be useful 
questions to ask of participants. Also, it was only once analysis had reached quite an 
advanced stage that it could be ascertained whether the interviews had been effective in 
illuminating critical variation. 
For this study the interview questions were formulated with a view to eliciting 
information about the participants’ lived experiences of creativity. The “guide questions” 
were principally framed in such a way that the participant was invited to talk about a time 
when they had been, or had noticed something, “creative”. Teachers were asked about their 
experiences of creativity in teaching and outside teaching contexts. The hope was that this 
might effect a kind of “triangulation”, which would make it more possible to understand 
what the teachers were seeing as creativity. In terms of the “two faces” of variation with 
which phenomenographers may concern themselves (Pang, 2003), the researcher wanted to 
focus in on the variation that made the discernment of creativity possible from the 
participant’s perspective. In order to recognise a process or an artefact as “creative” and, 
then, recognise the same sort of thing in a different setting, the person must be focusing on 
something that somehow defines creativity, for them, across different settings. 
A precedent was available in the form of the Marton et al., (1993) study of Nobel 
laureates’ understandings of scientific intuition. That study indicates that there are common 
phenomenological aspects to the experience of scientific intuition, so that no matter what 
different metaphors or descriptions the scientists use to describe it, the experience of 
intuition is identifiable both within the experience of individual scientists (recognisable by 
them each time it occurs) and across the experience of different scientists (recognisable, 
from a second order perspective, as common to different people). In order to capture such 
“within person” and “between person” variation it seemed important to ask teachers about 
their experience of creativity in a range of situations. 
In some phenomenographic studies, researchers have introduced a stimulus object of 
some kind into the interview context if it is thought that doing so would be helpful in 
eliciting data. For example, Adawi, Berglund, Booth and Ingerman (2001) discuss why two 
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knives and a cup of coffee were included as part of the prepared interview context for a 
study of lay adults’ conceptions of “heat” and “temperature” (Adawi & Linder, 2005). In 
some studies researchers have used graphical representations (Goldberg & Anderson, 
1989), or moving objects. In the present study it was decided that as people often judge 
“products” as creative, it could be useful to observe participants’ responses to an artefact 
shown in the course of the interviews. 
The main criterion considered when selecting the artefact was to stimulate comment and 
conversation in the interviews. It was thought best to avoid presenting anything that would 
lead to obvious conclusions or seem pressuring. When selecting a suitable artefact easily 
recognisable “classical” works were avoided as it was considered that such artefacts might 
lead participants too quickly to a particular conclusion about the “creativity” of the work 
and curtail valuable discussion. The stimulus artefact chosen was a music video clip., 
featuring a popular contemporary band, the “Scissor Sisters” and their song titled I don’t 
feel like dancin’ (Released on album “Ta-dah”, September 2006, on label Interscope-
Geffen-A&M; writers Elton John, Scott Hoffman, Jason Sellards; Scissor Sisters 
producers). The clip was selected, by the researcher, after viewing a morning’s music 
television on a local television channel. The chosen video clip was thought to offer many 
possibilities for comment as it combined a popular song and lyrics with complex imagery, 
which offered many levels and possibilities for comment. This artefact was introduced in 
the latter half of the interviews to allow time for the participants to answer other questions 
beforehand. Participants watched the clip from beginning to end on a lap-top computer 
screen. The researcher busied herself during this time so that participants would not feel 
pressured while watching. The clip performed well as a stimulus in a pilot interview with a 
non-teacher volunteer and also in the early interviews with the teachers and was retained 
for use in all of the interviews. Utilising the video seems to have added useful dimensions 
to the data as it prompted participants to explore the broader social dimension of creativity 
and issues around the selection of creative objects. Whether participants found the clip 
“annoying” (Participant 2), of moderate interest (e.g. Participants 9 and 7) or conducive to 
feeling “happy” (Participant 6), the direction of discussion almost invariably led 
participants to reflect upon how artefacts, more generally, relate to the social or cultural 
context. 
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3.4.2.1 The interview questions 
After explaining to each participant that in this study the researcher was interested only in 
how the participant experienced creativity, participants were invited to tell about the 
following: 
 A time when you were creative outside teaching. 
 A time when you were teaching creatively. 
 A time when you were enhancing the creativity of students. 
 A creative student. 
 A time when you have come across the word “creativity”. This question was 
sometimes rephrased as: “What would come to mind if you saw the word 
creativity written somewhere?” Participants were sometimes asked if they 
had come across the word creativity in documents at school. 
 It is explained that a video will be shown as an aid to bringing up any 
additional thoughts about creativity and the participant should feel free to 
comment afterwards in any way they wish. The participant watches the 
video and is then invited to talk about anything that they thought about 
creativity while watching it. 
 A time when you really experienced creativity. 
Questions were usually asked in the same order. Interviews lasted from forty minutes to 
up to an hour and a half. Where there were time constraints on the interviews, such as 
where teachers were on a break between activities, interviews tended to run to the shorter 
time frame of forty minutes and the number of questions asked was sometimes reduced. 
The questions that were left out were determined on the basis of how teachers had 
responded to the early questions. Teachers sometimes discussed a range of areas in 
response to the first two or three questions. All of the questions were effective in eliciting 
data. Participants did not seem to find the interviews onerous and most indicated that they 
had found it interesting or enjoyable to think about or talk about creativity. 
3.4.3 Strategies to collect unbiased data 
In phenomenographic studies interview questions provide some structure to the interview, 
so that particular areas of interest to the researcher are addressed, but participants are able 
to choose which aspects to focus on. As advised in the phenomenography literature (Cope, 
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2004) as much as possible, steps were taken to clarify what participants meant by their 
statements, whilst taking care not to “lead” the participants during the follow up 
discussion. Follow up questions were, as much as possible, worded using the same terms 
as the participant. 
3.4.4 Data analysis method 
This section addresses the approach to data analysis, the researcher’s background/prior 
knowledge, how data analysis was undertaken with an open mind, processes used to 
control and check interpretations and the decision making, which led to the development of 
the outcome space. First, the general approach to data analysis will be addressed. 
The recorded interviews were transcribed and the typed transcripts provided the data for 
the analysis. Data analysis entailed a lengthy, iterative process during which the transcripts 
were read repeatedly. Hypotheses were generated about what structures underlay the 
participant’s utterances. These were then tested against the data to see if they made sense 
of the participants’ experiences of creativity as expressed in the interviews. This process 
continued until clear, describable categories began to emerge. The following five sections 
provide detail of how the analysis was approached with rigour and an open mind and how 
interpretive awareness was managed. 
3.4.4.1 Management of interpretive awareness 
Every effort was made during analysis to understand how the participants were seeing 
creativity. Whilst my familiarity with the creativity literature was sometimes helpful in 
making hypotheses about what participants were describing, the analysis was undertaken 
with the intention to discover and describe conceptions of creativity, not to apply 
frameworks or make the data fit existing frameworks. 
I began work on this thesis with little more than a classroom teacher’s working 
acquaintance with psychological theory about creativity. Interpretive awareness of any 
kind did little to help with deciding how to proceed in the early stages of analysis. There 
was no great need to “bracket” any pre-conceived ideas I could possibly have had as the 
data was overwhelming in the variety of interpretive possibilities it cast up. The only 
option available was to follow every thread and pathway into “blind alleys”, sometimes 
negotiating the same blind alley many times in case some clarifying detail had been 
missed. 
 153
In reviewing the literature I attained some familiarity with the creativity literature and 
relevant theories, such as Self-determination theory (SDT). There is no doubt that SDT and 
other theoretical approaches in the psychology literature have been major aspects of the 
interpretive awareness I have brought to the analysis in its later stages. However, the 
phenomenographic approach specifies that interpretive awareness is withheld so that 
relationships in the data may be allowed to emerge, whilst the iterative process is also 
guided by interpretive awareness until finally stable patterns are discerned (Cope, 2004). 
Once the key dimension of variation had been identified and tested against the data I 
recognised that the distinction that SDT researchers make between external control and 
autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000c), aligned closely with the distinction I was seeing between 
external value and internal value foci, as expressed by the participants in this study. I also 
determined that the term “autonomy” as defined within SDT would provide a suitable 
descriptor for one of the identified categories of description – the category described as an 
experience of creativity as autonomy and authenticity. 
3.4.4.2 How the dimensions of variation emerged during analysis 
The dimensions of variation identified as delimiting the variation between different 
categories of description in this study are shown diagrammatically in Table 4-2 in Chapter 
Four. Although this means previewing some elements of the findings, in the interests of 
making the analysis procedure as transparent as possible an account of how these 
dimensions emerged during analysis will now be made. 
In any of the conceptions of creativity, identified in this study, it is proposed that the 
participant has in awareness: 
 A discerned variation element, which may be in the internal or external worlds. 
This may be “felt” such as the felt difference between an automatic process and the 
feeling of acting outside “auto-pilot”. This appears to be the aspect that draws 
attention and sets the creative object apart as “creative”. 
 An object of reflection ( e.g. a product and its value; a task process; self) 
 154
These elements are in the participant’s awareness along with an interrelation between 
four main evaluative dimensions: 
1. An evaluation of where rules/values/rewards are reliably located 
2. A perception of what rewards or causes drive/sustain a given creative process 
3. An assessment of the functionality/appropriateness of the creative object 
4. An assessment of the benefit to the person or to society that derives from the 
whole object – that is, the social value of the process and what it delivers. 
Before describing how the dimensions of variation arose during analysis it may be 
useful to begin with the observation that the dimensions are descriptive and it is possible 
that two or more dimensions could be reduced to one dimension if a suitable descriptor 
was implemented. To illustrate, it may be helpful to consider two key dimensions of 
variation which, according to Åkerlind (2003, p.385), have been identified in numerous 
studies of teachers’ conceptions of teaching or developing as a teacher. These dimensions 
are: 
 increasing awareness of the role of students in the teaching–learning 
process; and 
 increasing breadth of impact or benefit from the teaching–learning process. 
These two dimensions could, perhaps, be seen as two intertwined aspects of a single 
dimension. But researchers have obviously seen a requirement to treat them separately for 
the purposes of describing different experiences of a phenomenon. The second of these 
dimensions bears a similarity to evaluation dimension number four identified in this study. 
It could be suggested that some of the dimensions identified in the present study are also 
intertwined and not necessarily separate. Indeed it is possible that dimension number one – 
the assessment of where rewards, rules and values are most reliably located – may change 
over time through reflection on the value of the other dimensions. Such evaluations could 
be considered part of dimension one itself. These issues aside, it was decided that all of 
these dimensions were needed in order to delimit the different categories and their sub-
conceptions. How was this decision made? 
The need to describe the creativity conceptions with the help of evaluation dimensions 
two, three and four (E-DOV2, E-DOV3, E-DOV4) became apparent soon after evaluation 
dimension one (E-DOV1) was identified. Identifying evaluation dimension one (E-DOV1) 
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provided the key to the unfolding analysis. After a very long time spent analysing the data 
eventually two main lines of conjecture resulted in the realisation that some participants 
were experiencing creativity as autonomy. 
The first line of thought centred around how to understand why some participants had 
difficulty distinguishing between deeply engaging creative processes (prototypically 
intrinsically motivated processes) and processes that were reflectively endorsed but not so 
engaging (integrated or identified). Participants stated that both types of processes felt 
creative even if different in their experiential qualities: 
Sometimes what I’m doing, that’s a buzz for me because I think, “Yeah, good 
for you, you’ve done that with the lesson plans, yeah, that’s going to be 
good”, and, so it’s that, where things come together. But I guess the other 
part of it, it’s if I, like when I was making and painting that card, or if I’m 
cooking something for somebody, or I’m just experimenting, and trying it 
and it works, then it’s – it is, it’s a different kind of feeling. Or it’s a similar 
sense … (6) 
It’s similar, it’s similar, but different. It’s similar in that it’s about 
expressing something that you’ve done, and you think is important for other 
people in their lives, well, for, for me it’s a – maybe it’s a, it’s a different 
level of feeling or purpose, I guess. (6) 
Eventually the solution that seemed to best resolve this dilemma was that the common 
element identified internally is a sense of autonomy in both types of creative processes. 
This led to the hypothesis that the participant discerns creativity where a process is 
experienced as varying with processes that are not experienced as autonomous. 
The second line of thought was more of an “Aha!” moment during analysis, when I 
realised that I had long overlooked an important clue in the data. That clue lies in 
considering what the teachers are trying to do in encouraging their students to take 
ownership of learning and development. In trying to bring about a shift, in students’ 
approaches to learning, from focusing on external rules and rewards to focusing on sense-
making and internal rewards the teachers are showing that they are aware of both kinds of 
processes. But in encouraging students to take the latter, rather than former approach, they 
are demonstrating that they see the autonomous process as more valuable than the 
externally controlled one.  
The collision of these two main lines of thought established that the teachers are seeing 
creativity in its contrast with reliance on external control – that is, reliance on the value of 
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external rewards, external rules and externally espoused values without reflective reference 
to the value of internal reward and reflectively endorsed values. It became clearer that 
creativity is being experienced as a sense of meaning and also mindfulness, by contrast 
with mindlessness and meaninglessness. Creativity thus, in this view, refers to the habits of 
mind, the sense of meaning and other mental activity required to oppose, supplant or 
otherwise combat, taken-for-granted aspects of socialisation and meaninglessness. 
Establishing that the teachers not only define creativity where they experience it as an 
autonomous process, but also endorse it as part of their own approach to life and teaching, 
suggested that the teachers were choosing to regulate themselves in the world, by focusing 
on the internal rewards of autonomous processes and were building values central to their 
selves on that basis. This value orientation is one that sees interrelations between internal 
rewards, rules and values. Rewards, rules and values are obviously not equivalent notions 
and exactly how they interrelate is not speculated on here. However, all three are 
implicated in the teachers’ utterances: internal “rewards” are explicitly mentioned by all of 
the teachers expressing a high value for internal reward; “rules” generated on the basis of 
internal process aspects are implicated because the teachers base much of what they do to 
promote learning on what they observe of the internal elements of autonomous (including 
sense-making) processes; “values” relates to the teachers’ reflections on the value of these 
processes for people and society and their integration of these aspects into their lives and 
teaching. 
Once it was established that the internally focused teachers see autonomy (creativity) as 
an important way of regulating in the world the question arose as to how other teachers 
navigated in the world. It became much clearer, then, that other teachers were more 
focused on external rewards and rules. These teachers appear to be much less aware of 
internal reward as socially valuable. 
It was a logical step, then, to attempt to understand how external-value focused teachers 
experienced creative processes. How are creative processes experienced when creativity is 
not experienced as autonomy? I began to look at how the teachers saw the causes and 
rewards of creativity and what were the qualities of the processes described. This variation 
is shown along evaluation dimension two (E-DOV2). Whereas internally oriented teachers 
emphasised autonomous creativity, externally oriented teachers tended to talk about 
instrumental, functional and sometimes personal processes, but not autonomous processes. 
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The nature of evaluation dimension three (E-DOV3) emerged when it seemed necessary 
to distinguish between processes that are seen as functional for the person but not socially 
valuable, those that are seen as both functional and socially valuable and others without 
functional or social value. Some “non-valuable” creative products are identified, by 
participants, as coming into being on the basis of a “creative” process that is not at all 
functional. It therefore appeared that a dimension was required which could describe 
variation in the perceived functionality of the process. Teachers seem to be assessing their 
own or another person’s rationale for engaging in the process and deciding whether that is 
a functional assessment or not. 
Although these dimensions interrelate in the internal horizon (focus) of the discrete 
conceptions of creativity identified in this study, each emerged as necessary to describe 
what is in focus in the different conceptions of creativity and to delimit the variation 
between them. They were not imposed on the data but reflect my own reasoning about how 
to understand the variation between the teachers’ experiences of creativity. 
Some of the conundrums and difficulties met in the course of analysis will now be 
explicated. These further illuminate the process involved in discovering the categories of 
description and developing the outcome space for this study. 
3.4.4.3 Intra‐contextual shifts 
In their discussion of a phenomenographic study of student’s conceptions of “price” and 
“trade” Marton and Pong (2005) observe that study participants made intra-contextual 
shifts, expressing different conceptions of price and trade at different times. So too, in the 
present study of teacher’s conceptions of creativity, I believe that a reasonable explanation 
for some of the teachers’ varying ways of constituting creativity with reference to a single 
act or activity is that intra-contextual shifts occur as different phenomenological aspects 
come into focus. In focusing on the same “creative” activity, P3 talks about creativity as a 
reactive functional process – something she has to do – which changes to a different, more 
meaningful experience as she recognises that there were personal and satisfying elements 
which emerged later in the process. Arguably this represents a shift from seeing the 
process as, first, a functional, then a personal process: 
No, so it wasn’t something that I was doing out of “Oh look I really want to 
do this and love it.” It was like, “You have to bloody well do it and there’s 
no point in whinging about it.” … There were moments in it that was like, 
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there’s something that’s flowered, blossomed here and “Boom!” This is 
what’s making it very satisfying … I suppose I’ve always toyed with the idea 
that there is this creative side and it’s just been a matter of waiting for the 
time and place for it to emerge. (3) 
First P3 sees the process as creative because she felt under pressure to perform a “creative” 
act, which she earlier identifies as “creative” on the basis that she had to go through a 
disorienting problem-solving process. However, the quote above indicates that on 
reflection the process is identified as “creative” to her because it became satisfying. 
Psychologists recognise that “reactive” and “proactive” creative processes are different in 
terms of how they feel and the kinds of mental processes that are activated in each. Interest 
theorists have noted that “situational” interest can trigger deeper interest (Hidi & 
Harackiewicz, 2000; Hidi & Renninger, 2006). Therefore it seems feasible that intra-
contextual shifts could account, at times, for the participants’ different ways of constituting 
creativity while discussing a single activity. 
3.4.4.4 Meta‐definitions 
The journey to the present analysis was both thorough and beset by many difficulties and 
conundrums. Some of the most problematic issues were posed by, what the researcher has 
come to regard as, “meta-definitions”. The desirability of separating out the meta-
definitions from the “lived” definitions was not initially self-evident. It seems likely that 
much difficulty in communicating about creativity may derive from people’s ability to 
abstract from their experience and describe their conceptions of creativity in the form of 
meta-definitions. By way of illustration two of the participants’ meta-definitions will be 
discussed: Creativity meta-defined as “creation”, and creativity meta-defined as “thinking 
outside the square”. 
The problem with meta-definitions is not that they do not say something about how the 
participant sees creativity. It is that they do not seem to say enough. Having said that, it is 
possible that future research could reveal patterns in the ways people use meta-definitions 
of creativity. So it seems important to talk about them. A meta-definition, as I came to 
think of them, is like a line or thread drawn through a series of “lived” definitions. This 
line is abstract and without definite experiential dimension, whereas the operational 
definitions of creativity have a basis in lived experience and can be felt, recognised in 
experience, remembered, described and so forth. A meta-definition will fit somewhere into 
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most of a participant’s operational definitions. For example, P7 meta-defined creativity as 
creation or creating: 
Oh, I think it’s [creativity is] when we create things. (7) 
“Creation” is a central idea in P7’s way of linking together all the various aspects of 
creativity he has in mind. However, P7 also makes all of the following statements, which 
suggest that he is using the definition to refer to qualitatively different types of creative 
experience: 
I mean if we speak a sentence, we’re being creative. So, like I said before, if 
you write a book you’re being creative. (7) 
So, to say creativity, I think you need to have constructed something. Doesn’t 
necessarily have to be three-dimensional or two dimensional – it could 
disappear in a minute’s time. It could be a cloud or a bubble. (7) 
But that’s my true sense of real creativity. It’s like: “Oh, it’s really different, 
it’s really creative.” (7) 
I’ve seen lots of kids that have turned around and, you know, came in 
without a whole lot and gone on with it and really started something. (7) 
The birth of my first son … for me it was a defining moment, sort of; that’s 
why I’m here on Earth. That is what life’s all about. It’s a bit bizarre, but, 
like, it’s – then, then I’ve got the responsibility of helping to raise them, so, I 
hope a major part of creating who they are. (7) 
I’m a Christian myself, so I have a – believe I’m a creative being, creative, 
you know – so I’ve got a, I’ve got a – I’m just creative. So everything I touch 
and do is creative, whether it be painting my house, or whether it be going to 
the beach and making a sandcastle, or, yeah, painting my car, or whatever. 
(7) 
I mean, I believe God’s shaped who I am, so, yeah – I think, I’m showing you 
in that statement – yeah, I do think, because of that, I definitely, definitely, 
give a lot more of myself to other people. Very, very much so … Like, no 
moment’s wasted helping someone. (7) 
The idea of producing or creating something is implicated in all of these utterances. But 
what P7’s meta-definition does not say or show, is the complexity of his experience of 
creativity as creative being and creative contribution to the collective.   
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P7’s meta-definition is obviously a common link, like a thread that runs through very 
tiny and very large beads. In P7’s perspective the idea of creation links the human capacity 
to produce all of the following: thoughts, sentences, things, children, growth, community, a 
better world, God’s plan for humanity. Even the tiniest of these beads, a sentence or a 
bubble, is, in P7’s view of creativity, tinged with a kind of spiritual awe. His choice of 
meta-definition undoubtedly relates somehow to his Christian faith and somehow connects 
to the sense of meaning he feels in creating authentic selves through parenting and 
teaching. There is a sense conveyed in P7’s transcript that because he experiences meaning 
in these outerings or giving of self, production is a key theme for him, which somehow 
links together with the Christian doctrine around creation. But it would be misleading to 
confuse the meta-definition (creation) with the experiences from which it is abstracted – 
experiences of creativity which include ownership and authenticity. 
Another example of meta-definition obfuscation can be seen in the transcript of P12. 
P12’s meta-definition for creativity is “thinking outside the box”: 
P12: New things. I think anything can be creative really. Like when you’re 
thinking outside the box you are thinking creatively, so trying to find new 
ways of doing things, that’s creativity in its own right. 
I: So thinking outside of the box is creativity as far as you’re 
concerned? 
P12: Yep. 
Several of the teachers alluded to the idea of creativity as “thinking outside the square” or 
“box”. But as in the case of P7, P12 also says a lot of other things, which indicate that 
“thinking outside the box” is a distillation and far from the most important aspect of P12’s 
view of creativity: 
The word “creative” to me just alludes to things like freedom. (12) 
Higher order thinking is very much to do with art, you know, thinking 
outside the box, trying to figure out a way to solve a problem. (12) 
I think everyone has the ability to think outside the box, but it’s whether or 
not, you know, the key’s been unlocked … (12) 
So you have to think creatively and out of the box to get them to realize that 
there’s not just one picture of perfection as such … (12) 
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Oh it’s a very creative video clip … there’s still bits, moving bits, some of it 
that related to the music, some of it that didn’t really, it might have related 
to something of themselves or whatever. Yes it was very creative (laughs). 
Well they’ve thought outside the box. (12) 
The little artist book I made was probably the most creative [experience of 
creativity to me] because it wasn’t really what was expected, or … it wasn’t 
really for anyone, it was just for me and I wouldn’t really show it to anyone 
either (laughs). (12) 
These aspects of P12’s experience of creativity can all be linked up like beads on the fine, 
abstracted thread of “thinking outside the box”. But “thinking outside the box” is an 
abstraction and does not show the complexity, of P12’s understanding of ownership or 
authenticity. It does not show that, for P12, “thinking outside the box” can refer to both the 
evaluative action which instigates autonomous processes as well as problem-solving of a 
more reactive kind. 
The reason for pointing out this issue, apart from informing future research work, is to 
show that behind what looks to be two quite different ways of understanding creativity are 
really two quite similar ways of understanding creativity. One seems to delimit creativity 
as a production process, the other more as a problem-solving or thinking process – but both 
actually experience creativity as an autonomous process. Both P7 and P12 used very 
similar approaches to the encouragement of creativity in the classroom, based on similar 
beliefs in the value of ownership for students. 
There may be a number of such abstracted meta-definitions masquerading in common 
discourse as useful definitions of creativity. Common terms such as “problem-solving”, 
“creating”, and “originality” may all represent problematic meta-definitions, which blur the 
boundaries between interpersonal and intra-personal operational conceptions of creativity 
– that is, the ones people actually use to build up their view of creativity. Problem-solving 
can obviously be performed under many different kinds of conditions and from either a 
controlled or autonomous viewpoint. The relationship between originality and authenticity 
may also need to be examined. Autonomy oriented teachers look for authenticity not 
merely originality in the things their students produce. 
3.4.4.5 Teachers’ experiences of teaching creatively and enhancing students’ creativity 
During the analysis process I used various strategies to check my own interpretations of 
what participants were expressing about their experiences of creativity. For example, two 
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tables were constructed at a time during analysis when the emerging categories of 
description appeared to reflect stable variation but dimensions of variation were still being 
identified and tested. The reason for constructing the tables was to see more deeply into 
how the teachers’ understandings of teaching and learning were implicated in their 
descriptions of creative teaching and enhancing student creativity. Using the tables as an 
analytical tool allowed a clearer interpretation of what teachers meant by the term 
“creativity” in their descriptions of times when they had been teaching creatively or 
teaching to enhance the creativity of students. These tables were rigorously constructed. 
They and the accompanying write-ups of the identified categories of description for the 
teachers’ experiences of teaching creatively and enhancing students’ creativity have been 
included as appendices (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2) in this thesis. 
The tables provided a visual representation, which showed that when teachers were 
more focused on teaching as delivery they tended to see delivery as the locus for their 
creativity in teaching. Managing students and encouraging students’ learning through 
guidance and interesting instruction seemed to be the main objective for the teachers’ 
problem-solving. Teachers who were more focused on teaching as supporting/enabling 
either sense-making or autonomy tended to see supporting and enabling autonomy as the 
objective for their creativity in teaching. 
The tables indicate that there is some kind of correlation or coincidence between seeing 
teaching as delivery and conceptualising creativity in terms of the “X” versions of 
categories A through to E as identified in the present study. There appears to be a further 
correlation between expressing a view of creativity, in terms of categories F and G, and 
seeing teaching as enabling ownership and/or autonomy and authenticity. It appears that 
the key dimension of variation identified in this study is implicated in variation in teachers’ 
views of teaching, learning and creativity. It could be useful to undertake a more thorough 
investigation of these phenomena by conducting further studies. The tables have been 
retained as appendices in order to further illustrate the measures taken in this analysis to 
ensure rigour in interpreting what participants meant as they described their experiences of 
creativity. 
3.4.5 Presenting the results in a manner which permits informed scrutiny 
To permit informed scrutiny of the categories of description emerging from the study, 
detailed descriptions have been presented of the categories of description. This has 
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included ensuring that the categories of description are adequately illustrated with quotes 
from the transcripts (Cope, 2004). Findings have been presented through written 
description and also graphically as tables. The identified dimensions of variation have been 
represented diagrammatically, which contributes to the “communicative credibility” of the 
findings (Collier-Reed, Ingerman & Berglund, 2009). 
3.4.6 Evidence for a hierarchy of conceptions in the present study. 
In the present study, it is suggested that the identification of dimensions of variation and a 
hierarchy of inclusive categories provides grounds for verification of the findings. The 
identification of dimensions of variation and a hierarchy of inclusive awareness are 
findings which can be scrutinised by others and tested in further studies. As has been 
discussed in the phenomenography literature, phenomenographic studies are carried out in 
a spirit of open investigation, with the aim of collective learning (Collier-Reed, Ingerman 
& Berglund, 2009). Being able to describe the critical variation with reference to 
dimensions of variation, which can be discerned by informed others, provides one of the 
firmest indicators of the validity and transferability of the results. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUEENSLAND TEACHERS’ CONCEPTIONS OF 
CREATIVITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of this study of Queensland teachers’ qualitatively 
different conceptions of creativity. Differences between the conceptions have been 
described in terms of their variation along a number of dimensions of variation, making it 
possible to identify key aspects of difference between teachers’ ways of experiencing and 
constituting the phenomenon of creativity. 
The findings of the study are presented in four sections: 
1. Section one explains that within these results conceptions of creativity are seen as 
falling into two classes depending on whether creativity is being discerned from an 
observer perspective or from the perspective of the creator. 
2. Section two presents the categories of description, wherein the foci of the teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity, which have been categorised on the basis that they reflect 
similar values along one or more dimensions of variation, are described. 
3. Section three describes the dimensions of variation across the categories of 
creativity conceptions as identified in this study. 
4. Section four presents the outcome space for the teachers’ ways of experiencing 
creativity. The outcome space is a visual representation that shows how the 
boundaries of awareness identified in the study relate across the ways of 
experiencing creativity. The relationship is identified as reflecting a hierarchy in 
which some ways of experiencing and constituting creativity are inclusive of other, 
less comprehensive, ways of experiencing and constituting creativity. 
4.2 SECTION ONE: INTERNAL WORLD AND EXTERNAL WORLD FOCI 
Within the data, two locations for discernment of creativity were identified: evaluation of 
objects in the external world (things, people, behaviours) and evaluation of objects in the 
internal world (processes and process elements). Thus creativity is constituted differently 
and has different meanings when it is defined from an external observer perspective as 
compared with an internal creator perspective. When viewed from an internal perspective 
 166
the participant has information available about feelings experienced in the process of 
creating. When constituting creativity from an external perspective the nature of the 
process can only be inferred. 
Participants identified three main kinds of external objects as creative: 
 Domains 
 Products 
 People and their performances or actions 
Participants also identified internal processes and process elements as creative and were 
able to talk about such process elements. They discussed, for example: 
 Feelings, such as feelings of external pressure, challenge, enjoyment or meaning 
 Sensed (quasi-sensory) objects, such as a sense of direction or finding a solution. 
The notion of creativity seemed to draw the attention of the participants to “novelty” or 
“non-repetitiveness” within the external and internal worlds. Thus the creative “object” 
was discerned in relation to some contrasting feature in the external or internal worlds. The 
personal and/or social value of these discerned external world and internal world objects 
was evaluated by the participants. Commonality in ways of experiencing external and 
internal objects, translates into commonality in ways of constituting and experiencing 
creativity. These commonalities have in turn been grouped within categories of 
description. These categories of description are elucidated in written text and as a table 
(Table 4-1) in the following section. 
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4.3 SECTION TWO: THE CATEGORIES OF DESCRIPTION 
The study has resulted in the identification of seven categories of description. These 
categories are summarised below. 
Group 1: Externally defined group 
Creativity is seen in the qualities of “external objects”, such as domains, products, people 
or actions. The value of the creative object and its (inferred) creative process is decided 
from the perspective of the observer rather than the creator. 
 
 Category A. Creativity is experienced as domain specific 
o A property of the arts 
o Domain hierarchies 
 Category B. Creativity is experienced as pro-social 
o Innovation 
o Exceptionality 
 Category C. Creativity is experienced as pro-individual 
o Unconventional products 
o Individualism 
Group 2: Internally defined group 
Creativity is seen in “internal objects”, such as feelings of disorientation, or feelings of 
meaningfulness and internal change. The value of creativity is decided from the 
perspective of the creator rather than the observer and includes evaluations of the qualities 
of the process. 
 
 Category D. Creativity is experienced as an instrumental processes 
o Responding 
o Improvising for a functional purpose 
o Functional spontaneity 
o Instrumental gain 
 Category E. Creativity is experienced as personal processes 
o Recreational 
o Activities with meaning 
o Occasional ownership 
 Category F. Creativity is experienced as ownership 
o Taking ownership: transformative tasks under personal control 
o Meaningfully expanding capacities as a person 
 Category G. Creativity is experienced as authenticity and autonomy 
o Creative self/being 
o Contributing to holistic transformations of the collective 
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Now follows a detailed description of the categories. As there are two groups of categories, 
each group is introduced with a short summary of the characteristics of that group. Each 
category within the group is described and sub-categories within the category are described 
below that. Each sub-category is illustrated with quotations from the transcripts. It is 
important to note that quotations have been considered in the full context of the transcripts 
from which they are extracted and may provide only indications of the meaning expressed. 
In order to avoid copious amounts of quotation, where it does not detract from the meaning 
of an utterance quotes are sometimes condensed. I have used an ellipsis (…) to indicate 
words are missing, or where there was a long pause in the respondent's answer. No actual 
names of participants are retained in any of the quotations. The transcript from which the 
quotation has been extracted is indicated at the end of each quote by the number of the 
transcript enclosed in brackets. At the end of the description of all seven categories of 
description, the variation between categories and relationships between the categories are 
summarised in table form. 
4.3.1 Group 1: Externally defined group 
In the foreground of conceptions within this group, creativity is seen in qualities of 
“external objects”, such as domains, products, people or actions. The discernment of 
novelty or difference sets creative objects apart as different from other “normal” or non-
creative external objects within an observer’s experience. The value of the creative object 
and its (inferred) creative process is rationalised in terms of social contribution. 
In this group social norms, existing cultural content and standards play a key role in 
conceptions by providing the backdrop for the discernment of the novelty of creativity. The 
perception of non-mainstream thought or non-mainstream characteristics underlying the 
creative process may be common across all conceptions of creativity in this group. 
However, the social value of creativity emerges in the relation between two simultaneously 
discerned aspects: the perceived functionality of the creative object and the perceived 
functionality of the social norms or rules against which the creative object is seen. 
Creativity is not always seen as contributing social value. Three major categories of 
creativity conceptions have been identified for this group. These are described as domain 
specific, pro-social and pro-individual. 
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4.3.1.1 Category A. Creativity is experienced as domain specific 
Some participants expressed the view that creativity is relevant to practices and products in 
some domains and not others. Definitions of creativity in this category tend to reflect how 
the arts domains appear to participants and how they are discussed and valued socially. By 
describing this conception as domain specific it is not meant to imply that creativity is seen 
as taking different forms in different domains. In the present category, the participants are 
not thinking in such an evaluative way, but in a way that is accepting of social discourse 
around differences between the arts and other disciplines. The category has been divided 
into two sub-categories. In the first the participant is focusing on an unexamined division 
between the arts and other domains. This is described as an experience of creativity as 
A1.A property of the arts. In the second, the focus is on specific differences between the 
arts and other domains, which tend to establish hierarchic relationships between “creative” 
and “non-creative” domains. This is described as an experience of creativity as A2.Domain 
hierarchies. These sub-categories are described in more detail below and illustrated with 
quotations from the transcripts. 
A1. A property of the arts: Some teachers expressed a view of creativity as connected 
explicitly to the arts, or arts and design. In this view creativity is experienced as having 
something to do with any or all of the arts-related domains including visual and performing 
arts, music, writing and literature, film production and “craft”. When seen as a property of 
the arts, teachers seem to have in mind other domains, which are seen as not creative, such 
as science, accounting, teaching, or domains involving repetitive work: 
Musicians, artists, writers. I suppose that’s where I tend to see a definition of 
creativity. (3) 
Again, all the creative students I immediately think of are all my music and 
artistic students because that’s immediately where my brain goes when I 
think “creative.”(15) 
I guess when we think about what’s creative, what people talk about, they 
always sort of talk about it in artistic terms and I think that I’ve made that 
connection in my head that, sort of, to be creative is to somehow be 
artistically expressive. (2) 
A2. Domain hierarchies: In this view participants compare and contrast “creative” and 
“non-creative” domains, establishing hierarchic relationships between them. One domain 
may be seen as more rigorous, more functional, more interesting or of greater social worth 
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than another. These hierarchies seem to reflect tensions between the perceived value of 
“the functional” and “the aesthetic”. But this tension was conceptualised by different 
participants in different ways. Sometimes functionality “won” out in the comparison and at 
other times aesthetic qualities “won” in preference to functionality: 
The following quotation illustrates conceptions of the latter type, where domains 
involving practices aimed at the production of artefacts with aesthetic appeal are seen as 
higher, better or more desirable than domains involving functional practices: 
Music, painting etc., that was seen as being a creative thing see, sort of, that 
is a very separate world and one that I thought I would never be able to 
enter and other professions were much more pragmatic and prosaic and so 
on … you have this stereotype of that and the opposite of course is your, is 
the dramatist, the writer, the composer or whatever, whatever. It’s those 
people who are creating something. (3) 
In another way of seeing domain hierarchies, participants seem to be focusing on the 
arts as domains where people think “aesthetically” or impractically. Artistic thinking is 
seen as less suited to the functional requirements of the “real” world than the thinking and 
doing associated with other more practical domains: 
I would like to make, I would like to do creative, sort of making type things. 
Because I’m thinking of creativity as being sort of “making rather than 
buying”, rather than kind of an artistic sort of thing … Rather than as an 
artistic thing, maybe, with being sort of: “Oh, I’m so creative”. (4) 
Well, I don’t think we were thinking creatively, we were thinking in a more 
sort of utilitarian sort of way. We were designing something to do a 
particular job. (10) 
In fact [doing craft] is rather silly – not silly, but it’s not the sort of thing 
that one actually does so much at the moment really, is it? (4) 
In those days, you did, like, do poetry. Kids did write poetry … whereas, I 
don’t know if they do now … But I do know that [an academic] says, well, 
you know, teaching poetry, it’s like, it’s a really esoteric sort of thing, but 
it’s really unnecessary. So, you know, I mean it’s sort of in opposition, like 
it’s the creative rather than the critical sort of side of things, or whatever. 
(4) 
Because participants demonstrate concern with the relative social value of “the 
aesthetic” and “the functional” it does not seem that they are simply applying definitions of 
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creativity. The teachers appear to be making evaluations of creative domains based on their 
experience of artistic objects and arts practices relative to their experience of other kinds of 
objects and domain practices. These evaluations seem, in some cases, to reflect lack of 
familiarity with “the aesthetic” versus familiarity with “the functional”. The research aims 
of the present study, time constraints around interviews and a number of other 
contingencies curtailed further exploration of this aspect. 
4.3.1.2 Category B. Creativity is experienced as pro‐social 
This view of creativity focuses on pro-social expressions of creativity as reflected in 
products, people and performance. Creativity is seen as in the interests of society when it is 
perceived, from an external perspective, that a product or performance is both novel/unique 
and socially valuable. This category differs from the previous category primarily in that the 
focus is now on establishing the social value of products and people, rather than 
establishing the social value of domains and practices. Creativity is sometimes seen as 
establishing the outer limits of acceptable or mainstream culture and standards of 
performance in a given context, but also has a preservative role and produces consumable 
content for a variety of (receptive) audiences. This category of externally defined creativity 
conceptions involves making judgments of desired, shareable products, cultural content 
and human resources. Creative products and people stand out as new or different and may 
set new standards of performance, but in building on familiar and approved kinds of 
content and performance, they also conform to criteria of social acceptability and preserve 
valued norms. Products that do not conform to the criteria of this lens are evaluated as not 
creative or are evaluated as creative using a pro-individual lens (Category C). 
The category has been divided into two sub-categories, which represent respectively the 
product and human counterparts of this focus. In the first, the participant is focusing on the 
novelty and social value of products and the social value of the process that has brought 
them into being. This is described as an experience of creativity as B1.Innovation. In the 
second, the focus is on outstanding or competent, socially valuable performance and brings 
into view the creative person or the creative abilities of a person. This is described as an 
experience of creativity as B2.Exceptionality. These sub-categories are described in more 
detail below and illustrated with quotations from the transcripts. 
B1. Innovation: In this view the participant defines creativity as a process, which has 
delivered something of value – a product or idea – into the public domain. The value of 
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creativity is therefore “seen” where it produces something which is externally judged as 
useful or valuable. Teachers expressed two main variations on the theme of creativity as 
pro-social innovation, depending on whether creativity is defined with a focus on a) world 
change or b) personal consumption. These foci correspond with conceptions: B1a. Cultural 
innovation and B1b. Perceived innovation. 
When constituting creativity as B1a. Cultural innovation, the participant defines 
creativity as a creative process that has resulted in a product that brings something 
unequivocally new and of value into the public domain where it can be accessed or 
referenced by the many. The product is seen as being of such quality or usefulness that it 
qualifies to become a cultural resource or part of the cultural fabric and in some way 
changes the “world”. A culturally innovative product defines the new “cutting edge” along 
a particular dimension of socially valuable commodities. Thereafter it can only be copied, 
improved upon or performed differently: 
Well then there’s the series of sameness and every now and then there’ll be 
something again very different and um – I’m wondering if that difference, 
that very different thing that comes up every now and then is the creative bit 
… and the others then follow suit … (1) 
Teachers gave varying examples of cultural innovation. It could be something that 
“raises the bar” on previous standards, a new genre, an invention, discovery or new 
scientific research. Cultural innovation could be decided on an intellectual basis or an 
experiential basis, that is, some innovations could be understood as innovative without 
direct experience of the product: 
I know one of them did do a doctorate in koala diseases, or something like 
that – obviously an area of research that was new to the rest of the world – 
and she was obviously being creative in putting time and effort into those 
diseases … (10) 
Another way of assessing cultural innovation was through direct experience by a 
knowledgeable person: 
But also experiences. When you’re as old as me then you’ve seen this style of 
music and presentation of music in particular, you’ve seen that develop 
before your own eyes in the time that I’ve been alive and it takes a bit to 
catch one’s eye and demonstrate true creativity in my sense of its meaning. 
(10) 
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When deciding cultural innovation, on the basis of experience, existing products were 
sometimes used as a comparison or standard to help decide what is culturally innovative. 
This suggests that “creativity” is in the background of this conception as the human 
processes that have brought existing culture and existing standards into being. Cultural 
innovation seems to constitute a category of creativity conceptions which positions 
particular products as incremental in a process of continual cultural improvement: 
I think that [Cirque du Soleil] is a pinnacle of that particular genre, of which 
is done in a … I think that all the components of whatever is creativity have 
come together to produce this absolutely wonderful thing and it’s almost 
hard to believe that that will somehow evolve and change and get better. It’s 
hard to believe that. But I can remember watching the Moscow Circus, when 
I was young – that was the pinnacle. And not that I had those sorts of 
thoughts because there was not much to make comparisons with … But after 
watching Moscow Circus on television and then going and seeing our local 
touring circus, you know, you can maybe be starting to make judgments, 
starting to make value judgments about things … (2) 
However, when defining creativity as B1b. Perceived innovation, the participant 
appears to disregard the criterion that a creative product needs to improve the world. In this 
way of defining creativity it seems that the product need only be appreciated and seen as 
creative by an audience. The main criterion seems to be that the product elicits a positive 
emotional response, whether of admiration for the skill involved, appreciation of the utility 
of an object, or an emotional response to aesthetic qualities of the product. Participants 
may appreciate a product as a whole, or parts of it, or some parts more than others: 
I can appreciate, I suppose, the craft, somebody who is able to put all that 
together, which was the creative sort of thing, I imagine. (4) 
The way I feel to the world, the things that stand out to me as being creative 
are the ones that my eye is led to, that I like … that I’m attracted to. (10) 
Perhaps when you read a novel, you think, somebody writes something that 
seems to be, you know, a description of something, but it, somehow or 
another it connects with something that you’ve seen or heard and you think, 
“Oh, what a wonderful way of saying that particular thing.” (4) 
I just find sometimes that there is a very, there are a couple of pieces of 
music and sometimes it’s only three or four bars in a piece of music … 
Brahms’ piano concerto number one, the opening three or four bars of that 
are just so intense that ah, you know … (2) 
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One of the features of both of these perspectives on defining creativity through a focus 
on what is produced is that the creative process itself is not observed. The qualities of the 
process can only be inferred from the qualities of the product. The interest generated by the 
product seems to incite interest in the process: 
Yes, and then you obviously think beyond that and there’s a creative process 
that’s gone into that because you’ve had your eye drawn to it, because you 
like it, because it’s attractive to you. Then you appreciate the creativity 
that’s gone into it. (10) 
B2. Exceptionality: In this pro-social view of creativity the focus is on individuals who 
appear to stand out positively in contrast with the normal/conventional, but unremarkable, 
performance of the majority. The creative person, seen through this lens, seems to be in the 
valued minority of individuals who are seen as “good” at a particular thing and perform in 
a socially valuable way. The creative person may be seen as innovative or an innovator. 
But this does not seem to be essential in order to be classed as creative. Exceptionality may 
also be seen as competence in the form of mastery, high achievement or strong academic 
performance. Exceptionality was sometimes conflated with being an achiever in the arts. 
Exceptionality may be identified through some innovative work or competent 
performance that sets the person apart from others in a context: 
I don’t define myself as being creative in terms of artists or, you know, 
people who have achieved – musicians, artists, writers. (3) 
But there’s always a handful in any particular year that stand out and they 
are particularly good at some field that they’ve mastered … sport … dance. 
(10) 
She was a very creative girl, you know, very good at, you know, in the arts 
and drama and English. (3) 
Exceptionality tends to be linked to positive potentials or capacities in the person, such 
as high IQ, artistic talent, desire to achieve, academic or leadership ability: 
They’re, they’re not as outspoken. They will be a leader but they’re not an 
in-your-face type leader. (1) 
Gifted, or should I say, kids who actually have creativity, or who show 
creativity like this one student that I’ve seen, they don’t big-note themselves. 
They’re a very different type of person. (1) 
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There would be a handful that I’ve seen leave, or I’ve heard of, leaving 
school and doing particularly creative things. There was one recently spoke 
to our senior students at the beginning of the year and she’s become a 
playwright and has produced plays for a number of companies in Brisbane. 
Yeah, I would have thought she was particularly creative. (10) 
Exceptionality in one area may be seen as balancing out average or negative 
performance in another area: 
It just blows me away sometimes when a kid that’s been in your class for a 
year suddenly gets up and belts out this song and he’s just amazing, you 
know … “I didn’t know you could do that! Oh my God! That’s fantastic!” 
Suddenly, you know, you see another side of a kid who, aw, they’re a great 
kid in class or sometimes they’re an absolute rat-bag in class … (15) 
The positive social value attributed to creativity in this sub-category appears to be 
linked to an associated conception of creativity as B2a: A life-goal. This conception places 
creativity in the future of individuals, as something that a person can aim for in life, but 
which may or may not be possible to attain. It also establishes a view of the creative 
process as a journey that is undertaken for extrinsic reasons, of seeking affirmation, 
achievement or proving one’s self. In other words, when seeing creativity as a life-goal the 
participant seems more focused on the goal itself and the risks, effort and problems 
involved in grasping the goal than what is gained in the progression towards the goal. 
Becoming a creative achiever tends to be seen as requiring talent or exceptional endurance. 
It is seen as something that many may wish to attain but few ever do: 
One of the other creative things that, as I said I’ve always had in the back of 
my mind – probably a lot of people do – is I’d like to write a book one day … 
It’s been a matter of waiting for the life experience and I don’t want to do it 
badly. So that might stop me from doing it. I don’t want to fail so I won’t 
start. (3) 
It became quite obvious later in my piano playing life that that was limited. 
It was very limited what I could have achieved even with all the ambition 
and ah, all the will in the world. (2) 
4.3.1.3 Category C. Creativity is experienced as pro‐individual 
Some participants expressed a view of creativity as performing or thinking outside social 
norms for individualistic rather than pro-social reasons. In a pro-individual view of 
creativity, rather than serving society at large, or conforming to social norms, creativity is 
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seen as unconventionality, which serves the interests of the individual or a minority. In this 
view creativity is seen in products or actions that are outside social norms. These products 
or actions are judged through a lens, which perceives tensions between the desirability of 
external regulation by social norms/rules and the freedom individuals have to think outside 
them. Individualistic creativity could be seen negatively or positively by participants 
depending on the perceived functionality of the external norms regulating activity in a 
context. Creativity could be seen as failing to conform to functional norms. But it could 
also be seen as more of an individual response to austere or controlling norms. Even 
though the latter conception suggests a more sympathetic view of individualistic creativity, 
the creative act is nonetheless seen as serving the individual rather than society. 
In this category of creativity conceptions there are limits to how regulation by the 
individual is seen. Individual expressions and tendencies may be seen as unruly and 
needing to be controlled by a higher authority or as something an individual decides on an 
extrinsic cost-benefit basis. A third possibility of creative transformation through internal 
regulation appears to be outside awareness. This view of creativity as individualism 
therefore never goes beyond seeing creativity as being in a kind of tension with a 
regulatory function of social norms. Creativity is identified as insulated from, rather than 
contributing to, society or a social context. 
A pro-individual view of creativity differs from the pro-social view primarily on the 
grounds that creativity is seen as operation outside norms in a self-interested, rather than 
socially interested way. The pro-social view, by contrast, sees creativity where it 
establishes norms, preserves norms and operates in the broader public interest. 
The category has been divided into two sub-categories, which represent respectively the 
product and human counterparts of this focus. In the first, the participant is focusing on the 
unconventional novelty and uncertain social value of creative products. This is described 
as an experience of creativity as C1.Unconventional products. In the second, the creative 
object is socially deviant performance or actions. The focus shifts to the individualistic 
intent of the person and the tension between the individual and regulatory norms. This is 
described as an experience of creativity as C2.Individualism. These sub-categories are 
described in more detail below and illustrated with quotations from the transcripts. 
C1. Unconventional products: Some participants expressed a view of creativity as 
unconventional processes giving rise to unconventional products of uncertain social value. 
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The novelty aspect of creativity is here seen in products as something that is out of kilter 
with the expected or normal. Although this can also be the case for pro-social products, 
here the participant has a sense that the meaning contained in the product is unconventional 
without contributing anything of social value. Both the product and the process behind it 
seem to relate to some agenda of the creator, but with little relevance or value from the 
observer’s perspective. 
In the following quotations the participant is commenting on the creativity seen in the 
“Scissor Sisters” music video shown as a stimulus for comment during the interviews. 
From the participant’s perspective, the video presents images that are inexplicable, weird 
and “different to the norm”. This is a clearly different framework for defining creativity 
from the pro-social view of products, for the participant neither appreciates the product 
(perceived innovation) nor sees the product as contributing positively to the world (cultural 
innovation) : 
Well … that shows some sort of creativity or really, really warped sense of 
humour or something like that. (1) 
Yeah. It’s different to the norm. But then these days what is the norm? There 
isn’t really a lot of norm these days. (1) 
There was one woman in some sort of a glass bowl and she was sort of, 
whether she was trying to get out or she was dancing on her back in the 
glass bowl, I didn’t know what she was doing there … just very unusual. (1) 
Instead of being seen as having definite social (or personal) value, the participant sees 
this kind of unconventional creativity as having some value to the individual. This kind of 
creativity is seen by P1 as requiring the exercise of tolerance. 
[Accepting creative individuality] shows that we value people as individuals 
… um … and that what they produce has some value. What they produce has 
worth, and um, so that video clip that was produced has some value in 
today’s society and we shouldn’t actually be slamming it and saying “Well 
that’s rubbish”. (1) 
I suppose it’s a little bit daunting, to me, being very traditional, um, but 
because I’m interacting with young kids all the time – teenagers anyway – 
I’ve, I’ve grown to accept it. It’s not shock value, at all, if you’ve just got a 
head floating around singing … You know, it’s not shock value, as what it 
might have been to the parents of the kids in the 50’s and 60s with their, um, 
their psychedelic dress and into the drugs and all that sort of stuff. (1) 
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C2. Individualism: In this view creativity is seen as reflected in actions that do not conform 
to the regulatory norms of a context. Instead of displaying behaviour, which is unique and 
appropriate or of quality, the creative person displays behaviour which is seen as individual 
and inappropriate to a given context. Creativity is seen as outside what is expected or 
desired socially. The context and the nature of the regulatory norms in focus seem to 
dictate what form creativity may take. 
In the following examples, creativity is seen in the context of a science class. Whilst the 
conception may incorporate a view of creative processes as artistic, fun or imaginative, it is 
the teacher’s perception that they are part of a student’s private agenda, which gives rise to 
the conception of creativity as individualistic. The teachers have the expectation that good 
socialisation will be demonstrated by following the rules of the science classroom. In the 
following examples the students demonstrate creativity, by doing something “of their 
own”, which conflicts with the classroom situation. They are therefore failing to be 
regulated by the rules of the classroom: 
I’ve certainly seen them do creative things in my lessons, which are not what 
they’re supposed to be doing. There’s any number of instances where you 
come across someone who’s completely bored with your science lesson and 
are sketching Anime characters in their book, or drawing model cars, or, 
you know, writing poetry, or those sorts of things … Well they’re certainly 
showing an aspect of their own creativity that is almost in total conflict with 
what’s supposed to be happening. (10) 
Well, as I said art works, pieces of art, ah … music, poetry, working on their 
assignments … research topics from other subjects, the sorts of things that 
kids will do if they’re bored or they’re pressed for time and they think that 
they can get away with doing it in your class. (10) 
What a child sees to be creative in a science lesson may lead to an explosion 
or toxic chemicals being released in the room. (10) 
The following examples are slightly different and suggest a specific meaning of 
individualistic creativity as outside learning. Here the teacher is thinking of learning as 
acquiring content. The student is expected to follow instructions, acquire knowledge and 
relay it back to the teacher in a specific format. From the teacher’s perspective creativity is 
demonstrated where the students present their work in a way that is individual rather than 
appropriate. Creativity is not seen as bad behaviour but it is seen having a value which 
only the individual experiences. That agenda is not seen as relevant in the context of 
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demonstrating learning in science. Creativity in this context is more of a failure to be 
regulated by the norms of teaching and learning in science. 
I want them to be able to experience things in their own way in their own 
comfort zones and if it means that they do all their assignments in one way 
because that’s comfortable for them … But I then have to go and mark it and 
I hate marking those sorts of productions … When I have to mark some 
assignments, I think this is not the way I would do it. But when you then look 
at, they’ve covered this, this, this, and this and this and they’ve done it in this 
different format, so what? Y’ know, that’s fine. But if they’ve covered those 
aspects and they’ve got the science right, then I don’t mind any more. (1) 
There’s a lot of similarity that you teach year to year in the assessment 
pieces and every year, every now and again a student will produce 
something that’s out of the ordinary, approached something from a different 
angle and still come up with the goods and would stand out as being, guess 
you’d call it creative, yeah. (10) 
In the following example the teacher is seeing individualism from a more sympathetic 
perspective. Here creativity is being constituted in the context of expected behaviour in the 
school. In this example, instead of strongly criticising the student there is a hint of criticism 
regarding the “system” of school regulations. However, the teacher recognises that the 
student’s creative behaviour will be seen as aberrant from the school’s perspective: 
Well, you don’t really bump into it that much, er, in official documents in 
schools and things like that. Although sometimes you might get it in terms of 
a child being aberrant or, you know, doing something that was er, you know, 
behaviourally challenging to the, to the school … and so the child has 
worked out something and how to use the system and, you know, you can say 
well, “Gee, they were creative in that”. (2) 
In each of these examples, the teachers are seeing creativity from an external 
perspective as individualism. Its value is seen as inward – something of which only the 
individual is aware, but which becomes evident where it appears that an individual is not 
regulating themselves according to the norms or rules of the wider social context. In some 
cases where the teachers are seeing creativity as failure to conform to functional norms, 
creativity may be seen as detrimental for society and/or the socialisation of the individual. 
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4.3.2 Group 2: Internally defined group 
In the foreground of conceptions within this group, creativity is seen in “internal objects”. 
These are usually feelings experienced in the process, such as being in an unfamiliar 
situation, quasi-sensory objects and internal change, which identify creative processes as 
different from other “normal” or non-creative processes. The value of creativity is 
rationalised across the qualities of the process and the discerned value of what is produced 
internally and externally. Creativity is being defined from the perspective of the creator 
rather than the observer. 
4.3.2.1 Category D: Creativity is experienced as instrumental processes 
This category of internally focused creativity conceptions is delimited principally by the 
experiential qualities of the process. Creativity is discerned from the participant’s point of 
view, as acting outside “auto-pilot” for a purpose that typically involves responding to 
some form of external pressure or may involve internal pressure to gain reward of an 
extrinsic rather than intrinsic nature. Thus the processes identified as creative in this 
category are distinguished by the lack of internal reward in the creative process. There are 
two sub-categories within this category: sub-category D1 functional processes and sub-
category D2 instrumental gain. 
Sub-category D1. Creativity is experienced as a functional process. In sub-category D1 
creativity is seen and evaluated as a functional process. In a view of creativity as a 
functional process, the perceived pressure to perform a process that is “outside auto-pilot” 
is more external than internal. In such a process it is determined, on the basis of situational 
elements and internal qualities of the process, that there is functional value in carrying out 
the creative process. This involves an evaluation of a situation and the determination that, 
although the process may be inconvenient, unpleasant, unfamiliar or difficult, a creative 
process is appropriate. Creative processes of this type have distinct internal qualities such 
as the sense of operating outside “auto-pilot” or going through a process, which is not 
planned. They are concerned with producing solutions or objects with functional value, 
which may or may not involve producing externally defined novelty. The value of 
creativity of this type may be further rationalised as a functional skill, which is seen as 
good for the adaptability and social functionality of the person/learner: 
It broadens their skills base on how they could tackle problems that they may 
encounter in the future. (1) 
 181
Creativity conceptions in this functional process sub-group differ from those in the next 
sub-group on the basis that here the process is evaluated as mainly valuable for what it 
produces or gains in terms of problem-resolution. There is no discerned internal value in 
the process itself. 
The category has been divided into three sub-categories depending on whether the 
experience of creativity focuses on: a) the need to respond to outside pressure b) the need 
to improvise for a functional purpose or c) the choice to spontaneously do something 
differently from usual. These three foci correspond to sub-categories: D1a. Responding; 
D1b. Improvising for a practical purpose; and D1c. Functional spontaneity. These are 
explained in more detail below and illustrated with quotations from the transcripts. 
D1a. Responding: In this sub-category creativity is seen as problem-solving in response to 
outside pressure. Creativity is defined as a creative process, which has to be carried out in 
order to solve a sudden, unexpected or unyielding problem. This means that the impetus 
for the process is seen as coming from the environment rather than in a volitional way from 
the self. The descriptions given by participants indicate that when improvising in this way 
there is a moment where he/she realises that an impasse or obstacle has been reached and 
there is a need to shift to a different, less automatic way of thinking: 
So it’s when you hit that roadblock, when you suddenly have to go: “Oh my 
brain has to engage now and go: How am I going to fix this? How am I 
going to get round this?” You know, it’s that questioning suddenly: “Here’s 
my options, which one do I take?” (15) 
So it’s in those moments that you could be creative, because it wasn’t 
planned, you know. Your lesson plan basically would stop. It would be 
truncated and to go on you knew would be a disaster. (2) 
Sometimes when you’re driving the car there’s things that happen that make 
you have to alter any preconceived line of destination … to your destination 
… and so you have to think quite quickly, er, differently about that. (2) 
To some extent I was forced into the creativity and perhaps if I hadn’t been 
forced I’d have been sort of complacent and not done anything about it. (3) 
When the value of this kind of creative process is rationalised the participant sums up 
the value of creativity in a parsimonious way: the process has no internal value, but the aim 
is to do the best that can be done with the available resources: 
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Yeah, you make the best decision given the resources that you have … given 
the situation. (2) 
Doing the best with what you’ve got kind of problem-solving … I think that 
is, that’s being creative. (15) 
D1b. Improvising for a functional purpose: In this view creativity is seen as a problem-
solving process, which is constrained by aspects of the environment and by the 
requirements of the problem situation, but is not experienced as having the same level of 
urgency as in D1a.Responding. Participants may indicate that there is some level of 
personal involvement in this kind of creative process and there may be concern with 
producing something of quality or interest for an audience. Nonetheless creativity is still 
seen as having mainly functional value – as getting a job done or serving a practical 
purpose: 
I don’t know if I want to say there’s a functional side to it, or what, but, you 
know, you know that, you know that there’s something [a pro-forma or 
template] there, but it’s not exactly what you want, so you have to be 
creative with what’s there to, you know, serve a different purpose, or 
something. (4) 
Well, I guess they [creative solutions] fulfil a particular purpose. They must 
be educationally sound. As I said they fulfil a purpose, they meet some 
aspect of the curriculum or literacy or numeracy … (10). 
Although seen as functional, creativity of this type was usually seen by participants as 
less crucial or important than other priorities or long term goals. Some teachers commented 
that improvising in the context of a busy life and teaching is often impractical because of 
time constraints: 
You kind of think “There’s just not enough time in the day any more”, so, 
you know, it becomes a matter of eventually, you lose, well, you know, I lose 
the creativity or the urge to be creative because of the pragmatic aspect of 
the time involved … (3). 
Two of the teachers indicated that functional improvising may well occur regularly, but as 
an unnoticed, background aspect of everyday functioning: 
The pragmatic practical everyday [creativity], you kind of, you tend to 
overlook those particular results because they’re just there all the time. (3) 
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D1c. Functional spontaneity: In this experience of creativity as functional spontaneity 
there are similarities and differences with D1a Responding and D1b. Improvising for a 
practical purpose. In this view creativity involves a more volitional shift from “auto-pilot”: 
a sudden decision to do something differently. But as in the previous conceptions in this 
group it does not involve a strong sense of purpose and its perceived value as a process is 
related to its functionality rather than internal value: 
Well, I don’t know, if you could just sort of, think, “Oh, we have some 
tomatoes in the garden and we have some something in the fridge – I’ll whip 
something up with those things.” That would be creative, maybe … So, 
maybe, maybe there’s something spontaneous about that. Perhaps, that is 
different from how you might normally approach cooking … (4). 
Sub-category D2. Creativity is experienced as instrumental gain. As in the previous sub-
category, this view of creativity as instrumental gain, involves an experience of a creative 
process that is without intrinsic value. In the previous sub-category external pressure 
results in an uncomfortable experience of creativity. In the experience of creativity as 
instrumental gain, a more internalised version of external pressure results in a process 
which is nonetheless without “intrinsic” value. The intention in this instance is to obtain 
some form of extrinsic reward, such as external approval or to produce something others 
would see as innovative – or both. Thus the process is instrumental in obtaining something 
extrinsic to the process and does not involve intrinsic reward: 
I really wanted to be different. That was me, that was me personally and 
things I wanted to do would then also reflect that. So just to do something 
that everybody else was doing would have just meant that you were run of 
the mill … So you had to think harder or more creatively or outside of what 
was happening. (2) 
Well I think that you, if you’re doing something that’s quite new, people … 
ah … can be drawn to that and of course if they’re drawn to that newness 
they’re also drawn to you, I would suspect, and that has a sort of an 
affirming nature in the sense that, well, like any theatrical event, you know, 
there’s sorta that applause part, it’s really the affirming part of the whole 
process. Um … and if you do something really different that just seems to 
elevate that affirmation. (2) 
It appears that the two main discerned elements that set such processes apart as 
“creative” are the sense of acting outside “auto-pilot”, and/or outside what is normal or 
expected, combined with the intention to be perceived as “creative” as the end result of the 
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process. The participant may be seeing, as a goal, any of the external definitions of 
creativity – that is, to be appraised as artistic, exceptional or innovative or some 
combination of these. Whilst this kind of motivation to achieve may have the potential to 
“kick-start” a meaningful process, the conjunction of an internal compulsion to appear 
creative with the sense of operating in a non-auto-piloted process, nonetheless represents a 
surface experience of creativity. There is no intrinsic sense of reward. 
4.3.2.2 Category E. Creativity is experienced as personal processes 
In this view of creativity, creativity is internally defined as processes with personal 
relevance. Into the foreground of experiences of creativity in this view comes a sense of 
internal value in the creative process and separates this category from a view of creativity 
as either purely functional or purely instrumental in achieving an outcome. Personal 
processes may be evaluated as having a functional component. But it is now internal value 
– pleasure or meaning of some kind experienced in the process – which defines creativity 
and sets creative processes apart from other processes. However, in this category creative 
value tends to be seen as limited to the private world of the individual and also to particular 
situations or types of activities. In other words personal creativity is not seen as something 
that can be done all the time. Creativity may be compartmentalised as something that only 
happens in certain activities, such as art or craft activities, or as a process that is not usually 
allowed in formal settings, such as work. 
Although there appear to be similarities with an experience of creativity as 
individualism – an experience of creativity as personal is not defined with an external focus 
on behaviour and norms, but internally with attention given to the “felt” qualities of 
creative and non-creative processes. This focus requires that participants turn attention 
inwardly to compare how different processes feel. Participants do not see personally 
meaningful processes as breaking rules or as threatening social norms. Personal processes 
are evaluated as valuable in some way. They tend to be seen as appropriate in some 
contexts. However, this category differs from categories higher in the hierarchy in that 
transformative potentials of creative processes are not clearly seen. Creativity defined as a 
personal process tends to be seen as an occasional or situated process. 
The category is divided into three sub-categories depending on whether the focus is on 
a) recreational processes b) a sense of relevance to the “self” c) relevance and control as 
related to occasional learning. These foci correspond to experiences of creativity as E1. 
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Recreational; E2. Activities with meaning; and E3. Occasional ownership. These sub-
categories are described in more detail below and illustrated with quotations from the 
transcripts. 
E1.Recreational: In an experience of creativity as recreational, the participant defines 
creativity as a process that is enjoyable and contrasts with work or pressure. The focus is 
on feelings and on personal reasons for engaging in the process, such as relaxation or a 
mild or general sense of interest. Creativity is evaluated as a process with recreational 
value: 
Doing the mosaic was doing something, sort of, purely as a kind of, you 
know, “Oh, I have some free time, it would be nice to do something creative 
because that is different from what I’m doing the rest of the time”. (4) 
E2.Activities with meaning: Some participants expressed a view of creativity as a process 
with purpose and meaning that occurs or is chosen in some situations. In this view 
creativity is seen as more valuable than just a relaxing or enjoyable process. The process 
seems, to the participant, to be somehow meaningfully connected to who he/she is as a 
person or related to important values. But the participant is not seeing the creative process 
as under personal control and has an unclear sense of how such processes might relate to 
other processes such as learning or teaching. Creativity may be seen as a part of the self or 
as connected to some important values but overall is an undeveloped part of how the 
participant sees him/herself as a person: 
Which is, sort of, different from saying, “Oh, I’ll make a birthday cake for 
my child and it will be really creative,” because that is very, that’s actually 
not very spontaneous, that’s very planned … That would have some special 
sort of meaning, or something. So you, you’d invest it with something of 
yourself. (4) 
I suppose I’ve, ah, I suppose I’ve always toyed with the idea that there is this 
creative side and it’s just been a matter of waiting for the time and place for 
it to emerge. (3) 
Yeah, well I think creativity isn’t something you can bash around too much. 
Well for me creativity is part of who I am as well I think, so … yeah … to me. 
I’m sort of putting the two together. Or maybe that’s just my rear view of life 
in the world. (3) 
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E3.Occasional ownership: In this view of creativity the participant is seeing the creative 
process as one that is relevant to the self and also under the control of the individual, with 
the potential to play a part in important socially valuable processes such as learning or 
teaching. Although only barely aware of these potentials, the teacher is aware that it is 
personal control of the process which establishes the value of this kind of creative process. 
Interest/relevance and control in the creative process may now be related to purposeful 
learning or to enhancements observed in the learning process itself, such as making 
possible a more satisfying, easier, better quality process resulting in a higher quality 
outcome. Despite seeing some of these potentials, the participant is still mainly unaware of 
how relevance and purpose might relate more generally to learning, teaching or growing as 
a person. Creativity is seen as something that can happen occasionally when circumstances 
allow. Transformative learning potentials of creative processes are glimpsed but not clearly 
seen: 
Yeah. And it also had something of myself in it, I think – which was 
interesting because, you know, this was this team of people who was doing 
things. But it – and every now and again I would think and do what they 
would want me to do – but I still basically feel that, in the end, they sort of 
thought, “Oh, she seems to know what she’s doing” or something like that. 
So – so there was something kind of personal in it as well. (4) 
They [children] lose [their creative urge] a little bit and I’m wondering if 
what we do at school makes them that way. Because we’re so focused on 
getting them through to get a result to do the curriculum that we have to do, 
to follow the syllabuses, that it allows very little room for them to explore 
other, ah, their interests, explore their creative side. (1) 
I decided to go back and study and become a teacher and for me that was a 
bit like me giving myself the chance to look at that other side or creative side 
or something that allowed me to develop myself … (3) 
4.3.2.3 Category F. Creativity is experienced as ownership 
In this view of creativity, the role of relevance or meaning in learning and growing as a 
person is now seen with clarity and conviction and creativity is endorsed as a process of 
central importance in learning and teaching. The critical discerned variation that informs 
this operational definition of creativity is external control of learning vs. sense-making and 
active control of the creating and learning process. The teacher is focused on the value that 
ownership of learning brings in enhancing learning, building knowledge and experience, 
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promoting self-regulation in learning (over time and across subject areas/projects) and 
development of creative thinking. In other words, creativity is seen as having both internal 
and external value for it is now seen as integral to important socially valuable processes, 
such as learning. The teacher sees a comprehensive set of values and potentials for 
creativity including the development of the person as a learner and a high functioning 
member of the social world. 
There are two main foci within this category: a focus on a) transformative tasks under 
personal control and b) the meaningful expansion of personal capacities and learning. 
Teachers expressing a view of creativity as ownership see these two aspects as 
interconnected. Recognising tasks as transformative is linked to seeing their potential for 
development of the person as a learner. 
It is suggested that this latter focus marks the outer boundary of awareness in the 
present category. Although transformative tasks and meaningful expansion are also 
integral to an experience of creativity as Category G: authenticity and autonomy, there is 
no evidence in the transcripts that all teachers who define and value creativity as ownership 
necessarily experience creativity as authentic creative being. Some teachers seemed to see 
themselves as still journeying towards fulfilment. They value ownership, but seem to be 
searching for some unresolved aspect of self. In these transcripts there is a strong emphasis 
on the value of learning, but not “being”: 
I love learning new things, I always have. That’s probably reflected in how 
many things I like to do for pleasure … but I think it stops for me at a certain 
point. Like I would not say I’ve mastered anything I’ve ever done, you know, 
I always sort of dip my finger in it and then after a while I get bored and 
move onto something new or I figure, “I’m as good as I’ll ever get at this; 
move on”. (13) 
Therefore the external horizon for this category stops short of creative being and it is 
suggested that the outer limit of discriminated value for creativity in this focus is the 
development of high level capacities, such as, self-directed learning, interest and high level 
creative thinking and problem-solving. Nonetheless the combined internal and external 
values the teachers see as arising from processes of ownership are enough for them to 
endorse the value of ownership as an integral aspect of life, learning and teaching. 
F1.Taking ownership: transformative tasks under personal control: The focus of this sub-
category is the transformative potential of task-level processes of ownership. This means 
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the participant is thinking of creativity as a task process under the control of a person, 
which is seen as not only enhancing the quality of experience and outcomes in the task 
process, but as having the potential to lead on to valuable changes in the person’s 
experience and control of learning. Teachers recognise that higher levels of ownership may 
happen as a result of the first. 
When defining creativity as transformative tasks under personal control the participant 
is focused on the immediate value of ownership in improving the quality of thinking, doing 
and learning and improving the outcome in a given task. But this conception differs from 
an earlier conception of creativity as occasional ownership as the participant is 
peripherally aware of additional potentials beyond learning in the immediate task and can 
easily shift focus to talk about them. The following quotation illustrates how the teachers 
see internal value in tasks under the control of the person. The teachers see improvements 
in processing, but also see value in the pleasure or meaning of the process: 
Kids who are engaged, you see it in their faces: they light up; they are 
energetic about things. They are happy when they are doing things, they 
wanna do the hard work. Whereas kids that are disengaged they take the 
easy, you know, they take that that “cop out” road: the “Aw its good 
enough, I know my lines, yeah, that’s good enough.” Whereas kids who are 
really engaged will learn their lines and think, “Well this line needs to mean 
this and if I move to this stage the audience will get more out of this” or “If I 
change the pace here” or something along those lines. (13) 
The teachers also demonstrate that they pay attention to the internal world of the 
process and can describe what they find valuable about the creative process. It is usually 
seen as a process that is under the control of the creator and is internally rewarding. 
Teachers may note changes in their awareness of time or surroundings: 
So it’s really nice to zone out and be able to focus on one sole activity at a 
time. I find that with music, like you’re there and you have to be in the 
moment and that everything else doesn’t matter anymore. (13) 
When all control is lost in the rest of your life and you’re working on 
something that you know you can control, something that you can finish and 
finalise and say “I’ve done this,” it’s a very satisfying feeling as well. (12) 
Because it’s the self-reward, you know, the sense of achievement from 
[internal] reward. (8) 
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F2.Meaningfully expanding capacities as a learner: In the foreground of conceptions in 
this sub-category is a focus on internal control of processes as moving people forward, 
increasing knowledge and capacities as a learner. Here the teacher acknowledges a role for 
ownership in setting people on a course of self-improvement and possibly towards finding 
higher levels of meaning in life. The focus of this sub-category is the change in the person, 
which relies on the transformative process, but goes beyond it to become owner-led 
expansion of learning and thinking capacities and interests. Teachers pointed to different 
ways that they saw this happening in students or in their own approach to learning. 
Owner-led learning, doing and creating could be seen in some students as a transferable 
skill: 
So naturally you get students who come through who can actually transfer 
skills between the subject areas, because when we develop the practical 
knowledge, for example, we’re actually researching, so there’s that, that art-
literacy thing coming through. (8) 
Learners may be seen as developing attitudes such as persistence. They may be seen as 
purposefully expanding knowledge in areas of interest. They may be seen as developing 
confidence in being self-directed as a learner. They may be seen as developing a 
questioning attitude and learning through inquiry and exploration. A related aspect is 
developing an attitude of taking pleasure in setting challenges and attaining them: 
They [creative students] are continuously trying to develop their practical 
knowledge, so that process that I spoke about earlier they then develop from 
their own ideas, as a result, because they keep asking questions … It’s just a 
positive experience if the student is engaged and persists with it. (8) 
I guess in everything that I do I always try to challenge and see if I can do 
something that I haven’t done before but sometimes, some things I guess are 
more personal than others. (13) 
Creativity is one of the things that will, will carry you deeper into that thing 
that you like in the first place. (9) 
I had one student, who—he’s continuing in graphic design, animation now—
he just had this very personal aesthetic and I think at times he’d been told it 
wasn’t art, what he was doing, these little cartoons and animations … Yes 
he’s actually doing animation now and I think he will do very, very well for 
himself, because he had a very unique approach. (12) 
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I think its maybe its related to inquiry learning which I’ve done in primary 
schools where you develop your big context, kids frame their own questions 
and enquiries so they should be asking the questions! You know and then 
communicating and interpreting would be answering that and then 
presenting your ideas would be performing, how do you present your ideas. 
It’s enquiring, that’s all it is. But it also involves you planning for enquiring. 
Yeah. (8) 
Some teachers also saw ownership as helping to build high-level thinking and problem-
solving: 
Well creativity thinking is very strongly linked to high level thought and to 
think creatively you need to take a concept and link in with another concept 
which is totally unrelated to create something new and that’s creative 
thought and it occurs in any subject area. In fact, Albert Einstein was known 
as a day dreamer and that’s how he, he dreamed of the theory of relativity. I 
mean every great scientist was a daydreamer, you know, every 
mathematician has to be a daydreamer because it’s all about strategies and 
strategizing is a process of finding something undefined and defining it. 
Yeah, so: strategising. (8) 
Having to go through a higher order thinking process. Higher order thinking 
is very much to do with art, you know, thinking outside the box, trying to 
figure out a way to solve a problem. So for example, if you’re in science and 
you’re trying to fix or come up with some sort of experiment, or solve a 
problem, you have to think creatively to do that. (12) 
4.3.2.4 Category G. Creativity is experienced as authenticity and autonomy 
In the foreground of an experience of creativity as authenticity and autonomy is a focus on 
living and going about life as a creative being. This incorporates awareness of the capacity-
building aspects and values of ownership, but expands to include a sense of having 
meaningful direction in life, of valuing what one does in life and autonomously operating 
from primarily internal values rather than primarily external values. The category is thus 
delimited by the expansion of the object of reflection – a focus on the operation and 
actualisation of the self. A sense of contributing positively to the world via one’s creative 
activities and capacities also comes into this focus. 
The category has been divided into two sub-categories. In the first the focus is on “self” 
– what it means to participants to be and live as a creative person. This is described as an 
experience of creativity as G1.Creative being. In the second, the focus is on the 
contributions of creative self to the human collective. This focus links internal 
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transformation with external transformation and expresses how participants see creative 
transformation as bringing value to the world. This experience is described as 
G2.Contributing to holistic transformations of the collective. These sub-categories are 
explained in more detail below and illustrated with examples from the transcripts. 
G1.Creative self/being: Some teachers expressed a meaning of creativity as being a 
creative person or being. In this view, creativity is felt as a way of going meaningfully 
about life and engaging with the world. A metaphor for the way teachers see creativity in 
this view is “a tree”: every part of the tree is seen as creative including the seed from which 
the tree grows (meaning, relevance in ownership). Teachers may see the conditions needed 
for growing the tree as creative (environment, nurturing), the growth process as creative 
(transformation, learning), the branches and fruit as creative (products), what else the tree 
provides to the world as creative (expertise, values, thoughtfulness) and their own role in 
tending the tree as creative (teaching, mentoring, giving, supporting). Even though teachers 
transfer attention from one part of the tree to another, essentially these are all aspects of the 
same view of creativity. The seed of the tree in this view is usually authentic interest, but 
may, it seems, include other types of experienced meaning. Teachers with this view see 
authentic interest/meaning as a seed or embryo with the potential to develop and transform 
the person by triggering deep learning, interest and a sense of self. Through his/her creative 
activities and interactions with others the person may feel connected to the social world. 
There are a number of aspects to the experience, which come together to create a sense 
of being a creative person. Not all of these are necessarily articulated by any one 
participant. Integral to the experience is a sense of meaning and direction in life, which for 
some participants, revolved around a particular area of interest or passion: 
If you didn’t love what you were doing you wouldn’t be creative in that field. 
(12) 
In most cases experience in the area of interest had developed over a long period of time 
and contributed to a sense of competence in that area: 
From early on I would just do creative things, whether it be scribbling, or 
cutting things out, or watching other people do crafty things. Learning. 
Everything. I don’t remember a time when I haven’t been creative. (12) 
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I discovered composition in grade one basically … I’ve written hundreds of 
songs, six musicals, a “Top 40” hit … ah … and I’m still writing, still 
composing right now. (5) 
So that comes down then to a wealth of experience over the years … having, 
you know, played a lot. Ah, and another thing also is having played a lot of 
instruments … (5) 
So, Dad gave me all the bits of wood and a hammer and nails and got me to 
make a pineapple case and it was all, you know, the ends hung out, the 
square was all raggedy … and he put it up on the wall, nailed it onto the 
wall of the packing shed at the pineapple farm. And I remember that, I would 
have been five – before I went to school. (9) 
However, for one participant, a sense of meaning in life seems to have occurred 
spontaneously in a religious conversion experience, after which he re-evaluated and re-
modelled his life with a focus on creative or constructive interrelations with the world and 
society: 
I would have ended up in prison, not – not as a teacher. Just the sort of 
things I was up to, living on the street, so, so, I guess to change that 
direction and have an encounter with God, it’s real, tangible and it’s not 
religious. It’s just lifestyle … I made a decision to, to follow that, I guess and 
that’s changed my life, turned it around completely … (7) 
This particular participant went on from that experience to develop an area of expertise and 
become an energetic teacher with a particularly strong interest in “giving” to others and 
enabling what he sees as creativity. 
His account suggests that there may be different pathways to the establishment of an 
experience of creativity as creative being. The common element between P7’s example and 
the experience of the other teachers expressing this view is nonetheless a sense of meaning 
and meaningful direction in life through the activities the participant sees as creative. 
It gives me probably more than anything, it gives me direction in life because 
it’s – life has meaning. (7) 
Common to each experience of creative being is not only a sense of meaning in life but 
also a sense that this meaning is linked to “who” the participant is as a person: 
Well, it’s who I am. (7) 
It’s like living and breathing and all that kind of thing. (5) 
 193
Another aspect of creative being, articulated by participants, is a common attitude of 
seeking meaning. Although participants had one or two main areas of interest and were 
skilled in those areas, all of these teachers expressed an interest in experiencing meaning or 
interest in almost everything they did. The teachers appeared to enjoy problem-solving and 
seemed adept at making dull tasks interesting. They saw this as part of their creative 
approach to life: 
You know, things that I do, I, I like to do in a creative sort of way. You know, 
even if it’s just cooking a meal, or making something. (9) 
Whatever I’m doing, there’s a way to turn it into creative. (5) 
Some teachers indicated that the meaningfulness of creating and problem-solving 
derives from the process itself, from a sense of pleasure, joy or interest experienced in the 
process. The teachers described the source of pleasure in terms suggesting that they often 
experience flow-like depth in creative processes. One teacher described this as being in 
“the zone”. But teachers also demonstrated sensitivity to an inner world of “quasi-sensory” 
cues, such as feelings of direction and feelings of knowing when a solution to something is 
right: 
When I woke up I had no idea in my head about any of that. It just evolved as 
the day … that, that was amazing … The quality of the work, that was 
produced, um, the ideas that came out – ideas I’d never would’ve even … If 
you asked me to sketch out the ideas for a really, really, good percussion 
suite movement I would never even have touched those things …  
… At the end I was saying “Did I do that? My God!” Yeah, at the end of the 
day I was just “Ho, ho, ho, ho!” (As if floating on air.) “Touch me, touch 
me, I’m hot!” You know. (5) 
No you can’t describe it because, it, I think we said that earlier on – where 
the brain decides and all the pieces are in the right spot and the Rubik’s 
cube is … done. (5) 
It’s, it takes all of your brainpower. Yeah, because you, you are being 
challenged, you’re slightly close to the edge, you know, and then – but there 
are sort of, sort of, hand holds on the way through it, you know. You, you 
discover something, you, “Right, okay, got that!” You know, like the 
counselling experience was very much like this. You don’t know what the 
hell’s going on, but you (unclear) then, “Right, got that!” Then you move on 
to the next bit. (9) 
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Some teachers indicated that because of the internal rewards experienced in creative 
processes they were able to place less emphasis on external rewards or external 
affirmation. The teachers also did not see it as necessary to have their work validated by 
others in order to see themselves as creative. The sense of value in being a creative person 
is internal rather than contingent on external evaluation: 
There are, there are things that I’ve written that, ah, no one’s probably 
heard and it doesn’t matter because it’s the instant, the actual moment that 
it’s made, is where the biggest buzz is … There’s one particular song, which 
is not the best thing I ever wrote, but it was a “Top 40” hit, right? And I 
enjoyed the buzz of writing it much more than saying “Oh, I’ve got a “Top 
40” hit!” (5) 
I’ve done other artwork, you know, portraits of people, and skill-wise they’ve 
been much better than that little artist book that I made. The little artist book 
I made was probably the most creative [to me] because it wasn’t really what 
was expected, or … it wasn’t really for anyone, it was just for me and I 
wouldn’t really show it to anyone either (laughs). (12) 
A further commonality across this category is a view of creativity as taking a thoughtful 
approach to life and the norms of society. Therefore the sense of creative being, for the 
teachers in the study, not only comprises a sense of meaning in life through doing 
meaningful things, it also encompasses the sense of being evaluative in one’s way of 
seeing the world. Teachers endorse a stance of being open to possibility and questioning 
things that are sometimes taken for granted. The teachers could feel quite strongly about 
this and could be wary, or even scornful, of what they saw as closed-mindedness, 
adherence to social constructs and the following of rules and procedures. It is interesting 
that much of this expressed concern is related to what the teachers see as impediments to 
“creativity”, particularly for students. Where closed-mindedness was seen as inhibiting 
creativity, the teachers were often emotional in their comments: 
For every research scientist you’ll find a pedestrian plodder teaching 
algebra in grade 11. That’s as far as their brain can go. (5) 
Well you got people writing textbooks from the point of view of “they know 
theory”. Right? But they don’t necessarily know kids. (5) 
There was that period in the, you know, the forties, fifties, I don’t know how 
old, I don’t know what age bracket that was, but it could be later than that, 
the sixties, sixties and seventies, but, you know, there was that whole 
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stigmatism that anything to do with artistic stuff, they just wouldn’t … people 
were hippies or, you know … so I think there’s a stigmatism there with a 
certain age bracket. (7) 
Schools haven’t been around that long, for a couple of hundred years – well 
not even that, we’ve had a school system and so they’ve had to categorise all 
these different disciplines, and they’ve just chucked, somehow, all the 
creativeness has been chucked into this small area. Whereas, you know, if 
you think of creativity in a more open way, it spans across all the disciplines, 
really. (12) 
In their support of creativity, teachers seem to be drawing on their own history of 
transformation, seeing the growth of learning, the development of more complex ways of 
seeing and evaluating social norms and the establishment of meaning in life from a 
perspective of personal experience. Participants expressing this view valued creativity, 
whether conceptualised as ownership or creative being and sought to enable it in others. 
The teachers saw themselves as different from people who do not share this value. In 
particular, they saw themselves as being in a minority of teachers taking a “creative” 
approach to teaching, as compared to more method oriented teachers, who were perceived 
as less flexible or less engaged in teaching: 
Because most manual arts blokes are lock-step type guys, you know. They 
teach kids skills, you know: “This is how you do it, boys”. And, I am a bit of 
a rarity, because I’m – and that’s the creativity. That’s the difference 
between me and most other manual arts teachers. (9) 
Not all teachers [value creativity], no, no. Some really get it and they work 
very hard. When you think about those teachers, these teachers are very 
engaged themselves in the process and they work on it. Yeah. (6) 
4.3.2.5 G2.Contributing to holistic transformations of the collective 
In this view the value of authentic development and being a creative person is related to 
positive contributions, which creative people are seen as making to the collective. These 
contributions may be rationalised in terms of both internal and external value. That is, the 
change that takes place in the person on their journey to creative being is seen as part of the 
external value of creativity. Some of the contributions teachers saw creative people making 
to the collective included innovation, the capacity to think outside norms, building 
expertise and being able to share it with others, mentoring, inspiring a new generation of 
creators and communicating with others. 
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Teachers saw creative people as valuable in society for their capacity to not be limited 
by norms and therefore to think independently and innovatively: 
So I think there is value in people thinking differently to other people, 
because without free thinkers and creative thinkers we wouldn’t have a lot of 
things we take for granted now. (12) 
Where would the world be without the creative people to move it forward? 
(5) 
But a more holistic view was also expressed in which creative contribution is seen more 
from a perspective of giving and sharing what one has developed over time and being a 
contributing, interactive or communicative member of the collective. For P5 this is a 
“ripple effect” which adds value to a creative person’s sense of meaning and purpose, 
whilst it adds value to the collective: 
It’s very rare that a person does all the creating and doesn’t share it with 
someone. So I come back to what I said before, I have certainly influenced 
the way an awful lot of teachers teach. I have influenced the way an awful lot 
of students view teachers. I’ve influenced the way a certain number of 
students who are now teachers teach, because they say “Oh! I want a 
classroom like Foley’s.” You know and I’ve had this conversation with past 
students who are teachers and that was all creative. Ah, I’ve influenced I 
don’t know how many people to take up a career in music, ah, because I’ve 
physically taught them an instrument. I’ve taught them the mechanics of 
making music – and on it goes, on it goes, on it goes. So, that’s the good 
thing about being a teacher, isn’t it? So, my little contribution to the wave 
front of humanity moving forward may not be as big as Einstein’s, but I’ve 
helped a fair number of people who’ve done something and then those 
people have then … it’s a ripple effect. (5) 
4.3.3 Division of Category B into B “X” and B “N” versions 
Within the data two variants on the foregoing description of the Category B. Pro-social 
category were discerned. The variation concerns the inference of qualitatively different 
processes in the background of innovations and exceptionality. Participants sometimes, as 
illustrated in the quotation from P6 below, infer autonomous processes in the background 
of the perceived innovation and are thus, when evaluating the “creativity” of products, 
bringing into focus the perceived personal and/or social benefits of authentic and 
autonomous processes. 
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And, and then I got lost at one point in what seemed to be the darkness of the 
images … I guess, this is about this generation, that group of people, 
creating like, with real issues for them. Some of which are pretty dark, I 
guess. Yeah? … So when I think about creativity, there’s a lot to think in 
there. There’s content, about the themes – and maybe an expression of what 
people are dealing with. There is the music that made me feel happy, it made 
me feel happy watching this guy dance. I was in awe at the make-up and the 
colours and the technology. So it’s kind of, you look at it and you think, 
“Ooh, that’s a beautiful thing”. (6) 
Some of the teachers seem also to be seeing exceptional autonomy as a form of 
exceptionality in its own right. 
There’s one student who’s incredibly creative. I think she’s just constantly 
seeking new ways to interpret ideas, and I don’t think it really matters that 
my subject is a creative subject; I think she approaches all of her subjects in 
that way. You know trying to really think of how to do things in a different 
way to everybody else, or a unique way, or, in my subject – I mean she’s 
very good with materials and techniques and all that sort of thing, skills – 
but then when it comes to playing around with a concept and ideas she really 
does think outside the box, she really does think beyond the expected and she 
really analyses what people have done in the past and how she may do it 
differently. (12) 
Therefore two variants on the conception of creativity as pro-social can be 
distinguished. These are designated as a B “X” version in which the inferred process 
behind innovation, or exceptionality, does not include awareness of benefit in autonomous 
processes and does not posit a role for autonomy in personal development. This contrasts 
with a B “N” version where innovation is seen as including autonomous processes at least 
some of the time. The descriptors “X” and “N” refer to distinctions between a more 
external rule or value focused view of creativity (view “X”) and a more internal rule or 
value view of creativity (view “N”). These views are further clarified in the discussion of 
the dimensions of variation that follows. As expressed in the quote of P6 above, the 
perception that an authentic/autonomous process has occurred may contribute to the 
overall appreciation of the product from an “N” perspective. The division of Category B 
into these two variants was not explicated earlier because seeing the difference between the 
two relies on familiarity with the descriptions of categories F and G. 
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Table 4‐1 Overview of categories of description for Queensland teachers’ conceptions of 
creativity 
Category 
Referential aspect Structural aspect 
Creativity is 
experienced as: Sub-conceptions: Internal horizon 
Ex
te
rn
al
ly
 fo
cu
se
d 
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
 
A Domain specific A1. Property of the arts A2. Domain hierarchies 
 
Socially defined differences between 
domains 
B “X” 
B “N” Pro-social 
B1. Cultural innovation 
B2. Perceived innovation 
B3. Exceptionality 
B3a).A life-goal 
Pro-social “X”: 
Products/performance reflecting 
valuable novel contribution 
(excludes “autonomy” as a process 
possibility) 
Pro-social “N”: 
Products/performance reflecting 
valuable novel contribution 
(includes autonomy as a possible valued 
aspect of the creative process) 
C Pro-individual 
C1. Unconventional 
products 
C2. Individualism 
Products/performance reflecting 
novelty that is not socially and/or 
personally valued 
In
te
rn
al
ly
 fo
cu
se
d 
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
 
D Instrumental process 
D1. Functional processes 
D1a) Responding 
D1b) Improvising for a 
practical purpose 
D1c) Functional spontaneity 
D2.Instrumental gain of 
extrinsic reward 
Functional: 
Externally pressured problem 
situations 
(no intrinsic reward) 
Instrumental: 
Situations involving internal pressure 
towards extrinsic goals 
(no intrinsic reward) 
 
E Personal process 
E1. Recreational 
E2. Activities with meaning 
E3. Occasional ownership 
Non-pressured activity situations 
(some intrinsic reward) 
F Ownership F1. Taking ownership F2. Expanding capacities 
Learning and development 
(autonomous motivation; broad focus 
on personal and social value of 
creativity ) 
G Authenticity and autonomy 
G1. Creative Being 
G2. Contributing to holistic 
transformation of the 
collective 
 
Self/being 
(autonomous motivation; broader 
focus on personal and social value of 
creativity) 
 
 
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the categories of description for the teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity. This table shows key aspects of the variation between the 
categories of description, as differences in what is present to awareness in the internal 
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horizon of the different ways of experiencing creativity. Categories A to C differ 
principally on the basis of what type of external object is in focus – domains or novelty in 
performance or products – and the degree to which these objects are seen as beneficial to 
society. Categories D to E differ in the qualities of the focused process and the degree to 
which the processes are seen as personally and socially valuable. Categories F and G 
reflect greater awareness of internal aspects of creative (autonomous) processes and greater 
awareness of the personal and social value of those processes. Participants expressing 
views of creativity as ownership or as autonomy and authenticity, tended to emphasise and 
value creativity as autonomy in processes or in self-regulation and were also aware of other 
meanings of creativity and other more externally oriented ways of regulating. 
This table does not depict the boundary of awareness between those conceptions 
constituted through a more external rule lens and those constituted through a more internal 
rule lens, nor does it depict the relationship of inclusiveness implicated by the “N” 
participants’ inclusive awareness of the key dimension of variation – which is described 
here as an evaluation of which location for rules/values/rewards is most reliable – external 
or internal. Awareness of this key dimension of variation involves the awareness that 
rewards can be both internal and external and in selecting internal reward as a preferred 
basis for the generation of rules and values, the participants demonstrate expanded 
awareness of the social value of an internal value focus. These relationships are shown 
diagrammatically in Table 4-3, which depicts the Outcome Space for the study. 
4.4 SECTION THREE: THE DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION 
This study has revealed that the lived creativity conceptions/definitions expressed by the 
study participants are complex evaluations involving a focal (internal world or external 
world) object and theories of what causes and is socially valuable in behaviour or things. 
These evaluations, which, from the participants’ points of view constitute definitions of 
creativity, exhibit variation along a number of dimensions. These dimensions allow the 
identification of key areas of difference between the categories of description and the 
identification of variants within the categories. In the present section the dimensions of 
variation are outlined. The relation of the dimensions to the categories of description is 
shown in Table 4-2. Following on from this is the presentation of a rationale for seeing the 
principal structural relationship across the categories of description as reflecting a 
hierarchy of inclusive awareness. Finally the study outcome is presented diagrammatically, 
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in Section 4.4, as an Outcome Space depicting this structural relationship as one of 
inclusive awareness. 
4.4.1 The dimensions 
The dimensions of variation identified as delimiting the variation between different 
categories of description in this study have been shown diagrammatically in Table 4-2. In 
addition to the external world-internal world foci, there are six dimensions of variation. 
Two of these (DOV1 and DOV2) delimit aspects of what the person is observing. The 
remaining four are more evaluative aspects (E-DOV1, E-DOV2, E-DOV3 and E-DOV4) 
of the participant’s experience when experiencing and defining creativity. The six 
dimensions are described below: 
DOV1. A central object of reflection. This is about what the person is looking at or 
drawing into awareness and reflecting upon. It may delimit the parameters or extent of the 
context within which the creative object/objects is/are perceived to occur. 
DOV2. A discerned variation element. This is the aspect that draws attention and sets 
the creative object apart as “creative”. The notion of creativity seemed to draw 
participants’ attention to particular kinds of “non-static vs. static” variation – that is, 
things/process elements that are novel, different or non-repeating as opposed to things that 
are familiar, common or repetitive. 
These two aspects interrelate with four main evaluative dimensions: 
E-DOV1. An evaluation of where reliable rules/values/rewards are located – externally 
or internally. 
E-DOV2. A perception of what kinds of rewards or causes drive/sustain a given 
creative process. This dimension is closely linked in to the position taken regarding 
dimension of variation one (E-DOV1) as it involves a sense of the feeling elements of the 
process and a perception of what is conceivable in terms of what drives or sustains 
behaviour. If internal rewards and values are not perceived as reliable, then behaviour is 
perceived as driven by some form of external pressure or extrinsic gain. 
E-DOV3. An assessment of the functionality/appropriateness of the “creative” object. 
There is a strong element of evaluating the functionality of the “object” within its context, 
whether the object is a process undertaken by the self or something done or produced by 
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someone else. Participants seem to reflect on whether the thought processes behind the 
process were/are functional or not. 
E-DOV4. An assessment of the benefit to society that derives from the whole object – 
that is, the social value of the process and what it delivers. This is a much more global 
assessment of the object under reflection, which positions and evaluates it in relation to its 
broader social value. 
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Table 4‐2: Dimensions of variation for Queensland teachers’ conceptions of creativity 
Creativity conception 
 
Central object of 
reflection 
Discerned variation: 
 
(What makes the 
creative object 
“creative”?) 
Evaluation dimension 
1: 
(Where are 
rewards/values located 
in the world?) 
 
Evaluation dimension 
2: 
What causes of 
behaviour drive the 
creative process? 
A-C (object>process) 
D-G (process>result) 
Evaluation 
dimension 3: 
Evaluated 
functionality or 
appropriateness of 
creative object: 
A-C (object>process) 
D-G (process>result) 
Evaluation 
dimension 4: 
Rationalisation of the 
social benefit of the 
object of reflection 
View 
X 
View 
N 
Externally focused conceptions   
A. Domain specific Domain divisions 
Domain hierarchies 
 
Practical-production vs. 
aesthetic-production 
 
 
X) External (control) X) Various excluding 
autonomous 
X1) Non-functional 
X2) Functional 
 
X1) Not socially 
beneficial 
X2) Socially beneficial 
V
iew
 X
 is inform
ed by the “X
” versions of definitions A
-E 
“X
” definitions A
-E are ideologically rejected or m
oderated  
B1. Pro-social “X” 
B2. Pro-social “N” 
Products/performance Norms vs. novelty X) External (control) 
N) Internal (autonomy) 
X) Various excluding 
autonomous 
N) Various including 
autonomous 
Functional/appropriate X, N) Socially 
beneficial 
C. Pro-individual Products/performance Norms vs. novelty X) External (control) X) Various excluding 
autonomous 
X1) Non-functional 
X2) Functional 
 
X1, X2) Not socially 
beneficial 
Internally focused conceptions 
D1. Instrumental 
process 
 
Pressured problem 
situations and goals 
Auto-pilot vs. operating 
outside auto-pilot 
X) External (control) 
N) Internal (autonomy) 
 
 X1) External pressure 
X2) Internal pressure to 
gain extrinsic reward 
N) External pressure 
 
Functional X, N) Socially 
neutral>beneficial 
 
E. Personal process Non-pressured 
activity situations 
Boredom/routine vs. 
relaxation, interest, 
change of activity, 
choice 
 
X) External (control) X) Intrinsic (situated) Functional/appropriate X) Personally but not 
especially socially 
beneficial 
F. Ownership process Learning and 
development 
Surface learning/ext. 
control vs. sense-
making/autonomy 
 
N) Internal (autonomy) 
 
N) Autonomous Functional 
 
N) Socially beneficial  
Ideologically 
accepted 
G. Authenticity and 
autonomy 
 
Being/self Meaninglessness/ext. 
control vs. 
meaning/autonomy 
N) Internal (autonomy) N) Autonomous Functional N) Socially beneficial  
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4.4.2 A hierarchy of creativity conceptions 
An important aspect of the results of this study is that the conceptions of creativity can be 
ordered according to a hierarchy of inclusiveness. Åkerlind (2003, p. 378) observes that 
“the hierarchy of inclusiveness that phenomenographic analysis searches for is one of 
increasing breadth of awareness of different aspects of the phenomenon being 
investigated.” Åkerlind argues also that, in phenomenographic studies, empirical 
confirmation of hierarchic relationships comes from being able to show that at least some 
transcripts, from a given study, show evidence of awareness of relationships expressed in 
categories lower in the hierarchy, but not vice versa: 
From a phenomenographic perspective, conceptions of teaching may be 
categorised according to the awareness shown of key aspects or dimensions 
of teaching, where awareness of an aspect is indicated by the perception of 
the potential for variation in that aspect (Marton & Booth, 1997). From this 
perspective, awareness of the quantitative–qualitative dimension in learning, 
for example, would be indicated by an awareness that learning may be both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature, even if the value of one type of 
learning (such as the quantitative accumulation of information) is negated by 
the teacher. Lack of awareness of this dimension of teaching and learning 
would be indicated by a taken-for-granted assumption that learning is all of 
the same nature. From this more limited view of learning, another type of 
learning cannot be rejected at an ideological level, because the understanding 
of learning does not include awareness of that as a possibility (Åkerlind, 
2003, p.377). 
In the present study some of the teachers demonstrate that they perceive the potential 
for variation in human regulation – that is, awareness of the potential for behaviour to be 
oriented towards external rules/rewards/values and/or towards internal 
rules/rewards/values, whereas some teachers do not demonstrate that they perceive this 
potential for variation. Ryan and Deci (2000a) have observed similarly that the meaning of 
“autonomy” is often misinterpreted by scholars and researchers who are seeing autonomy 
as “individualism,” “independence” or “free will”. They argue that to grasp the meaning of 
autonomy, as posited and researched within SDT, it is necessary to think outside “the box” 
of “ideas that fit well within a controlled, contingent reward-based social context” (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000a, p.323). They argue that despite the wealth of research demonstrating the 
existence and value of autonomous functioning, many researchers continue to wrestle with 
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the meaning of autonomy. This kind of discussion within the motivation research literature 
suggests that autonomy is a challenging concept, even for psychologists. 
The analysis has resulted in the finding that the Queensland teachers who participated in 
the study expressed conceptions of creativity, which can be ordered as a hierarchy on the 
basis that transcripts in which a focus on the value of internal rules and rewards is 
demonstrated also reflect awareness that behaviour can be regulated with a focus on 
external rules and rewards. Creativity conceptions evidencing awareness of greater breadth 
of personal and social benefit, deriving from autonomous experience, have been identified 
as reflecting inclusive awareness of externally controlled regulation in behaviour. A person 
must be able to focus simultaneously on the perceived benefits of both forms of regulation 
in order to evaluate one as more beneficial than the other. However, in order to grasp the 
meaning of autonomy as something other than individualism (i.e. failure to be regulated by 
the external rules of a context – a distinctly control oriented conception of creativity) a 
person would need to see greater value in intrinsic motivation, ownership and sense-
making, than in following norms and rules. The logical consequence of seeing that, 
however, is that in order to see this value, the person would have to be regulating 
autonomously. 
I have chosen the term “autonomy” as a suitable referent for the most comprehensive of 
the categories of description. Autonomy has been a central construct defined and 
researched within Self-determination theory (SDT) (Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000c). As 
noted in the literature review the word autonomy can be used to reflect different meanings. 
The meaning I wish to convey approximates to the one expressed within the SDT 
paradigm. Autonomy, as it is used in the present research findings to convey the referential 
component of a category of description, should be understood as self-directedness in 
learning, development or being, which is perceived by participants to have personal and 
social value. 
Language fails, in some ways, to provide adequate linguistic delimiters for autonomous 
processes, because the meaning of autonomy to which SDT researchers and the present 
study findings refer will tend to fall outside some people’s intuitive experience of what is 
conceivable in human behaviour. Research within SDT and the present study, suggests 
that, for some people, external control in regulation represents the full extent of human 
regulation possibilities. However, from the point of view of teachers expressing views of 
creativity as either ownership or autonomy, control by external contingencies represents 
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only part of the spectrum of regulation possibilities, because, in their lives they utilise an 
additional source of values, which is internal reward from authentic, autonomous 
experience. 
To some extent, autonomous individuals cannot avoid expressing some sort of rejection 
of the values of the social world when viewed from a purely controlled perspective, 
because that world assumes that all worthwhile forms of regulation arise from 
internalisation of rules and procedures outside the person and that autonomy does not exist. 
If a computer was programmed to model human interactions in a world governed only by 
controlled processes, that world would reflect some values which could not be endorsed 
from the perspective of an autonomy orientation. A case in point, as reflected in the data 
for the present study, is the refusal, by some of the more autonomy oriented teachers, to 
accept that learning is best achieved through “lock-step” methods. To them such methods 
achieve, at best, impoverished learning experiences, and at worst, prevent or even 
discourage learning: 
I just, I can’t do it [teach in a lock-step way]. You know, when I say I can’t 
do it, it’s because I won’t do it. I refuse to do it. I just, don’t know what it is. 
Thought about this a lot, but I’m just, it’s, I’m just not prepared to be like 
that … (10). 
I didn’t like the way that, er, music was introduced to kids in high school. It 
was: “Well you got crotchets and quavers and then you learn this and then 
you learn that and then you study binary performance A-B and let’s listen to 
a piece of music that’s A-B and it’s only written 400 years ago. Tell me, put 
your hand up when it gets to the B sections. Let’s do an analysis of 
Beethoven’s ninth symphony” … and they were so tedious! I thought there’s 
gotta be a better way of doing things … I started experimenting with ideas 
and this idea came to me: “Well why can’t the kids learn music through 
composition and they can actually walk into the classroom and compose?” 
(5) 
But as Åkerlind (2003) implies the question is not so much whether one type of teaching is 
inherently better than another type of teaching, but are there grounds for understanding one 
way of seeing teaching/learning as inclusive of another way of seeing teaching/learning? If 
this can be established, Åkerlind argues, it opens up the understanding that for those 
teachers there exists the option of being able to ideologically reject or negate views lower 
in the hierarchy. The empirical demonstration of inclusiveness is established when some 
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transcripts, in a given study, show evidence of inclusiveness of structures for conceptions 
lower in the hierarchy (Åkerlind, 2003). 
In the present study, establishing this would require that at least some transcripts, 
identified as illustrative of conceptions of creativity as autonomy and authenticity, 
evidence awareness of the potential for variation in a key dimension across the conceptions 
of creativity. It has already been suggested that implicit in the conception of creativity as 
either ownership or autonomy is the identification of two ways of orienting to the world. In 
order to “shift” students from a controlled orientation to learning to an autonomous 
approach to learning, the teacher needs to recognise the relative value of both approaches. 
But in addition to this, a number of the more autonomy oriented teachers do refer explicitly 
to the structure of more externally controlled views, treating them, much as Ryan and Deci 
(2000a) do above, as views which they reject on the basis that these imply a restricted view 
of human regulation – and by implication beyond that, a limited view of the dynamics of 
social cohesion. 
For example, P5 and P9 show that they are aware that, in the world, some people 
operate in a “lock-step” way, which they view as “not-creative”, and others have a more 
autonomous regulatory approach, which they endorse, and identify as “creative”: 
A lot of people have that, or some people, manual arts teachers, have that 
sort of lock-step approach to life, in general, you know. They’re very 
prescriptive, and they do things, you know, in a cut-and-dried, step-by-step 
sort of way. But, and then, other people like me, who are much looser … 
well, it’s a bit, it’s creative, I suppose. That’s what it is. (9) 
I sort of worked this out years ago: the creative people in schools, you’ll 
find, by and large as a rule of thumb – you’ll find, you got the music, the 
performing arts, you’ve got the arts lot on one side and then you’ve got the 
maths/science on the other. Arts is where you find the creativity. Maths, 
science, it’s where you find the, ah, liking structure, formulas, rules, all that 
kind of thing … And as a rule of thumb that works pretty well. I’ve been in 
schools long enough to see that. (5) 
Note that P5 is not comparing domains, but regulatory styles. It could be objected that 
since some of the more control-oriented participants describe themselves as “not-creative”, 
they might be aware of differences between control and autonomy and simply choose not 
to be autonomous, because they do not endorse autonomy: 
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Creative? I’m huh, by nature, I’m not a creative person. I like … I like 
predictability … I’d like to stay within a lot of norms society sets I think. (1) 
It appears, when read in the context of the whole transcripts, that expressions of this type 
do not reflect comparisons with autonomy, but are indications that the participant is aware 
of no socially acceptable regulatory options beyond external control. There are several 
indicators of this: View “X” (external rule oriented) transcripts reflected more procedure-
oriented and transmission-focused approaches to teaching; a view of interest and relevance 
as only peripherally related to learning; reflected infrequent engagement in intrinsically 
motivated activities; and associated creativity with the arts and professions outside 
teaching. All of these suggest that expressing view “X” is indicative of not seeing the 
intrinsic value of authentic/autonomous processes or not seeing intrinsic value very clearly. 
Having proposed that view “N” transcripts reflect awareness of controlled regulation, 
but that view “X” transcripts do not evidence awareness of autonomous regulation, more 
convincing empirical confirmation of a hierarchic relationship of inclusivity, occurs where 
“N” transcripts show evidence of awareness of differences in the structural aspects of 
control and autonomy, such as awareness that actions may be performed for either external 
or internal reward. In the following quotation P5 shows that he is aware that people 
commonly perform acts to achieve external rewards, but that the more satisfying 
alternative is where the act is performed for the internal reward: 
There are things that I’ve written that, ah, no one’s probably heard and it 
doesn’t matter because it’s the instant, the actual moment that it’s made is 
where the biggest buzz is … There’s one particular song, which is not the 
best thing I ever wrote, but it was a top 40 hit, right? And I enjoyed the buzz 
of writing it much more than saying “Oh, I’ve got a top 40 hit!” Now that 
wasn’t as big a thrill as the actual writing. (5) 
This contrasts with an “X” view, where the reward is seen to lie in external “affirmation” 
and there is seemingly no awareness of internal reward in the creative process: 
If you’re doing something that’s quite new, people … ah …  can be drawn to 
that and of course if they’re drawn to that newness they’re also drawn to 
you, I would suspect, and that has a sort of an affirming nature in the sense 
that, well, like any theatrical event, you know, there’s sorta that applause 
part, it’s really the affirming part of the whole process. Um … and if you do 
something really different that just seems to elevate that affirmation. (2) 
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SDT places autonomy and authenticity at the pinnacle of the human developmental 
trajectory. It is considered that when people feel fully autonomous, it is because they have 
successfully learned to regulate in such a way that all three psychological needs for 
competence, relatedness and autonomy are satisfied. Various phenomenological and 
externally observable indicators of wellness result (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 
2000a). So too have phenomenographic researchers tended to identify deep approaches to 
learning and student-focused views of teaching as more comprehensive than surface 
approaches to learning and teacher-focused views of teaching ( Åkerlind, 2003; Van 
Rossum & Hamer, 2010). Åkerlind (2003) points out that, nonetheless, there has been 
some debate about whether views of teaching and learning should be seen as inclusive or 
bi-polar. In the present study it has been determined that the appropriate framing of the 
relationship between internal rule and external rule ways of experiencing creativity is a 
hierarchy of inclusiveness. The conceptions of creativity as ownership (Category F): and as 
autonomy and authenticity (Category: G) are perceived through an internal value lens 
which sees greater value and benefit deriving from a focus on internal rewards than 
external rewards. 
4.5 SECTION FOUR: THE OUTCOME SPACE 
On the basis of the deliberations outlined in the foregoing discussions of the dimensions of 
variation and the grounds for interpreting the data as reflecting an inclusive hierarchy of 
categories of description, an outcome space has been constructed, which depicts the 
categories of description as constituting an inclusive hierarchy. This outcome space 
constitutes the outcome of the research. 
  
   209
Table 4‐3: Outcome Space for the Phenomenon of Queensland Teachers’ Conceptions of 
Creativity 
 Internally focused conceptions Externally focused conceptions 
Ex
te
rn
al
 h
or
iz
on
 
E
xt
er
na
l r
ul
es
, v
al
ue
s, 
re
w
ar
ds
  
X1. Instrumental 
 Functional responding to 
pressure 
 Instrumental attainment of 
an extrinsic reward 
 
X2. Personal 
 Recreational activities 
 Activities with meaning 
 Occasional ownership 
 
 
 
X3. Domain specific (arts) 
 
X4. Pro-individual 
 
X5. Pro-social “X” 
(excludes autonomy as a process 
possibility) 
In
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rn
al
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es
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s, 
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w
ar
ds
 
(I
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w
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s o
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w
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fo
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s o
n 
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s, 
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lu
es
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w
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ds
)   
N1. Ownership of learning 
 Taking ownership 
 Expanding capacities 
 
 
N2. Authenticity and autonomy 
 Creative being 
 Contributing to the 
collective 
 
 
 
 
 
N3. Pro-social “N” 
(includes autonomy as a process 
possibility in innovation and in the 
development of exceptional talent or 
unique qualities) 
 
The more expansive external horizon for view “N” is depicted as encompassing 
awareness of value in internal rewards. This forms a lens on the world in which external 
rules/values/rewards are evaluated with simultaneous reflection on the experienced value 
of internal reward. When constituted through this lens, conceptions of creativity 
incorporate increased breadth of awareness of the personal and social benefits of authentic 
processes of learning, development and being. A logical implication of experiencing 
creativity as ownership (Category F) or authenticity and autonomy (Category G) is that 
from this perspective the experienced pro-social value of “innovation” and/or 
“exceptional” performance would, at least some of the time, involve sensitivity to the 
presence of authentic/autonomous processes in the emergence of the product or 
performance. 
The outcome space therefore reflects these aspects of variation between “X” and “N” 
versions of the externally focused experiences of creativity: 
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The “X” experience of creativity as a pro-social external world object (Sub-category B 
“X”) focuses on “extrinsic” values and process qualities, such as knowledge, skill and 
persistence, but excludes awareness of autonomy. 
The “N” experience of creativity as a pro-social external world object (Sub-category B 
“N”) includes awareness of “extrinsic” values, but also includes awareness of autonomy as 
a process possibility in innovation and in the development of exceptional talent or unique 
qualities. 
The outcome space depicts that expressing an “N” (internal rule) view, includes 
awareness of view “X” (external rule) ways of regulating in the world and would therefore 
include awareness of most “X” operational understandings of creativity, even if those 
understandings are compared and contrasted negatively with the value of view “N” 
operational understandings. Expressing view “N” operational definitions of creativity 
implicates awareness of view “X” operational definitions, because doing so involves 
reflection on – and rejection of the value of – other comparable kinds of experience. As 
discussed earlier, if it is an accurate interpretation that autonomy (regulation with reference 
to internal rewards) is a complex evaluation that regulating with a focus on internal 
rewards/rules is more valuable than regulating with a primary focus on external 
rewards/rules, then, it is logically impossible for the reverse situation to occur. That is, 
from a view “X” perspective, view “X” and view “N” cannot be compared, given that to 
do so would mean that regulating with a focus on internal rewards/rules had been assessed 
as more valuable than regulating with a focus on external rewards/rules. The person would 
thus have to be expressing view “N” rather than view “X”. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
I think everybody’s creative.  (Participant 7 in the present study) 
By nature I’m not a creative person.  (Participant 1 in the present study) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study has found that the teachers’ ways of defining and valuing creativity were tied 
structurally to a central dimension described, in the research outcomes, as an evaluation of 
which location for rules/values/rewards is the most reliable – external or internal. Greater 
expansiveness in views of creativity involved greater focus on the benefits, for individuals 
and society, of attending to internal rules/values/rewards rather than external 
rules/values/rewards. From an internal rule perspective unreflective control by external 
rules/values/rewards was seen as not creative and was ideologically rejected as less 
beneficial than reflective regulation by internal rules/values/rewards. Seven categories of 
creativity conceptions were identified which describe the various ways that the teachers 
defined creativity operationally, that is, as an aspect of their lived experience. 
The variation between the identified categories is reflected as different combinations of 
values on several dimensions. These dimensions include observer vs.creator perspective 
(internal world-external world foci), a definitive “discerned variation” criterion (a novelty 
aspect), perceptions of the causes and rewards of “creative” processes, perceptions of the 
functionality/appropriateness of the “object” within its context, and assessments of the 
benefit conferred to the person or society from the perceived creative object (process and 
product/outcome). The outcome space for the study has been constructed to reflect a 
hierarchy of categories wherein the more expansive ways of conceptualising creativity can 
be seen to include awareness of categories lower in the hierarchy. Teachers who expressed 
more expansive views of creative value conceptualised and endorsed “creativity” as 
ownership of learning/development or autonomous and authentic being. 
Two supporting analyses suggest that greater reliance on external rewards, rules and 
values is consistent with both an extrinsically focused view of creativity and a 
teacher/transmission-focused view of teaching, whilst greater reliance on internal rewards, 
rules and values is consistent with both an intrinsically-focused view of creativity and a 
student/enabling-focused view of teaching. These analyses suggest that conceptions of 
creative teaching and the enhancement of student creativity differ significantly when seen 
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from extrinsically focused (external rewards/rules/values) vs. intrinsically focused (focus 
on internal rewards/rules/values) perspectives. 
This section of the thesis discusses some of the features and implications of the 
findings. Also discussed are similarities between the internal rule-external rule dimension 
of variation identified in this study, and the autonomy-control dimension as defined in 
Self-determination Theory (SDT). The SDT research literature indicates that people exhibit 
tendencies towards taking either an intrinsic value focus or a more extrinsic value focus. 
Within SDT these tendencies are described in terms of an autonomy orientation vs. control 
orientation. It appears that, within SDT, autonomy and control are conceptualised similarly 
to the internal-external rule orientations as they emerged in the present study. The term 
“autonomy” has been utilised in the present research as a suitable referent to delimit the 
meaning of creativity as seen from an internal value perspective. It is therefore suggested 
that SDT theory and research provides an additional means of apprehending and 
scrutinising the key internal rule-external rule dimension of variation as identified in the 
present study. 
5.2 VALUE ORIENTATIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND PARADIGMS 
The central dimension of variation in teachers’ conceptions of creativity, as identified in 
this study, is described as an evaluation of which location for rewards, rules and values is 
more reliable – internal or external. When constituting creativity some of the teachers see 
rules and values as primarily located externally, in society, in norms and procedures. 
Rewards are seen as being in the gaining of things, such as qualifications or approval of 
others. Although some norms, procedures and rewards are clearly evaluated, by the 
teachers, so that some may be rejected as inappropriate, dysfunctional or wrong, while 
others are retained or adhered to, the teachers do not include the internal and social value 
of autonomous processes in that evaluation. Therefore they have a different way of 
thinking about what is important, personally and socially, than do teachers for whom 
external values are rejected if it is felt that they do not offer as much personal/individual or 
social benefit as those derived through autonomous processes. It is through these lenses 
that the teachers constitute “creativity”. Therefore, in the background of all of the teachers’ 
operational creativity conceptions, is an assessment of the relative value of internal and 
external rewards/rules/values. 
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These ways of experiencing and orienting to what is important in life and society appear 
to approximate to the construct of causality orientations, which is described by Deci and 
Ryan (2000, p.241) as “the degree to which people are (1) autonomy oriented, which 
involves regulating their behavior [sic] on the basis of interests and self-endorsed values” 
and “(2) control oriented, which involves orienting toward controls and directives 
concerning how they should behave.” They identify a third orientation, impersonal 
orientation, which involves a lack of intentionality in behaviour. This orientation does not 
appear to be relevant for the present study. 
Deci and Ryan (1985b) differentiate between the notion of perceived locus of causality 
(PLOC) and the similar construct “locus of control” (Rotter, 1966). Locus of control, they 
explain, refers to the sense of control over outcomes and can apply to either autonomous or 
controlled processes. It is therefore not the same as perceived locus of causality. They also 
explain their choice to use the terms autonomy orientation and control orientation rather 
than internal-external orientation. Deci (1980) originally designated the causality 
orientations as internal, external and impersonal, “since the perceived locus of causality for 
the first is internal, for the second, external, and for the third, impersonal” (Deci & Ryan, 
1985a, p.111). However, they note that the terms internal/external have been used so 
extensively in the psychology literature to describe various constructs that using these 
terms has become confusing. For the purposes of the present research I have elected to 
follow this reasoning, even though the term “control oriented” has unwanted connotations. 
It is meant to refer, however, to the fact that the person experiences a sense of needing or 
having to act in certain ways, with a sense of pressure from either external or internal 
controls, as opposed to a sense of acting freely from self-endorsed values or interest (Deci 
& Ryan, 1985a, 2000). 
In psychology research controlled and autonomous orientations are measured using a 
scale such as the General Causality Orientations Scale (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). In 2012 
researchers consolidated many years of research into causality orientations with the 
formulation of the Index of Autonomous Functioning [IAF] (Weinstein, Przybylski, & 
Ryan, 2012). Weinstein, et al., (2012) found that the more that individuals demonstrated 
dispositional autonomy and scored high on the IAF, “the more they were likely to 
experience positive well-being indicators such as positive affect, self-esteem, life-
satisfaction, a sense of clear meaning in life, and a value for personal growth … ” (p.406). 
Self-determination theory takes a “dimensional view, in which people are described in 
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terms of their placement on two or more dimensions” (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, p.154). 
Although research has found that people tend, at any time, to be high in one or the other 
orientation, within SDT they are not classified as being one “type” or the other (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985b). 
That a psychological, quantitatively researched model of motivational orientations 
should align with the central dimension of variation emerging in a study, which has used a 
qualitative research approach aimed at elucidating structural relations in teachers’ 
experiences of a phenomenon, is not as contradictory as it might seem. Marton (1981) has 
argued to the effect that psychological and phenomenographic inquiry are not necessarily 
distinct except to the extent that, within a given psychology paradigm, aspects of people’s 
perception are taken as “psychologically real entities”. Marton illustrates with the 
examples of Piaget’s early and later work, which he sees as exemplifying a shift of interest 
in describing aspects of the world from a second-order to a first-order perspective. The 
interest of phenomenography is with describing aspects of experience from the former 
perspective rather than the latter. Similarly Ryan and Deci (2006) have argued that for the 
purposes of educational and other social interventions, it is often the case that the “regnant 
level”, as they term it, of investigation and explanation, is with how events are experienced 
rather than with biological explanations: 
Consider the issue of improving a school system. The neuro-circuitry of the 
brains of administrators, teachers, and students would be actively involved in 
any such change, but an intervention plan would likely be more useful if it 
were formulated in terms of structural and interpersonal changes that affect 
the experience, values, and motives of the actors involved than if it were 
formulated in terms of cells in the brain that should be activated and cortical 
activation that will lead to desired motor outputs. The fact that an 
explanation is at a lower level of analysis does not necessarily make it more 
scientific or causally accurate, and it certainly does not make it more 
practically useful as an explanation or point of intervention. (Ryan & Deci, 
2006, p.1572) 
Therefore it appears that, as in phenomenography, SDT researchers have often taken 
“experience” as their realm of inquiry. 
5.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN “X” AND “N” VIEWS 
Teachers expressing views of creativity as ownership (Category G) and/or authenticity and 
autonomy (Category F) tended to emphasise these meanings of creativity even though they 
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were also aware of other meanings of creativity, such as, of creativity as a functional 
response to pressure (Sub-category D1a). I have designated this experience of creativity as 
an “N” view of creativity, because of its focus on the in-ternal or intrinsic value of 
creativity. These teachers define “creativity” primarily in terms of the discerned variation 
between regulating with a focus on internal reward/rules/values (autonomy) and regulating 
with a focus on external reward/rules/values (external control). In other words, one of the 
key definitional aspects in these views of creativity is sensed variation in the 
phenomenological quality of experience between a controlled experience of learning or 
being and an autonomous experience of learning or being. Teachers expressing view “N” 
were also aware that some people do not regulate with a focus on internal reward. They 
regarded the regulatory focus on external reward/rules/values as not creative. 
Experiences of creativity as ownership (Category G) are similar to experiences of 
creativity as autonomy and authenticity (Category F) in that both reflect awareness of 
value in autonomous processes. Category G is differentiated from Category F by its more 
expansive object of reflection. Whereas the object of reflection for the ownership 
conception is delimited, in the findings, as a focus on learning and development, the object 
of reflection for the authenticity and autonomy conception is self or being. Expressing a 
view of creativity as ownership may not always mean that the person also experiences 
creativity as creative being. However, it would be informative to find out to what extent 
teachers who experience creativity as ownership might regard ownership of learning as a 
precursor to finding fulfilment in life even if the person does not yet feel that this point has 
been reached. 
Participants expressing either Category F or Category G evaluate creativity as socially 
beneficial on the basis that the process is transformative of the person in a positive way. As 
indicated in the literature review, SDT research suggests that these “intuitive” assessments 
of the value of autonomy in learning/life are accurate – that is, autonomy can be sensed 
and these assessments of value appear to be based on a feeling of eudaimonic well-being, 
which is phenomenologically distinct from hedonic well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
Eudaimonia is the sense that needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy have been 
satisfied and is sustained through attention to informational cues (Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
A range of operational definitions of creativity was expressed by participants in this 
study (Categories A-G) and there are a number of subtle and more critical differences in 
the “X” participants and “N” participants” experiences of these different conceptions of 
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creativity. Thus, there are some definitional aspects that appear to be held in common, but 
there is significant variation overall between “N” and “X” ways of experiencing 
“creativity”. 
Participants expressing view “N” did not express the view that creativity is specific to 
particular domains (Category A). They saw creativity mainly as autonomous processes 
applicable across domains. “N” participants sometimes stated that creativity is commonly 
associated with the arts. But they tended to qualify the view as a misconception, a social 
construct or one of a range of ways of looking at creativity: 
I think they [the arts] are traditionally what people associate with creativity, 
so if you say you’re a creative person people automatically think: “O.K. well 
you either draw, paint or you’re in one of the arts.” But I don’t think people 
always associate creative thinking with coming up with new ideas and new 
ways of approaching things. (12) 
In contrast with the “N” view, participants expressing view “X” tended to emphasise 
that creativity is a property of the arts. Exactly why this emphasis is so strong in the “X” 
view is still unclear. But it may have to do with lack of familiarity with the processes of 
creating art or an unclear sense of autonomous processes or a combination of these. It 
could be that the participants are aware of no creative process, which could be common to 
the production of aesthetic, scientific and practical objects, nor common to “high” and 
“low” arts domains. The participants seem to understand the processes occurring in arts 
domains as a mix of processes that are “mysterious but valuable” and “familiar but not 
valuable”. The “X” participants have experienced creativity as functional problem-solving 
processes and as personal processes, which, from an “X” perspective appear to relate to 
“low” artistic domains, such as hobby or school art, but not to “high” culturally relevant 
production. None of the “X” participants seemed to relate functional problem-solving to 
cultural production in “the arts”. Perhaps experience of these particular “creative” 
processes does not help to intuitively account for culturally significant artwork or 
achievement. For example, science teachers P15 and P1, see “creative” (artistic) processes 
as unfathomable: 
Where do you start writing songs? Where do you start? And I just go, I just 
go, I have no idea. That’s just like a talent, a skill that I can’t even fathom 
because I can’t even imagine where to start. (15) 
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I mean I see a lot of people who seem to have lots of creativity … they can 
think of something and then they can make their own paintings that they’ll 
hang on their own walls and … I’ve never done that. (1) 
It seems possible that the aspect missing from the “X” experience of regulation – 
autonomy – is the aspect, which would unseat the view of creativity as specific to the arts 
if it were present to awareness. It may be useful to investigate conceptions of “the arts” as 
a research focus in its own right. 
A definition of creativity as prosocial products and performance, was expressed by both 
“X” and “N” participants (Category B). All of the teachers seemed capable of seeing a 
product as creative if it contributed something new and appropriate to the collective (B1. 
Cultural innovation) or if they “liked” it (B2. Perceived innovation). Both strongly “X” 
and strongly “N” participants made statements to the effect that if they did not like a 
product they would not see it as creative. Similarly, both “X” and “N” participants could 
see outstanding performance as creative. So, at this point, it seems that Category B. must 
be seen as containing a view of innovation, which is common to both “X” and “N” views. 
However, because the perception of process comes into the overall appreciation of an 
innovative product/performance, it seems that “N” participants also have a view of 
innovation, which differs from an “X” view of innovation. The teachers looked at a 
number of different aspects when assessing the “creativity” of a product. Perceptions of the 
process behind the product were clearly a key aspect in their appreciation of a given 
product. Research suggests that, for products with aesthetic qualities, at least, very little 
seems to be known about what exactly people are attending to when they enjoy a product, 
such as a piece of music or artwork and evaluations can be “diverse and complex” 
(Newton & Donkin, 2011). Undoubtedly evaluations are as complex for “X” participants 
as for “N” participants. However, it is apparent in the transcripts and a logical conclusion 
that “N” teachers sometimes look for evidence that the process behind a product is 
authentic (that is, a process of the “self” or of the creator) .This difference between “X” 
and “N” views of innovation/exceptionality has therefore been made explicit in the study 
findings as “X” and “N” versions of creativity as pro-social (versions B “X” and B “N”). 
This distinction may be especially important in the education context, where teachers 
would be looking for signs of students’ learning. B “X” and B”N” views would be 
implicated in what teachers look for in student and product “creativity”. “X” and “N” 
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views of pro-social creativity may also be evident in teachers’ global rationalisations of the 
social benefits of innovation. 
There may be differences in “X” and “N” experiences of creativity as a functional 
process, especially as a response to pressure (Sub-category D1a). It is not clear if “X” 
participants and “N” participants experience pressured problem-solving in exactly the 
same way. “N” participants made very few statements indicating that they see pressured 
problem-solving as creative. Some autonomously oriented participants indicated that 
where possible they would change their mode of engagement in a task or orient themselves 
within the parameters of a situation in order to make it “creative” (autonomous): 
Whatever I’m doing, there’s a way to turn it into creative. (5) 
When I’m home I have to wash the dishes: How can I make that process as 
enjoyable for everyone as possible? And that’s where my creativity comes … (13) 
 
However, even if people experience themselves as authentic and autonomous beings all 
of the time there may be some kind of threshold beyond which the autonomous process 
becomes so “squeezed” by time and other pressures that it does cease to feel autonomous. 
The participants may feel gradients of autonomy from more internally to more externally 
controlled because of external pressure. But it may be difficult for highly autonomous 
individuals to experience even extremely pressured processes as “not creative” if they are 
assessed or felt to be authentic. When purely functional creative processes are discussed by 
autonomously oriented participants they tend to be compared negatively with the value of 
autonomous processes. Certainly autonomy oriented participants indicated a preference for 
engaging in authentic and autonomous processes: 
It just goes hand in glove. See now I gotta try and isolate an [a creative] 
incident from what really is what is normal, for me. (5) 
It drives me nuts being constantly reactive in my role. I need to have some, 
to do some proactive stuff. (6) 
In contrast “N” teachers tended to experience creativity primarily as doing something 
outside their usual procedural approach: 
It’s [creativity is] sort of stepping outside your usual areas of training and 
everyday life. (10) 
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It is possible that participants, for whom it is “normal” to reference external rules and 
values may feel more uncomfortable in pressured problem situations than participants for 
whom problem-solving is normal and enjoyable. The question of how functional or 
pressured problem-solving appears from “X” and “N” perspectives may need to be 
explored in further research. 
There are differences between “X” and “N” experiences of creativity as personal 
processes (Category E). This category is distinguishable from an experience of creativity 
as ownership or autonomy and authenticity, in that the participant is not aware of any great 
social value or benefit arising from the intrinsically motivated process. It may be that there 
is not yet enough internal value experienced in such processes for the participant to 
evaluate the experience as beneficial, except in a recreational or occasional context. From 
the perspective of an interest researcher it might be said that the participant experiences no 
“stored value” for particular content (Krapp, 2002, 2003) or that the participant 
experiences only situational or triggered interest (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). However, 
from an “N” perspective interest is likely to be seen as valuable for its potential to promote 
learning or development. 
There are also questions to answer regarding how view “X” relates to the experiences of 
creativity as pro-individual (Category C) and as instrumental gain. (Sub-category D2). It 
appears, at this point, that experiencing and defining creativity operationally as pro-
individual or instrumental gain may be restricted to a view of the world which sees 
behaviour as linked to external and “introjected” controls and contingencies – that is, 
external controls and internalised external controls (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). It could be 
difficult, from an autonomy perspective, to experience creativity as individualistic pursuit 
of extrinsic gain, because from an autonomy view, autonomy is creativity. It seems 
unlikely that a person would identify both externally controlled and autonomous processes 
as creative. If autonomy oriented people do alternate between these ways of defining 
creativity operationally it seems unlikely that they would value such “creativity” in the 
same way that they value autonomy. 
Full provision has not been made, as yet, for describing all of the structural elements of 
one participant’s (P7) religious version of autonomy and authenticity. Those participants 
whose autonomous and authentic experience was based mainly on sense-making and 
personal development through interest in a particular field of expertise, tended to find the 
process of creativity highly satisfying. This does not seem to have been as strongly the 
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case for P7. However, the dimensions of variation for this experience of creativity are 
currently considered to be quite consistent with those of participants more strongly focused 
on sense-making. P7 felt authentic and autonomous as a Christian and evaluated 
“creativity” as personally and socially valuable. However he saw “creativity” as 
originating with “God” rather than with the activities of the person and tended to locate 
process satisfaction in the “completion” or the sense of having “constructed something” 
rather than, as he put it, “the process through”. Whether this constitutes a significant 
difference from other teachers’ views of creativity as authenticity and autonomy could be 
investigated in further studies. It may be the case that variants on the experience of 
creativity as authenticity and autonomy will be found. 
In summary, teachers who saw it as more reliable and valuable to regulate with a focus 
on internal rewards, rules and values emphasised meanings of creativity as ownership of 
learning and development, or as authentic and autonomous being. As these are operational 
(lived) definitions of creativity, the teachers derive and develop these definitions through 
their experiences of autonomous processes. In this “N” experience of creativity, the 
teachers also recognise a number of other meanings/definitions of creativity, some of 
which they may share in common (experientially) with an “X” experience of creativity. 
The “N” experience of creativity includes awareness of the potential for variation in how 
people regulate in the world, that is, that regulation can involve a focus on external or 
internal rewards/rules/values. The “N” experience therefore includes awareness of 
externally ruled ways of constituting creativity. An “X” view of creativity, by contrast does 
not see the internal world as a reliable source of rewards/rules/values. In an “X” view of 
creativity the potential for learning and development through autonomy is not recognised. 
Therefore, views of creativity as Category F. Ownership and Category G. Authenticity and 
autonomy are not integrated into the “X” view of creativity. 
5.4 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER STUDIES 
Findings from some phenomenographic studies of learning exhibit commonalities with the 
findings from the present study. Examples from some studies conducted by Van Rossum 
and Hamer (2010) serve to illustrate. In the present study it has been found that teachers 
conceptualise creativity as Category F: Ownership, where the object of reflection is 
learning and development. Teachers in this study also conceptualised creativity as 
Category G: Authenticity and autonomy, where the main object of reflection is self/being. 
Van Rossum and Hamer (2010, p.15) identify a student conception of learning, described 
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as Widening horizons, where the object of reflection is “personal development” and a more 
complex learning conception again as Growing self awareness, where the main object of 
reflection is “self”” The general alignment between the two sets of study outcomes is 
apparent and, as Van Rossum and Hamer also argue, alignment across phenomenographic 
studies of learning-related phenomena constitutes a certain kind of validity for the 
phenomenographic results that fall into this category. They term this type of validity 
“convergence of outcomes validity” (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010, p.48). 
It seems relevant to acknowledge Van Rossum and Hamer’s use of the “living tree” 
metaphor in describing the particular (student) conception of learning, which they identify 
as Growing awareness. I decided to use this metaphor despite discovering that these 
researchers had used it previously, as it seemed to provide an appropriate way of 
explaining that some teachers’ various uses of the term “creative” are really different 
aspects of a single conception. 
Van Rossum and Hamer (2010, p.8) describe a slightly different usage of the “tree” 
metaphor. It may be worth pointing out this difference as it could point to areas of 
difference between conceptions of “learning” and conceptions of “creativity”. They state: 
The appropriate metaphor for learning here is growing, the self a “living 
tree” firmly rooted in a garden (environment), providing shade and 
protection to and cared for by a number of gardeners (significant others), 
each with their own speciality. This conception of learning we re-label 
growing self-awareness. 
In this use of the “tree” metaphor no reference to “seed” or “fruit” is indicated. However, 
in their description of the conception of learning as Growing self awareness the authors 
point to a number of studies, all of which find that a sense of control, a sense of becoming 
an agent or “being in charge” is central to the meaning of learning in this conception. 
Therefore Van Rossum and Hamer do identify the “seed” of ownership as a key element in 
a mature conception of learning even if they do not address this aspect in discussing the 
relevance of the tree metaphor for the conception. However, if “fruit” is not mentioned by 
them either, it may be because creativity is often more overtly connected to the idea of 
producing something than is the notion of “learning”. The concept of learning may focus 
attention on taking in information, on assimilation or transformation of knowledge and on 
sense-making, more so than on how learning is put to use in the production of things. 
Student participants in studies might rarely talk about “learning” in terms of what it is used 
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for. Another difference in the present researcher’s use of the “tree” metaphor is that when 
expressing their conceptions of creativity as ownership and as authenticity, the teachers in 
the present study clearly saw themselves as constantly growing but also as gardeners with 
relation to the learning/creativity of students. 
Van Rossum and Hamer (2010, p.9) suggest that because there is now considerable 
agreement across phenomenographic studies of conceptions of learning and related 
phenomena (e.g. good teaching, intelligence, understanding), the models that are emerging, 
“may prove to be more generally applicable than many researchers feel comfortable to 
consider”. They seem here to be reflecting some concerns that have been expressed about 
the validity or reliability of phenomenographic research findings (Cope, 2004; Sandberg, 
1997). But they argue that the many replications, across studies of learning conceptions, 
constitute a form of validation. 
The “phases of interest” model of interest development (Hidi & Harackiewicz, 2000; 
Hidi & Renninger, 2006) also exhibits some parallels to the hierarchic view of creativity 
observed in the presented study. In this psychology-based work it has been shown that 
interest develops from triggered or situated interest, which may or may not evolve to a 
higher level of interest. However, at each successive stage in the model, interest content is 
increasingly valued by the person and particular content more frequently engaged until at 
the highest level of interest a person may see him/herself as a person who pursues 
particular content (Renninger, 2009). This model suggests that people who experience only 
mild levels of interest and people who experience interest as co-extensive with the “self” 
are likely to experience “interest” in qualitatively different ways. This phase model of 
interest development seems to reflect boundaries of awareness between the triggered 
interest and more pervasive interest phases, similar to the ones identified in the present 
study between the personal category and the ownership/autonomy categories. 
However, the present research diverges in its finding and approach from Kleiman’s 
(2008) phenomenographic study of university teachers’ conceptions of creativity, which, to 
the best of my knowledge is the only other cross-disciplinary study of teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity. Kleiman’s study was conducted with fifteen university 
academics. Amongst the categories he identified is a category of description, which 
describes a view of creativity as constraint focused. He identifies three kinds of constraint 
focused creativity, described as: “constrained in order to enable student creativity; 
constrained by the institutional environment; and constrained in order to meet the 
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expectations of the students’ (Kleiman, 2008, p.212). Kleiman states that he initially 
thought of putting these utterances aside, but on reflection decided to group them into a 
category in case such views reflect something fundamental about creativity – in his words: 
“perhaps there is a binary aspect to the phenomenon of creativity i.e. its existence relies – 
to a lesser or greater extent – rather like matter and anti-matter, on the presence of its 
opposite” (Kleiman, 2008, p.213). 
From my point of view this was a thought provoking hypothesis and as the present 
study findings show, there is a figure-ground or discerned variation aspect involved in the 
participating teachers’ identification of creativity, which appears in the results as a 
dimension of variation. However, there were many times during the analysis process where 
I became frustrated to the point of thinking with Kleiman that “creativity” seems to appear 
to people as the obverse or reverse of whatever else they see as non-creative. After long 
periods engaged in analysis I often ended up feeling as though the object of investigation 
had evaporated like a mirage under the intensity of scrutiny. Identifying creativity 
conceptions sometimes felt like a “wild goose chase”. 
What stopped me from adopting a similar approach to Kleiman on this matter of 
“constraint” has possibly to do with differences in our data. Some of the teacher 
participants, in the present study, quite clearly indicated that constraint in an educational 
context could hamper, but not stop, them from taking a creative approach in their teaching 
and facilitating creativity, even if other teachers showed no interest in doing the same. It 
eventually became apparent that these teachers see creativity from an autonomy 
perspective as a quality learning process. They could no more remove creativity from the 
school context than argue that learning has no place in the classroom. 
In the course of analysis for the present study, utterances that demonstrate teachers’ 
positions on the issue of constraint have been approached as information about different 
conceptions of creativity. The present research does not follow Kleiman’s approach on the 
issue of constraint. 
5.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study provides a number of important insights based on aspects of the findings which 
have immediate and broad relevance in terms of implications and application. In particular, 
these aspects of the findings are: 
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 The role of figure-ground contrasts drawn from lived experience in the teachers’ 
operational definitions of creativity 
 Interconnections between meta-definitions and operational definitions 
 Identification of a number of dimensions of variation as a means of 
distinguishing between meanings of creativity 
 Individually and as a group the teachers expressed more than one meaning of 
creativity 
 The identified conceptions of creativity reflect a hierarchy of inclusive 
awareness 
The study shows that internal-external value orientations (or, in SDT terms, causality 
orientations) are implicated in how teachers constitute and value creativity. Although some 
quantitative studies of teachers’ conceptions of creativity observe similar patterns 
(Diakidoy & Kanari, 1999; Fryer & Collings, 1991), the researcher knows of no other 
studies which have illuminated a link between causality orientations and conceptions of 
creativity. Further, this qualitative study illustrates how teachers conceptualise creativity 
and demonstrates that, although creativity conceptions exhibit variability, they also exhibit 
structural relations and may be reliably mapped. 
With so few phenomenographic studies having investigated conceptions of creativity, 
any phenomenographic studies of creativity conducted with demonstrable adherence to the 
prescriptions of the phenomenographic approach, may at this time be regarded as 
contributing timely and useful perspectives to the field of creativity conceptions research. 
Whereas there have been many phenomenographic studies of learning, studies explicitly 
dealing with conceptions of creativity within education still number only a few. Even 
taking into consideration phenomenographic studies of related areas such as problem-
solving and intuition the area is hugely understudied. The researcher believes that the 
present study is the first to attempt to illuminate the broad spectrum of school teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity, with close attention to the principles of phenomenography. From 
this perspective the study can be seen as significant for contributing much needed insights 
into teachers’ ways of seeing and understanding creativity within a very limited pool of 
available studies. 
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The outcome space may have practical implication as a tool for deciphering how the 
term is being used and understood, not only across the group of teacher participants in the 
study, but in the broader education context and in writing about creativity. The study 
provides important insight into why and how teachers, and educators more generally, value 
creativity differently and envision the facilitation of creativity differently as well. 
Furthermore the study indicates that the scientific definition of creativity, which has 
focused on creativity as an outcome, has not accounted for qualitative differences in 
people’s experience and awareness of creativity. In overlooking this aspect the scientific 
approach to the study and discussion of creativity has not been effective in reducing 
contention around the meaning of creativity. This study provides insights, which should 
make clearer how the support of creativity can be undertaken in education and 
organisations. 
5.6 EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
The study indicates that the support of student creativity in Australian education would be 
well served by giving attention to teacher training in autonomy support. The findings 
suggest that teachers will have varying requirements in terms of professional development, 
not only for meeting national curriculum requirements to support student creativity, but in 
terms of the support needed for coping with the demands of teaching in the current 
transitional climate in education (Burnard & White, 2008). The findings align with 
observations made by Jeffrey and Woods (2009), who contend that within the teaching 
community is a group of teachers for whom teaching creatively to enable ownership in 
learning forms the core of their pedagogy. Teachers who teach with a focus on ownership 
of learning and teachers who teach with a greater focus on content, rules and extrinsic 
kinds of reward, will require different kinds of support in respect of teaching for creativity 
and may have different needs in terms of professional development more generally. 
The findings should also be useful as an aid to communication about creativity in 
education. Educators who argue for or against the support of creativity may have different 
views of the value of creativity. Some teachers might be interested in innovation, but with 
little or no awareness of the value of autonomy. Some teachers may see creativity as both 
pro-social and individualistic kinds of innovation or production, again with little or no 
awareness of the value of autonomy. Some teachers may value and support autonomous 
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forms of creativity, whilst being aware that creative processes can differ and that people 
have other ways of seeing creativity. 
5.6.1 Why is creativity so contentious? 
In the sport of boxing, the boxers enter the “ring” to fight from the “blue corner” and the 
“red corner”. Although it is now said that educational discourse around creativity is 
marked by several rhetorics (Banaji, 2008), and that educational interest in creativity tends 
to be justified for utilitarian and individual reasons (Gibson, 2005), it is also observed that 
while some teachers demonstrate commitment to creativity, others are more focused on 
acquisition of knowledge and behaviour management (Craft, 2008a; Jeffrey & Woods, 
2003, 2009). This study makes explicit that the apparently contentious nature of creativity 
is, in large part, due to qualitative differences in understandings of creativity. Through the 
findings of this study it can be understood why teachers would tend to come out fighting 
more from one corner than the other. The study allows an early insight into what really are 
the precise parameters of the conceptions of creativity, as conceptualised and advocated by 
teachers. 
In the “red corner” educators are fighting, to varying degrees, from the perspective of 
autonomy. They are interested primarily in the process, but not just any process. This is a 
specific type of process. For these teachers and academics, the most valuable form of 
innovation is likely to be autonomous innovation and the most valuable form of learning is 
likely to be active, engaged, sense-making and personally relevant discovery. They see the 
objectives of creative teaching clearly and know what they want to see happening 
“creatively” for students in the classroom. From this perspective both the knowledge and 
the problem-solving abilities for innovation grow primarily from curiosity, sense-making 
and investigation. 
In the “blue corner” are those teachers and academics who understand the educational 
focus on creativity as more of a supporting agenda for innovation. They are fighting, to 
varying degrees, from the perspective of external control. These educators are likely to see 
content and skills as important, with some attention given to the teaching of creative 
thinking skills for functional purposes. Some may find creativity highly confusing as a 
topic and see creativity enhancement as a pressured objective for the classroom teacher. 
Others may emphasise the importance of delivering the content required for creative work 
at the finish of schooling. From this perspective greater emphasis may be placed on testing 
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that the content has been acquired, than on quality in learning and the facilitation of 
interest. 
Both groups of teachers may show varying degrees of interest in the more functional 
forms of creativity. However, teachers who conceptualise creativity as ownership or 
autonomy are more likely to see autonomy support as a strategy for promoting the 
development of functional problem-solving capacities. 
In terms of the waxing and waning of creativity initiatives seen in education over the 
years (Craft, 2008a, 2008b), one could hypothesise that these initiatives have dissipated in 
the “boxing ring” of the educational context as a result of these divergent understandings 
of creativity. Values that seem intuitively obvious from a red corner perspective would be 
met, understandably, with varying degrees of incredulity from the blue corner – and 
perhaps vice-versa. Communication difficulties arising from these variations in perspective 
would be exacerbated, I believe, by the difficulties that arise from speaking about creative 
processes, in abstract or metaphoric terms. In this study it was observed that teachers often 
use “meta-definitions” when talking about creativity. These appear to be generalisations 
abstracted from experience of creative processes, which do not convey the breadth of 
teachers’ understanding of value in creative processes. The abstract language of creativity 
discourse may often serve to obscure and trivialise the more complex, intuitive 
understandings, which subserve and inform teachers’ views of the value of ownership and 
autonomy. Meta-definitions could also obscure whether internal or external definitions 
underpin teachers’ or policy makers’ emphases on creativity at any given time. 
In the movie, The Matrix (Wachowski & Wachowski, 1999), Neo is offered the choice 
to take the “red pill” or the “blue pill”. It is explained to him that if he takes the red pill his 
perception of the world will be transformed. If he takes the blue pill he will remain in “The 
Matrix”. Neo decides to swallow the red pill and he exits life in “The Matrix” forever. 
When he is reborn, as the film’s graphic imagery suggests, into the bare reality of Zion, it 
is confirmed for him that there is indeed a world beyond “The Matrix”. He discovers too 
that he can revisit “The Matrix” but he can never fully return. Now he sees that life in “The 
Matrix” was really – although he was not aware of it at the time – life under external 
control (the external control, it might be added, of machines that had evolved from what 
were once the mechanical technologies that had been developed to serve humanity). Much 
popular and scholarly discussion has focused on the possible meanings of the movie’s 
metaphors (Cook-Sather, 2003; Merrin, 2003; Miller, 2000). But the Matrix-Zion contrast 
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provides an apt metaphor to represent the variation between “X” and “N” views and I have 
often speculated that it also has something to say about the minds that made this metaphor 
central to a commercially successful movie on the eve of the world’s transition to 
electronic communication. That is, perhaps the film’s creators also experience creativity as 
autonomy and wanted to say something about how they see the place and role of this 
aspect of human functioning in the new electronic media environment. 
In the present climate of global interest in creativity and with a growing body of 
research now demonstrating the value of autonomy for the enhancement of learning, 
creativity and well-being, educators have the opportunity to put aside trite definitions and 
superficial interests in creativity and look more seriously at autonomy support in 
education. The present research provides insight into why creativity has been so 
contentious: creativity is conceptualised from perspectives of autonomy vs. control 
orientations. 
On the basis of the wealth of current research, including this study, which demonstrates 
the benefits of autonomy, there can be little doubt about which direction is advised for the 
support of creativity in education. Clearly, a proportion of teachers teaching now in 
Australian schools are already teaching with a view to autonomy support. It is likely that 
these teachers would resist conditions within education that threatened to stifle student 
trajectories towards deep learning, authenticity and autonomy. But if these teachers are 
placed under policy pressure to diminish their focus on autonomy-support they would 
likely regard such pressures as conducing towards ineffective approaches in education. So 
that autonomy support can flourish in schools it is pertinent to ask: What can be done, 
within education, to make the topic of creativity less contentious and what can be done to 
encourage autonomy support generally, as an aspect of pedagogy? 
5.6.2 Can you see “Zion” from “The Matrix”? 
The study reported on in this thesis indicates that teachers understand creativity in 
qualitatively different ways. Thus it appears that, intuitively, teachers’ day to day views of 
creativity are often, in figurative terms, as far apart as “The Matrix” and “Zion”. The 
question was posed, in the Foreword, as to whether it is possible for teachers to understand 
other teachers’ ways of conceptualising creativity, so that creativity issues may be more 
effectively addressed in education. This is a question that needs to be explored more fully 
within the education community as there are a number of ways of thinking about this 
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question and each way probably presents different levels of educational challenge. Since 
the study has found that the “N” view is inclusive of “X” views (the evidence for which 
lies, as shown earlier, where “N” teachers’ demonstrate their inclusive awareness of 
qualitative differences between “X” and “N” regulation), it is reasonable to ask what this 
means for the framing of best pedagogical practice in Australia. Should autonomy-support 
be requisite knowledge for all policy makers, teacher trainers and teachers? How could 
teachers currently expressing an “X” view be encouraged to go beyond transmission 
focused teaching in order to facilitate students’ autonomy/creativity, if experience of 
autonomy is outside their awareness? What should the policy/training response be if some 
teachers insist on transmission focused pedagogy as the most appropriate means of 
building Australia’s “creative capital” whilst they remain simultaneously unaware of more 
comprehensive teaching approaches, conceptions of learning and/or views of creativity? 
Rather than explore all of the possible questions that could arise in lieu of the findings, 
it seems most relevant to ask if the findings from the study could help to reduce the degree 
of uncertainty currently experienced around discussion of creativity questions in education. 
I believe that they can. The findings indicate that it is important to be aware of the role that 
teachers’ lived experience of creativity plays in how they conceptualise and value it. Much 
of the “noise” in creativity discourse is instantly more understandable if creativity 
conceptions are seen as a hierarchy of qualitatively different ways of experiencing and 
defining it. 
How to share these understandings across the teaching community may be challenging 
but at least the challenges have shape. Useful research directions around understanding the 
conceptualisation and enhancement of creativity and innovation can be formulated. 
Supportive bodies of literature are available to inform the facilitation of creativity where it 
is internally defined as ownership/autonomy and where it is externally defined as 
innovation. As stated earlier the vast majority of creativity research has focused on 
external definitions (Lidstone & Stoltman, 2007; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco, 
2004b). Given that, prior to this investigation, it has not been formally recognised that the 
phenomenology of autonomy can inform some teachers’ ways of defining and facilitating 
creativity, it is likely that the body of research detailing the nature and support of 
autonomy has often been overlooked as a resource in supporting student creativity. 
Researchers, Ng and Smith (2004), for example, appear to have in mind a meaning of 
“creativity” as ownership/autonomy, and they point to the autonomous motivation 
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literature as being informative about the facilitation of creativity. They cite SDT research 
as evidence that it is possible to learn in a way that is “independent”, socially responsible 
and supports creativity, as a counter-argument to Asian teachers’ views that “creative” 
students, exhibit “independent” and socially undesirable behaviour. The present study 
findings not only show that teachers, as a group and individually, are likely to express 
several distinct meanings of creativity, they show that teachers value different meanings of 
creativity differently and thus tend to emphasise or reject particular meanings. Therefore 
the findings should assist educators when considering what would be the most relevant 
research literatures to assist them with facilitating valued meanings of creativity. 
Next in relevance is the question of whether teachers who presently do not see 
autonomy can learn to be supportive of autonomy. Reeve (1998) argued that they can. In 
his research with trainee teachers, he found that “interventions at the preservice teacher 
level can communicate the benefits of autonomy-supportive instructional strategies 
sufficiently well to change motivating style toward a more autonomy-supportive 
orientation” (Reeve, 1998, p.327). Although he qualifies some of his hopes as being 
ambitious, he conjectures that teachers’ ideas about how to motivate students, may be 
“malleable”. School environment would also be an important consideration in maintaining 
positive teacher attitudes towards autonomy support. 
In the present study it was found that an “X” view of creativity includes a conception of 
creativity as occasional ownership (Category E, sub-category E3). Inherent in this 
conception is the understanding that relevance and interest are sometimes or ideally 
important in promoting learning and quality outcomes. This conception of creativity could 
be useful in bridging between an “X” view of creativity and an “N” view of creativity. 
Trainers might hope to use this conception to demonstrate similarities and differences 
between the “X” and “N” experiences of creativity. In particular, the presence of this 
conception within “X” transcripts suggests that “X” teachers should be able to apprehend 
the “N” position on the value of ownership for promoting deep learning and development. 
Furthermore, occasional ownership and ownership reflect similar ways of constituting 
creativity, as a personally relevant process. From a training perspective this could be an 
important area of common ground between “X” and “N” operational definitions of 
creativity. 
Finally, it seems important not to forget the professional development needs of teachers 
who are currently autonomy-supportive. A number of teachers in the study group indicated 
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that when at school they tended not to talk about their interest in creativity. One of the 
teachers indicated that she would not raise the issue at school for fear of being vilified for 
loving her job after fifteen years of teaching. Others indicated that they felt like, acted like, 
or were treated like, what could be described as “lone mavericks” in their subject areas. 
Although teachers who expressed views of creativity as ownership and autonomy 
described the creative process in similar ways, they appeared to have little opportunity to 
discuss their views, even with like-minded colleagues, to consolidate understandings or 
expand skills and insights at their level of understanding. It could be a useful experiment to 
observe what happens when autonomy-supportive teachers are provided with opportunities 
to collaborate and further develop their understanding of autonomous processes. It would 
also be useful to gather information about how autonomy-supportive teachers envision 
such issues as whether or how it is feasible to approach the evaluation of autonomous 
processes and development. 
5.6.3 The Australian Curriculum 2014 
In order to further demonstrate the potential usefulness of the findings, I will suggest some 
ways that the conceptions and structures of awareness identified in the study, could relate 
to the Australian Curriculum focus on developing students’ “critical and creative thinking” 
capability (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 
2014b). The phenomenographic approach to identifying structures of awareness could be 
used in a predictive sense to anticipate issues that teachers might have, as they interpret the 
Australian Curriculum priorities, through the lenses of their experience. Further, the 
structures of awareness for the creativity conceptions identified in the present study could 
be utilised retrospectively to understand the approaches and expressed concerns of 
particular groups of teachers. Presently I will comment mainly on how the “X” and “N” 
perspectives on creativity might relate to the particular shape of the focus on “critical and 
creative thinking” as it is currently presented in the Australian Curriculum.  
Within the Australian Curriculum the “critical and creative thinking” capability is 
defined as involving two distinct types of thinking: “critical” and “creative”. Critical 
thinking is delimited as relating to analytical and evaluative reasoning, whereas creative 
thinking is seen as generative, imaginative and intuitive processes. Although the capability 
is divided into these two types of thinking it is also stated that they constitute 
“complementary dimensions” of thinking and learning. An aim of the curriculum focus on 
developing this capability is to encourage deep approaches to learning: 
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Critical and creative thinking are integral to activities that require students to 
think broadly and deeply using skills, behaviours and dispositions such as 
reason, logic, resourcefulness, imagination and innovation in all learning 
areas at school and in their lives beyond school. (ACARA, 2014, F-10: 
General capabilities: Critical and creative thinking: Introduction: para.1) 
Beyond this its aim is to establish sophisticated, reflective and evaluative thinking as an 
intellectual disposition: 
The capability is concerned with the encouragement of skills and learning 
dispositions or tendencies towards particular patterns of intellectual 
behaviour. These include being broad, flexible and adventurous thinkers, 
making plans and being strategic, demonstrating metacognition, and 
displaying intellectual perseverance and integrity. Students learn to skilfully 
and mindfully use thinking dispositions or ‘habits of mind’ such as risk 
taking and managing impulsivity (Costa and Kallick, 2000) when confronted 
with problems to which solutions are not immediately apparent. (ACARA, 
2014, F-10: General capabilities: Critical and creative thinking: Background: 
para.3) 
It is in the presentation of the background and evidence base for this curriculum priority 
that references are made to the view that critical and creative capability is most effectively 
developed during engagement in meaningful/authentic challenge: 
Theorists believe that learning is enhanced when rich environments contain 
multiple stimuli, stressing the importance of engaging the mind’s natural 
curiosity through complex and meaningful challenges. (ACARA, 2014, F-
10: General capabilities: Critical and creative thinking: Background: para.4) 
Perusal of the curriculum content and the subject rationales, as presented on the 
ACARA website, reveals that the development of critical and creative thinking capability 
is embedded throughout the structure of subject specific inquiry with the aim of supporting 
and strengthening deep learning and sophisticated, evidence-based reasoning and reflective 
habits of mind. Students are encouraged in their studies of Modern History, for example, to 
evaluate sources of information or evidence, perform syntheses of evidence and develop 
the analytical and critical thinking that will allow them to participate effectively in 
contemporary debates (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority 
[ACARA], 2014d). The acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills is to occur alongside a 
pervasive emphasis on deep inquiry and cultural critique. The support of evaluative habits 
of mind as an outcome is infused into the structure of the curriculum and appears to 
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assume systemic commitment to the value of building critical and creative capabilities. 
However, I would argue that the success of the curriculum in this regard relies on teachers 
(and other key stakeholders) understanding and committing to the value of the rationale. 
On the basis of the present study finding of the role of “X” and “N” perspectives in the 
formulation of teachers’ definitions of creativity, there are reasons to expect different 
levels of teacher commitment to the student-inquiry focus of the curriculum, or perhaps 
different reasons for valuing it. 
On the ACARA website the supporting evidence provided, for the importance of the 
critical and creative capability and the means of its facilitation, does not include reference 
to the SDT research into autonomous motivation. However, SDT research has established 
that the experience of autonomy improves learning and creativity, (Ryan & Deci, 2000c), 
promotes well-being across a range of organisational and cultural contexts (Chirkov, 2009; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000c; Van den Broeck, Lens, De Witte, & Van Coille, 2013), and is an 
essential condition for human flourishing (Chirkov, 2009). In other words, on the strength 
of the theoretical framework and substantial current evidence, autonomous functioning 
provides the benchmark for human well-being, optimal development, social adaptation and 
various aspects of performance. If the implications of these findings are taken far enough, 
then, it is an unavoidable conclusion that understanding of autonomy support is an 
essential ingredient for moral and ethical reasoning. It seems to me that no evaluative 
discussion of civil rights, politics, historical movements, government, cross-cultural 
analyses or organisational practices, including those of education, could be considered 
thorough without the opportunity to measure conditions, practices and outcomes against 
the empirical evidence for the conditions that support human flourishing. On the basis of 
this reasoning an important aim of education systems would be the support of the student 
capacities necessary to evaluate cultural conditions and environments in terms of whether 
or not they support/thwart autonomy. A further implication, is that in order to fully and 
accountably represent best practice, an education system would aim to support student 
autonomy, so that students can experience it, at the same time that students are supported 
to develop as autonomous people with the capacity for sensitivity to the presence/absence 
of autonomy support in the world around them. 
An implication of the present study finding that “N” views include awareness of both 
autonomous (internal rule) and controlled (external rule) regulation, whereas “X” views do 
not include awareness of autonomous regulation, is that “X” teachers could struggle to 
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appreciate the personal and social benefits of experienced autonomy (Categories F-G: E-
DOV4). Furthermore, from an “X” perspective, curriculum directives aimed at autonomy 
support could often be misconstrued as failing to serve students’ best interests if they 
appear, to the observer, to prioritise student comfort over “rigour”. It could be expected 
that directives to support authentic approaches to learning would be half-heartedly 
implemented if teachers do not see their value: 
And it was just lucky that I went to this seminar, because you can actually 
apply it to any student really and how you should be structuring your 
worksheets so that you give opportunities for every person to delve into all 
different aspects of the topic that you’re talking about … Yeah, you go to all 
of these workshops and you feel really, “Wow! I must try this, this and this!” 
You know, I feel really excited about it and then, of course, you get back to 
the routine of um, classroom teaching and, ah, you sort of forget half the 
time. (1) 
Teacher participants who valued autonomy did not need to be convinced of the need to 
support autonomy. Autonomy support was integral to their teaching. 
Although the Australian Curriculum does not expressly discuss its aims in terms of 
supporting autonomy and authenticity it does, as noted above, cite a number of theoretical 
positions claiming the value of authentic inquiry as a means of building high level 
intellectual capacities. In structuring the curriculum to support these capacities the 
Australian Curriculum appears to offer license and opportunities which could be leveraged 
from an “N” perspective to promote student ownership of learning and development and, 
ideally beyond that, the capacity for authenticity and autonomy as a person. The current 
shape of the Australian Curriculum seems to provide opportunity to promote intellectual 
activity of students that is consistent with the “N” view’s negation of the value of external 
rule. On this basis I would predict that “N” teachers would see value in promoting critical 
and creative thinking capabilities, particularly where they see them as being supportive of 
authenticity, deep learning, openness to experience and the capacity to critique taken-for-
granted structures that support extrinsic/external rule. 
From an “N” teacher’s perspective, concerns about the quality of the curriculum are 
likely to relate to any aspects that are perceived to inhibit students’ authentic engagement, 
such as time constraints, overemphasis on content in some areas at the expense of 
engagement, lack of flexibility to attend to the needs of specific students and perhaps lack 
of resources to set up suitable environments. It is even possible that from some “N” 
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teachers’ perspectives the curriculum guidelines around critical and creative thinking could 
be seen as not going far enough in that they fall short of discussing qualitative aspects of 
authentic inquiry and development, such as well-being, and tend to emphasise the 
development of intellectual capacities. However, where the critical and creative thinking 
capability interconnects with the other capability strands of the curriculum, it can be 
understood as involving the kinds of evaluations/problem-solving necessary to develop 
these capabilities. With regard to “Social and personal capability,” for example, critical 
and creative thinking would be involved in the discernment necessary for managing 
“spiritual and physical wellbeing” (Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting 
Authority, 2014c, para.2). 
A further, though possibly less crucial observation, is that the Australian Curriculum 
separation of the capability into “critical” and “creative” thinking could sit awkwardly with 
teachers’ “lived,” operational definitions of creativity. In an “N” view of creativity, for 
example, both analytic and creative thinking could be identified as creative if the process 
felt meaningful: 
Creating timetables! I actually love doing high school timetables, ah, and 
working out subjects and stuff like that. Cos that to me … Oh it can be a 
really, really “left brain” type – that’s in inverted commas – ah, kind of 
thing, very structured and analytic. But it can also be a really, almost a 
living work of art. Ah, a really good timetable where you’ve got things 
working so well, there’s all innovative ideas in there, um the kids get access 
to what they want, the teachers enjoy what’s happening. Ah, yeah, 
timetabling, it’s just so creative!(5) 
Presumably P5’s “creative” timetabling involves analysis, evaluation, logical reasoning 
and so forth. These, according to the ACARA website description of the capability, are 
elements of “critical” thinking. Hence, from an “N” perspective it may seem 
counterintuitive to regard “critical” thinking as separate from “creative” thinking. By 
implication it is also conceivable that someone defining creativity from an “N” viewpoint 
could intuitively consider that no thinking, whether “critical” or “creative”, is really 
creative unless it occurs in a meaningful process. There is yet another potential point of 
conflict with the “N” experience of creative self/being, given that the very essence of this 
experience is the critical discrimination of the greater value of internal rule relative to the 
value of external rule. From this perspective “critical” thinking is at the heart of creative 
self/being. 
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I have found it difficult to fully understand how the division between critical and 
creative thinking is constructed or intended, within the Australian Curriculum. The 
ACARA website cites some theoretical perspectives in support of its position, such as the 
philosophical inquiry model articulated by Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (Lipman, Sharp, 
& Oscanyan, 1980). I am not suggesting that the distinction between creative and critical 
thinking is not without use or purpose. It is just that on the strength of the findings of the 
present study I am suggesting that teachers’ intuitive definitions of creativity, which are 
derived from lived experience, could come into conflict with the more abstract way the 
term is used in the description of the critical and creative capability within the Australian 
Curriculum. It is conceivable that this difference in the use of the term could become 
problematic around the issue of assessment, for example, in cases where “N” and “X” 
views could inform divergent understandings of the nature and value of “original” thought 
or the processes that produce originality. 
There are a number of aspects of the curriculum that could be seen in a positive light 
when viewed from an “X” perspective. The curriculum possibly appears well rounded if 
looked at in terms of subject area content coverage. It has also been developed to reflect 
sequential building of knowledge and thinking skills and emphasises rigour and reasoned 
thought. There is nothing here to conflict with the “X” view. However, I suggest that it 
would be difficult to approach this curriculum while maintaining a focus on content 
delivery or basic skills acquisition and therefore teachers approaching the curriculum from 
view “X” could struggle with the pedagogical requirement to facilitate deep learning. To 
me, in its current form, the Australian Curriculum is clear in its rejection of shallow 
instruction and shallow learning in favour of the facilitation of sense-making and depth of 
understanding. There is such an overriding requirement to ensure that students develop the 
sophistication to work competently with information and social constructs that, it would 
not be in students’ interests if teachers were to focus mainly on delivering content, no 
matter how engagingly. Research has shown that students in the classrooms of 
transmission focused teachers tend to take shallow learning approaches in those classrooms 
(Trigwell, et al., 1997). Moreover, given that autonomous being is not an aspect of the “X” 
structure of awareness, on what basis could it be expected that “N” and “X” teachers 
would demonstrate homogeneous approaches to developing any or all of the cross-
curriculum priorities designated as “General Capabilities”? When autonomy is not part of 
awareness what standards inform development of ethical understanding, intercultural 
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understanding and personal and social capability? It seems to me that “N” and “X” 
structures of awareness would lead to divergent “intuitive” understandings of these 
capabilities and some degree of conflict is to be expected across the body of Australian 
teachers when interpreting the curriculum guidelines. 
In the weeks just prior to this thesis going to press, ACARA announced that the 
presiding Liberal-National Party coalition government minister for education, Minister 
Pyne, has initiated a review of the Australian Curriculum (Australian Curriculum 
Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014, January 10). Appointees to the 
review panel, Dr. Kevin Donnelly and Professor Ken Wiltshire, have both been active 
contributors to curriculum debate and development in Australia (Australian Government: 
Department of Education, 2014) . Dr. Donnelly, previously a school teacher, has openly, in 
his publications and media interviews, articulated his opposition to student-centred 
learning (e.g. Donnelly, 2004; Shaughnessy, 2007). Such a position is indicative of an “X” 
perspective for it sweeps aside what is, from an “N” perspective, an essential condition for 
socially valuable authenticity, autonomy and depth in learning. The Australian Curriculum 
board of developers might reasonably expect that any viable recommendations for major 
changes to the curriculum would need to reflect even-handed and informed evaluations of 
the relative personal and social benefits of transmission focused versus student focused 
teaching/learning approaches, for various educational purposes and contexts. The Chair of 
the Board of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), 
Professor Barry McGaw, has officially welcomed the review, stating that the review could 
potentially provide a useful, “additional perspective” on a curriculum that has already 
involved an enormous consultative effort throughout its development (Australian 
Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014, January 10). Australian 
educators now await the outcome of the review. 
5.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL THEORY: BRIEF REFLECTIONS 
Not only am I informing creative people everywhere that they are now 
members of a new class, I am telling them to develop a corresponding class-
awareness and begin to act on it. Yet I feel this presumption is justified. 
Creative workers already constitute a de facto class by virtue of their 
dominant economic role and function. 
(Richard Florida, 2002, p.317) 
   238
As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, Richard Florida has made clear that 
he understands the creative process as one that is often intrinsically motivated. He has also 
stated that he values the opportunity to perform creative work. With these sentiments and 
the findings from this study in mind, especially the commonality expressed across the 
views in which creativity is experienced and defined as autonomy and authenticity, I 
believe one can reasonably identify in Florida’s statement, above, his endorsement of the 
social value of autonomy and his sense of solidarity with other autonomous people. Florida 
seems to believe that, just as he does, people who value autonomy often regard themselves 
as creative. He therefore hopes to rally autonomous people with his appeal to the creative 
class. Throughout his work Florida demonstrates his belief that via their ethos of tolerance 
and authentic values autonomous people have more than “products” to offer the world. To 
the extent that socially influential individuals, such as Florida himself, truly do value 
autonomy, both the present study and the existing research literature that explores the 
value of autonomy, would support Florida’s project of encouraging autonomy and 
autonomous people. There seems to be little wrong with encouraging autonomy and a great 
deal right with it. 
The point I wish to make is that, probably, if one extrapolates from the findings of this 
study, the literature of social theory will be found to reflect similar “biases” to those seen 
in this small group of teacher participants. Some social theorists will embrace creativity as 
autonomy and may even believe that supporting autonomy broadly is a clear and valuable 
goal for humanity. They are likely to point out conditions in the social world that they see 
as conducive to the support of autonomy, such as freedom to create and contribute. Others 
will believe that humans need external regulation. From this perspective such freedoms in 
the social environment could appear unsettling, unnecessary or dangerous. Other external 
control perspectives on the relation of creativity to society are also possible. But in the 
interests of keeping comment reasonably brief I will not discuss these here. Readers and 
listeners need to be aware of the different meanings of creativity expressed in such 
arguments. 
As discussed in the literature review, Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan, 1964a, 1964b; 
Norden, 1969) and Walter Ong (1982) were also interested in creativity. They argued that 
the electronic media would tend to promote a global environment conducive to “creativity” 
of different kinds, but certainly an environment conducive to the support of intellectual 
autonomy and cultural participation. The writing of these visionaries has sometimes come 
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under scrutiny for the extent to which they might express a Christian vision of human 
progression (Sterne, 2011). From my perspective, their religious views have not detracted 
from the import of the message they conveyed. Both McLuhan and Ong envisaged that 
greater freedom and diversity in the global media environment is likely to promote greater 
creativity and they put time and effort into telling people about it. It seems reasonable to 
expect that people who value authenticity and autonomy for themselves would tend also to 
value it for others. This comes across in the transcripts for the present study and it is, 
perhaps, not surprising to find that many authors, such as Florida, Ong and McLuhan, who 
are themselves engaged in deeply authentic investigations, are also interested in the 
creativity of others. Importantly, the observations of contemporary media watchers suggest 
that the new electronic media environment has, as Ong and McLuhan predicted, conduced 
towards diversity and dissension and many different sites and forms of “creativity”. 
McLuhan argued that it was important, amidst this “maelstrom”, for educators to find and 
promote what the media environment offers for the benefit of humanity (Norden, 1969). 
The literature supports the view that autonomy is personally and socially valuable. 
Expressions of interest in the value of autonomous functioning are emerging in cultural 
environments around the world, including China (Liu, et al., 2011; Ng & Smith, 2005). 
Governments around the world are seeking to promote “creativity” through their education 
systems (Lidstone & Stoltman, 2007; Shaheen, 2010). The global environment is rapidly 
transforming into one where information is everywhere and the pressure on education 
systems to teach students to remember and reproduce information has arguably shifted to 
imperatives in support of creativity/autonomy (Bruns, 2008; Craft, 2008a; Ong, 1982). 
Education systems world-wide sit amidst these fertile conditions for encouraging 
autonomy. The option exists to take hold of opportunity and promote well-being and 
autonomous pro-sociality. Some of the main impediments to decisive action from 
educators are likely to be confusion about meanings and support of creativity and lack of 
commitment. 
An important resource for educators in making sense of the messages about creativity 
that arise in social discourse and social theory would be information about the meanings of 
creativity that can be found there. This study makes a contribution to the building of that 
resource in showing that qualitative difference is to be expected in people’s ways of 
defining and valuing creativity. The findings of this study have implications that ripple 
across the reading of social theory around creativity. 
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5.8 LIMITATIONS 
As an exploratory study it is to be expected that there are limitations of this research that 
arise from not having a prior sense of the research territory. Fryer (2012, p.24) raises two 
points in respect of qualitative studies that seem relevant to the present study: 
The sheer quantity of data generated [in a qualitative study] means that such 
methods are really only suitable for small-scale studies and so it is difficult 
to extrapolate from the results to a larger population. At the same time, 
qualitative studies are invaluable at the exploratory stage of an investigation, 
to highlight key areas that merit further investigation or methodological 
problems that may occur in the main investigation. 
The present study is a small exploratory study and the researcher is in agreement with 
Fryer that caution is advisable in extrapolating from the results to a larger population. 
On the second point, although the study has been useful as described above, the fact of 
being an exploratory study means that in retrospect, some methodological shortcomings 
have come to the fore, particularly concerning the participant group and interviewing. 
These are issues that could not have been known in advance and are insights which could 
be incorporated into the design of other studies. Therefore some of the same elements that 
make the study useful in indicating directions/recommendations for further research are 
also limitations in terms of the study itself. 
A possible limitation of the study findings is linked to the small number of participants. 
The number of participants has been adequate for revealing the key dimension of variation. 
However, some conceptions were only expressed by one or two participants and so data for 
some categories/sub-categories is sparse. Phenomenographic analysis is an arduous and 
difficult process and the end result cannot be predicted at the outset (Bruce, 2003). It is 
only once analysis is completed, especially in a study without precedent, that the 
researcher can assess whether it might have been useful to ask certain kinds of questions or 
prompt interviewees for further clarity, or to interview more of a certain class of 
participant. In hindsight, because there are indications that some teachers’ ways of 
experiencing creativity involve greater valuing of “extrinsic” than “intrinsic” rewards, it 
could have been useful if the group had been larger overall and if it had included teaching 
staff from the subject areas around business, IT and economics. It could have been 
informative also to have interviewed additional teachers expressing religious ideologies. 
Therefore future studies may reveal different or additional categories of description. It is 
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not reasonable to expect that categories of description will emerge as identical in future 
studies (Cope, 2004). This can be seen as limiting how the categories and sub-categories 
may be used. It may be appropriate to regard the categories as general indications of the 
range of conceptions of creativity which are likely to be expressed across a group of 
teachers. It is not expected, however, that larger group size would impact the key 
dimension of variation as identified in the study. 
The categories of description may be limited in terms of their cross-cultural application. 
There has been, for example, some research which indicates that in Saudi Arabia inhibiting 
intrinsic motivation through administering external reward may not reduce “creative” 
product outcomes as it does in Western samples (Hennessey, 2004). This kind of cross-
cultural difference in experience could mean that the internal “experiential” definition of 
creativity could vary between cultures. 
Some questions still remain to be investigated and some structural aspects are still 
emerging. The issue of how to describe conceptions that are both religious and 
authentic/autonomous remains to be resolved. Further research might point to the 
dimensions that could allow a fuller description of this view of creativity. Therefore, 
caution is also required in deciding which aspects of the results should guide future policy 
at this stage. 
5.9 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Further to the findings of this study four main research directions are recommended: 
1. Further research projects focused on eliciting teachers’ conceptions of creativity 
with diverse participant groups in cross-disciplinary studies similar to the 
present one; 
2. Research focused on investigating specific conceptions of creativity as 
illuminated in the present study; 
3. Research to identify creativity conceptions within particular teaching areas or 
within specific groups and disciplines; 
4. Research to investigate conceptions of creative teaching and enhancing 
students’ creativity. 
First, future work will be needed to confirm and/or expand upon the present findings. 
Further cross-disciplinary studies with larger groups of participants are recommended. 
There are two elements of this recommendation that require clarification: What would such 
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studies aim to confirm and what would be the purpose of gathering a larger participant 
group? 
There is considerable consensus within the phenomenography literature that replication 
studies are not a viable aim of phenomenographic studies. Cope (2004) explains the 
reasoning for this and is worth quoting in full: 
Reliability as a scientific concept refers to the replicability of results, that is 
“if another researcher repeated the research project … what is the probability 
that he or she would arrive at the same results” (Booth, 1992, p. 64). In 
phenomenographic studies, this interpretation would refer to replicability of 
the outcome space(s). That is, given a particular set of data, would different 
researchers report the same outcome space? The general consensus in the 
phenomenographic literature is that this is not a reasonable question to ask. 
As Booth, and Johansson, Marton and Svensson (1985), among others, point 
out, although broad methodological principles are adhered to, the open, 
explorative nature of data collection and the interpretative nature of data 
analysis mean that the intricacies of the method applied by different 
researchers will not be the same. Data analysis, in particular, involves a 
researcher constituting some relationship with the data. A researcher’s 
unique background is an essential part of this relationship. Consequently, 
replication of outcome spaces by different researchers is unlikely and not 
necessary. As noted by Burns (1994), if individuals experience phenomena 
in the world in different ways why shouldn’t different researchers 
investigating the phenomenon of variation in a group of individuals” 
experiences, experience the variation in different ways! (Cope, 2004, p.9) 
But as some phenomenographers have noted (Åkerlind, 2003; Van Rossum and Hamer, 
2010) commonalities across phenomenographic studies are sometimes seen as so reliable 
that they can help in arriving at the outcomes of a subsequent study. Åkerlind describes an 
instance of this: 
Given the substantial number of existing studies of conceptions of teaching, 
this analysis started with a search for dimensions of variation which had 
already been found in existing studies of academics” understandings of 
teaching. This was equivalent to entering the analysis at an advanced stage, 
when preliminary hypotheses about key dimensions of variation and 
structural relationships between categories are already being formed and 
tested against the data. (Åkerlind, 2003, p.384) 
Åkerlind (2003, p 375) observes that although “studies differ in the specific detail of each 
conception or approach described, significant commonalities have emerged in themes 
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running across the conceptions” which show as “key dimensions of variation in the 
meaning that teaching holds for university teachers.” She notes further that “this consensus 
is striking given the independent nature of the studies and the diverse range of countries, 
institutions and academics sampled across the studies” (Åkerlind, 2003, p, 376). 
I would anticipate that, given a similar spread of data in future studies, similar elements 
of the present findings, such as thematic figures/grounds and dimensions of variation 
would emerge. This is because autonomy is both one of the values on the key dimension of 
variation, as identified in this study, and also an operational (lived) definition of creativity 
as expressed across several transcripts. It seems likely that with a broad participant sample 
this dimension of variation, in particular, would emerge again as critical in the ways of 
defining creativity, even if some researchers, using different interpretive knowledge, posit 
grounds for constituting the categories of description differently. Thus future studies could 
seek to establish whether the internal rule – external rule dimension is critical in delimiting 
the variance between the qualitatively different experiences of creativity identified in those 
studies. 
The recommendation to gather a larger participant group for future work is based on the 
reasoning that a larger, even more diverse, group increases the likelihood that participants 
will make the kinds of statements which would alert the researcher to the presence of 
relevant dimensions of variation. Cope (2004, p. 14) discusses, for example, how he was 
alerted to views of “people” and “process” as dimensions in students’ ways of 
experiencing an information system, when a student interviewee started to talk about 
“people” and “processes”: 
A number of dimensions of variation have been revealed to the interviewer, 
who would then be interested in investigating the interviewee’s 
understanding of each dimension of variation (the range of values discerned) 
and awareness of relationships between the dimensions of variation. (Cope, 
2004, p.14) 
Although the number of participants, and the range of views expressed within the present 
study group, have been sufficient to reveal the key dimension of variation and demonstrate 
its importance in delimiting the structures of awareness for the qualitatively different 
definitions and experiences of creativity, with more participants comes the possibility that 
additional dimensions could emerge. It may be possible to identify additional categories or 
further sub-categories within the identified categories. 
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The clear emergence of some key dimensions of variation in the findings of this study, 
should mean that future work would be less hampered, than during the present study, by 
the degrees of uncertainty surrounding the analysis. The findings from this study should 
therefore assist researchers in their analyses with larger groups in future studies. This is not 
a suggestion that future research should expect to find the same or similar categories. As 
Van Rossum and Hamer (2010) report, expecting to see similarities with past findings 
could prompt researchers to overlook important new or different elements in the data. 
Nonetheless the study has begun to open up the research territory by indicating useful lines 
of inquiry. 
Next it is recommended that a line of research should focus on investigating specific 
conceptions of creativity as illuminated in the present study. 
 An area in need of investigation is teachers’ conceptions of art or “the arts”. Some 
teachers seemed to see art as non-utilitarian while others see art as useful, both in 
terms of what it produces and its potential to facilitate student learning, higher 
order thinking capacities and other personal and social benefits. Furthermore, given 
that teachers in the science and mathematics subject areas often seem to see 
creativity and art as closely linked while creativity and science are not associated 
(Newton & Newton, 2009), it should be useful to understand variation in teachers’ 
conceptions of art/the arts. 
 It would be useful to have a greater understanding of how teachers judge creativity 
in products/performance. Therefore some investigation of what teachers attend to 
when judging creativity in outcomes, for example, in students’ work, would be 
informative. 
 Teachers’ conceptions of individualism require further clarification. The 
disciplinary area of business could be a fertile ground for studying views of 
creativity as individualism, as it has been shown that the values endorsed in 
business faculties tend to be more extrinsic than intrinsic (Vansteenkiste, et al., 
2006). In addition Sternberg (1985) has found that business professors are less 
likely than professors in other faculties to associate creativity with wisdom, which 
suggests that they may often tend to see behaviour in cost-benefit terms and be less 
concerned with the social benefit of “creativity”. 
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A third area of inquiry would be studies of conceptions of creativity within particular 
populations. It would be informative to understand more about the creativity conceptions 
of teachers in particular disciplines, such as science or IT. There are indications from the 
present study that it would be informative to investigate creativity conceptions of teachers 
in religious schools. 
Finally, as indicated in the two supporting analyses, which have been included in this 
thesis as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, there are strong grounds on which to anticipate that 
teachers have qualitatively different ways of understanding creative teaching and 
enhancing the creativity of students. On the basis of these analyses it appears that variation 
in teachers’ views of teaching and learning may be structurally tied to whether rewards and 
values are reliably located in the external or internal worlds as are their views of creativity. 
It is strongly recommended that, teachers’ conceptions of creative teaching and of 
enhancing student creativity should be investigated in additional studies. 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
Research within psychology has shown that autonomy is associated with greater creativity. 
However, no research to date has indicated that autonomy is actually experienced by 
autonomously regulating individuals as creativity. Prevailing scientific definitions of 
creativity have failed to account for or acknowledge the experiential aspect of creativity 
conceptions. It appears on the basis of this study that critical variation in teachers’ 
conceptions of creativity is tied to the extent to which rewards, rules and values are seen to 
be located reliably within the external or internal worlds. It is suggested that reliance on 
external rules, values or rewards closely resembles a control orientation as identified in 
Self-determination theory, whilst greater reliance on internal rules, values or rewards 
resembles the orientation identified within SDT as an autonomy orientation. 
The finding from this study that teachers’ conceptions of creativity may be ordered 
hierarchically with respect to whether conceptions are constituted from the perspective of 
reliance on internal values (autonomy) or external values (control) represents a new way of 
looking at teachers’, and others’, experiences and definitions of creativity. The findings 
have implications which reach beyond Australian education to understanding of how 
creativity is conceptualised, experienced or defined within organisations, with 
reverberations across the reading of social theory. These findings provide insight into why 
creativity has been such a contentious topic in education and in social discourse. 
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APPENDIX 1:  TEACHERS’ CONCEPTIONS OF CREATIVE 
TEACHING 
Teachers’ conceptions of 
creative teaching 
Referential component 
Delivery Enabling 
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Creativity as external 
definitions (art, 
innovation, 
exceptionality) 
+ teaching as routine 
1. Unexamined: Creative teaching is 
an unexamined or alien dimension of 
routine teaching 
 
Creativity as a 
functional process + 
teaching as routine 
2. Implicit: Creative teaching is an 
implicit, background aspect of 
routine teaching 
 
Creativity as responding 
to external pressure to 
cater to students as 
individuals 
+ teaching as delivering 
the content 
3. Compromise: Creative teaching 
involves compromising on teaching 
beliefs 
 
Creativity as responding 
and improvising + 
teaching as a usually 
programmed activity 
4. Limited: Creative teaching is a 
limited subset of normal teaching, 
often involving risk and pressure 
 
Creativity as functional 
problem-solving + 
teaching as managing 
5. Management: Creative teaching 
is continual planning and solving to 
manage the contingencies of the 
classroom, teaching and learning 
 
Creativity as personal + 
teaching as constrained 
by the curriculum 
6. Teaching opportunities: Creative 
teaching is seizing opportunities for 
personal input into the design of the 
teaching-learning experience 
 
A
n 
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Creativity as ownership 
+ teaching as 
participation in student 
ownership of learning 
and creating 
 
7. Co-ownership: Creative 
teaching is participating with 
students to enable and 
support ownership of learning 
and creating 
Creativity as 
authenticity + teaching 
as enabling optimal 
learning, life and 
socialisation potentials 
 
8. Authenticity: Creative 
teaching is enabling and 
supporting authentic student 
selves and quality 
experiences of life 
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Overview of categories of description of teachers’ conceptions of teaching 
creatively 
Eight qualitatively different ways that the teachers understood creative teaching were 
identified. The focus of conceptions in each category is delimited by three main focal 
aspects: a particular conception or combination of conceptions of creativity, a conception 
of teaching and a particular view of the objective of creative teaching. In the following 
overview, the three focal aspects are denoted by the capital letters A, B and C. 
Key:  A. Conception of creativity 
 B. Conception of teaching 
C. Objective of creative teaching 
The eight qualitatively different experiences of creative teaching are described as: 
1. Unexamined: Creative teaching is an unexamined or alien dimension of teaching 
A. External definitions (innovation, arts, exceptionality); 
B. Delivery; 
C. Innovating/standing out as a teacher; being an exemplar of teaching methodology 
2. Implicit: Creative teaching is an implicit, background aspect of routine teaching 
A. Functional problem-solving/making; 
B. Delivery; 
C. The normal goals and aims of routine delivery of content 
3. Compromise: Creative teaching is compromising on teaching beliefs 
A. Functional problem-solving; B. Delivery; C. Responding to external change; catering 
to student individuality 
4. Limited: Creative teaching is a limited subset of normal teaching, often involving risk and 
pressure 
A. Functional problem-solving; 
B. Delivery; 
C. Embedding content; 
i. Episodes of teaching performance; 
ii. Meeting additional syllabus requirements 
5. Management: Creative teaching is continual planning and solving to manage the contingencies 
of teaching 
A. Functional problem-solving; 
B. Delivery; 
C. Management of a range of ongoing contingencies relevant to teaching, including 
behavioural/emotional engagement 
6. Teaching opportunities: Creative teaching is seizing opportunities for personal input into the 
design of the teaching-learning experience 
A. Personal/occasional ownership; 
B. Delivery/participation; 
C. Tailoring the learning experience to better suit teacher and student interests; students 
gaining more than content from the experience subject to the constraints of curriculum 
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7. Co-ownership: Creative teaching is participating with students to enable and support 
ownership of learning and creating 
A. Ownership; 
B. Enabling/participation; 
C. Bringing about/supporting a process that is transformative of students’ learning, self-
direction, thinking and producing 
8. Authenticity: Creative teaching is enabling and supporting valuable, authentic experiences of 
life 
A. Authenticity; 
B. Enabling; 
C. Enabling a process that is transformative of the person and/or the life quality of the 
person. 
The eight ways of experiencing creative teaching are described in greater detail below and 
illustrated with quotations from the transcripts: 
1. UNEXAMINED: Creative teaching is an unexamined, alien dimension of teaching 
A. External definitions (innovation, exceptionality); 
B. Delivery; 
C. Innovating as a teacher; being an exemplar of teaching methodology. 
In this experience, creative teaching is viewed as an unexamined or alien dimension of 
teaching. The view of creativity in focus is limited to its externally defined/external value 
aspect as innovation, arts and/or exceptionality. These definitions are simultaneously seen 
in relation to a conception of teaching as routine and as delivering content. The teacher is 
seeing teaching and creativity from a perspective of immersion in routine, hard work, 
applying teaching methods and following “tried-and-true” procedures. The teachers seem 
to be seeing the objective of creative teaching with a focus on the teacher. Creative 
teaching would involve doing things that are outside the purview of the teacher’s present 
teaching approach, capabilities or practices within his/her subject area. Such teaching 
seems to involve being recognised as an innovative, imaginative or outstanding teacher, 
but is not something the teacher has really thought about: 
To me, in the sense of using the word creativity and creative, is a step 
beyond the usual and the mundane, it’s something that’s different, that’s 
original and that’s eye-catching. Getting back to what I was saying about my 
teaching, that’s probably why I don’t consider it creative in the sense I’ve 
been using it, because I don’t consider it any of those things. I consider it 
working to a formula … that’s probably why I had to think long and hard 
about being creative because I don’t normally put myself into that category. 
(10) 
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Oh. That’s a tough question that one … I wouldn’t say that I was a, an 
exemplary teacher in methodology terms or whatever … (3) 
Alternatively, as illustrated in the following quotations, creativity may be seen as an 
aspect of artistic vocations and therefore outside teaching altogether: 
I suppose I don’t define myself as being creative in terms of artists or, you 
know, people who have achieved – musicians, artists, writers. I suppose 
that’s where I tend to see a definition of creativity … (3) 
Yeah, artists, writers, music, musicians, writers, film producers. You know, 
so I probably see creativity as being in that, you know, arts-literature sort of 
field … And other professions are much more pragmatic and prosaic and so 
on … (3) 
Teachers expressing this view indicated that whether out of choice, habit, inability or 
disciplinary convention, their own teaching was not creative and that teaching creatively 
had not been a goal of their teaching. One of the teachers stressed that if he had been 
creative while teaching it was more accidental than intentional. In response to the 
interviewer’s questions about the participants’ experiences of teaching creatively, the 
participants searched their memories for times when they might have taught in a way that 
could be considered artistic, interesting, exemplary or innovative from an external 
perspective: 
So to put it in a nutshell: Creativity me? No! Which is why I said to you, you 
know, I’m a very boring teacher. (3) 
I don’t know that anything jumps out at me. Based on what I said before, my 
teaching is … well I feel my teaching is … some people might look at my 
teaching and think, “That’s terribly creative Rob”. I don’t know. But to me 
it’s applying rules and laws and patterns and procedures that I have learnt 
or picked up in my training and in subsequent years, that I apply to my 
teaching. I don’t consider it particularly creative in the sense that I 
mentioned before, you know, going that step further to put something new in 
place that’s not necessarily been done before. (10) 
This category is placed lowest in the present hierarchy as the focus on external 
definitions of creativity combined with a view of teaching as routine, means that creative 
teaching is constituted as without relevance for teaching. 
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2. IMPLICIT: Creative teaching is an implicit, background aspect of routine teaching 
A. Functional problem-solving/making; 
B. Delivery; 
C. The normal goals and aims of teaching. 
In this view teaching creatively is seen as a background aspect of whatever the teacher 
routinely does while teaching. It is seen as a process which is unremarkable and usually 
goes unnoticed. Whereas in the previous category, teachers saw themselves as followers of 
procedure and therefore not performing in a way that would be seen as creative 
(innovative, artistic), seen through this lens creativity is inherent in much of what the 
teacher does on a usual basis. The teacher is now thinking of creativity as a process, but 
one which fades into the background of whatever a teacher is doing at a functional or 
everyday level. The definition of creativity has shifted from an external definition to an 
internal definition. The view of teaching is of teaching as routine delivery of content. The 
objective of creative teaching in this view is no different from the goals and aims of 
normal, routine teaching. 
In thinking about the relation of this kind of creativity to teaching, the teacher 
acknowledges that creativity must be, to some extent, an implicit or background process in 
teaching. It is “there” when teachers create or modify teaching resources or when they put 
thought into how they deliver the content as part of the normal goals and aims of teaching. 
Teachers are able to focus, in hindsight, on possible episodes of problem-solving, which 
may have passed unnoticed in the stream of everyday teaching activity. But as with 
Category 1, this kind of creativity in teaching is not something that the teachers think about 
or even notice: 
There would have been moments perhaps in my teaching career where there 
would have been something that I personally created and would have had 
the same kind of effect and feeling [as personal creativity]. But um because 
you’re so busy doing the practical or pragmatic everyday things that, you 
know, you just have to get through a busy week or year or whatever … the 
pragmatic, practical everyday, you kind of, you tend to overlook those 
particular results because they’re just there all the time. (3) 
Well, I guess in everything I do there are some things that I would feel are 
creative because they are putting something together that is outside my 
normal range of experience. Putting thought into something, to produce 
something that I’ve not necessarily done before. Whether that might mean I 
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borrow other people’s ideas or thoughts. It could happen. But yes, it’s sort 
of stepping outside your usual areas of training and everyday life. (10) 
Teachers expressing this view, tended to move to this position after having first 
considered creative teaching from a Category 1 perspective. Having first thought about 
creativity as an externally defined phenomenon, something others would notice about them 
as teachers, the participants then shift to thinking about creativity as an aspect of their own 
thinking and doing. The following quotations show the participant reflecting on the earlier 
position: 
I suppose there are lots of little things … [I’ve] sort of had a very narrow 
view and definition of what creativity is – who is creative. (3) 
See I’m kind of thinking of that [problem-solving]as part of my teaching and 
not necessarily creative, but it was probably happening quite a bit more than 
I think. (3) 
This suggests that seeing creativity from a more internal perspective involves wider 
awareness of the possible meanings of creativity and wider awareness of the possible 
relations between creativity and teaching. What does not vary between Categories 1 and 2 
is the view of teaching as delivering content. Furthermore in both categories the teachers 
see no clear student-focused or learning-focused objective for creativity in teaching. 
3. COMPROMISE: Creative teaching is compromising on teaching beliefs 
A. Functional problem-solving; 
B. Delivery; 
C. Responding to external change; catering to student individuality. 
In this experience creative teaching is seen as teaching that is outside the teacher’s comfort 
zone, not simply because it places additional pressure on the teacher, but because it is 
incongruent with the teacher’s beliefs about teaching. In the foreground of this experience 
is a view of creativity as problem solving/adapting in response to external pressure, which 
includes an affective element of discomfort, disorientation or difficulty. Also in the 
foreground is an understanding of teaching as delivering content. In conjunction with this 
view of teaching it is seen as the responsibility of learners to take in the content as 
delivered and reflect this learning appropriately in assessment. However, the objective of 
creative teaching is seen as enhancing student comfort rather than student learning. When 
experienced this way, creative teaching appears to the teacher as stepping outside the 
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teaching comfort zone to deliver the content in a way that requires the teacher to improvise 
and adapt for uncertain gains in student learning. Creative teaching therefore appears 
incongruent with what the teacher sees as good teaching. In the following quotes can be 
seen how P1, a long-serving science teacher, sees good or normal teaching: 
[It was creative teaching] because the way I normally teach on most days, 
because it’s easier for me, is where I do most of that work for the students 
rather than them actually doing it their way. (1) 
It’s the science they’ve … if they’ve covered the science I don’t mind how 
they actually portray it. (1) 
P1 reveals that she prefers to think for the students rather than them thinking for 
themselves and that what she really requires from students is that they demonstrate that 
they have acquired, or at least “covered”, the science knowledge. This is demonstrated in 
assessment pieces as presentation close to what the teacher expects. However, in the 
following extract P1 indicates that she is trying to change her approach and teach 
creatively, not because it is a better way of teaching, but because students and the teaching 
environment have changed, necessitating an adaptive response: 
P1: I know I’m a very traditional science teacher and I’ve taught in a very 
traditional way but I’ve realised over the past couple of years that it’s … 
the kids don’t respond to that way of teaching anymore and with only 5 
years left to retirement I want to make my teaching enjoyable. I really love 
it and I love interacting with kids so I’ve got to let go of my traditional 
ways of teaching and one way I do this is by going to various different 
workshops around the place – and I play the devil’s advocate in a lot of 
cases in those things – so that I can actually gain some different 
information of different ways in which I can handle kids in different 
situations, so that I can find those last 4 or 5 years of my teaching are 
going to be enjoyable … because kids have changed and we have to 
change our ways of teaching as well. 
I: Yes, I think it’s fascinating that you said that you feel the traditional ways 
aren’t working and that teachers will have to do something different, but 
that you’re actually enjoying that. 
P1: I am (ambivalent tone) … and in some ways I’m getting out of my own 
comfort zone … and um that makes it really hard … and I’m starting to 
take a few risks of what’s happening in the classroom – the way I deliver 
it. 
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The participant’s discomfort with the perceived objective of creative teaching is evident 
in the asides made whilst stating the central rationale of “having to change” to a different 
way of teaching: P1 attends workshops to assist her in this change, but “plays the devil’s 
advocate”; she would like to change her teaching style but finds it “really hard” and as 
involving “risks”. At the end of the extract the issue is revealed – P1 is seeing teaching as 
“delivery” and has therefore not made any significant change in her thinking about 
learning. Creative teaching seems to involve delivering the content in a different, riskier 
way from what is easy or normal. 
This view is seen as more complex than earlier conceptions, because the teacher is 
consciously thinking about the relation of creative problem-solving to teaching and now 
has in mind a teaching objective that focuses the problem-solving capacities of the teacher 
on the student. The conception is seen as less comprehensive than subsequent categories 
because the value of the objective is unclear to the teacher and is therefore not embraced. 
The “learning” conception seen as the objective of creative teaching is acquisition. The 
teacher has difficulty seeing how acquisition is enhanced via student “comfort” and is 
therefore not yet convinced that the creativity involved in delivering the content is worth 
the risk. Thus creative teaching is not yet endorsed by the teacher as having benefits over 
and above what is presently practiced. 
4. LIMITED: Creative teaching is a limited subset of normal teaching, often involving 
risk and pressure 
A. Functional problem-solving; 
B. Delivery; 
C. Embedding content; 
a. Episodes of teaching performance; 
b. Meeting additional syllabus requirements 
In this view of creative teaching, the participant’s attention is drawn to episodes, within the 
context of normal teaching, which require some form of improvisation and often involve 
risk or pressure. These are not implicit in the background of teaching, but are distinct, 
isolated episodes of problem-solving seen as a sub-set of teaching activities. These stand 
out to the participant on account of not being part of the majority of teaching, which is 
conceptualised as routine, planned or programmed delivery of content. The teaching 
objective of creative teaching episodes is dealing with things that “come up” in the course 
of teaching in the classroom or planning for teaching. The teachers tended to experience 
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these episodes as performing under pressure, but could also see them as worthwhile if a 
satisfying outcome is achieved. They are seen as having functional value, but have a 
limited place within the context of teaching. 
In response to the interviewer’s questions about creative teaching the teachers focus on 
instances of teaching work, that involve “thinking outside auto-pilot” and higher than 
normal levels of concentrated effort or disorientation to produce something for the 
classroom. The most common objective reported for teaching creatively was helping 
students with their learning. This could mean trying to embed content by making lessons 
memorable, bringing wandering attention back to the teacher or problem-solving to help 
individual students. A related objective is trying to include into one’s teaching, additional 
or updated syllabus requirements. Creative teaching tended to be seen as time-pressured 
and sometimes risky, in the sense that one’s strategies might fail. Creative teaching is not 
experienced as inherently enjoyable. Therefore the main satisfaction that teachers derive 
from this experience of creative teaching seems to be a feeling of relief or happiness when 
strategies work out. 
Teaching creatively in this limited sense could occur in the form of time-pressured 
responding and problem-solving to deal with conditions arising in the classroom or more 
pro-actively in the context of planning for teaching. The following quotations illustrate 
creative teaching of the first type: 
The teaching creatively came out of some very specific moments in time, of 
which you tend to be thinking on your feet. It tended to be something that 
was needed to assist the student or the students in their learning. So you had 
to be very quick thinking, think on your feet … You’re reading your 
audience, you’re reading the ambience of the audience and then you’re 
going, “Ah! I gotta change this, I gotta change this really quickly, I’m losing 
this audience.” So it’s in those moments that you could be creative, because 
it wasn’t planned, you know. Your lesson plan basically would stop. It would 
be truncated and to go on you knew would be a disaster. (2) 
You looked at them, they’re all looking at you, they’re all looking at what 
you’re doing, um and I remember that that particular little lesson was, uh, I 
thought was one of those really great teaching moments. (2) 
The following quotations reflect a view of creative teaching as time-pressured planning: 
So for me in my teaching, those elements of real creativity where I’ve come 
up with the idea and I’ve tried to work out, you know, the concept of the 
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process and the pragmatic aspects of making the creative idea work, in a 
real and practical situation, once again it’s hours and hours and hours of 
slogging hard work to produce a moment. (3) 
I have found that, um, an incredibly difficult and long process and there 
were certainly times in my teaching when I would think, you know “I’ve just 
spent 17 hours creating two hours worth of classroom work” and, you know, 
certainly a lot of the time you would look at 17 hours for two hours, “I’m 
bloody mad. I’m not going to do this again.” (3) 
Some teachers suggested that because of the time-pressure, risk and effort involved, 
creativity in teaching is largely impractical. For one of the teachers creative teaching was 
associated with “burn out”: 
I must say over the last few years when I became burnt out I became very 
prosaic and very boring. (3) 
But equally it’s not something you could probably do all the time. And this is 
going to sound odd but I could imagine that if you were able to generate that 
excitement all the time it’d actually just … raises the threshold to become 
boring if you sort of understand my meaning. You’d always be sort of 
“upping the ante” in some ways, trying to get more and more and more 
exciting. (2) 
Creative teaching is now seen as congruent with the aims of teaching. However, the 
instances of creative teaching are seen as a limited sub-set of teaching. The majority of 
teaching is seen as routine or planned, rather than involving creativity. 
5. MANAGEMENT: Creative teaching is continual planning and using strategies to 
manage the contingencies of teaching 
A. Functional problem-solving; 
B. Delivery. 
C. Management of a broad range of contingencies relevant to teaching: balancing 
pressures, classroom organisation, student engagement. 
In this view teaching creatively is seen as problem-solving to manage the various 
responsibilities and contingencies of teaching, including planning to limit risks and balance 
pressures associated with teaching in the classroom, organising the classroom and planning 
to ensure some level of student engagement. The main difference between this and the 
previous category is that creativity in teaching is no longer confined to isolated pressured 
moments in the teaching day, week or year, but is seen as integral to pedagogy – it is part 
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of being strategic as a teacher and therefore acknowledges that creativity is more 
continuous and relevant to teaching than in any of the previous categories. In the previous 
categories teachers seem to see creativity as something which could almost be taken out of 
teaching altogether. However, when pinpointing the objective of creative teaching in the 
present view the teacher is thinking more broadly than in previous categories about the 
various aspects of teaching, which require problem-solving or inventiveness. In this view it 
is still the teacher who controls and delivers the content, while students act as consumers. 
The affective element of creativity is similar also, as management strategies tend to be seen 
as functional (rather than meaningful to the teacher). 
Most of the time, most of the good feeling comes when you’ve pulled it off. 
When it’s worked the way you thought it would. (15) 
In this view the teacher’s creativity is aimed at ensuring that lessons will go smoothly 
and students will be engaged and either on task or learning. As in previous categories 
content delivery is seen as one of the main avenues for teacher creativity. Part of 
management involves how the teacher plans and uses content delivery to keep students 
engaged and organised. One of the teachers also mentioned thinking strategically about the 
use of incentives. Therefore the teachers’ problem-solving efforts are mainly being 
directed at behavioural and emotional types of student engagement (rather than 
ownership): 
Figuring out a way of: a) the practical side of things, like I need good 
consistency blood, da da da … going and creating in that way. But then also 
thinking about, I’ve got kids whose behaviour is incredibly poor. How am I 
going to manage kids with “squirty” bottles of blood and not have an insane 
mess? Being creative about my student behaviour management in the 
classroom, to be able to keep control of, what could turn into sheer chaos. 
(15) 
It’s that extra little “How do I make it interesting so the kids will get it? 
Where do I find the gory small pox pictures?” You know “What’s going to 
get the kids to go ‘Brrrr’?” and you know, and gory photos often work best 
and adding that extra in there and “What language am I going to use on the 
power point so that the kids will get it … ?”(15) 
I did a fairly simple set of extrinsic rewards, of which one of them was that if 
we were able to get through our work, the set work, that was being set by the 
school, if we were able to get through that, we would then work on a concert 
as a class. (2) 
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Another aspect of management as a teacher involves balancing various kinds of teaching 
pressure: 
You can feel pressured when you get lessons lumped on you or people didn’t 
do what they said they were going to do and then suddenly it’s an hour 
before a class and I’ve got to make a quick power point presentation on the 
history of vaccines … You do get the situation where if you have put time 
into creating new materials or coming up with an idea for a particular 
lesson and then it all goes horribly wrong and you just go “Ugh. Why, why 
do I bother? It was rubbish! All that time that I put into it” and you can feel 
pressured. (15) 
You’re always balancing these pressures in a lot of ways. (2) 
From this perspective it is accepted that teaching is often creative because it involves 
problem-solving on a daily basis with the objective of ensuring that things in the classroom 
go smoothly, curriculum requirements are met and students engage with the content of the 
curriculum. 
6. TEACHING OPPORTUNITIES: Creative teaching is seizing opportunities for 
personal input into the design of the teaching-learning experience. 
A. Personal process; 
B. Delivery; 
C. Tailoring the learning experience to better suit teacher and student interests; 
students gaining more than content from the experience subject to constraints of 
curriculum. 
In this experience of creative teaching, the meaning of creativity in view changes from 
purely functional problem-solving to a view of creativity as personal or as occasional 
ownership. Creative teaching is seen as teaching in a way that is personally relevant and 
allows greater possibilities for tailoring the learning experience to suit teacher and student 
interests. Both the affective experience of creativity and the objective of creative teaching 
change somewhat in this view. Rather than seeing the objective of creative teaching as 
allowing students to do something outside learning or as management, the objective of 
creative teaching is now seen as making learning relevant to the learner. It is perceived that 
where the curriculum opens up to allow the teacher greater scope for making decisions, the 
teaching experience can become more personal and experimental and therefore more 
enjoyable for the teacher and more congruent with the teacher’s competencies and beliefs 
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about learning. So, for the first time, meaningfulness comes into the teacher’s experience 
of creative teaching: 
So, I designed the task and I had lots of fun doing that … it also had 
something of myself in it, I think – which was interesting because, you know, 
this was this team of people who was doing things. But it – and every now 
and again I would think and do what they would want me to do – but I still 
basically feel that, in the end, they sort of, thought, “Oh, she seems to know 
what she’s doing” or something like that. So – so there was something kind 
of personal in it as well. (4) 
Simultaneously the objective of creative teaching is less towards implementation of the 
curriculum, managing pressures and working within narrow constraints and more towards 
creating learning experiences that are responsive to student requirements. However, there 
continues to be a strong focus, in this conception, on teaching as delivering content, even if 
in some circumstances it can be performed in a more collaborative way. The learning 
conception, although considerate of student requirements, continues to focus on acquiring 
content and skills: 
I mean, in some ways, you sort of, like if you do have that opportunity to 
make a course, you’ve got to make decisions about what to put in and what 
to leave out … So, you know, you just sort of, I don’t know, just try and plan 
something that has, that you think has got the gist of something in it, but that 
each of them can take away a bit of whatever they, whatever is, is relevant to 
them. (4) 
Teaching is seen as working within curriculum constraints and is seen as, often or usually, 
not creative, given that there are many perceived restrictions on this kind of creative 
teaching, such as teacher accountability and curriculum emphases. If the curriculum 
dictates that programs are to be followed, teaching becomes teaching to the program. 
Creative teaching as seizing teaching opportunities is therefore not seen as “teaching” per 
se, but as the teaching that can be performed when opportunities arise and teacher input is 
less restricted: 
I’m just saying it’s creative because in a sense, like, if you’re teaching 
maths, you’re basically, you’ve got, you’ve got your work program there to 
follow anyway, whereas this was, you know, five objectives, or something, 
and you really had to decide what it was that you could do. And, I think, it 
was reasonably creative there. (4) 
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Well, I’d have to say that the last, this year, I don’t think I was terribly 
creative, and I felt great pressure to just, sort of, do what everybody else did. 
(4) 
 
7. CO-OWNERSHIP: Creative teaching is participating with students to enable and 
support ownership of learning and creating. 
A. Ownership; 
B. Enabling/participation; 
C. Enabling/supporting a process that is transformative of students’ learning, self-
direction and creative thinking 
In this view creative teaching is experienced as participating with students to enable 
student ownership of learning and creating. The view of creativity in focus is no longer 
occasional ownership, but ownership. The teacher is fully aware of an underlying 
“principle” of ownership as control over learning and creating and is also aware of socially 
valuable learning potentials arising from processes of ownership. The view of teaching is 
now one of participation with the learner, to enable and support quality learning processes 
and quality outcomes. 
The objective of creative teaching in this view is enabling student ownership of 
learning. But this may involve aiming to facilitate any or all of a spectrum of quality 
learning-related objectives such as enabling engagement in an immediate task process or 
enabling self-directedness as a learning approach applicable across subject areas. Teachers 
may hope to enable ownership of meaningful self-development beyond school (life-long 
learning and creating). In connection with these objectives the teacher may aim to support 
the development of creative/higher order problem-solving and thinking. The teacher 
endorses the learning benefits of ownership. Therefore in this view of teaching creatively, 
the teachers are not seeing creative teaching as responding to outside pressures to teach 
creatively, but as creative doing and thinking as a teacher, which proceeds from personal 
values and understandings about quality in learning. Creative teaching and teaching are 
now one and the same, because teaching is seen as constantly creating to enable learning. 
So too are student ownership of learning and student creativity similar in this view: 
I’ve gotta think creative with my students too, but that’s the foundation of 
being a constructivist. Or as I like to call myself, more co-constructive, 
because we learn together and I’ve gotta be creative and appeal to different 
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learning styles and abilities to ensure achievement and part of that is 
removing barriers to encourage what I see as creativity … (8) 
The teachers see creative teaching as valuable because it supports valuable processes. 
Ownership of learning, the main objective of creative teaching, is seen as internally 
valuable in that it promotes more complex approaches to learning, interest in learning, 
higher order thinking and higher quality outcomes. Ownership is seen as externally 
valuable in that these processes and outcomes translate into positive socialisation potentials 
for students and therefore represent positive outcomes for society also. It is not, however, 
apparent that the participants are seeing beyond the developmental learning and product 
potentials of ownership. In other words, socialisation potentials may be limited to the link 
between self-direction and “capacities” – the capacity to learn, to self-improve, to be 
gainfully engaged, the capacity to perform well and produce high quality products – rather 
than, as in the following category, the potential for self-direction, well-being and 
wholeness as a person. In the present category the language used suggests a focus on 
performance, becoming more skilled and sophisticated as thinkers and growing more 
confident as learners. Teachers are focused on getting the “most” out of students or 
students being able to put in optimal performances: 
If I’m trying to guide students it’s me saying, alright, what can you do to get 
the most out of this?(13) 
I think probably, as I really just said, just making them feel comfortable and 
making them forget about rules – I think they’re the most important – and 
increasing their confidence. That’s the best I can think of in order to bring 
out the most in them. (12) 
The teachers saw a large part of (creative) teaching as creating a supportive and non-
threatening environment for ownership and learning. Teaching strategies could include the 
use of delivery to generate interest, but tended to focus more holistically on supporting the 
learner’s confidence and interest by attending to aspects of the learner’s environment, such 
as creating a supportive, interesting or relaxed classroom environment, building trust in the 
relationships between teacher and student: 
So when I teach creatively, I look at a number of aspects. Number one for me when 
I teach creatively is I try and engage my students … So if I have a high level of 
engagement I normally will have a high level of learning going on and a high level 
of students wanting to have a go and doing it, so risking themselves in a new 
situation. So with that in mind I try and create an atmosphere where everyone will 
not feel threatened and will have a go … (14) 
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So you really need to approach in a pretty careful way, because it’s very 
easy to crush their confidence as well … (12) 
So some people need a bit of a build-up, some people need help with their 
build up, and others don’t need any, they just need your trust that you know 
that they will achieve in the end. (8) 
If you give a kid a chance to sort of move in the classroom and express 
themselves and produce something that’s new and in a non-judgemental 
way, um, they just love being there. (5) 
Finding out about the needs and interests of individual students and showing genuine 
interest in students was also seen as key to teaching creatively for ownership: 
I try to get to know my students. I think that’s the key element, so I really do 
try to get to know the way they tick and think. (7) 
Before I even start teaching them I try to get to know each of them a little bit 
… So you have to think creatively and out of the box to get them to realize 
that there’s not just one picture of perfection as such, so you try to show 
them lots of different ways how they can appreciate their own, you know, 
unique skills, how they can use their own unique skills, how they can 
improve on those skills. (12) 
The underlying principle behind the teacher’s strategies, whether articulated or not, is 
recognition that transformative processes cannot take place unless learners feel in control 
of what they are learning or creating. The teachers are acutely aware of this central issue 
and all of their statements about the facilitation, support and value of creative processes 
can be understood with reference to this single aspect of awareness. Thus if teachers speak 
about the importance of freedom from rules, to give one example, they are not endorsing 
poor standards of classroom discipline. They are referring specifically to the importance of 
learner control in learning and creating. All of the transformative elements that they see 
occurring “downstream” from the learner controlled process are flow on effects from this 
initial “trigger”. In these transcripts, almost all statements about creative teaching can be 
linked in some way to the teacher’s central concern with student control of learning and 
with bringing about a rupture in the learner’s understanding of learning as externally 
controlled. 
For the teachers who saw ownership as the objective of creative teaching, 
“management” is in many ways, a very different exercise from management as 
conceptualised at Category 5. Not only are the teachers focused on an “internal” 
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curriculum, rather than an exclusively “external” curriculum (content, skills), the teachers 
observed the intrinsic value of ownership to be the foundation of high levels of student 
interest, improved attendance, better attitudes towards school in general and improvements 
in student confidence and learning: 
All you gotta do is look at the results: the kids’ faces. When you got kids 
running to get to the classroom you know you got something right. (5) 
It’s almost like a train, they get so much momentum up, they really do 
produce some amazing things. And I think it does transcend into other 
subjects as well, if they’ve got a couple of subjects that are very, very 
supportive and they’re comfortable in, I think that confidence goes across 
the board as well. (12) 
Gradually her confidence has improved and she’s gone from achieving – in 
“syllabus talk” – very minimal requirements and she has improved to 
achieving a very high outcome. Not only in terms of what the syllabus coins 
as a high achievement but also her confidence has grown, her ability to 
understand and to forget about everything else that’s going on and just 
focus. (12) 
The teachers see ownership as a clear teaching objective and experience creativity in 
teaching as meaningful. Meaningfulness may not always be experienced as “fun” or 
“easy”. Meaningfulness in this sense is reflected in the statements teachers make, which 
show that the aims of creative teaching are seen as important and are endorsed even if the 
experience is sometimes difficult or uncomfortable. 
Most manual arts blokes are lock-step type guys, you know. They teach kids 
“skills”, you know. This is how you do it, boys. And, I am a bit of a rarity, 
because I’m – and that’s the creativity. That’s the difference between me and 
most other manual arts teachers. Now that creates a lot of problems for me, 
because it’s difficult to manage that kind of stuff. (9) 
Some of the teachers made distinctions between the meaningfulness of doing something 
personal and the meaningfulness of creative teaching: 
Yeah, it [creativity in teaching] is different, I guess, because it’s not 
personal creativity for me, it’s job creativity. It’s being creative to get a 
result that isn’t for me, it’s for someone else, it’s to get the most out of 
people rather than to get the most out of myself – if that makes sense. (13) 
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8. AUTHENTICITY: Creative teaching is enabling and supporting authenticity 
A. Authenticity; 
B. Participation; 
Enabling a process that is transformative of the person 
Some teachers articulated a view of creative teaching, which includes ownership in its 
objective, but has a broader focus on the value and potentials of ownership for establishing 
well-being and wholeness. In this view creative teaching is experienced as enabling 
authenticity. Teachers express an ethical concern with creating conditions which can 
potentially lead to establishment of authentic student “selves” and optimal life quality. 
Teachers are looking beyond the more obvious learning potentials and social values of 
ownership and seeing importance in things the world might not see, but which are seen by 
the teachers as being of profound value to the person – feeling like one is accepted and has 
a worthwhile place in society, feeling that life is meaningful, having a sense of inner 
direction, having a sense of well-being and self. 
This view reflects sensitivity to the development of meaningfulness and well-being. As 
the teachers relate their understandings and personal journeys it becomes apparent that the 
journey towards wholeness as a person has involved finely tuned adjustments to thinking 
and values based on attention to the internal sense of meaningfulness. Meaningfulness can 
appear internally as fun in an activity, but at the higher end of the meaningfulness 
spectrum it appears internally as a feeling of being a whole and fulfilled person. Life has 
meaning and direction. For these teachers the process of becoming a whole person 
revolves around the experience of meaningfulness. This is a process of forward movement 
– possibly related to the sense that the cessation of meaning would entail a retreat into 
meaninglessness: 
Trying to think what – trying to think what that [life without creativity] 
would be like, what would it look like? You know, I think very boring. You 
know, what would you do? No, no. It’s very un-human to be like that. You’d 
have to be brain-damaged or something like that, where, where you needed 
someone to tell you what to do all the time. (9) 
“I would go crazy if I could not create every day” (5) 
Those teachers who express views of creativity, which reflect that they experience life 
from a position of meaningfulness and wholeness, appear to have gained understanding 
about how to reach and maintain a state of wholeness. The experienced value of wholeness 
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therefore delimits the outer horizon of awareness of creative value for these teachers. From 
these teachers comes an objective of creative teaching, which is here described as enabling 
authenticity or enabling the person. Enabling authenticity is inclusive of the teaching 
objective of enabling ownership. Conceptions of creative teaching in this category are 
distinguished by language conveying an ethical concern with students’ sense of well-being, 
wholeness, fulfilment, acceptance within their social (and school) environment, future 
quality of life and the importance of being themselves and feeling good about themselves. 
The strategies that the teachers use are implemented in the certainty that where the 
“person” (or self) is enabled in a climate of care and acceptance, students have their 
greatest chance of, not only optimal performance, but self-realisation, fulfilment, 
belongingness and well-being. The main teaching strategy in this respect, apart from the 
strategies involved in enabling ownership, seems to be acceptance, approval and support of 
the person, but in a way that recognises the importance of acceptance in transformation of 
the person: 
It doesn’t matter what sort of person or way you operate, I tend to 
encourage that to come out more anyway. I like them. I like the natural 
person that’s beneath. So, yeah, so I try to encourage them to be who they 
are. (7) 
Yeah, so I’m thinking strongly about the, the, my counselling days and that’s 
when it worked most beautifully. When you just allowed people … you know, 
that’s what they wanted, that’s why they came to me in the first place. 
Because, for some reason or another, they weren’t allowed to be themselves, 
because there was some kind of pressure on them, somewhere, so that they 
could come to me and for an hour they could, oh, just let go and just be 
themselves. So, you know, the kids do it with me when they come to their 
lessons, you know, they … I try not, you know – you have to, because of 
safety and because of this general, keeping a reasonably sane sort of 
workshop – but, yeah, try and let them just be themselves. (9) 
I think the only thing, the only other thing I think about creativity is about, 
kind of allowing people’s different ways of seeing, and being, kind of – just 
allowing people to be, and to see and do in their own kind of way, which is, 
can be different to the same person in different spaces and times (6). 
The teachers expressing this view saw themselves as teaching creatively all the time. 
Some saw teaching as part of their own fulfilment in life. 
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I: I’d like you to tell me about a time when you were being creative while 
teaching … when you were teaching creatively. 
P5:  Hey! Pick any day! 
I:  Well, tell me about one. 
P5:  It doesn’t matter. It just goes hand in glove. See now I gotta try and isolate 
an incident from what really is, what is normal, for me. 
I:  It’s still kind of interesting for me to see if you can pick a time when you 
were teaching the way that you can definitely say is … what you would 
pick out as creative. 
P:  Well I wrote a whole book about it …  
My whole job is creating. Teaching is creative. But then my, what I teach, 
every aspect is creative … Learning is creative. It’s, I think that’s, yeah. My 
students know I love my job but they think I’m also a freak because I love my 
job and I’m a high school teacher. (14) 
However, the nature of the conception suggests that “passion” for teaching need not be the 
case for all teachers who understand creativity as autonomy/authenticity. Some teachers 
seem to see teaching as meaningful in a purposeful way, rather than as their ultimate 
source of creative fulfilment. 
Teachers expressing this view of creative teaching, sometimes framed the value of 
creativity in terms of product outcomes, academic performance and learning, but they also 
talked about its value in terms of self, meaning in life and socialisation. The difference in 
breadth of focus, between Category 7 and Category 8 seems to come from having 
experienced transformation of the self and having an established sense of self as a creative 
being. Therefore in their endorsement of creative teaching, the teachers are simultaneously 
focused on what they see as the value of their own internal transformations and the 
potential value to students of going through a similar process. This is reflected in the 
following quotation from primary school teacher, P11, as she explains how she draws on 
this sense of internal value even when participating with very young students, in order to 
enable the transformative potentials of ownership: 
I don’t think I would have survived in the early years [of teaching] or as 
long as I have if I wasn’t a creative person. Like, I enjoy creating things with 
the kids … So I think if I wasn’t a naturally creative person it would be hard 
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to put that on and sit with little kids if you didn’t think that what they were 
doing was of value. (11) 
An important effect of having experienced this internal value is that the teachers are not 
prepared to teach in a way that stifles these potentials. Teachers expressing this view 
sometimes talked about their refusal to accept curriculum constraints that get in the way of 
the trajectory to authenticity. Sometimes creative teaching involved fighting against 
conditions in the education system, including problems around evaluation, ineffective 
curriculum and resistance from colleagues: 
I just, I can’t do it [teach in a lock-step way]. You know, when I say I can’t 
do it, it’s because I won’t do it. I refuse to do it. (9) 
People write textbooks to make money. Right? I wrote those textbooks to 
generate a change. Which I did. (5) 
It [the incidence of creative teaching] is sporadic, because obviously in 
education you are faced with a whole heap of different dilemmas and we 
have got educators who aren’t very creative … So, I work with colleagues 
who don’t do any of that at all and have no idea how to facilitate it or do it 
… (7) 
  
   268
  
   269
APPENDIX 2: TEACHERS’ CONCEPTIONS OF ENHANCING STUDENT 
CREATIVITY 
Teachers’ conceptions of 
enhancing student creativity 
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Authenticity 
and autonomy 
 
 
 8. Enabling authenticity 
and autonomy 
 
Overview of categories of description for teachers’ conceptions of enhancing student creativity: 
Eight qualitatively different ways that the teachers understood the enhancement of student 
creativity have been identified. The focus of conceptions in each category is delimited by 
four main focal aspects: a particular conception or combination of conceptions of 
creativity, a conception of teaching, a conception of “enhancing” and, in some cases, a 
particular view of the value, to students/society, of being creative. In the following 
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overview of categories, the four focal aspects are denoted by the capital letters A, B, C, 
and D. 
Key:  A. Conception of creativity 
 B. Conception of teaching 
C. Conception of enhancing 
D. Value of student creativity 
The eight qualitatively different experiences of enhancing student creativity are described 
as: 
1. An arts issue: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as an artistic concern 
A. Domain specific (arts); 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Students do art, arts course, express themselves artistically 
2. Teaching the content: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as teaching 
the disciplinary content so that it can be applied in a creative activity or pursuit 
A. Innovation; exceptionality; arts; recreational; occasional ownership; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Providing the knowledge content; 
D. Creativity has value outside school 
3. Providing a limited curriculum for exceptional students: Teachers experience 
enhancing student creativity as taking care of emerging talent and the needs of 
exceptional students 
A. Innovation; exceptionality; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Nurturing talent; 
D. Creativity has academic and social value as exceptionality 
4. Permitting individual expression: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity 
as permitting individual expression as a means of increasing student comfort with the 
main curriculum 
A. Individualism; personal; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Allowing; 
D. Student comfort 
5. Teaching thinking skills: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as 
encouraging problem-solving and lateral thinking strategies as a sub-layer of the 
curriculum 
A. Functional solving/making; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Encouraging 
D. Functional 
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6. Allowing room for ownership: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as 
making space in the curriculum for students to experience episodes of ownership 
A. Occasional ownership; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Allowing; 
D. Students develop interests and have meaningful learning episodes within 
curriculum constraints 
7. Supporting ownership: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as 
supporting learning, thinking and creative capacities through ownership 
A. Ownership; 
B. Enabling and supporting; 
C. Enabling transformation of learning and creating capacities; 
D. Internal and external world value 
8. Enabling authenticity: Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as enabling 
authenticity 
A. Authenticity; 
B. Enabling and supporting; 
C. Enabling creative being; 
D. Internal and external world value 
The eight ways of experiencing the enhancement of students’ creativity are described in 
greater detail below and illustrated with quotations from the transcripts. 
Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as: 
1. AN ARTS ISSUE 
A. Domain specific (arts); 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Students do art, arts course, express themselves artistically 
In this view the enhancement of student creativity is seen as an artistic concern. The 
teacher may see enhancing creativity as an aspect of student experience that is taken care 
of by the arts departments of the school, or, alternatively, may see enhancing creativity as 
teaching in a way that allows students to express their artistic inclinations. While focused 
on creativity as an artistic concern, the teachers are not thinking beyond the disciplinary 
content, familiar teaching practices or specified student outcomes in their own teaching 
area. The teachers who expressed this view did not see art as a concern of 
teaching/learning in their subject area, hence student creativity is no more than a peripheral 
concern of teaching/learning for them. This view was sometimes expressed as an initial 
response to the interviewer’s questions about enhancing creativity. The view that the 
enhancement of student creativity (as artistic creativity) is confined to the arts areas of 
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school is sometimes implied rather than stated directly. The teachers take-for-granted that 
creativity is a property of the arts domains and imply that being a teacher in a non-arts 
subject area, such as science/mathematics automatically precludes teacher concern with 
creativity. Another view expressed is that development of problem-solving is appropriate 
to learning in the sciences, while creative thinking and making is appropriate to learning in 
the arts: 
As a science and maths teacher I never thought of myself as a promoter of 
creativity. (10) 
I really only … the only time I’m en … it’s more enhancing problem-solving, 
rather than enhancing creativity per se … (15) 
That’s the immediate link. Immediately it’s the arts, whether it be the visual 
arts, the music, the dance or whatever, but there’s that, er, I guess, the 
creative “something from nothing”, like nothing at all kind of situation, that 
you feel sometimes with art as opposed to adapting, manipulating and things 
like that – my problem-solving side of things. (15) 
[A creative approach] is definitely not what you do in maths. I mean, it’s 
possible to do it in maths but we don’t do it in maths, as a sort of cultural 
kind of thing in maths. (4) 
Some teachers seemed to suggest that student creativity is enhanced when students with a 
proclivity for artistic thinking are given an opportunity to express their artistic inclinations: 
Some students are very logical and in their presentations they write things 
down step by step, whereas others when you looked at their end product on 
the butchers’ paper was full of um … of various … uh diagrams and colour, 
use of colour … (1) 
Some of the teachers made statements suggesting that enhancing student creativity had 
been far from the forefront of their thinking about what their students need to learn. Some 
felt unprepared to answer the interviewer’s questions about enhancing student creativity. 
The strong association between art and creativity seems, at least partially, responsible for 
setting up this disparity, in teachers’ minds, between creativity and learning: 
I should have got these questions in advance shouldn’t I?(10) 
I’m not sure if I could answer the part about enhancing their creativity. (3) 
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Because the priorities in Education Queensland aren’t “creativity”, it’s on 
numeracy and literacy, it [creativity] sort of just fades in the background a 
lot. (1) 
Do you mean [have I seen the word creativity] in a curriculum document or 
… ? Can’t say I have. It’s probably in a group of a number of words that 
would … I would have read and just not taken any particular notice of. (10) 
2. TEACHING THE CONTENT 
A. Innovation; exceptionality; arts; recreational; occasional ownership; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Providing the knowledge content; 
D. Creativity has a range of possible values to students which relate to outside or 
beyond school 
Another view expressed was that enhancing student creativity involves teaching the 
disciplinary content so that it can be subsequently applied in a creative activity or pursuit. 
The predominant meaning of creativity in the foreground of this experience seems to be of 
creativity as cultural innovation or some form of vocational competence or achievement. 
But the teacher may also have in mind any kind of hobby or personal interest a student 
might have outside the classroom. The teacher is seeing the teacher’s primary 
responsibility to students as one of teaching the disciplinary content and is not concerned 
with any possible value that might derive internally from engagement in creative processes 
at school. The creative process itself is seen as applying technical knowledge. The teacher 
may have in mind a range of possible values for creativity such as the social value of 
innovation or exceptional performance or the satisfaction to the individual of personal 
creativity in a recreational context. These values are seen as relating to the world outside or 
beyond the school, or in some cases, to a process that comes at the end of learning: 
I see myself as someone that’s, you know, “this is the knowledge you need to 
go out and be creative.” OK? So this is the paint set if you like of scientific 
knowledge you require if you want to leave here and be creative, or if you 
just want to live your life and apply those things to your future creativity. 
(10) 
So if I hear that one of my students has gone on to be, and I know one of 
them did, do a doctorate in koala diseases, or something like that, obviously 
an area of research that was new to the rest of the world, and she was 
obviously being creative in putting time and effort into those diseases, and I 
would like to have thought as a science teacher I had provided some of the 
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tools to allow her to move into that area and be creative. And that doesn’t 
necessarily just apply to the sciences. I’m sure that some aspects of science 
that I’ve taught, people may take them and lead them into artistic 
endeavours or financial endeavours or whatever and they would be able to 
apply some of those tools I’ve taught them in those areas and be creative in 
that area as well. (10) 
It may be that in this perspective creativity is predominantly associated with production or 
making, rather than with finding or discovery. Therefore creativity is seen only as the 
result of learning rather than an aspect of learning itself. P3, quoted below, sees creativity 
as thinking for one’s self, a conception close to ownership. But here it occurs only at the 
end of the learning, not as an aspect of the learning process: 
Well you could see that their imagination has been caught, um and they start 
thinking for themselves instead of sitting there being sponges. And I suppose 
that’s what makes them creative, I think, when they start, you know, they’ve 
taken in what you’ve got, or what you’ve been giving them and then they 
start to use it for themselves. (3) 
Implicit in this view is the idea, that it is not necessary to do anything other than teach 
the content in order to enhance creativity. Student creativity looks after itself as part of the 
way things work inside the curriculum. Creative students tend to be seen as those students 
who are naturally capable or have the necessary attitudes/aptitudes to forge ahead of other 
students. Thus creativity is often seen as something that some students do naturally, 
because they are good at subjects or motivated to succeed. This seems to require no input 
from the teacher: 
There’s always a handful in any particular year that stand out and they are 
particularly good at some field that they’ve mastered … sport … dance. (10) 
You hear of [creative] students, occasionally when they are still at school, 
but often when they leave school and you hear about them afterwards. (10) 
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3. PROVIDING A LIMITED CURRICULUM FOR EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS: 
A. Innovation; exceptionality; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Recognising/nurturing talent 
D. Creativity has academic and social value as exceptionality 
In this view teachers experience enhancing student creativity as nurturing emerging talent 
or addressing the needs of exceptional students, either as an addition to the main 
curriculum or as a limited sub-section of the curriculum. The conception of creativity in 
focus is exceptionality and/or innovation. Whereas, in the previous category enhancing 
student creativity requires no attention at all from the teacher, in this view the teacher is 
thinking of the needs of exceptional students who might require support, encouragement or 
special arrangements for learning in order to realise their potential. As in the previous 
conception there is a strong focus on delivering skills and content. But the teacher now 
suggests that exceptional students would require a different type of curriculum or different 
type of instruction/delivery as compared with the majority of students: 
P2: Ok, they’re what, eight years old? I’m not really that certain whether they 
know what their creativity is … I think that at that stage, my feeling is that 
you try to make as broad a base as possible and just see what comes out of 
it. So you make sure that there are conditions there that if there is any kind 
of, ah, inspiration that’s gonna come out of the child, then, for some 
reason, it should be allowed to emerge – um, and you have to recognise 
that and that’s quite tricky when you have so many pressures on you as a 
teacher to do, you know, to conform with the on-site curriculum, which 
may be taking you in a direction you may not necessarily wish to go with 
these children, and these children may need a different type of curriculum 
…  
I: So it’s the teacher who judges when something is creative or not in the 
student’s behaviour? 
P2: I think ultimately. I mean the student may do something and then you 
would have to be able to … I think it would be quite good to recognise that 
as being quite different, and ah some sort of expression or something that 
the child is, um, wanting to show, that there was something, something out 
of the … something different in their life. Something that’s emerged. 
I suppose one girl stands out and this’d be ages ago, but um, at one stage, she 
sort of said to me … I suppose she gave me some feedback on … and she 
was a very creative girl, you know very good at, you know, in the arts and 
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drama and English. But she also did Japanese and I suppose at one stage 
she sort of said, “I really like the way you use sound and pictures” … 
because, oh well, she said “using sound a lot”, cause she said “I’m really 
learning well with that”. (3) 
Creativity is viewed as something that is relevant for only a small number of students. The 
teacher’s only role is to recognise and encourage exceptional talent and performance. 
4. PERMITTING INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION: 
A. Individualism; personal; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Allowing; 
D. Student comfort 
In this view, teachers experience enhancing student creativity as catering to students’ 
individuality and interests, not as a way of learning the requisite content, but as a way to 
increase students’ comfort with the less interesting, more arduous or hostile aspects of the 
main curriculum. It seems that the teacher is not associating individual expression with 
learning, but is seeing it as related to student comfort, the support of which falls largely 
outside the central aims of education. Whilst it is seen as fair on the students if they have 
room to express themselves, the teacher sees no direct link between student creativity and 
the mandatory learning in the curriculum. Some teachers seem to see student creativity as 
individualism, where students are seen as doing something for themselves, outside 
regulation by the norms of teaching and learning in the subject area. In this category the 
teacher is not really thinking beyond the importance of delivering the curriculum content. 
Learning is seen as acquiring content/skills and creativity is seen as a personal process 
with no direct relation to learning. 
Teachers demonstrated some variation in the extent to which they saw individual 
expression as having a useful place in the curriculum. Individual expression, whilst not 
linked to key learning, could be seen as providing needed balance in the curriculum. The 
following quotations convey the teacher’s sense that individual expression provides needed 
respite from harsh or unyielding aspects of school life. This view of enhancing creativity 
by permitting individual expression might be described as giving students space in which 
to feel safe. Here teachers are seeing internal value in creativity, but are not seeing that 
value as related to learning: 
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It was all little structured poems of some kind, and … all the class would be 
able to do them … you know, do lovely little sort of things that they felt good 
about and you felt good about. (4) 
So I did notice that there were times, I think, students who picked Japanese 
because I think they felt safe in my classroom, to some extent, you know, that 
who they were wasn’t going to be ridiculed or harangued or whatever. (3) 
I was giving them opportunities to, uh, looking at multiple intelligences as 
well, um, so they can operate in an area where they feel comfortable rather 
than not always being too prescriptive in what they should be doing. (1) 
But some teachers implied or stated that they would rather that students applied 
themselves to acquiring the content than to being individually expressive. The reasoning 
behind this can be seen in the quotations below: creativity and learning are seen, not just as 
separate processes, but as opposed to each other. For these teachers, learning is 
demonstrated when students reflect back that they have taken in the content that has been 
delivered. Deviations from teacher expectation reflect, not learning, but something of the 
student’s own thinking that is antithetical to learning or is, at best, tolerated when it does 
not distract from learning the content. Allowing or enhancing student creativity seems to 
facilitate the comfort of the student, but does not facilitate the teaching objective of 
delivering content and checking to see that the content has been delivered. The teacher 
recognises learning as acquisition of facts and skills, which is demonstrated in assessment 
rather than during the process: 
When I have to mark some assignments, I think this is not the way I would do 
it. But when you then look at, they’ve covered this, this, this, and this and 
this and they’ve done it in this different format, so what? You know – that’s 
fine. But if they’ve covered those aspects and they’ve got the science right, 
then I don’t mind any more. (1) 
The underlying discomfort, which the teachers experience in giving students freedom to 
release their individuality at the expense of rigor and wasting teacher time, which is 
tactfully expressed in the quotation above, is expressed more forcefully, by P10, in the 
following quotation: 
Well, they’re certainly showing an aspect of their own creativity that is 
almost in total conflict with what’s supposed to be happening. Again, in my 
lessons, I will give students a chance to demonstrate that they have 
understood and picked up the skills and the knowledge that I’ve taught them, 
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but I don’t know that I’ve necessarily given them the chance to be creative. 
What a child sees to be creative in a science lesson may lead to an explosion 
or toxic chemicals being released in the room. (10) 
Whether the teachers see individual expression as a useful or impractical adjunct to 
learning, when seeing creativity as individual expression it seems that the teachers have 
inherent reservations about the value of enhancing student creativity, on the basis that 
individual expression is seen as unrelated to the act of acquiring the content and is 
therefore, at best, something that has a limited place in the curriculum. 
5. TEACHING THINKING SKILLS: 
A. Functional problem-solving/making; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Encouraging and coaching; 
D. Functional value 
Some teachers expressed a view of enhancing student creativity as teaching the thinking 
skills necessary for functional problem-solving and creating. In the foreground of this view 
of enhancing student creativity are meanings of creativity as problem-solving and 
improvising for functional purposes. Teachers may experience enhancing student creativity 
as encouraging the thinking necessary for problem-solving, encouraging lateral thinking 
strategies and encouraging a degree of risk taking and exploration. These skills are taught 
or encouraged as a sub-layer of the accepted curriculum. Creativity is not now seen as part 
of a limited curriculum for artistic or talented students, or as student comfort outside 
learning. It is here seen as learnable thinking skills with practical value for all students. 
There continues to be a strong emphasis on teaching content in this view, but the teachers 
seem to accept creative problem-solving skills as a viable form of learnable cross-
disciplinary content or a skill that allows students to make use of content. 
Sometimes the kids, you know, want to find out transpiration rate of plants 
or this, that and the other and then trying to figure out how they’re going to 
design their experiment so it does this and helping them, you know, giving 
them those leading questions to go “What if, what if, what if ? … And then 
get them to, you know, problem-solve that way and then get to the end result 
that way so they’re not spending three weeks testing the wrong thing and not 
getting any results. (15) 
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Yep … just not necessarily following the steps and if we don’t have the 
appropriate equipment at our school what … ? Here’s the equipment we do 
have, how can you use this differently and are you still going to get the same 
result if we did it this way rather than this way, you know, are you still 
controlling all of the variables that you need to control? If not what are we 
going to do about that? Are we getting enough data? You know, is it 
accurate?(15) 
I know the grade 8s at the moment are doing three lessons a week on what 
they call a challenge task, which is trying to get the kids to be a little bit 
more creative. We’re looking at weeds and ants at our school because that’s 
a problem at the moment, but we’re trying to challenge the kids into being 
creative about designing a poster that might be “How do we get rid of ants 
in our garden?” or a poster on weed eradication, something like that. They 
know what a general poster is, the format that it should take, but then what 
they put into that poster we’re trying to get them to think laterally … that 
poisons are not necessarily always the only answer. (1) 
I sometimes actually stop the class and just get, uh, get the class’s attention 
to that particular person for a moment and just say, “This is not just one 
way that you can do this. Here are some other ways.” And sometimes I 
actually get that student to explain that “I’m doing it this way.” (1) 
You know, if they take those sort of risks while they’re in a, in a sheltered 
environment like a school, then, they can learn that it’s OK to make mistakes 
– at times … I think it makes them a better person at the end, when they 
finish school at grade 12. They are much more confident to tackle situations. 
If they are stuck with a problem that they then have to solve, they’ve worked 
out a few avenues, different ways in which that might be able to be solved … 
Yeah – their skill, their skills base, it broadens their skills base on how they 
could tackle problems that they may encounter in the future. (1) 
6. ALLOWING ROOM FOR OWNERSHIP 
A. Occasional ownership; 
B. Delivering content; 
C. Allowing; 
D. Students develop interests and have meaningful learning episodes within the 
constraints of a crowded curriculum 
In the foreground of this view of enhancing student creativity is a view of creativity as 
occasional ownership. In this view enhancing student creativity involves making some 
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room for students to perform tasks in which they are truly interested and over which they 
have control. The teacher is now seeing a more direct relationship between student interest 
and student learning than is expressed in previous conceptions. The teacher sees that there 
may be benefits in terms of improving mental processing, improving the quality of the 
process and producing a quality outcome. But in this conceptualisation the potentials and 
longer term possibilities for student development beyond the task at hand are not seen. 
Constraints on teachers and teaching and the predominance of the external (content and 
skills) curriculum remain a strong aspect of the focus. Thus enhancing student creativity is 
seen as ideal in some ways, but is also considered largely impractical, as there is very little 
room for ownership within the existing curriculum. One of the teachers also expressed 
reservations about the usefulness of ownership as an approach in learning on the basis that 
some students do not like to take risks and prefer structure. 
This [poem] is now assessment and for marking and counting for her results 
and grades, but it still allowed her to do something that she was passion … 
well maybe passionate isn’t the word that a 15 year old would have with 
politics, but she has an interest in it and has taken an interest in politics 
recently … and so, um, writing a poem about that just came easy to her … 
They lose [their creativity] a little bit and I’m wondering if what we do at 
school makes them that way. Because we’re so focused on getting them 
through to get a result to do the curriculum that we have to do, to follow the 
syllabuses, that it allows very little room for them to explore other ah, their 
interests, explore their creative side … If they had free reign or free run to 
be as creative as possible, I think the end product would be different, than 
having to work within these guidelines and doing it for assessment … But 
there are some students that I encounter who will not be game no matter 
how much freedom that you give them because they’re not risk takers. (1) 
7. SUPPORTING OWNERSHIP: 
A. Ownership; 
B. Enabling and supporting; 
C. Enabling transformation of learning and creating capacities; 
D. Internal and external world value 
In the foreground of this view is a meaning of creativity as ownership of one’s learning 
and creating. Teachers experience enhancing student creativity as supporting deep learning 
   281
and self-direction of learning and creating. Ownership of learning and creating is seen as a 
key aspect of student development, which can be supported through the curriculum. 
Enhancing student creativity is no longer seen as part of a limited curriculum or as a sub-
layer of the curriculum, but as integral to the curriculum, to teaching and learning. 
Ownership is seen as leading to, not only deeper learning and self-direction in learning, but 
also to “higher order thinking”. Supporting creativity as student ownership is the teacher’s 
primary teaching focus. 
Yeah I like to be more of a, well, play the supportive role, you know, second 
fiddle is always better; cos it’s the kids’ turn in this classroom to be, you 
know, first fiddle … I like to, you know, if we’re being in drama, working on 
plays, I like the kids to tell me. I don’t like to stand up and say, you know, 
“This is this character and this is who this character is.” But I like to get 
them to explore it themselves and then me to help them see that to a reality. 
(13) 
It’s related to inquiry learning, which I’ve done in primary schools, where 
you develop your big context, kids frame their own questions and enquiries. 
So they should be asking the questions It’s enquiring that’s all it is. But it 
also involves you planning for enquiring. Yeah. (8) 
Yeah, because they take it on then. They take it on. I mean, I’m still there to 
give them some boundaries, or whatever. I mean, they take it on, they’re 
making it. They come and ask you “What do you think about this? Do you 
think it’ll work?” (6) 
Ownership is seen as having the added benefit that as interest and control over 
learning/creation processes increases, there is also an improvement in the quality of what is 
produced. Therefore the process and what it produces – higher quality, more “creative” 
outcomes, including thinking outcomes – tend to fuse together as aspects of the same 
phenomenon: 
I:  Why do you think ownership works with creativity? 
P13:  Um, cause I think they [students] have an interest in it. Once they own it, 
they can’t blame the result on anyone other than themselves, they, you 
know, what they put in is exactly what they’re going to get out and that end 
product that they have is either going to live up to their expectations of 
what’s in their heads or it’s not going to live up to it … and I think if they 
take ownership, well then it’s like: “Well why isn’t it the way that you want 
it? What can you do to make it better?” And the kids that don’t [have 
ownership] will just leave it as it is and the kids that really get into it 
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wanna make the piece their own and go that extra step … Kids who are 
engaged, you see it in their faces – they light up, they are energetic about 
things. They are happy when they are doing things, they wanna do the hard 
work. 
Teachers expressing this view see enhancing student creativity as what they do 
consistently as a teacher. Because this approach to teaching requires an open attitude, 
ongoing learning as a teacher and consistently thinking about how to create the conditions 
for ownership, teachers tend also to see teaching creatively and enhancing student 
creativity as two aspects of the same teaching focus: 
P8: Yeah that [teaching-learning experience] was so awesome! Even though 
we weren’t creating something totally new we were being so creative in the 
sense of manipulating the sounds to make it sound like the original and the 
rewards in that were just so great because we learnt so much. 
I: So this was you and the class? 
P8: Yeah 
I: So it really was a creative … a creative experience for you as well as for 
them by the sounds of it. 
P8: Yeah, because I’m a co-constructivist. I learn with my kids. 
Teachers expressing this view described the internal aspects of processes of ownership, 
with considerable clarity and appeared to use these insights when participating with 
students and creating an environment for teaching and learning. The teachers talk about 
what the students “sense” and “feel” and how those feelings contribute to learning and 
creative processes: 
I:  So creativity is enjoyable? 
P8: Oh yeah definitely, hugely. Because it’s the self-reward, you know, the 
sense of achievement from reward. The um, you know, yeah. It’s just a 
positive experience if the student is engaged and persists with it. 
[The students] feel that they can participate in their own way in their arts 
and creative space. Yeah, they’ve got ownership of their environment 
because of that, because I trust that they can be responsible and creative in 
that environment. (8) 
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8. ENABLING AUTONOMY AND AUTHENTICITY: 
A. Authenticity; 
B. Enabling and supporting; 
C. Enabling creative being; 
D. Internal and external world value 
In this view enhancing student creativity is experienced as enabling students’ capacities to 
function as autonomous, authentic beings. This view may be seen as inclusive of the 
previous category as processes of ownership are seen as essential to, or part of, being 
authentic. But now, the conceptualisation of creative value expands beyond self-
directedness in learning, thinking and creating to include awareness of potentials for 
optimal socialisation – especially finding meaningful direction in life, sense of self, well-
being and a sense of meaningful belonging. In terms of the tree metaphor, if the previous 
category is concerned primarily with the seed, the growth of the tree and the fruit, in the 
present view the potentials that are inherent in the seed of ownership now broaden to 
encapsulate aspects such as the health of the tree and its interconnections with the 
surrounding garden. The teachers are interested in providing conditions and support that 
make it possible for students to realise their potential for more than future work or 
achievement: for finding meaning in life, a way of relating meaningfully to the wider 
social world and building values and a sense of self. The teachers are aware of most or all 
of these possibilities even if they recognise that not all students will attain all aspects of 
authentic being. Teachers who see enhancing creativity as enabling authenticity talk about 
the value of being or of becoming one’s self through meaningful processes of ownership. 
They see the value of creativity from the perspective of the development of the whole 
person, experiencing well-being and wholeness as a person and finding a meaningful place 
in the social world. Again teachers are concerned with the feel and sense of creating and 
what it feels like to experience meaning as a creative person: 
You feel good inside, like you feel like you’re good at something and even if 
no one else likes it, it doesn’t matter, you like it. So it fulfils you. It’s like 
being at the top of Maslow’s hierarchy, you don’t need anyone to say it’s 
good, you just feel, it doesn’t matter, it just feels good inside, it feels like 
you’ve achieved what you wanted to achieve. You may not be achieving 
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everything you want in life but for that little creative pursuit you’ve achieved 
that sense of wellbeing. (14) 
I suppose they [people] want to do the thing that, that I do, as well, you 
know, which is to, I guess, discovery – a chance to be yourself, you know? … 
So, you know, the kids do it with me when they come to their lessons, you 
know. They … I try not – you know, you have to because of safety and 
because of this general, keeping a reasonably sane sort of workshop – but, 
yeah, try and let them just be themselves. (9) 
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research team 
 understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or 
penalty 
 understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Officer on 3138 2340 or 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the 
project 
 agree to participate in the project 
 understand that the project will include audio and/or video recording 
 
Name  
Signature  
Date  /  /   
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